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In Germany, the term Konvolut has a common philological 
application: it refers to a larger or smaller assemblage ± 




the most precise and most evocative term for designating 
WKHHODERUDWHO\LQWHUWZLQHGFROOHFWLRQVRIµQRWHVDQG
PDWHULDOV¶>«@ 












What is a Convolution? 
 
 
This question may appear to be the opening to this thesis, but it is also its end, in terms of 
temporality as well as teleology: the question will inevitably require repetition even after its 
consideration, and thus its answer is not the final goal, which is actually to come back to the 
question, eventually. When speaking about convolutions it is entirely natural, then, to start at the 
end. This may seem illogical or counterproductive, but is not too far off the mark if one considers 
the sometimes overlooked truth, as elucidated usefully by philosopher and novelist Dan Lloyd, 
WKDWµVFKRODUO\ERRNVXVXDOO\EHJLQE\DQQRXQFLQJWKHLUFRQFOXVLRQVDQGIROORZZLWKWKHVXSSRUW¶
(Lloyd 2004: xvi). Thus, the opening question was in some way only illusorily the start, and will 
be answered now, with the support to follow leading back to the question itself. 
This is because a convolution is a loop, or a fold, as the folds of the brain 
(neuroanatomically speaking, the trench-like sulci and ridge-like gyri which also constitute the 
larger looping lobes of the cerebral cortex) are sometimes termed the cerebral convolutions ± this 
will be one of the main senses in which the convolution is considered in this thesis. But it is a 
loop in another sense, in the way stories or narratives are often referred to as convolutions (or 
convoluted) if their plots and themes are complex and refuse any straightforward reading ± most 
commonly when they are non-linear, either because their temporality is skewed or some other 
element of the supposedly transparent structure of a story is subverted (perhaps speech is not 
VLJQDOOHGE\TXRWDWLRQPDUNVRUFKDUDFWHUV¶QDPHVFKDQJHZLWKRXWDSSDrent reason; there are 
countless examples, no doubt). This literary version of the convolution is the other main sense 
referred to here. Nevertheless, a convolution is also a function, also known as a zip, in computer 
science, specifically in the field of formal languages (Cf. Borowski and Borwein 2002: 119). 
Additionally, in the branch of mathematics known as functional analysis, a convolution is an 
operation on two functions which produces a third function, the inverse operation of which is 
NQRZQDVDµGHFRQYROXWLRQ¶&I/DSODQWH±107; also, Cf. OEDµGHFRQYROXWLRQ¶
8QGRXEWHGO\WKHVHIXUWKHUPHDQLQJVRIµFRQYROXWLRQ¶DQGSHUKDSVRWKHUVDUHUHODWHGWRWKH
neurological and the literary definitions I have proposed, but for reasons which will become 
clearer later on, I want to wander away from these definitions from mathematics and computer 
science in this thesis ± to purposely wander away is indeed part of what I am trying to propose 
about the very nature of convolutions. 
 Having thus started with a nod to the end, an actual beginning behoves an appearance 
now, and so a return to the first sense of convolution mentioned: that of the cerebral 
convolutions. Of the four senses recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary for the noun 





pioneering anatomist Helkiah Crooke, who according to the Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography µEXUVWLQWRSXEOLFDZDUHQHVVLQZLWKWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRIMicrocosmographia: a 
Description of the Body of Man. It was the first English language anatomy written by a physician, 
UDWKHUWKDQDVXUJHRQ¶ODNB: 394), and though it provoked the ire of the medical establishment 
of the day, such as it was, as well as causing some consternation on the part of religious 
institutions too, Microcosmographia was a huge success. It was so popular that it was reprinted 
WKHQH[W\HDUDQGDJDLQLQDQGVRGHVSLWHWKHILUVWXVHRIWKHZRUGµFRQYROXWLRQ¶coming 
considerably earlier (in a different, pre-cerebral context ± more on this later), it seems safe to say 
WKDWWKHLQVWDQFHWDNHQIURP&URRNH¶VDQDWRP\E\WKHOED ± a simple, direct mention in sense 3 
RIµ7KHconvolutions RIWKH%UDLQ¶± would have been a coinage that many read and took on 
board. By the late nineteenth century, at least, the term seems almost unshakable in neurological 
discourse. 
 $JRRGH[DPSOHRIWKLVWHUP¶VVWDQGDUGL]HGXVHDWWKDWWLPHLV&KDUOHV5LFKHW¶V
Physiology and Histology of the Cerebral Convolutions, which was WUDQVODWHGIURP5LFKHW¶V
native French and SXEOLVKHGLQ(QJOLVKLQ$VWKHWLWOHVXJJHVWV5LFKHW¶VSXUSRVHLVWRGUDZ
together in summary what knowledge had been gleaned thus far about convolutions, both animal 
and human, and expound on it a little further. His dedicatory page unsurprisingly mentions two 
further French eminences in the neurological world, Paul Broca and Jean-Martin Charcot, and 
there is no doubt that future Nobel Prize winner Richet is here rubbing shoulders with fellow 
bastions of thHHVWDEOLVKPHQWWZRILJXUHVKHGHHPVWRµKDYHVRJUHDWO\KRQRXUHG)UHQFKVFLHQFH
E\WKHLUPDJQLILFHQWZRUNVXSRQFHUHEUDOFRQYROXWLRQV¶5LFKHWLLL,QKLVSUDLVHIRUWKHP
Richet silently draws a parallel as well, thus praising himself for also taking up the discussion of 
FRQYROXWLRQV0RUHVXUSULVLQJDQGOHVVPDLQVWUHDPSHUKDSVLV5LFKHW¶VRSHQLQJDVVHUWLRQWKDW
what appears to be his relatively straightforward task in writing the book is in fact almost 
impossible. This he puts down to the ever-changing nature of the field, and corollary to this, that 
LQRUGHUµWRIDLUO\XQGHUVWDQGWKLVGHSDUWPHQWLQPHGLFDOVFLHQFHDQGWREHDEOHWRH[SODLQLW
intelligently, exacts a familiarity with a greater number of sciences than does almost any other 
subjHFW¶5LFKHWYLL+HJRHVRQWROLVWWKLVEURDGEXWQHFHVVDU\VNLOOVHWRIVFLHQFHVDQG
FRQFOXGHVWKDWLQGHHGµWKHOLVWPLJKWEHLQGHILQLWHO\PXOWLSOLHGDQGLQDOOWKHVHVFLHQFHVHDFKRQH
of which is a life-long study, who can hope to be so perfected as not to be justly exposed to 
FULWLFLVP"¶5LFKHWL[7KHLPSRUWDQWWKLQJWREHDULQPLQGKHUHLV5LFKHW¶VVXJJHVWLRQRI
the inherent multiplicity involved in the study of convolutions ± the field is itself already 
convoluted, requiring a paradoxical movement out of the field for a fuller definition. 
This expostulation on disciplinary itinerancy, bordering on outright scepticism, is 
PLUURUHGLQ5LFKHW¶VDFWXDOGHVFULSWLRQRIDFHUHEUDOFRQYROXWLRQµHDFKFRQYROXWLRQIRUPVDQ







other part that it is not certain that they are even separate enough to describe where they start and 
end (and so, that I started my own introductory chapter on convolutions at the end now seems 
less strange and better justified, perhaps even just the orthodox way of approaching the topic). 
The form of studying cerebral convolutions follows its contents; or in other words, despite (even 
because) they are virtually indistinguishable, the end of one field that studies convolutions is 
simply the beginning of another ± just as with cerebral convolutions themselves. Thus, in a 
VSHFXODWLYHFORVLQJFKDSWHUWR5LFKHW¶VERRNZKLFKDSSHDUVWRSUH-empt the neuropsychology of 
the twentieth century, his admirably doubt-ridden fastidiousness reaches its self-negating zenith. 
(QWLWOHGµ,QWHOOHFWXDO)XQFWLRQVRIWKH&RQYROXWLRQV¶ 5LFKHW¶VYHU\ILUVWVWDWHPHQWLVWREDOGO\
DGPLWµ,GRQRWEHOLHYHWKDWDWWKHSUHVHQWWLPHWKLVTXHVWLRQFDQEHSURSHUO\WUHDWHG¶± but of 
FRXUVHWKHUHVWRIWKHFKDSWHUYHU\PXFKGRHVWU\WRµHVtablish a relation between intellectual 
phenomena and [the human brain¶V@QXPHURXVDQGULFKFRQYROXWLRQV¶5LFKHWZKLFK
essentially reads like an attempt to locate the material basis of the (immaterial) mind in the lobes 
of cortex in the brain. Despite repeatedly remarking all of the problematics entailed by the 
LVRODWLRQRIGLVFUHWHFRQYROXWLRQVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKLVµUHODWLRQ¶ by hook or by crook, is 
seemingly the ultimate end-goal for Richet and his peers. 
 Yet it is precisely this plethora of problematics that has persisted into the present day, 
DQGQRDPRXQWRILQ5LFKHW¶VZRUGVµVFKHPDWLFDOO\GHVLJQDWLQJ¶SDUWVRIWKHEUDLQZKLFKLV
tantamount to simplifying and reducing them) can account for this. This has led to the 
befuddlement rather than the clarification of the situation. As technology and visual aids have 
progressed more quickly and beyond the capacity to understand what is being seen, it is an 
overabundance of descriptive terms rather than their dearth which has become the issue. Critics 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari point to this in their attempt to prune and reseed the garden of 
neurological terminology: 
 
Thought is not arborescent, and the brain is not a rooted or ramified matter. What are wrongly 
FDOOHGµGHQGULWHV¶GR not assure the connection of neurons in a continuous fabric. The 
discontinuity between cells, the role of the axons, the functioning of the synapses, the existence of 
synaptic microfissures, the leap each message makes across these fissures, make the brain a 
multiplicity immersed in its plane of consistency or neuroglia, a whole uncertain, probabilistic 
V\VWHPµWKHXQFHUWDLQQHUYRXVV\VWHP¶0DQ\SHRSOHKDYHDWUHHJURZLQJLQWKHLUKHDGVEXWWKH
EUDLQLWVHOILVPXFKPRUHDJUDVVWKDQDWUHHµ7KHD[RQDnd the dendrite twist around each other 
OLNHELQGZHHGDURXQGEUDPEOHVZLWKV\QDSVHVDWHDFKRIWKHWKRUQV¶ 






Could the argument about the significance of the convolutions, not just in the brain but in 
neurology itself, really come down to a distinction between trees and grass? At any rate, what 
UHPDLQVFOHDULVWKHDWWHQWLRQWRQHXURORJ\¶VWH[WXDOQDWXUHWKDWLVUHTXLUHGDQGWKHFRQYROXWHG
metaphorical liberties at its centre that Deleuze and Guattari observe (and in which they are 
WKHPVHOYHVSHUKDSVDOVRFRPSOLFLW&RXSOHGZLWK5LFKHW¶VVWDWHPHQWVRQWKHSRWHQWLDOO\LQILQLWH
domains of expertise required to properly assess it, neurology is perennially left unfulfilled, ever 
awaiting commentary and analysis outside of its usual remit and boundaries. Yet this has, of 
course, not diminished the progress of neuroscience into the modern day.1 The schematic view of 
convolutions, which will always ultimately leave something unseen and thus unremarked, lies at 
the heart of neuroVFLHQFH¶VLGHQWLW\SURYLGLQJLWVGULYLQJIRUFHUDWKHUWKDQEHLQJDFDXVHIRU
concern. 
 It is not immediately obvious why this reductive, schematic tendency is important, but it 
is certainly a question of identity, and in more ways than one. Principal among these ways are 
two: how some domain or item can be identical to any other; and how stable the boundaries 
between domains or items might be, how well defined their identities are. In the first instance, 
what is most relevant here is the philosophical debaWHRYHUZKDWLVNQRZQE\QDPHVVXFKDVµW\SH
physicalism¶ RUWKHµPLQGEUDLQLGHQWLW\WKHRU\¶ RUVLPSO\µLGHQWLW\WKHRU\¶IRUVKRUW± the names 
themselves may not be identical, but ironically designate equivalent theories, in essence. This is 
because the\DOODJDLQZRXOGUHIOHFW5LFKHW¶VVWDWHGGHVLUHWRµHVWDEOLVKDUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ
intellectual phenomena and [the human brain¶V@QXPHURXVDQGULFKFRQYROXWLRQV¶± to establish 
once and for all a concrete relation between mind and brain. Proponents of the identity theory, of 
course, tend to the view that mind and brain are more than just related, and are actually identical. 
%XWWKHFRQWURYHUV\VXUURXQGLQJWKHWKHRU\¶VFHQWUDOWHQHWVPHDQVWKHUHDUHSOHQW\RIGHWUDFWRUV
too, who nevertheless seek to find alternative ways of expressing the relation of mind and brain. 
In summing up this debate, philosopher C V Borst reveals that regardless of position, there is a 
pre-existing, ingrained, idiomatic way of attending to such matters, because 
 
it is certainly now common knowledge that the brain, even although a physical organ, bears some 
intimate relation to the mind; and this knowledge is manifestly embodied in common idiom. 
:KHQUHIHUULQJWRDGPLWWHGO\PHQWDOKDSSHQLQJVRUFRQGLWLRQVZHVSHDNRIUDFNLQJRQH¶VEUains, 
SLFNLQJDQRWKHU¶VEUDLQVKDYLQJLWRQWKHEUDLQKDYLQJDJRRGEUDLQRUFRQWUDULZLVHEHLQJDOO
brawn and no brain; and so on. 
(Borst 1970: 13±14) 




 Which can itself easily be considered a part of the continuous progress of neurology, and as such, unless being deliberately and 







The brain itself has become a metaphor for mind. It is not yet possible to see the stuff that is 
calOHGµPLQG¶ EXWWKHUHDUHVHYHUDOZD\VLQZKLFKWKHVWXIIRIµEUDLQ¶FDQEHVHHQ± make the 
terms identical, and all of a sudden, mind can be seen. However, there is perhaps more seeing 
EHLQJGRQHWKDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJDVRIWHQµVHHLQJ¶LVDOVRLGLRPDWLFDOO\ taken to mean 
µXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶ZKHQWKLVLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\WKHFDVH 
 Again, the importance in this distinction between seeing and understanding is as crucial 
as that between brain and mind, because in the former, the distinction itself can go unobserved ± 
that is to say, the relative importance of seeing is itself not always seen. Demarcating boundaries, 
especially when dealing in the abstract or the linguistic, as here, begins to be severely 
complicated.2 Laura Otis expresses this complex idea succinctly in her book Membranes (2000), 
accentuating the manner in which vision and language can become perplexingly entangled, and 
how this plays out in disciplinary wrangles. Originally trained as a biochemist and neuroscientist, 
but later turning to comparative literature and the cultural history of science, Otis is uniquely 
positioned as a witness to these wrangles, and it is indeed separate yet similar forms of 
witnessing which inform her account. Right at the start of Membranes, she eloquently describes 
two experiences early in her career, one in a neuroscience lab and the other in a lecture on literary 
theory, in both of which she learnt ostensibly the same thing ± first through the example of 
vision, and second through the example of language:  
 
I was a biochemist, a mere visitor to the lab, but I learned an important lesson that night. The eye, 
and the regions of the brain that interpret visual information, respond only to changes, to borders 
EHWZHHQOLJKWDQGGDUN>«@7RFUHDWHPHDQLQJIURPZKDWLWVHHVLQdeed, for there to be vision at 
all, the eye needs borders, differences that distinguish one object from another. 
 Fresh from the lab, I learned the same lesson in [an] introductory course on literary 
WKHRU\>«@:KHQGHILQLQJVRPHWKLQJZHW\SLFDOO\FRPSDre it to something similar and then, like 
WKHH\HIRFXVRQWKHZD\LWGLIIHUVIURPWKHFRQFHSWVPRVWFORVHO\UHODWHGWRLW>«@/LNHRXU
visual system, we create meaning only through the differences we perceive and the boundaries we 
believe are present.  
(Otis 2000: 1±2)  
 
7KRXJKLQERWKLQVWDQFHVWKLVDPRXQWVWRWKHµVDPH¶DQGµLPSRUWDQWOHVVRQ¶ this focus on 
defining things negatively ± on seeing and understanding concepts and objects by their 
differences from (and boundaries with) other concepts and objects, rather than in and of 











themselves intrinsically ± itself produced an ironic and furthermore somewhat unsettling 
GLIIHUHQFHLQ2WLV¶VDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHVDPHEDVLFLGHD 
 
What had struck me in the lab as natural and quite reasonable devastated me in the classroom. 
Perhaps I had hoped that nature and culture worked differently, or that the humanities offered a 
different perspective from that of the natural sciences. How could there be truth, I wondered, and 
how could there be meaning, if we defined our ideas only negatively? What were our thought and 
vision worth if we perceived the world only in terms of boundaries, arbitrarily drawn? 
(Otis 2000: 2) 
 
2WLV¶VIUDQNDFFRXQWHQFDSVXODWHVWKHNQRWW\UHODWLRQVKLSVDWSOD\LQGLVFXVVLRQVRILGHQWLW\DQG
boundaries, be these visual, neurological, conceptual, linguistic or disciplinary. This is because 
WKHVDPHµQDWXUDO¶DQGµUHDVRQDEOH¶LGHDKDGEHFRPHXWWHUO\EHIXGGOLQJDQGHYHQDOLHQDWLQJWRKHU
when transferred across invisible lines of context, with previously unquestionable truth-value 
paradoxically confirmed only by negation and contrast.3  
 However, rather than give up in despair at the seeming intractability of the situation, it is 
worth pointing out that somehow eyes still see, objects are still described, meaning is still 
transmitted and knowledge of one sort or another is still produced, all regardless of the 
supposedly irreconcilable differences in identity thrown up by boundaries. Otis reaffirms just 
such a positive outlook and furthermore translates it into an expansive philosophical remit for 
research:  
 
It has been more than ten years since that class and that night in the lab,4 and in that time I have 
come to regard the division between the humanities and the natural sciences as another boundary 
arbitrarily drawn. Scholars on both sides of the line want to answer the same questions, and we 
express ourselves through metaphors provided by a common culture. If we exaggerate our 
differences and take pride in our technical dialects, it is because our identities, as we perceive 
them, rely on these differences. To communicate effectively with one another, to live with one 
another, we need to rethink these identities, focusing not on the semipermeable membranes that 
separate us but on our permeability and on our mutual connections.  
(Otis 2000: 2) 
 




 I touch upon the LVVXHRIFRQILUPDWLRQE\QHJDWLRQLQWKHFRQWH[WRI:+$XGHQ¶VSRHWU\LQWKHILUVWFKDSWHURIWKLVWKHVLV
Convolution 1: Quest. 
 
4







Part of rethinking these identities, Otis contends, is to think disciplines together, and this might 
easily be interpreted, as I do in this thesis, as the need for humanities subjects such as literary 
studies to become part of that extra-neurological skillset that Charles Richet advocates as integral 
to a proper consideration of neurology. 
 Otis has not been alone in calling for just such a breakdown of boundaries, and certainly 
the last decade and a half or so since the publication of Membranes has seen an immense 
groundswell of research into interdisciplinary subjects involving some nexus of humanities and 
sciences focused on the brain and mind.5 However, as literary scholar Paul B Armstrong argues, 
WKLVµVR-called cognitive revolution in literary studies¶ as the name implies, has relied much more 
RQµFRJQLWLYHVFLHQFHZKLFKH[SORUHVKRZWKH³PLQG´NQRZVWKHZRUOGUDWKHUWKDQ
QHXURELRORJ\ZKLFKIRFXVHVRQWKHVWUXFWXUHDQGIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKHEUDLQ>«@¶+HVD\V this is 
µQRGRXEWXQGHUVWDQGDEOHVLQFHLWLVHDVLHUWRPRYHOLWHUDU\SKHQRPHQDIURPSV\FKRORJLFDO
theories about mental processes than it is to bridge the gap between neurological mechanisms and 
OLYHGH[SHULHQFH¶$UPVWURQJ:KLOVWQRWZDQWLQJto dismiss cognitive science in its 
entirety, and also keeping in mind that (as will be mentioned below) neuro-critics Suparna 
&KRXGKXU\DQG-DQ6ODE\DVWXWHO\SRLQWRXWWKDWPRVWLQYRFDWLRQVRIWKHWHUPµQHXURVFLHQFH¶
actually leave out a large part of thHRYHUDOOILHOGDQGUHIHUPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\WRµFRJQLWLYH
neuroscience¶ $UPVWURQJ¶VFRPPHQWDU\PDNHVWZRLPSRUWDQWFRQWULEXWLRQVKHUHDQGXSRQ




Though literary scholars and scientists of all manner are generally agreed that mind-body 
dualism is an intellectual cul-de-sac, neither do any of the alternatives seem to offer a better 
solution; I do not want to advocate dualism any more than anyone else, but neither do I think that 
the endless toing and froing of the debate over what should most appropriately replace it aids 
fruitful discussion of anything. It seems to me that new research ought to synthesize anything and 
everything relevant which has already been studied, and wait (albeit impatiently) for better 
theories, better technologies and better interdisciplinary collaborations to emerge from this.6 








 Having said this, however, I am cognizant and furthermore sympathetic to the view espoused by interdisciplinarian neuroscience 
researchers Felicity Callard and Des Fitzgerald, who are well positioned (or rather, well scattered) for their fairly scathing critique of 
UHFLSURFDOLQWHUGLVFLSOLQDULW\µ$OOWRRRIWHQ³UHFLSURFLW\´HPHUJHVDVWKHLPDJLQHGRUJDQL]LQJOogic of interdisciplinary 
collaboration ± with collaborators invited to forms of mutuality, fair exchange, and so on. [But] what is missing from this analysis 







Perhaps then, and only then, will a return to the debate make any sense. In the meantime, not 
accepting any reductions tRµPLQG¶QRUWRµEUDLQ¶DORQHVHHPVWKHEHVWZD\IRUZDUG± an 
acceptance that they are not the same thing but not at all appreciable separately. This is summed 
XSUHDOO\ZHOOE\$UPVWURQJZKRGRHVQRWGRDZD\HQWLUHO\ZLWKµWKHFRJQLWLYHWXUQ¶ but 
nevertKHOHVVVWLOOSRVLWVWKDWµSURGXFWLYHGLDORJXHEHWZHHQOLWHUDU\VWXGLHVDQGQHXURVFLHQFHPD\
be facilitated if the mind-brain dispute can be bypassed and a way to correlate aesthetic 
experiences and neurological mechanisms that does not rely on assumptions about the mind can 
EHIRXQG¶$UPVWURQJ 
,QWKLVVSLULW,WXUQQRZIURPWKHµPLQG-brain dispute¶, to some observations on how and 
why literature can and does interact with neuroscience ± but instead of in a directly relational 
sense, it does this according to the logic of convolutions, and should be investigated as such. This 
LVEHFDXVHµFRQYROXWLRQV¶DUHRQHRIWKHFHQWUDOµmetaphors provided by a common culture¶ as 
Otis puts it, that in turn provide further metaphors in which neuroscience and literature (as well 
as many other disciplines) trade across the abovementioned invisible lines. To begin with, then, it 
ought to be mentioned that neuroscience is both a rapidly expanding but hotly contested sphere. 
7KXVLQWKHLUUHFHQWFDOOIRUDµFULWLFal neuroscience¶ Choudhury and Slaby take philosopher 
(GPXQG+XVVHUO¶Vconcept of the µOLIHZRUOG¶ DµSUHWKHRUHWLFUHDOLW\LQZKLFKZHDOOOLYHDQGIURP
ZKLFKZHGUDZRXUSUHVFLHQWLILFXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶DQGVD\WKDWLQIDFWµWRGD\¶VQHXURVFLHQFHLVLQ
part WKUHDWHQLQJWREHDFRORQL]LQJIRUFHZLWKUHJDUGWRFHUWDLQGRPDLQVRIWRGD\¶VOLIHZRUOG¶
(Choudhury and Slaby 2012: 3, note 5). They claim that neuroscience now contributes to the very 
constitution of the lifeworld, taking up an undeserved pre-eminence in KXPDQLW\¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of itself ± that the totalizing reach of the neurosciences have enacted a form of revolution in 
conceptualizing and characterizing what it even is to be human. 
This, according to them, constitutes an epistemological and ontological revolution, the 
principles of which must be questioned, as in fact should the revolutionary rhetoric employed. To 
what degree is literature, a field which can also traditionally lay claim to a similar pre-existing 
authority on human self-comprehension, one of the domains being colonized by neuroscience? 
Thus, the primary aim of what follows in this thesis is to offer a preliminary exploration of the 
intersections of literature with neuroscience, alongside the complex relationship they have both 
maintained with study of the mind. This will be chiefly examined through this idea of the 
µFRQYROXWLRQ¶± as mentioned, a mainly nineteenth-century term for a loop or fold in the lobes of 
the brain, but also a structural notion distinctly related to literature via tKHµFRQYROXWHGSORW¶± as a 
SRVVLEOHDOWHUQDWLYHWRWKHZLGHO\KHUDOGHGQHXURVFLHQWLILFµUHYROXWLRQ¶WKDW&KRXGKXU\DQG6ODE\
are so keen to interrogate.  
However, proposing such an alternative is not simply a case of assessing how literary 





inaugurated by neuroscience, nor vice versa ± it is as much about taking a further step back and 
assessing whether there is even a revolution to speak of, of questioning if the correct questions 
are being asked instead of being assumed. For example, as recently as 2010, psychologist Eugene 
7D\ORUZULWHVµ+XPDQLVWLFSV\FKRORJLVWVDUHHQFRXUDJHGWRWXUQWKHLUDWWHQWLRQWRWKHKXPDQLVWLF
implications of the neuroscience revolution in order to answer aspects of the relationship between 
WKHEUDLQDQGWKHPLQGWKDWWKHUHGXFWLRQLVWLFQHXURVFLHQWLVWVVWLOOFDQQRWIDWKRP¶7D\ORU
:KLOVW7D\ORU¶VDQWL-reductionistic sentiment here is certainly laudable and necessary, he 
too readily takes for granted the revolutionary nature of neuroscience. This is tantamount to 
accepting this hyperbolic idea ± µWKHQHXURVFLHQFHUHYROXWLRQ¶± before a single bit of critique has 
been ventured, undermining any eventual attempt as a reaction rather than an intervention.7 
Therefore, this is what gives an analysis of neuroscience as a convolution, as opposed to as a 
revolution, an advantage straight out of the gate: it questions and contextualizes such hyperbole, 
appraising the humanistic roots of neuroscience, rather than taking the supposed revolution as a 
JLYHQDQGIRFXVLQJRQLWVµLPSOLFDWLRQV¶DORQH8 Convolutionary analysis does not merely look 
forward at the post-neuro-revolutionary world, but looks at how and why such a rhetorically 
loaded notion even exists, including its very own role (the role of convolutionary analysis) in this 
historical yet ongoing narrative. As such, the goal, as sociologist of scientific knowledge 
0DOFROP$VKPRUHSXWVLWLVµWRWUHDWUHIOH[LYLW\OHVVDVDSUREOHPDnd more as an opportunity; an 
opportunity, even, for celebration (Ashmore 2015: 94). This serves to illustrate the spirit of 
FRQYROXWLRQDVZHOODVWKHSHUSHWXDOO\µFRQYROYLQJ¶UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQVFLHQWLILFDQGOLWHUDU\
writing, because the neuroscientific analysis of literature only reveals the equal need for a literary 
analysis of neuroscience. A basis for such an analysis will be given in the next section, beginning 
with a reformulation of the research question at hand. 
  




 For an extended commentary on the so-FDOOHGµQHXURUHYROXWLRQ¶&I/\QFK 
 
8
 At first glance, this may seem to be the opposite of historian and philosopher oIVFLHQFH7KRPDV.XKQ¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWUHYROXWLRQVLQ
science rewrite history, thus rendering themselves invisible, because according to commentators such as Choudhury and Slaby, the 
µQHXURVFLHQFHUHYROXWLRQ¶LVVRNHHQWRPDNHLWVHOIYLVLEOHDXGLEOHDQGgenerally attention-worthy. However, this is not so for two 
main reasons: first, it is fair to say that after four editions of his landmark (revolutionary?) book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.XKQ¶VWKLQNLQJLVQRZDFWXDOO\SDUWRIWKHZD\VFLHQtific revolutions occur (strongly corroborated by accounts such as 
-RKQ'*UHHQZRRG¶VRIµ7KH&RJQLWLYH5HYROXWLRQ¶&IVHFRQGWKHSRLQWKHUHLVQRWWRGHQ\QHXURVFLHQFH¶V
contemporary standing, but to remark the gradual twists and turns in its coming to prominence ± a narrative compressed to the point 
RIYLUWXDOLQYLVLELOLW\E\WKHERPEDVWLFVXGGHQQHVVRIµUHYROXWLRQ¶ 
7KLVLVFRPSDWLEOHZLWK.XKQ¶VYLHZEHFDXVHLWLVWKHprocess of revolution which is cleansed and rendered invisible, 
rather than its influence in the post-UHYROXWLRQDU\SUHVHQWGD\.XKQJLYHVWKHH[DPSOHRI-RKQ'DOWRQ¶VGHYHORSPHQWRIFKHPLFDO
DWRPLVPµ:KDWDOORI'DOWRQ¶VDFFRXQWVRPLWDUHWKHUHYROXWLRQDU\HIIHFWVRIDSSO\LQJWRFKHPLVWU\DVHWRITXHVWLRQVDQGFRncepts 
pUHYLRXVO\UHVWULFWHGWRSK\VLFVDQGPHWHRURORJ\7KDWLVZKDW'DOWRQGLGDQGWKHUHVXOWZDVDUHRULHQWDWLRQWRWKHILHOG¶.uhn 2012: 








1HXURVFLHQFH¶V+LVWRULFDO5LVe and Currency 
 
 
So, instead of asking again what a convolution is, one might instead simply ask: what is 
neuroscience? Though a singular noun, the OED¶VHQWU\IRUµQHXURVFLHQFH¶UHYHDOVDQLQWULQVLF
SOXUDOLW\µ(DFKRIWKHVFLHQFHVDVQHXURDQDWRP\QHXURphysiology, etc.) concerned with the 
VWUXFWXUHRUIXQFWLRQRIWKHQHUYRXVV\VWHPVXFKVFLHQFHVFROOHFWLYHO\¶1RWRQO\LVWKHµEUDLQ¶
not mentioned, but the earliest usage the OED JLYHVRIµQHXURVFLHQFH¶ZKLFKLVQRWLQSOXUDOIRUP
is from a 1970 article FDOOHGµ3URPLVLQJ7UHQGVLQ1HXURVFLHQFH¶ZKHUHLQDXWKRU)UDQFLV6FKPLWW
ZULWHVWKDWµGXULQJWKHSDVWIHZ\HDUVQHXURVFLHQFHFRPSULVLQJWKHVFLHQFHVRIEUDLQDQG
behaviour, has been differentiating, integrating, regrouping¶ Although here the brain is finally 
PHQWLRQHGPRVWQRWDEOHDJDLQLVWKHVLQJXODUQHXURVFLHQFH¶VKLGGHQSOXUDOLW\DQGLQVWDELOLW\LWLV
not a science but a collection of sciences; it refers not only to physiology, but also to behaviour; 
LWVGHOLPLWDWLRQDOUHDG\LQYROYHVµGLIIHUHQWLDWLQJLQWHJUDWLQJ>DQG@UHJURXSLQJ¶DQGILQDOO\
neuroscience is the study not of the brain, but of the whole nervous system. 
 Why then do experienced neuroscientists even now write concrete and narrow 
VWDWHPHQWVVXFKDVWKHYHU\WLWOHRI'LFN6ZDDE¶V book We Are Our Brains,9 when they 
VKRXOGEHPRUHWKDQDZDUHRIDOORIWKHDERYH"6KRXOGWKH\QRWZULWHVRPHWKLQJOLNHµZHDUHRXU
nervous systems¶ RUµZHDUHRXUEUDLQVSOXVRXUEHKDYLRXUVSOXVDQ\WKLQJHOVHWKDWFURSVXSYLDD
process of differentiating, integrating and regrouping¶? Historians of science Fernando Vidal and 
)UDQFLVFR2UWHJDKDYHOLQNHGWKLVUHGXFWLRQRIWKHKXPDQVXEMHFWWRDµFHUHEUDOVXEMHFW¶ZLWKWKH
UHFHQWGHYHORSPHQWRISHUVRQKRRGLQWRVRPHWKLQJPRUHOLNHµEUDLQKRRG¶&I9LGDODQGOrtega 
2011). From the title onwards, their edited volume Neurocultures (2011) emphasizes the plurality 
of the sciences of the brain and nervous system, but also of new fields and public interest 
HPHUJLQJIURPWKHVHVFLHQFHV7KH\ZULWHWKDWµWKHEHOLHIWKat human beings are essentially their 
EUDLQ>«@KDVEHFRPHH[WUHPHO\SRZHUIXOLQFRQWHPSRUDU\FXOWXUH>6RPH@VFLHQWLVWVKDYHDW
least by their public pronouncements, contributed to reduce to the brain the range of determinants 
RIKXPDQH[LVWHQFH¶9LGDOand Ortega 2011: 7). The perhaps expected philosophical response 
provoked by the neuroscientific reduction of selfhood to brainhood actually has, since Patricia 
&KXUFKODQG¶VERRNNeurophilosophy (and its resolutely reductive defence of totally 




 This title is itself only a further reduced variation on Nobel prize-ZLQQHU)UDQFLV&ULFN¶Vµ$VWRQLVKLQJ+\SRWKHVLV¶ZKLFKJLYHVRQH
RIKLVPRVWIDPRXVERRNVLWVWLWOHDQGFODLPVWKDWµ³<RX´\RXUMR\VDQG\RXUVRUURZV\RXUPHPRULHVDQG\RXUDmbitions, your sense 







neurobiological explanations of mental states), only exacerbated the idea of brainhood.10 
However, as self-styled anti-neurophilosopher Raymond Tallis observes, 
 
those who believe that personhood boils down to brainhood are entitled to point to several serious 
questions that opponents like me leave unanswered. Why, if the brain is not the basis of 
consciousness, is it so intimately bound up with our awareness and our behaviour? And what are 
ZHWRPDNHRIWKHJHQXLQHDGYDQFHVRIQHXURVFLHQFH">«@7KHFULWLTXHRIQHXral accounts of 
consciousness is only the first step. 
(Tallis 2013: 45) 
 
As Tallis rightly points out, tackling cerebral subjection on philosophical grounds, though 
necessary, only prompts equally necessary questions which need to bypass the reactionary 
diVPLVVDORIQHXURVFLHQFH¶VJHQXLQHEHQHILWVWRVRFLHW\ 
 As yet, neither philosophy nor neuroscience offers a satisfactory account of human 
FRQVFLRXVQHVV,QKLVHVVD\µ&RQVFLRXVQHVVDQGWKH1RYHO¶ literary author and theorist David 
Lodge points out that 
 
until fairly recently, consciousness was not much studied by the natural sciences. It was 
considered to be the province of philosophy. Psychology, inasmuch as it aspired to be an 
HPSLULFDOVFLHQFHUHJDUGHGFRQVFLRXVQHVVDVµDEODFNER[¶$OOWKDWFRXOGEe observed and 
measured was input and output, not what went on inside. 
(Lodge 2002: 6) 
 
In this rather diplomatic gloss on the behaviourism that dominated early twentieth century 
psychology, Lodge highlights the historical role of philosophy in the study of consciousness, but 
goes on to say how the natural sciences have since come to incorporate this study. Sketching out 
WKLVWUDMHFWRU\OHDGVWR/RGJH¶VPDLQTXHVWLRQµ:KDWKDVDOOWKLVWRGRZLWKOLWHUDWXUH>«@"¶




important point which Lodge claims is being steadily taken on board by luminaries in and around 
the cognitive/neuro sciences, such as Noam Chomsky, Gerald Edelman, Antonio Damasio and 




 A distinction can also be drawn here, nevertheless, as per philosopher CarO)&UDYHU¶VVXJJHVWLRQµ7KHUHDUHQHXURSKLORVRSKHUV
and there are philosophers of neuroscience. Neurophilosophers use findings from neuroscience to address traditional philosophical 
puzzles about the mind. Philosophers of neuroscience study neuroscience WRDGGUHVVSKLORVRSKLFDOSX]]OHVDERXWWKHQDWXUHRIVFLHQFH¶






Daniel Dennett. It is this kind of steady (if still new and slightly hesitant) adoption of literary 
studies by the sciences of mind and brain that mean theses such as this one do not appear 
completely out of the blue, and give me the impression that discussion of literature alongside 









+RZHYHUMXVWDVQHXURVFLHQFH¶VVWDULVRQWKHULVHOLWHUDWXUH¶VLVVHHPLQJO\ on the wane. In On 
Literature (2002), theorist J Hillis Miller sums up the situation as follows: 
 
7KHHQGRIOLWHUDWXUHLVDWKDQG/LWHUDWXUH¶VWLPHLVDOPRVWXS,WLVDERXWWLPH,WLVDERXWWKDWLV
the different epochs of different media. Literature, in spite of its approaching end, is nevertheless 
perennial and universal. It will survive all historical and technological changes. Literature is a 
feature of any human culture at any time and place. These two contradictory premises must 
govern all serioXVUHIOHFWLRQµRQOLWHUDWXUH¶WKHVHGD\V 
(Miller 2002:1) 
 
:KHQ0LOOHUVD\VSOD\IXOO\WKDWµLWLVDERXWWLPH¶ he means literature has a history which is tied 
to the print culture in which it became prevalent, this culture itself in flux as he is writing in 2002 
and even more so now as I write today in 2016. Miller argues that literature arose out of a 
universal literacy attached to the establishment of nation states, reflected in notions of national 
literatures and the development of modern research universities. This accounts for the current 
double status of literature today, usurped by new media technologies whilst simultaneously 
codified into Western views on education, social formation and the freedom of speech 
represented by literary expression. So perhaps it is the university-led, authoritative stance of 
literary studies and theory that is on the wane rather than literature itself? Poet and political 
activist Joshua Clover espouses just such a view, saying that  
 
For a while now, many of us poets have been telling ourselves lies about the political force of 
poetry. Many of these we know by heart. Speaking truth to power. Finding the form which might 
ERWKUHYHDODQGSHUVXDGH3UHVHUYLQJWKHVSDFHRIFULWLTXH>«@/D\LQJEDUHWKHWUXWKRIWKH
ineluctably immiserating mechanism in which we live. We have been aided in this set of 
justifications by that peculiar historical development known as capital-T Theory, and particularly 
by ideas based arounGWKHSULPDF\RIGLVFRXUVHDQGµthe materiality of the signifier¶ ± ideas which 
allow activities at the level of language to claim the same material force as a thrown brick. Both 
constitute the world.  
%XWLW¶VVXFKEXOOVKLWLVQ¶WLW",GRQ
WPHDQWRGLVPLVVWKHWKHRUHWLFDOGHYHORSPHQWVRIWKH
last forty years, the so-FDOOHGµlinguistic turn.¶ I often find myself defending such matters against 
various attacks ± one must oppose anti-intellectualism, tooth and nail. One must be open to new 
thoughts. It just so happens that my own understanding of our present situation finds these 







,I0LOOHUFRQWH[WXDOL]HVOLWHUDWXUH¶VSROLWLFDOFRDOHVFHQFHLQWKe university during the last hundred 
and fifty years or so, then Clover¶VPRUHUHFHQWIRUW\-year historical sketch of the so-called 
µOLQJXLVWLFWXUQ¶FRQGHPQVWKHFXUUHQWSROLWLFDOLQHIILFDF\RISRHWU\LQGLFDWLQJWKDWXQLYHUVLW\
orthodoxy has no bottom-up potential, only traditional, top-down, hegemonic dominion over the 
poet, the individual, the subject. 
 :KHQ&ORYHUGHFULHVµFDSLWDO-T Theory¶ µWKHSULPDF\RIGLVFRXUVHDQGµthe materiality 
of the signifier¶KHHVVHQWLDOO\PHDQVZKDWFDQZLWKREYLRXVUHVHUYDWLRQVEHXPEUHOOD-termed 
µpoststructuralism¶ Nor is he the first to decry this. Indeed, two interesting views on 
poststructuraliVP¶VYLUWXHVYHUVXVLWVOLPLWDWLRQVDUHRIIHUHGE\5D\PRQG7DOOLVDQG'DYLG/RGJH
Tallis marks his distaste for poststructuralism, postmodernism and deconstruction in book-long 
polemics such as Not Saussure: A Critique of Post-Saussurean Literary Theory (1988) and 
Theorrhoea and After $OWKRXJK7DOOLV¶VDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWQLKLOLVWLFDQWL-humanistic 
lexical oblivion are relatively convincing, his scathing indictments of theorists Jacques Derrida 
and Jacques Lacan, though often amusing and perceptive, end up doing what Clover specifically 
ZDUQVDJDLQVW7DOOLVWRWDOO\µ>GLVPLVVHV@WKHWKHRUHWLFDOGHYHORSPHQWVRIWKHODVWIRUW\\HDUVWKH
so-FDOOHG³OLQJXLVWLFWXUQ´¶,QVRVWHDGIDVWO\FRPEDWting the abyssal relativism he sees in the 
thought of these figures, Tallis disregards plenty of positive or useful aspects of theory, 
poststructuralist or otherwise ± and this is the same wholesale dismissal which Tallis admonishes 
in critics of scientific thought.11 Furthermore, as philosopher Christopher Norris has argued, 
science and deconstruction, for example, are not necessarily as incompatible or antithetical as 
they might at first appear (Cf. Norris 1997; 1998). Nor do the notorious and oft-attacked claims 
to scientific status of structuralism and its intellectual descendants preclude a set of philosophical 
GLVFRXUVHVVXFKDVWKRVHJURXSHGXQGHUDWHUPOLNHµGHFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶ from having been in 
constant, fruitful and most importantly co-generative dialogue with science all along. Indeed, 




Lévi-Strauss and the scientistic claims of structuralism is not, however, equivalent to a rejection 
RIVFLHQFHLWVHOI>«@7KHUHLVFOHDUHYLGHQFHLQ'HUULGD¶VZRUNRIDFRQVLVWHQWLQWHUHVWLQDQG




 As David Fuller and Patricia Waugh write of Tallis and this oft-UHSHDWHGVWDQFHRIKLVµ7DOOLV¶VRZQDUJXPHQWLVVRPHWLPHVIRUFHG
to proceed (as he acknowledges) using the rhetorical manoeuvres which he deplores in his opponents: hyperbole, reductio ad 
absurdum, selective quotation, and some measure of generalization from a small number of examples. If literary critics need the 








478; also, Cf. C Johnson 1993). 
'DYLG/RGJHWDNHVDGLIIHUHQWWDFNWR7DOOLV¶VWRWDOGLVPLVVDORIPRGHrn literary theory. 
First, Lodge glosses on C 36QRZ¶VXQFHDVLQJO\GHEDWHGOHFWXUHµ7KH7ZR&XOWXUHVDQGWKH
6FLHQWLILF5HYROXWLRQ¶DQG) 5/HDYLV¶VVWURQJUHEXWWDOEHIRUHSDUDSKUDVLQJDPRUHUHFHQW
FULWLF3DWULFLD:DXJKQRWLQJWKDWµVXFKGHEDWHV are most intense when one form of knowledge 
lays claim to the exclusive title to all knowledge. The contest is unnecessary. Literature 
constitutes a kind of knowledge about consciousness which is complementary to scientific 
NQRZOHGJH¶/RGJHRULginal emphasis). Lodge later extends this complementariness 
between knowledge forms to an ironic equivalence between creators and guardians of each: 
µ7KHUHLV>«@DFHUWDLQDIILQLW\EHWZHHQWKHSRVWVWUXFWXUDOLVWOLWHUDU\WKHRU\WKDWPDLQWDLQVWKDWWKH
human subject is entirely constructed by the discourses in which it is situated, and the cognitive 
science view that regards human self-FRQVFLRXVQHVVDVDQHSLSKHQRPHQRQRIEUDLQDFWLYLW\¶
(2002: 89). As Ortega and Vidal note, in his 2001 novel Thinks... Lodge dramatizes just such 
GLOHPPDVIDFLQJµZULWHUVZKRDUHYLVLWLQJLQSUHVWLJLRXVUHVHDUFKFHQWUHVGHYRWHGWRWKHFRJQLWLYH
QHXURVFLHQFHV>WKXVGHDOLQJ@ZLWKWKHFODVKEHWZHHQWKHVFLHQWLILFDQGKXPDQLVWZRUOGYLHZV¶
(Ortega and Vidal 2013: 337). Ortega and Vidal comment that as the novelist protagonist of 
Thinks... struggles with the neuroscientific approach to selfhood, she turns and finds no greater 
solace in the entrenched poststructuralist anti-subjectivity dominating humanities scholarship; 
WKXVµLIWKLVQRYHO>«@VWDJHVWKHFRQIOLFWRIWKHWZRFXOWXUHVDVDZD\RIDHVWKHWLFDOO\FRQYH\LQJ
RSSRVLQJZRUOGYLHZVLWDOVRSURSRVHVZD\VRIWUDQVFHQGLQJWKRVHDQWDJRQLVWLFYLVLRQV¶2UWHJD
and Vidal 2013: 349). The logic in this seems to be not to come down on any side of the debate, 
the opposing arguments actually sharing the same flaw, and instead focus on recovering the lost 
µVHOI¶RIWKHZKROHHTXDWLRQ 
 ,QWKH2UWHJDDQG9LGDODUWLFOHMXVWPHQWLRQHGHQWLWOHGµ%UDLQVLQ/LWHUDWXUH/LWHUDWXUHLQ
WKH%UDLQ¶WKH\VXUYH\ZKDWWKH\WHUPWKHµQHXUDOWXUQ¶LQOLWHUDU\VFKRODUVKLS± that is to say, 
literary study that takes on board cognitive and neurological approaches. This nascent but swiftly 
EORVVRPLQJILHOGLVUHDOO\DFRQWLQXDWLRQRIWKHµOLQJXLVWLFWXUQ¶ stemming from various offshoots 
of cognitive/neuro science themselves based on insights from linguistics ± only more or less 
GRLQJVRZKLOVWDOVRUHMHFWLQJRWKHUW\SHVRIOLWHUDU\FULWLFLVPGHULYHGIURPWKHµOLQJXLVWLFWXUQ¶











However, this need not solely apply to writers of the newly christened neuro lit (or neuronovels, 
neuronarrative, and so forth);12 the insights of literary authors and critics need not be cast aside 
simply because they do not fit the current brain-paradigm, or because they are or are not 
poststructuralist ± science and literature have had a long history of speaking to each other in 
mutually inclusive and productive ways, one that goes back way beyond linguistics and 
neurology, and nobody would ever dream of rejecting this history in quite the same way. 
 ,QDGGLWLRQWRWKLVDEULHIQRWHKHUHRQP\XVHLQWKLVWKHVLVRIµSRSXODU¶WH[Ws, in the 
sense of traditionally non-scientific or non-academic texts. It seems to me that if one is going to 
draw out the scientific aspects of literary texts or the literary aspects of scientific texts, one is 
already disrespecting what, as has been remarked above, are essentially arbitrarily drawn 
boundaries. The capaciousness of the potential topics of convolutions means that such 
distinctions between what concretely constitutes true science or literature, or similarly, what is 
low and what is high art, need to be temporarily set aside (if not altogether). Indeed, these are the 
very stakes in play: that such demarcation of intellectual and textual boundaries is ideological, 
DQGWKDWDWDQ\UDWHDVVRFLRORJLVW7KRPDV)*LHU\QSXWVLWµERXQGDULHVDUHGUDwn and redrawn 
LQIOH[LEOHKLVWRULFDOO\FKDQJLQJDQGVRPHWLPHVDPELJXRXVZD\V¶*LHU\QIn this 
attitude, I am also inspired by the self-SURIHVVHGUDWLRQDOHEHKLQGKLVWRULDQ5REHUW0<RXQJ¶V
ZRUNLQWRPLQGDQGEUDLQµ0\H[SORUDWLRQRIWKHVWUDnge origins and fates of theories in the 
nineteenth century has emboldened me to find good ideas wherever they turn up, without trying 
to be overly systematic. It seems to me that the understanding of human nature has suffered 
PLJKWLO\IURP³V\VWHP´¶(Young 1990: ix). Avoiding such systematized intellectual 
entrenchment, I think that as great a pool of sources as possible can only be beneficial to my 
study, including anything that has in some way communicated the nexus of literary and 
neuroscientific thought ± µSRSXODU¶RURWKHUZLVH  
  










Again, What (and Why and How) is a Convolution? 
 
 
To return to convolutions and recap, then, the point is not to regard any intellectual revolution in 
either literature or neuroscience as conclusive, or as a revolution at all ± as Choudhury and Slaby 
ZULWHDOWKRXJKµWDONRID³QHXURUHYROXWLRQ´KDVEHHQLQWKHDLUIRUDZKLOH¶WKH\DQGWKHLU
FROOHDJXHVQHYHUWKHOHVVµVKDUHDFHUWDLQHQQXLDERXWWKLVUHYROXWLRQDU\UKHWRULF¶&KRXGKXU\DQG
Slaby 2012: 5±6). Instead of revolution, and as an antidote to just such neuro-revolutionary ennui 
(or its literary corollaries in the schisms of the neural and linguistic turns), I want to emphasize 
the idea of the convolution as a useful and invigorating way of reconceptualizing the interactions 
of literature and neuroscience ± without at all bypassing the social institutions and practices in 
which both fields are irrevocably embedded. So to repeat the opening question of this thesis, one 
FDQDVNRQFHDJDLQZKDWLVDµFRQYROXWLRQ¶? According to the OED, the word originates in 1545, 
DQGWKLVH[DPSOHLOOXVWUDWHVWKHHDUO\V\PEROLFSRZHURIWKHLGHDµIt hath many conuolucyons, as 
ZRUPHVO\HQJWRJHWKHUKDXH¶7KLVLPDJHRIZRUPVO\LQJWRJHWKHULQDWDQJOHLVDYLYLG
anatomical simile from a proto-text on obstetrics used to define something perhaps more prosaic: 
µ$IROGWZLVWWXUQZLQGLQJVLQXRVLW\RIDQ\WKLQJUROOHGRUFRLOHGXSRURIDFRLOHGIRUP¶
Compare this to the next specifically anatomical sense from the OEDµAnat. Each of the sinuous 
IROGVRUZLQGLQJVRIWKHVXUIDFHRIWKHFHUHEUDOKHPLVSKHUHVLQKXPDQVDQGWKHKLJKHUDQLPDOV¶
Although this definition refers to brain structure, it implies a complex organization difficult to 
GLVFHUQDPRQJVWWKHµVLQXRXVIROGVRUZLQGLQJV¶VLPLODr to the earlier worms. So a convolution is 
a loop, or a fold, as in the cerebral convolutions. But as mentioned previously, it is also a loop or 
fold in that stories and narratives can be considered convolutions or convoluted if they in some 
way refuse a straightforward or linear reading. Although the OED has not yet recognized what 
for me is this very common meaning, Merriam-Webster GHILQHVµFRQYROXWLRQ¶ERWKDVµDWZLVWRU
FXUYH¶DQGDVµVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVYHU\FRPSOLFDWHGDQGGLIILFXOWWRXQGHUVWDQG¶ a parallel 
highlighting quite neatly what I am trying to say about convolutions both literal and figurative. 
Writing of the history of illustrations of the brain and its functions, medical historians 
Edwin Clarke and Kenneth Dewhurst observe that 
 
as little was known about [the cerebral cortex] there seemed no need to depict the convolutions of 
WKHEUDLQZLWKDQ\DFFXUDF\>«@(UDVLVWUDWXVRI$OH[DQGULD>KDG@VWDWHGLQWKHWKLUGFHQWXU\%&
that the appearances of the gyri were comparable to coils of small intestine [while a] later 
observer, with a more culinary bent compared the cerebral convolutions to a plate of macaroni. 
Thus it was thought that there was no precise anatomical pattern or determinable functional 
organization, a misconception that survived until the first few decades of the nineteenth century. 






Already one sees KHUHLQWKHZRUGµFRQYROXWLRQV¶± WKURXJKµZRUPV¶ µFRLOVRILQWHVWLQH¶DQG
µPDFDURQL¶± a nexus of anatomy, structural complexity and elucidating metaphor stretching back 
to classical antiquity. However, as Clarke and Dewhurst point out, 
 
it is paradoxical that the most obvious part of the brain and one of the most important from the 
functional point of view should have been mostly ignored until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. This is its external surface, the cerebral gyri with their surrounding sulci and their 
covering mantle of cortex. Before the seventeenth century, attention was directed exclusively to 




This reticence regarding what is first encountered in the brain upon dissection or surgery is not to 
be sniffed at. What is visible and so easily metaphorically rendered long resisted further 
commentary ± worms atop worms stayed merely that, a messy pile of purposeless meat 
comprising the surface of what is now considered that most wondrous of organs: the brain. 
Metaphors like this are evidently the bread and butter of literary writing, but it is perhaps 
less obvious how pervasive they are, not only in the way science is conducted, written about and 
even simply thought of, as I argue in this thesis ± metaphor has been seen in recent times to 
largely govern our entire conceptualization of everyday life and its tasks. If this is the case, it is 
worth expanding a little on metaphor here, in order to stress its importance, though in differing 
and shifting ways, to these three broadly defined but interlacing ambits: the literary, the scientific 
and the everyday (this latter mostly experienced in a linguistic way, but I think still 
metaphorically inflected in pre- or extra-linguistic circumstances). First, the literary; it seems 
entirely obvious, to the point of mundaneness, how preeminent metaphorical language is in 
literature. Indeed, literary and metaphorical expressions, long or short, are often treated as near 
synonyms, and one kind of expression needs to in some way speak to the other in order to be 
truly considered completely itself ± WKDWLVWRVD\µQROLWHUDWXUHZLWKRXWPHWDSKRU¶+LFNH\DQG
Reiss 2000: 101), no metaphorical expression without recourse to the literary.  
This, in brief, sums up the common sense view. However, literature as it is now 
understood is the product of a historical elaboration, which as J Hillis Miller argues, is not even 
400 years old (Cf. Miller 2002: 1±2). Even if the longer view is taken (as well as, perhaps, a less 
strict definition of the word itself), literature in a basic sense still relies at least upon the invention 
of writing. Thus it would be fair to say that metaphor predates literature (in speech at least, and as 
long as it is viable to assume that pre-literate society used in its verbal exchanges what would 





relationship between literature and metaphor, as elaborated above. Though I am aware the 
assumptions are now mounting up like the worms mentioned earlier, a further assumption might 
be that pre-theoretic experience, what Husserl called the lifeworld, even predates metaphor. 
Literature and metaphor and the lifeworld are all related, but not in the ways that seem so 
intuitive in the first instance. 
In any case, even if one decides that all of the above is not only purely speculative but 
entirely false, then Miller contends literature is still somehow cordoned off completely from 
HYHU\WKLQJHOVHLQFOXGLQJLWVRZQLQGLYLGXDOH[HPSODUV+HZULWHVµ(DFK>OLWHUDU\@ZRUNLV
closed in on itself, separated frRPWKH³UHDOZRUOG´DQGIURPDQ\XQLILHGVXSHUQDOZRUOGZKLFKDOO
ZRUNVPLJKWEHSUHVXPHGWRSXWWRZRUN¶0LOOHU7ZRWKLQJVDUHLQWHUHVWLQJKHUHILUVW
0LOOHU¶VGHSOR\PHQWRIWKHZRUGµVXSHUQDO¶ as in elevated or even celestial, is used by him to 
UHIHUWRDEHOLHILQ3ODWRQLFIRUPVLQ+XVVHUO¶VSURWpJpMartin Heidegger, Miller ultimately 
GLVPLVVLQJWKLVEHOLHI1HYHUWKHOHVVE\FRQWUDVWZLWKWKHLPSOLHGLPSODXVLELOLW\RIWKHµUHDO
ZRUOG¶ZKHQUHQGHUHGLQTXRWDWLRQVPDUNVOLNHVRWKLVVPDFNVRI+XVVHUO¶VOLIHZRUOGDVDUHDOP
of experience existing prior to any systematic exploration or explanation of the so-FDOOHGµUHDO
world¶ Secondly, in the process of substantiating this line of argument, Miller borrows from 
Derrida (this latter already borrowing from Heidegger) and invokes the image of a curled up 
KHGJHKRJµDVDFDWDFKUHVLV>«@IRUZKDWLVLGLRPDWLFDERXWHDFKOLWHUDU\ZRUN2QHIRUPWKLV
WDNHVLVWKHDSSURDFKWRZDUGFRLQFLGHQFHRILWVPHDQLQJDQGWKHPDWHULDOLW\RILWVOHWWHUV¶0LOOHU
2002: 34). That is to say, the hedgehog in its ball supposedly represents a poem (and by extension 
any literary work) curled up hermetically to protect itself with quills from anything outside. The 
OED GHILQHVWKHQRXQµFDWDFKUHVLV¶DVµ,PSURSHUXVHRIZRUGV; application of a term to a thing 
ZKLFKLWGRHVQRWSURSHUO\GHQRWHDEXVHRUSHUYHUVLRQRIDWURSHRUPHWDSKRU¶6RLQWKLVUHVSHFW
WKHKHGJHKRJLVDSXUSRVHIXOGHPRQVWUDWLYHµSHUYHUVLRQRIDWURSH¶ a wilful metaphorical 
imposture on the part of Miller (and Derrida), intended to denote the specificity and impenetrable 
uniqueness of a text. Miller goes on to admit that  
 
no doubt I am here, by making a conceptual analysis, committing again the error against which I 
warn. It cannot be denied that literary theory contributes to that death of literature [announced 
HDUOLHULQ0LOOHU¶VERRN@/LWHUDU\WKHRU\DURVHLQLWVFRQWHPSRUDU\IRUPMXVWDWWKHWLPH
OLWHUDWXUH¶VVRFLDOUROHZDVZHDNHQLQJ,IOLWHUDWXUH¶VSRZHUDQGUROHFRXOGEHWDNHQIRUJUDQWHGDV
still in full force, it would not be necessary to theorize about it >«@. 
The efflorescence of literary theory signals the death of literature. That Routledge editors 
should hDYHLQYLWHGPHWRZULWHDERRNµon literature¶ is a symptom of this. They would not have 
thought of making such a request if literature were not widely perceived these days as problematic 
[or] in mortal danger [or] something that can no longer simply be taken for granted. 






Thus the hedgehog is a self-consciously self-defeating metaphor, deployed in the service of 
proclaiming the death of the literature that by the same token protects or portions itself off in this 
self-contained way. Essentially, metaphor may underpin but also outlive literature (and literary 
theory) ± these expressions already incorrectly reifying metaphor, theory, literature and their 





Metaphor Inaction versus Metaphor in Action 
 
 
Curled up in a ball, on the defensive, so to speak, the hedgehog of literature currently denies 
visibility of its inner self, in an attempt, perhaps, to protect its soft underbelly. Thus, with 
reference to what could be called this issue of its true visibility, Miller pithily goes on to say 
something which as much highlights the supposed wane of literature as it reaffirms the cultural 
pre-HPLQHQFHRIVFLHQFHµ7KLV>SUREOHPDWL]DWLRQRIYLVLELOLW\@WDNHVSODFHE\DQLPSODFDEOHODZ
that says you can see clearly something that is deeply embedded in your culture only when it is in 
the act of UHFHGLQJLQWRWKHKLVWRULFDOGLVWDQFH¶0LOOHU7KHUHDVRQVFLHQFHDFKLHYHV
such current dominion on the cultural and academic scene is precisely because not enough people 
can see this dominion, perhaps because there is not enough of this so-calOHGµKLVWRULFDOGLVWDQFH¶ 
EXWDOVRSHUKDSVEHFDXVHGHVSLWHFRPPHQWDWRUV¶RIWHQ-made critiques and analyses of its twists, 
leaps and pretences, science itself is largely unwilling to acknowledge the presence of catachresis 
in its makeup (unlike literary sWXG\ZKLFKDVSHU+HLGHJJHU'HUULGD0LOOHU¶VKHGJHKRJDERYHLV
happy to repeatedly explore it). Despite the best efforts of people who buck this trend, such as in 
ELRORJLVW(YHO\Q)R[.HOOHU¶VRefiguring Life: Metaphors of Twentieth-Century Biology (1995) ± 
plus repeatedly elsewhere in her extensive oeuvre ± or sociologists and historians Maasen, 
Mendelsohn and Weingart in their edited collection Biology as Society, Society as Biology: 
Metaphors (1995), the overwhelming significance of how science is metaphorically 
conceptualized remains undervalued. The two examples given here are both from the life 
sciences. However, I contend that the same basic principle is true further and wider, or as 
HYROXWLRQDU\ELRORJLVW5LFKDUG/HZRQWLQSXWVLWµZHPXVWQHYHUORse sight of the immensely 
SRZHUIXOUROHSOD\HGE\PHWDSKRUVLQRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHQDWXUDOZRUOG¶.ULPVN\DQG
Gruber 2013: ix), implying not only a field larger than his own, but that against his admonition, 
the role of metaphor in science is frequently understated or even overlooked.13 
The recognition of metaphor, not only within and across intellectual pursuits, but also 
across time, has at least been noted by journalist and popular science author Steven Johnson, such 
as in his book Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities and Software (2002), 
ZKLFKGHDOVZLWKWKHDSSOLFDWLRQVRUPDQLIHVWDWLRQVLQYDULRXVILHOGVRIµFRPSOH[LW\WKHRU\¶ 
 
Certain shapes and patterns hover over different moments in time, haunting and inspiring the 
individuals living through those periods. The epic clash and subsequent resolution of the dialectic 




 This is not so in the field of literature and science, wherein metaphor has been widely recognized as a true force not only in 






animated the first half of the nineteenth century; the Darwinian and social reform movements 
scattered web imagery through the second half of the century. The first few decades of the 
twentieth century found their ultimate expression in the exuberant anarchy of the explosion, while 
later decades lost themselves in the faceless regimen of the grid. You can see the last ten years or 
so as a return to these Victorian webs, though I suspect the image that has been burned into our 
retinas over the past decade is more prosaic: windows piled atop one another on a screen, or 
perhaps a mouse clicking on an icon. 
(S Johnson 2002: 22) 
 
Positing a pattern through time which in itVHOILQYROYHVµDUHWXUQ¶ what Johnson colourfully 
describes here is the intriguing reoccurrence or even necessity of guiding images propelling 
entire paradigms towards discovery. Taking his tack from the very phenomenon he is attempting 
to outline, the liWHUDU\TXDOLW\RI-RKQVRQ¶VZULWLQJKHUHPDNHVLWVHHPWKDWWKHPHUHO\YDJXH
µVKDSHVDQGSDWWHUQV¶KHRULJLQDOO\SURSRVHVDUHPXFKPRUHFOHDUIRUFHIXODQGHQWUHQFKHGWKH
PHQWLRQRIµLPDJHV>«@EXUQHGLQWRRXUUHWLQDV¶ itself a strong metaphor suggesting metaphoric 
language as not just something produced by the gaze of science, but, going beyond its eye and on 
past the socket and into its brain, fundamental to the workings of its collective mind. 
Psychology professor Shimon Edelman advocates something similar in Computing the 
Mind: How the Mind Really Works (2008). In a section subWLWOHGµ2QWKHQDWXUHRIWKHTXHVW¶RI
LQWHUHVWEHFDXVHWKHQRWLRQRIµTXHVW¶LVLWVHOIDQDUFKHW\SDOPHWDSKRUXVHGH[WHQVLYHO\LQWKH
sciences of mind/brain, as I will argue in the next chapter), Edelman writes the following:  
 
The explanatory achievement of cognitive science may be compared to that of another discipline 
ZKRVHVXEMHFWPDWWHUKDVEHHQLQKXPDQLW\¶VSODLQVLJKWVLQFHLPPHPRULDOWLPHV\HWUHPDLQHGD
mystery until a few decades ago: astrophysics. Two hundred years ago, with the subatomic 
structure of matter still unknown, physics lacked the very CONCEPTS in terms of which the 
nuclear reactions that occur over the life cycle of a star are described. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, the principles of stellar nucleosynthesis came to be understood to a sufficient 
degree so as to make it, in broad outline, into high-school textbooks. 
The predicament of the nineteenth century psychologists (and neurologists) was similar 
to that of their physicist contemporaries: they were lacking the fundamental explanatory concept 
>«@ZLWKRXWZKLFKWKHVWXG\RIPLQGVDQGRIEUDLQVFRXOGQHYHUHYHQDVNWKHULJKWTXHVWLRQV 
(S Edelman 2008: 497±498; original emphasis) 
 









belief in history hinging on some concrete physical discovery or other, Edelman is at pains to 
SRLQWRXWWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIµ&21&(376¶WRH[SODQDWLRQVZLWKWKHLQFRPLQJPHWDSKRULFGLJLWDO
vocabulary providing for him a new conceptual (and thus fundamental) framework for accounts 
of the mind/brain based on calculation and computation. 
Therefore, both Edelman and Johnson speak to the importance of metaphorical concepts 
in the shaping of what is even possible, let alone achievable within scientific investigation. 
Furthermore, it is of note that Edelman joins Johnson in making a case for the historical 
importance of these conceptual metaphors, without which an entire era of research is left bereft of 
a full explanatory capacity; thus, a historical view of scientific achievement turns on the 
development or coming to prominence of conceptual metaphors (and perhaps interestingly in 
both cases mentioned here, at similar points in time). However, it is useful to mention also that 
Raymond Tallis (who alongside his extensive philosophical writing has worked as a gerontologist 
and a clinical neuroscientist) is quick to dispute the validity of complexity as per Johnson and 
computation as per Edelman (though without naming either of these writers specifically), as 
metaphorical ways of explaining the mind, the brain, or consciousness. 7DOOLV¶VDUJXPHQWKLQJHV
on the notion that neurophilosophical and scientistic (as opposed to scientific) discussions of 
mind and brain tend to mystify issues by utilizing inappropriate language, in a widespread but 
dissimulating gesture of the kind of catachresis Miller mentions above. More specifically, in 
order to diminish or even dismiss the many difficult problems associated with describing 
consciousness and its contents, these erroneous discussions rely upon the products of neural 
activity (as a condition necessary but not sufficient for consciousness and its resulting 
behaviours) as a way of explaining that very same neural activity. 
In other words, this is a form of begging the question, which Tallis describes in his book 
Why the Mind is Not a Computer (2004) DVµSUHPDWXUHFRQFHSWXDOFORVXUH¶KHHOXFLGDWHVIXUWKHU
by saying that 
 
under the influence of the language of neuromythology, we are misled into believing we know, 
and make coherent sense of, more than we in fact do. [We] cheat in our attempts to link, say, 
human beings as citizens with the activity of their brains by importing, or reading back, the most 
sophisticated activities of citizens ± µFDOFXODWLRQV¶µLQIRUPDWLRQSURFHVVLQJ¶HWF± into our 
descriptions of neuronal activity. 
(Tallis 2004: 30) 
 






Edelman and Johnson respectively base their work.14 Tallis then systematically refutes the value 
RIWKHVHWHUPVDVFRQFHSWXDOPHWDSKRUV+RZHYHU7DOOLV¶VQHHGWRH[SORGHWKHVHVR-called 
µQHXURP\WKRORJLFDO¶WHUPVRQO\EHOLHVWKHLUVLJQLILFDQFHDVKHUHDGLO\DGPLWVKLPVHOI7DOOLV
credits the conception of his book as occurring during the writing of a separate 
 
critique of contemporary materialistic accounts of human consciousness [when he realized] that 
certain terms were used repeatedly and that the use, or more precisely the misuse, of these terms 
lay at the heart not only of the errors in neurobiological and computational theories of the mind 
but also of their apparent explanatory force. 
(Tallis 2004: 33) 
 
He is here admonishing the truth-value of such metaphors whilst simultaneously admitting their 
explanatory conceptual power. This is important because while Tallis clearly rejects the terms 
indexed in his book, he is nevertheless much more comfortable using metaphors or terms 
borrowed from literature in his own writing; on just one page in the concluding remarks of his 
ERRN¶VLQWURGXFWLRQ7DOOLVDSSHDOVIRUDGLIIHUHQWNLQGRIH[SODQDWRU\FDSDELOLW\EXLOWRQWKUHH
LQVWDQFHVRIµVWRU\¶ DQGRQHHDFKRIµVDJD¶DQGµJUHDWDGYHQWXUH¶7DOOLV 
Whilst this is not to denigrate his argument up till that point, in the strictest sense if a 
theory of mind or consciousness cannot claim complete identity with a brain or a machine, its 
history is equally neither a µsaga¶ nor a µgreat adventure¶, nor is any of its resultant descriptions 
of experience reducible to simplHVFLHQWLILFµVWRULHV¶ However, despite all this, what shines 
WKURXJKKHUHLVWKDWWKHUHLVDFKDQJHLQWRQHLQ7DOOLV¶VFRQFOXVLRQ, as he moves from a relatively 
balanced yet wilful dismantling of neuromythology and into a more impassioned plea for a new 
EUDQGRIµFULWLFDOQHXUR-HSLVWHPRORJ\¶DSOHDLQZKLFKKHDSSHDUVWRSUHIHUDPRUH
traditional mythological language. It is fair to say that Tallis probably thinks of these terms which 
carry (on the face of it) more literary associations as noWLRQVZLWKOHVVµSUHPDWXUHFRQFHSWXDO
FORVXUH¶± perhaps not far off of a convolution, a loop that seems to be closing but veers away 
again at the last moment towards some unknown goal. 
2QEDODQFH7DOOLV¶VDUJXPHQWLVPRUHWKDQDQ\WKLQJKLJKO\ZDU\RIRYHrly reductive 
theories and what sway these theories may hold over contemporary neuroscience; in this his 
argument is well thought through and certainly justified. However, it also only underscores the 
power (not to mention pervasiveness) of conceptual metaphors to an argument, this latter being 




 Admittedly, Johnson only partially relates his position to the mind/brain, but he nevertheless repeatedly makes reference to many 
other people whose prime focus has become this neuropsychological relation with complexity, highly lauding them and 
interconnecting their work outside of their own respective fields. Johnson also uses this as a jumping off point for his next, much 







ultimately insightful analyses here, though stemming from someone with a long neuroscientific 
background and thus more than well-qualified enough to comment on such matters, remain 
thoroughly outside of the mainstream. Tallis himself notes the very same in his more recent 
onslaught against what he sees as fallacious uses of neuroscience and evolutionary theory, based 
as they are, just as are recourses to complexity and computers, on catachrestic uses of language: 
 
The utter failure of my efforts to halt the inexorable advance of Neuromania and Darwinitis may 
be judged by the fact that, since [the earliest of these published efforts] twenty years ago, 
evolutionary psychology, various modes of neuro-GHWHUPLQLVPEDVHGRQWKHQRWLRQWKDWµ<RXDUH
\RXUEUDLQ¶DQGDGR]HQQHZGLVFLSOLQHVEDVLQJWKHPVHOYHVRQWKRVHWZRRIIVKRRWVRI
evolutionary theory and neuroscience have achieved an extraordinary influence on discussions of 
human nature. 
(Tallis 2011: 7) 
 
When faced with the immovable wall of the status quo, it seems likely that the multiple and 
varied frustrations of Tallis, Keller, Lewontin, Edelman, Johnson and others speak to the way 
certain metaphors (in this case those pertaining to science, but undoubtedly those far further 
afield too) are so deeply ingrained as to be almost invisible.  
%L]DUUHO\KRZHYHUDOWKRXJK7DOOLV¶VVHOI-admission to failure ± and admirable refusal to 
surrender nevertheless ± is par for the course as far as the disavowal of scientific metaphoric 
strength is concerned, some branches of science, interestingly enough offshoots of linguistics and 
cognitive science, place metaphor at their centre. In fact, they do this in order to attempt to 
explain the pervasiveness of metaphor, which seems to be routinely passed over for inspection, as 
actually at the foundation of the way people think, let alone the way people speak or write. Thus 
one gets the extremely influential and path breaking position of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson 
in their book Metaphors We Live By. Originally published in 1980, in this book Lakoff and 
Johnson contend that  
 
metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish ± a 
matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typically viewed as 
characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, 
most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the 
contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and 
action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature >«@. 
But our conceptual system is not something we are normally aware of. In most of the 





lines. Just what these lines are is by no means obvious. One way to find out is by looking at 
language. Since communication is based on the same conceptual system that we use in thinking 
and acting, language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like. 
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 3) 
 
This is difficult ground to tread as it not only flies in the face of common sense views of both 
metaphor and conceptualization, but it also seems to be somehow extra- or pre-psychological ± 
people write and speak the way they do based on ways they think and act which are themselves 
based on what is ordinarily conceived of as the more florid end of the ways they write and speak. 
Furthermore, in looking at language for their evidence for this, Lakoff and Johnson add another 
pre-determining layer of problematic circularity ± the truth about the way people act and think 
can be seen in the way people use language, language itself determined by the way people think 
and act. 
Nevertheless, their systematic approach to metaphor analysis, resulting in what they term 
µFRQFeptual metaphor theory¶ is more intelligible and persuasive than it might at first seem, and 
they observe in their extensive afterword to the 2003 reedition of Metaphors We Live By that, 
 
by bringing metaphorical thought into the limelight, this book revealed the need to rethink some 
of the most fundamental ideas in the study of mind: meaning, truth, the nature of thought, and the 
role of the body in the shaping of mind. As a result it had far-reaching implications in field after 
field ± not just linguistics, cognitive science, and philosophy but also literary studies, politics, law, 
clinical psychology, religion, and even mathematics and the philosophy of science. 
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 243) 
 
It is precisely this last, the effect on or of philosophy of science, which is of interest here and 
which perhaps can be contested on the basis that conceptual metaphor theory, firstly, makes 
assumptions about the nature of evidence necessary to its linguistically-based, empirical study of 
metaphorical language; and secondly, pretending for a moment that this first problem is not true, 
science itself (as it very often is wont to do in general, and as was shown earlier in this particular 
case) has by and large disregarded any analysis of metaphor that the philosophy of science might 
have conducted. 
 Nonetheless, this is not to say that conceptual metaphor theory is not useful; on the 
contrary, these problems only show up further the convolving, almost-but-not-quite-circular 
nature of the interaction between scientific DQGOLWHUDU\WKRXJKW/DNRIIDQG-RKQVRQ¶VDIWHUZRUG
goes on to mention in slightly more detail the effect conceptual metaphor has had on literary 
studies (amongst the other fields mentioned above), and they do indeed assert that overall their 





PHWKRGVRILQTXLU\¶: 274). Additionally, given their attempted upheaval of thought and 
their consequent noting of some degree of success, Lakoff and Johnson simultaneously admit to 
repeated frustrations in the face of the status quo, just as Tallis does, whilst also observing the 
slightly problematic (and thus necessarily self-reflexive) nature of conducting a project to change 
thought and action in the world, when the project itself is based on already extant thoughts and 
actions: 
 
Every scientific theory is constructed by scientists ± human beings who necessarily use the tools 
of the human mind. One of those tools is conceptual metaphor. When the scientific subject matter 
is metaphor itself, it should be no surprise that such an enterprise has to make use of metaphor, as 
it is embodied in the mind, to construct a scientific understanding of what metaphor is. 
(Lakoff and Johnson 2003: 252) 
 




thus suggesting the transfer of sense by analogy from one term to another and constituting an 
instance of catachresis, [namely] a metaphorical expression for which there exists no literal 
equivalent. Moreover, literal LVOLNHZLVHFDWDFKUHVWLF>«@ 
(Norris 1998: 428) 
 
Rather than see in this some spiralling linguistic mise-en-abîme, Norris says it is at the heart of 
-DFTXHV'HUULGD¶VUHDGLQJRIWKDWDUFK-theorist of metaphor: Aristotle. This, according to Norris, 
affords Derrida a greater anti-relativist or anti-realist position (and thus one thoroughly amenable 
to a world of science written in an ontologically responsible way) than that with which most 
commentators would normally credit Derrida. In light of all this, Lakoff and Johnson¶V2003 
stance on their seminal 1980 work is admirable; the self-criticality and reflexivity mentioned 
above is remiQLVFHQWRIWKDWDGYRFDWHGE\&KRXGKXU\DQG6ODE\LQWKHLUFDOOIRUDµFULWLFDO
neuroscience¶ and in the most recent afterword of Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson 
profess a path somewhere between literalist, objectivist views and the converse poststructuralist 
tack, accepting neither outright. 
Indeed, as useful as Lakoff and Johnson¶Vapproach has been, its reflexivity is what I am 
most interested in, and is something that they merely touch upon, rather than deeply explore 
within the methods they use themselves. In order to keep honest a philosophical, scientific project 
wanting to change science and philosophy but adhering from the outset to a dominant empiricist 





hurt as a reciprocal gesture to conceptual metaphor and its lengthy reach. If the literary mode is 
indeed not special as Lakoff and Johnson claim, but simply the most normal way of thinking, 
then perhaps drawing on the diverse expertise of the historical study of the literary mode (as I 
propose to do) could be beneficial, as an interpretative tool that does not simply assume the 
empirical, quantitative default, and recognizes the perils but fundamental necessity of appraisals 
of catachrestic language. As mentioned, Lakoff and Johnson discuss their own use of metaphor in 
building their theory but also how other fields resist such discussions. This is because the 
µFDUU\LQJRYHU¶RIWKLQJVLGHDVDOUHDG\µFDUULHGRYHU¶IURPVRPHZKHUHHOVHLVDGLIILFXOt and at 
bottom collaborative process, requiring real widespread co-operation instead of mere lip service 
to interdisciplinarity. Using the fruits of literary analysis as tools to analyse scientific writing 
could correspondingly bear as nourishing fruit as scientific analysis of literature has done over 










for the lobes of the brain and their constituent sulci and gyri, the convoluted texts of literary and 
scientific writers alike, and how all of these interweave with my own writing on their history, 
content and evolution. If, as Lakoff and Johnson say, getting the very concept of conceptual 
metaphor off the ground has been a major sticking point for intellectuals and researchers in other 
fields, then the more obvious, prosaic, etymological and historical coexistence I am pointing to in 
µFRQYROXWLRQ¶PLJKWVHHPWo be more readily accepted. Sadly, even this appears not to be the 
case; Maasen, Mendelsohn and Weingart argue that while the adoption of metaphors across 
disciplines in science and from science to other spheres (and vice versa) is known to be 
commonplace to the point of being almost inevitable, the conscious acceptance of this linguistic 
cross-pollination is far less widespread. Most often it is in fact met with stubborn resistance, 
SRVVLEO\EHFDXVHµWKHWUDQVIHURIPHDQLQJLVQRORQJHULOOXVWUDWLYHRUHYHn decorous but can imply 
the redefinition of the subject matter. By becoming integrated, in the case of interdisciplinary 
transfer, in the body of theories, methods, and basic definitions of subject matter, the transfer 
PD\LQYROYHWKHLUWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ¶0DDVHQHWDO7KH\JRRQWRVD\WKDWµDVORQJDVWKH
perceived difference in meaning is slight, or serves the purpose to create additional insights, 
metaphors are judged to be good. As soon as the use of metaphors implies change of meaning, 
even cKDQJHRIWKHGLVFLSOLQDU\LGHQWLW\WKH\DUHMXGJHGWREHEDG¶,ELG 
However, considering the undoubted ubiquity of metaphors in all fields, judgement (and 
even fear) of their interdisciplinary validity obfuscates serious analysis of what functions they 
KDYHVHUYHG7KHUHIRUHPXFKOLNH0DDVHQ¶VVRORSDSHULQWKHVDPHYROXPH quoted above, my 
intention in the chapters to follow is to avoid the futility of the debate regarding the pros and cons 
of metaphor uptake and instead address the following questions: how far-reaching and influential 
DUHVSHFLILFPHWDSKRUVVXFKDVµFRQYROXWLRQ¶" $UHWKHUHRWKHUH[DPSOHVRIVLPLODUO\µFRQYROYLQJ¶
terms and what are their histories? To what degree are these related metaphors two-way-streets in 
the transferal between brain science and literature? What impact does this have on writing within, 
across and about these spheres? And given its attempts at interdisciplinary integration, both in 
terms of content and methodology, to what extent does this include my own writing? Thus, in the 
VSLULWRIDZDQGHULQJRUIROGLQJµFRQYROXWLRQ¶ inspired in large part by the Derridean concept of 
destinerrance (and ironically backed by trenchant anti-Derridean Raymond Tallis in his recent 
HODERUDWLRQVRQWKHµPHWDSK\VLFDOIOkQHXU¶± Cf. Tallis 2013), the scope of this thesis is not 





I have found the continuing groundswell of neurologically-inflected studies of literature 
and culture to reaffirm my stance. A case in point is the publication in 2012 of Borges and 
Memory by Argentinian neuroscientist Rodrigo Quian Quiroga. Prior to the start of my research, I 
LGHQWLILHG-RUJH/XLV%RUJHVDVDZULWHUZKRW\SLILHVP\LGHDVRQµFRQYROXWLRQV¶ where his 
fiction and the sciences of the mind and brain snake in and out of each other almost 
imperceptibly. Just such a psychological, neuroscientific view of Borges has been greatly 
substantiated by comparatist Patricia Novillo-Corvalán, and furthermore extended to include 
textual interactions with his contemporaries James Joyce and Samuel Beckett (Cf. Novillo-
&RUYDOiQDE4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VERRNZKLFK1RYLOOR-Corvalán also mentions, 
corroborates this view from the standpoint of neuroscience, not just covering how Borges 
potentially had a distinctly cutting-HGJHJUDVSRIEUDLQIXQFWLRQDQGPHPRU\EXWKRZ%RUJHV¶V
VWRULHVDOVRKDGDVWURQJO\GLVFHUQLEOHHIIHFWRQ4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VRZQVFLHQWLILFZRUN$V
PHQWLRQHGHDUOLHUDQGVSDUNHGE\4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VERRNWKHILUVWFRQYROXWLRQ I identified 
reflects a long-VWDQGLQJVFLHQWLILFWURSHWRGRZLWKµTXL[RWLFTXHVWV¶ originating in one of 
%RUJHV¶VRZQJUHDWSDVVLRQV0LJXHOGH&HUYDQWHV¶VDon Quixote. Indeed, Maasen et al. 
WKHPVHOYHVVSHDNRISHRSOHZKRµILJKWD'RQ4XL[RWLDQFDXVH¶Ln the discussion of metaphors in 
science ± this itself a metaphor which could be taken positively or negatively depending upon 
FRQWH[WEHFDXVHWKHµIORZRIPHWDSKRUVDPRQJVFLHQFHSROLWLFVOLWHUDWXUHDQGHYHU\GD\
discourses is continuous, recursive, anGVHOHFWLYH¶EXWWKHPHWDSKRUWDNHVRQDµOLIHRI>LWV@RZQ¶
once the original context has been transcended (Maasen et al. 1995: 8). 
7KLVW\SLILHVZKDWIRUPHLVDMXVWLILFDWLRQRIµFRQYROXWLRQV¶QRWMXVWDVDQREMHFWRIVWXG\
but equally as an original and fruitful methodology. The work of an Argentinian neuroscientist 
4XLDQ4XLURJDWRRNPHDZD\IURPDIHOORZ$UJHQWLQH¶V%RUJHV¶VOLWHUDU\ZULWLQJVDQGonto a 
PRUHEURDGO\+LVSDQLFWURSH¶VHIIHFWRQVFLHQFH)ROORZLQJWKHWURSHLQWKLVZD\FXOPLQDWHGLn 
research on so-called father of modern neuroscience Santiago Ramón y Cajal, and his views on 
literature, science and his native Spanish society ± LQFOXGLQJWKHQRWLRQRIWKHµTXL[RWLFTXHVW¶
mentioned earlier.15 :KHQ&DMDO¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQ6SDLQVFLHQFHand quixotism at the start of the 
twentieth century revealed inconsistences ± specifically the manner in which quixotic, scientific 
individuals relate to their society ± a change of angle was needed. Thus, I followed the quixotic 
quest as it led away to another time and place, and into the quest-themed writings of poet W H 
$XGHQDQGQHXURORJLVW2OLYHU6DFNV$VLVHYLGHQWIURPWKLVµTXL[RWLVP¶DQGµTXHVWV¶DUHERWK
terms representative of how literature and brain science mutually inform each other, but equally 
they encapsulate how disparate fields are written about (including by me) in a common idiom 




 For penetrating discussions of Cajal with regard to nationalism and literature (specifically Borges), Cf. Otis 2000 and Novillo-







been my intention to perform what it is I am demonstrating ± that is to say, my writing should 
µFRQYROYH¶ embodying the process of convolution it seeks to describe ± I have brought all of the 
above together in the first chapter under the title Convolution 1: Quest. 
In Convolution 2: Detective, side-stepping from quest heroism to genre fiction heroism, 
my premise is to examine the notion that neuroscience is detective work and that therefore 
neuroscientists are literary detectives. The chapter departs from the point at which philosopher 
Dan Lloyd considers cognitive nHXURVFLHQFH¶VYLHZRIKXPDQDQGQHXURQDVµGHWHFWRU¶ and goes 
on to the current cultural standing of neuroscience and its practitioners as the true bearers of 
insight into human nature, where this arguably used to be the domain of the detective figure. It 
then moves to a discussion of neuro-themed television mysteries to demonstrate this uncanny 
QHXURVFLHQWLILFLQVLJKW+RZHYHUE\XQFULWLFDOO\DVVXPLQJGHWHFWLYHILFWLRQ¶VFRPIRUWLQJ
resolution of a self-defined problem, neuroscience does not question the ethical and 
epistemological implications of its borrowings. The chapter wraps up by surveying how this 
plays out in the works of Oliver Sacks, before returning to Lloyd. On the way, I consider 
GHWHFWLYHILFWLRQ¶VLQEXLOWWHQGHQF\WRLQWHUURJDWHDQGWKXVSRlice itself, and suggest neuroscience 
WKHUHIRUHQHHGVWRWDNHRQERDUGDOORIWKHOLWHUDU\JHQUH¶VOHVVRQVQRWMXVWWKHJODPRURXVRQHV 
The third chapter, Convolution 3: Labyrinth, adds an extra layer of convolution and 
claims that if the brain is a labyrinth as neuroscience deems it to be, then so too is brain science 
itself. This shifts the argument from relatively straightforward epistemological detective-like 
activity, to a metaphorical blurring of epistemological and ontological endeavours, an accretion 
into activity-as-material-object that is the labyrinth. From maps in the mind to mice in mazes, 
neuroscience (as well as its history) is a complicated labyrinth which challenges stable notions of 
interiority and exteriority, and oscillates between the reductive simplification of cartography and 
its own incorporation of maze-like associations. My suggestion as the chapter unfolds is that, 
where the concept of mapping fails to deal with the complexities of labyrinthine thinking in 
QHXURVFLHQFHOLWHUDWXUH¶s long-term experience of the figure can be educational and illustrative, 
such as in the works of Borges. The chapter closes with a synthesis of the literary and the 
neuroscientific, via a reading of the work of Douglas Hofstadter. 
Convolution 4: Ballistics begins with the melodramatic assertion that every neuron is a 
gun. This is to say that a neuron does not simply interact with its neighbour in a friendly manner, 
but instead fires at it. When phrased like this, it seems preposterous, but the idea of neurons firing 
is otherwise so normal and idiomatic as to seem entirely natural and unquestionable. The thread 
of the chapter runs from the notion of the speed of thought, through uncritically standardized 
SUREOHPVIURPWKHQRWLRQ¶s history (typified by the apocrypha surrounding Phineas Gage), and on 





temporal implications of thinking about neurons alongside guns and missiles remains 
underexplored. By contrast, the chapter argues, metaphorical ballistic ramifications have been 
much better examined by literary study than science, and in this vein I focus on B S Johnson, 
Toby Litt and Jacques Derrida. The common ancestry of neurons and weapons in the scientific 
jargon of neurophysiology silently relates notions of military and biological defence, and the 
disavowal of this convolution requires rectification by instruction from the literary example, so 
that weapons do not fall into the wrong hands ± that is, if they have not already. 
Completing the description of the shape of a convolution, which returns to where it 
began (but not quite), the concluding chapter of this thesis serves as a form of second 
introduction, and is therefore titled Convoclusion: A Reintroduction. It proceeds by firmly 
asserting the importance of intellectual interrogation as a prerequisite for convolutionary practice, 
be this in literature, neuroscience, or any other field. It continues by briefly reiterating the 
contents of all the chapters, before setting out again upon a final case study of the problematic 
GLVDYRZDORIFRQYROXWLRQLQWKHKLVWRU\RIQHXURVFLHQFHLOOXVWUDWLQJWKHYHU\VLOHQFHRIµFDVH
studies¶ From this silence emerges the suggestion for a wandering path out of this problem, once 
again taking in Borges, Sacks, Lloyd and Hofstadter, and definitively stating the case for a 
UHDGLQJRIOLWHUDWXUHZKLFKFDQDFWXDOO\µPDNH¶QHXURVFLHQFHKDSSHQ)LQDOO\DVHULHVRIIRXU
µFRQYRFOXVLRQV¶HQFDSVXODWHLQPLQLDWXUHDOOWKHLVVXHVUDLVHGE\WKHthesis, before proposing an 
ultimate, novel conclusion for its reflexive and itinerant cogitations. 
Each chapter in this thesis revolves (or convolves) around each central, titular term, 
while the texts used to do so traverse the entire list of terms by including or connecting to more 
WKDQRQHIRUH[DPSOH%RUJHV¶VVKRUWVWRULHVDUHFRQVLGHUHGLQDOOWKHFKDSWHUVZLWKRXWEHLQJWKH
sole focus of any). As mentioned, the intention is for the finished work to resemble as well as 
GHVFULEHDQLQWHOOLJLEO\µFRQYRlving¶ intertwining structure. In doing so, this thesis seeks to 
provide a new and coherent conceptual framework for further research into the joint field of 
literature and neuroscience which favours neither discipline over the other, recognizing what 
should be their more widely evident discursive equivalence and relevance. By redressing this 
IDLUO\UHFHQWO\HPHUJHGLPEDODQFH,LQWHQGWRFRQWULEXWHDVPXFKDSLHFHRIµFULWLFDO
neuroscience¶ WRUHLWHUDWHRQFHDJDLQ&KRXGKXU\DQG6ODE\¶VVLJQLILFDQWFRLQDJe, as a work of 
creative and important literary scholarship. In conclusion, then, I would like to suggest that in 
order to contest the supposed impingement of the so-FDOOHGµQHXUR-UHYROXWLRQ¶XSRQHYHU\WKLQJ
from culture to the very lifeworld itself, it might be most useful to dispense with a simplistic 
corresponding counter-revolution, and instead, in a highly collaborative, critical way, attempt to 
wander through and identify the convolutions that already weave throughout the history of 













While little hands make vain pretence 
 Our wanderings to guide. 
(Carroll 1982: 13) 
 
 
Everything tends toward the flourish, toward the curve, 
toward intricate convolution. What the reader does not 
perhaps gather at first sight, however, is that this manner of 
laying and arranging things also incorporates a setting apart 
± one that leads us back to the knight. 








Science is a quest and the brain is its ultimate goal, or so much of the rhetoric of neuroscience 
would have one believe. This elevates the status of brain science and its practitioners to noble, 
even epic proportions, worthy of any literary, questing knight. However, when the knight in 
question is the deluded Don Quixote, the self-ascribed rationality of neuroscience is brought into 
doubt. This chapter follows the trope of the quixotic quest, beginning with just such a paradoxical 
self-determination in the writing of neuroscientist Rodrigo Quian Quiroga, and backwards 
WKURXJKKLPWRKLVLOOXVWULRXVIRUHEHDU6DQWLDJR5DPyQ\&DMDODWWKHGDZQRIQHXURVFLHQFH¶V
EXUJHRQLQJHSLVWHPRORJLFDOJULSXSRQWKHLPDJLQDWLRQRIWKHZRUOG:LWKUHDVRQ¶VUHSXWDWLRQ
thus revealed as potentially neurotic, I move to the poetic, theoretical and autobiographical 
writings of W H Auden and Oliver Sacks, and their attempts to instead salvage the individual 
(and ironically rational) possibilities of neurosis, by recasting the true fate of the quixotic quest in 
DQHQWLUHO\GLIIHUHQWOLJKW$VWKLVGHPRQVWUDWHVµTXL[RWLVP¶DQGµTXHVWV¶DUHERWKWHUPV
representative of how literature and brain science mutually inform each other, written as they are 





Rodrigo Quian Quiroga: The Quest of Rationalistic Quixotism 
 
 
This chapter takes as its primary cues some comments from a book recently published by a 
neuroscientist. However, this is not a book predominantly about his findings; these he has 
outlined previously elsewhere, and the more recent book is actually about an important literary 
writer. So what is the connection? According to the scientist in question, Rodrigo Quian Quiroga, 
the common root of his own research on memory and of the writings of Jorge Luis Borges can be 
found in the history of neuroscience, all of which Quian Quiroga covers in Borges and Memory 
(2012). The book itself has its own history; it was originally published as Borges y la Memoria in 
2011 in tKHDXWKRU¶VQDWLYH6SDQLVK*LYHQWKLV4XLDQ4XLURJDZULWHs in his Acknowledgements 
that  
 
Borges, who was raised bilingual, joked that the Spanish version of Don Quixote was a bad 
translation from the English original. It may actually be the case that the English translation of 
[Borges and Memory@VXUSDVVHVWKHRULJLQDO7KLVVKRXOGQ¶WEHDWWULEXWHGWRP\PRGHVWELOLQJXDO
abilities, though, but to the terrific work and dedication of [translator] Juan Pablo Fernández. 
(Quian Quiroga 2012: 204) 
 
Thus, this chapter will be about negotiation between one cultural ambit and another, be it 
linguistic or disciplinary, in translation or historical, neuroscience or literature. In doing so, and 
LQWKHVSLULWRI4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VUHPDUNVKHUHDQGHOVHZKHUHDERXWDon Quixote, I want to trace 
VRPHRIWKHLQWHUWZLQLQJVRI&HUYDQWHV¶VTXHVWLQJNQLJKWZLWKVFLHQFHHVSHFLDOO\DVUHJDUGVWKDW
pertaining to the mind/brain. The chapter will be an attempt to investigate what historian of 
VFLHQFH0D[6WDGOHUKDVGHVFULEHGDVµDFHrebral romanticism inscribing the neurosciences, 
wittingly or not, into an age-old, anthropological quest of ultimate significance, the final capstone 
on the long-ZLQGHGSDWKWRKXPDQQDWXUHH[SRVHG¶ 
The wealth of commentary generated by MigueOGH&HUYDQWHV6DDYHGUD¶VDon Quixote 
since its two-part publication over 400 years ago is immense. Notwithstanding this reiteratively 
SDUDGLJPDWLFWH[W¶VRYHUEHDULQJFHQWUDOLW\LQWKHFDQRQRIWKH+LVSDQLFZRUOGLWLVZRUWK
considering its nigh-on instantaneous universal reach; Manuel Durán and Fay R Rogg note that as 
its first part ZDVµWUDQVODWHGDOPRVWLPPHGLDWHO\DIWHULWVSXEOLFDWLRQLQ>Don Quixote] 
LQIOXHQFHGZULWHUVIURPLWVLQFHSWLRQ¶'XUiQDQG5RJJ7KLVPHDQVWKDWZKDWLVZLGHO\ 
considered the first novel proper was from the beginning subject to simultaneous intra- and inter-
lingual scrutiny. Indeed, translation was an issue inscribed into its textual fabric, as the very 
framing device for the narrative is supposed to be the transcribed version of a tale verbally 






captivate us? How does the work penetrate and play on the modern mind? And so, like Don 
4XL[RWHZHEHJLQRXUTXHVW:HFKRRVHDVDSRLQWRIUHIHUHQFH(GLWK*URVVPDQ¶VWUDQVODWLRQRI
Don Quixote EHFDXVHWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\YRFDEXODU\PDNHVIRUPXFKHDVLHUUHDGLQJ¶ 
 So what does this have to do with cognitive/neuro science? A first clue comes in Durán 
DQG5RJJ¶VDSSHDOWRWKHDOPRVWGHOXVLRQDOTXHVW-like quality of attempting yet another critical 
reading of Don Quixote; Grossman, the translator of the edition they choose for this reading, 
VLPLODUO\HPSKDVL]HVWKDWµHQGHDYRXULQJWRWUDQVODWHDUWIXOZULWLQJSDUWLFXODUO\DQLQGLVSHQVDEOH
work like Don Quixote, grows out of infinite optimism as the translator valiantly, perhaps 
quixotically, attempts to enter the mind of the first writer throuJKWKHJDWHZD\RIWKHWH[W¶
(Grossman 2005: xviii). This preoccupation, as Durán and Rogg observe, is something that 
FRQWLQXHVWRµSHQHWUDWHDQGSOD\RQWKHPRGHUQPLQG¶VLPLODUO\EXWLQWKHRSSRVLWHGLUHFWLRQWR
µTXL[RWLFDOO\¶µHQWHUWKHPLQG¶RIWKHQRYHO¶VZULWHUDV*URVVPDQLPSOLHVLVWKHQDWXUDOHYHQ
ideal way of heroically embarking upon another treatment of this heroic text. The common idiom 
here means delusional questing becomes the mutually reinforcing norm: the Don and his squire 
(and their DXWKRUEXUURZLQWRRQH¶VVNXOOVRWKDWRQHPD\WKHQEXUURZLQWRWKHLUVPDNLQJLWVHHP
that a reciprocal, metaphorical kind of ad hoc exploratory neurosurgery is very much the order of 
the day. 
 Quixotic quests are embedded into the English-language cultural lexicon. The everyday 
PHDQLQJRIWKHQRXQµTXHVW¶ as in a search or pursuit, always feels as if it is about to stumble into 
something grander, more significant or aspirational than the prosaic act of looking for a lost item 
of clothing, or trying to find the right balance of herbs in a sauce. This more epically charged 
aspect of a quest is reflected in the OED¶VVL[WK GHILQLWLRQRILWµ,QFKLYDOULFRU$UWKXULDQ
romance: an expedition or search undertaken by a knight or group of knights to obtain some thing 
RUDFKLHYHVRPHH[SORLW1RZDOVRDVLPLODUVHDUFKRUMRXUQH\LQDQ\ILFWLRQDOQDUUDWLYH¶7KLV
definition dates back to the late fifteenth century, but interestingly, the OED also claims that 
LQVWDQFHVRIµ4XL[RWH¶ roughly equivalent both in noun and adjective form to our present day use 
RIWKHZRUGµTXL[RWLF¶ were first in evidence in 1644, this earliest example credited to English 
SRHW-RKQ&OHYHODQG:KLOVWWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\ZRUGµTXL[RWLF¶LWVHOIFDQUDQJHLQPHDQLQJIURP
idealistic and whimsical all the way to foolhardy, capricious and downright delusional, 
&OHYHODQG¶VXVDJHVXJJHVWVWKHODWWHUHQGRIWKLVVFDOHµ7KH4XL[RWHVRIWKLV$JHILJKWZLWKWKH
Wind-PLOOVRIWKHLURZQH+HDGV¶1RWHWKHVSHFLILFPHQWLRQWKDWWKHORFDWLRQRIWKHGHOXVLRQal 
DFWLRQLVWKHµKHDG¶ It would appear that the illusory and cranium-bound quixotic quest has been 
on our linguistic horizon for a long time ± almost as long as Don Quixote and its ingenious 





 With this latter thought in mind, I turn to another, related discussion on the origin of 
terms. Literary scholar J A V Chapple, writing in 1986 on the entrance of the now ubiquitous 
ZRUGµVFLHQWLVW¶WRWKHJHQHUDOYRFDEXODU\FRQWUDGLFWVWKHOED¶VWKHQHQWU\E\VD\LQJWKDW
William Whewell did not coin the term in his influential Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences 
(1840), but in a much earlier piece written for the Quarterly Review (and this has since been 
verified and updated by the venerable dictionary). In this earlier piece from 1834, Whewell 
describes the argument regarding the proper title for a person engaged in science that transpired 
DWWKHSUHYLRXV\HDU¶VPHHWLQJRIWKH%ULWLVK$VVRFLDWLRQIRUWKH$GYDQFHPHQWRI6FLHQFHµVRPH
ingenious gentleman proposed that by analogy with artist, they might form scientist, and added 
that there could be no scruple in making free with this termination when we have such words as 
sciolist, economist, and atheist¶Cited in Chapple 1986: 1; original emphasis). However satirical, 
the logic here proveGVRXQGHQRXJKDQGLQGHHGWKHZRUGµVFLHQWLVW¶VWXFNEHFRPLQJIDUOHVV
FRQWURYHUVLDOWKDQDWWKDWPHHWLQJ0RUHLQWHUHVWLQJO\DFFRUGLQJWR&KDSSOH:KHZHOO¶VWKLUG
person accreditation referred actually to himself, probably the fictionally secret proponent of the 
new term. Not only was Whewell narrativizing himself (albeit in a gesture of mock modesty), but 
KHVSHFLILFDOO\FDOOVKLPVHOIDQµLQJHQLRXVJHQWOHPDQ¶ This appellation aligns him directly with 
&HUYDQWHV¶VPRVWIDPRXVFUHDWLRQ%\:KHZHOO¶VWLPH 'RQ4XL[RWHRI/D0DQFKD¶VIXOOWLWOHRI
El Ingenioso Hidalgo KDGEHHQWUDQVODWHGLQWR(QJOLVKPDQ\ZD\V7KHVHUDQJHGIURPµ9DORURXV
DQG:LWWLH.QLJKW(UUDQW¶LQ7KRPDV6KHOWRQ¶VSLRQHHULQJWUDQVODWLRQRI± Cf. Colahan 
WRµWKHPRVW5HQRZQHG'RQ¶DVSHU-RKQ3KLOOLSV¶VYHUVLRQ± Cf. Hayes 2009: 
73, note 6), but by far the most common version, and thus arguably a cognate phrase for the 
'RQ¶VQDPHLWVHOIZDVDQGVWLOOLVµLQJHQLRXVJHQWOHPDQ¶ There is therefore a strong suggestion 
that by the 1830s the linguistic and cultural tropes of Don Quixote¶VWUDQVODWLRQVKDGEHFRPHVR
embedded in the brains of pace-setting proto-scientists such as Whewell that they had become 
guiding metaphors for how the new specializations of science emerging in the nineteenth century 
went about organizing and referring to themselves. 
 Historian of science Charlotte Sleigh, like Chapple, writes convincingly about the 
interaction of Whewell with the literary writers of his day. Other than their explicit historical 
GLDORJXHV6OHLJKKLJKOLJKWVWKHGLVWLQFWLRQLQ:KHZHOO¶VZULWLQJVEHWZHHQGHGXFWLYHDQG
inductive reasoning, where deduction is akin to pure logic or mathematical thinking, while 
µLQGXFWLRQFRQVLVWHGLQJDWKHULQJHYLGHQFHJHQHUDOLVLQJLWDQGWKHQmaking an explanatory leap 
WRSRVWXODWHDJHQHUDOFRQFOXVLRQ¶6OHLJK7KLVVR-FDOOHGµH[SODQDWRU\OHDS¶ following 
the creative reassembly of some prior knowledge in light of the evidence gathered, was a piece of 
imaginative reasoning central to :KHZHOO¶V philosophy. As Sleigh argues, 
 
:KHZHOO¶VLQIOXHQWLDOPRGHORIVFLHQWLILFPHWKRG>«@ZDVEDVHGRQLGHDOLVPDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK










novel¶ but it is hDUGQRWWRH[WUDSRODWH:KHZHOO¶VLGHDWRWKHULJKWVRUWRISHUVRQWRRHVS\LQJLQ
LW'RQ4XL[RWH¶VPLQG-altering bookishness ± as his housekeeper says early in Part 1 of Don 






(but often playful) commentator on scientific matters, and his reliably unreliable narratives 
stretch to these ostensibly non-ILFWLRQZULWLQJV$V6OHLJKH[SODLQVµ&ULWLFVHYHQGLVDJUHHRQWKH
IXQGDPHQWDOTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHU3RH¶VHVVD\³(XUHND´DERXWWKHQDWXUHRIWKHXQLYHUVHLVVHULRXV
RUVSRRI¶7KLVPD\EHEHFDXse this piece, first published in 1848 and subWLWOHGµ$
3URVH3RHP¶3RH±IOLWVEHWZHHQFRVPRORJ\UHOLJLRQDQG3RH¶VUHSHUWRLUHRI
OLWHUDU\GHYLFHVDQGPRWLIV,WVPDLQWLWOHLVDWUDQVOLWHUDWHGUHIHUHQFHWRWKH$QFLHQW*UHHNIRUµ,
have found it¶ an expression most commonly attributed to Archimedes of Syracuse. Whilst 
$UFKLPHGHV¶ FU\RIµ(XUHND¶OHJHQGDULO\DFFRPSDQLHGWKHVSLOOLQJRIVRPHEDWKZDWHU3RH¶V
HVVD\µEureka¶ spills over into his lengthiest work of non-fiction and one which has only fuelled 
further historic, scientific and literary uncertainty (Cf. Sova 2001: 82) ± KLVORTXDFLRXVWDNHRQµ,
KDYHIRXQGLW¶LQGLFDWHVQRWWKHHQGRIDVHDUFKEXWVRPHWKLQJPRUHOLNHDEHJLQQLQJ 
 Since at least the times of Whewell and Poe, then, it is not certainty that follows 
searching, but uncertainty ± questions lead to quests lead to more questions, and so on. In Borges 
and Memory4XLDQ4XLURJDGLVSHOVWKHQRWLRQRIDµ(XUHND¶moment motivating scientists, 
positing instead something like tKHF\FOLFDOTXHVWLRQVDQGTXHVWVMXVWGHVFULEHGµ:KDWLVLWWKHQ
WKDWPDNHVVFLHQWLVWVZDQGHUDERXWLQDXQLYHUVHRILGHDVDQGH[SHULPHQWDWLRQ"¶KHDVNV (Quian 
Quiroga 2012: 2). Note that in this question he ties the world of ideas to the world of 
expeULPHQWDWLRQWKURXJKWKHDFWRIZDQGHULQJ7KLVPLUURUV'RQ4XL[RWH¶VUHVSRQVHWR6DQFKR
3DQ]D¶VTXHU\UHJDUGLQJWKHWUXHYDOXHRINQLJKWHUUDQWU\JLYHQLWVODUJHO\XQREVHUYHGQDWXUHDQG
if it would not simply be better to go and work directly for some more explicitly appreciative 
SDWURQ7KH'RQUHSOLHVµEHIRUHRQHUHDFKHVWKDWSRLQWLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRZDQGHUWKHZRUOGDVD
kind of test, seeking adventures, so that by concluding some of them, the knight acquires a 






than made, a protracted list, very much in the quixotic mould, of fortuitous and fanciful 
consequences of this µZDQGHULQJ¶DVDµWHVW¶16  
4XLDQ4XLURJDDQVZHUVKLVRZQTXHVWLRQUHJDUGLQJDVFLHQWLVW¶VPRWLYDWLRQVZLWKDQRWKHU
DPELWLRXVOLVWVXPPDUL]HGDVIROORZVµWKHVHDUFKIRUNQRZOHGJHRULQPRUHPXQGDQHWHUPV
simple curiosity. Nagging questions; the pressing need to figure something out and the inability 
WRGRDQ\WKLQJHOVHXQWLOWKHDQVZHULVIRXQG¶4XLDQ4XLURJD7KHVHµSUHVVLQJ¶DQG
µQDJJLQJ¶TXHVWLRQVVHHPWRERUGHURQWKHFRPSXOVLYHPHDQLQJWKHVHDUFKKHPHQWLRQVGRHVQRW
sound like a choice, EXWDPHQWDODQGSK\VLFDOLPSHUDWLYH$OUHDG\WKLVµVLPSOHFXULRVLW\¶VWDUWVWR
read like something to which he is driven, requiring more complex interrogation than is being 
DOORZHGIRUKHUH4XLDQ4XLURJDFRQWLQXHVE\VD\LQJWKDWµRQHFDQWKHQDVNZKHWKHU scientists, 
embarked upon their personal quests ± their quixotic endeavours ± VSHQGWKHLUWLPHMXVWWKLQNLQJ¶
(2012: 3). Although he subsequently claims the reality is a lot more repetitively mechanical and 
only theoretically so lofty, his adjectival invocation of Don Quixote is striking for two reasons: 
first, it specifically pitches science as a romantic or epic quest; but second, by admitting that the 
quixotic quest underpins and even validates the monotonous reiterations of the empirical 
experiment, he HTXDWHVVFLHQFH¶VSXWDWLYHUDWLRQDOLW\ZLWKWKHGHOXVLRQDOFRQWHQWVRIWKH'RQ¶V
head ± the quest itself LVHQRXJKWRMXVWLI\DQGH[SODLQRQH¶VYLYLGPHQWDOOLIHLQWKHIDFHRID
humdrum existence. Quian Quiroga elaborates: 
 
in my quest to understand diffHUHQWDVSHFWVRIKRZWKHEUDLQZRUNV>«@LWLVUDUHYery rare, to 
FRPHE\Dµ(XUHND¶ Problems are usually left open, answers usually lead to more questions, and 
the final solution is almost always elusive. But perhaps our obstinate perseverance may be nothing 
PRUHWKDQWKHNQRZOHGJHWKDW>«@WKHSOHDVXUHLVQRWLQILQGLQJWKHDQVZHUEXWLQVHDUFKing for it. 
(2012: 3) 
 
This pleasure, then, would be that of repetitive questioning and measuring, with its ultimate aim 
intentionally illusory; this feels like a paradoxical rationalization, a wilful equation of scientific 
method with the delusional quixotic quest. Unsurprisingly, this raises a further question ± to what 
degree do scientists such as Quian Quiroga suffer from what philosopher of science Nicholas 
Maxwell somewhat problematically WHUPVµUDWLRQDOLVWLFQHXURVLV¶" 
 Maxwell believes science has increased the knowledge of humanity, and thus its 
technical potency, but due to the effects of this so-FDOOHGµUDWLRQDOLVWLFQHXURVLV¶ not its wisdom. 
This has apparently led to µthe crisis behind all the other current global crises: science without 




 2IZKLFKLQFLGHQWDOO\-DFTXHV'HUULGD¶VFRQFHSWRIdestinerrance would perhaps be a neat encapsulation. In an attempt to emulate 
the spirit of said concept, complicated enough as it is on its own without convoluting the rest of the argument in this section, I shall 






wisdom. In these circumstances, to continue to pursue knowledge and technological know-how 
dissociated from a more fundamental quest for wisdom can only deepen the crisis. As a matter of 
urgency, we need to free science and DFDGHPLDRIWKHLUQHXURVHV>«@¶(Maxwell 2004: xiii; 
original emphasis). 7KLVPD\VHHPDWRXFKRYHUEORZQEXWLWEHDUVRXW0D[ZHOO¶VFKRLFHRIWKH
ZRUGµTXHVW¶KHUHDVLQVRPHWKLQJELJJHURUPRUHVLJnificant underlying the quotidian aspect of 
science, and he uses it again in the first paragraph of a chapter arguing for a return to the pre-
science and more humanities-IULHQGO\SUDFWLFHRIµQDWXUDOSKLORVRSK\¶RQO\DPRUHUDWLRQDO
version) (2004: 47). MD[ZHOO¶VDLPVDUHEDIIOLQJO\FRQYROXWHG\HWFODLPFRQFHSWXDOFHQWUDOLW\
his entire argument is to do with the very truth of aims. His point of departure in explaining 
µUDWLRQDOLVWLFQHXURVLV¶LVDSWO\WKH2HGLSXVFRPSOH[ZLWKLWVGHVLUHVWRORYHRUNLll a particular 
parent reformulated in terms of abstract aims. Thus, he re-represents the complex as a basic aim 
A in conjunction with another more problematic (and thus repressed) aim B resulting in the 
SURIHVVLQJRIDQXQZLWWLQJO\IDOVHDLP&µ1HXURVLV as I have sketchily characterized it above, is 
a condition that almost any aim-pursuing entity is likely to fall into, in so far as it is sufficiently 
VRSKLVWLFDWHGWRUHSUHVHQWDQGKHQFHPLVUHSUHVHQWWKHDLPVWKDWLWLVSXUVXLQJ¶Maxwell 2004: 2; 
original emphasis). Maxwell argues that science, and by extension academia, is rationalistically 
neurotic because it misrepresents its own aims.  
4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VDIRUHPHQWLRQHGFRPPHQWVZKLFKSRVLWDQLOOXVRU\DLPVRDVWR
continue asking questions, would at first glance appear to be neurotic in this way. However, with 
the illusory aim and its quixotic nature having been so readily admitted, his position is actually 
PXFKFORVHUWR0D[ZHOO¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWDWERWWRPVFLHQFH¶VUHDOSUREOHPDWLFDQGWKXV
disavowHGDLPLVµLPSURYLQJNQRZOHGJHRIexplanatory truth, the truth being presupposed to be 
H[SODQDWRU\RUFRPSUHKHQVLEOH¶0D[ZHOORULJLQDOHPSKDVLV7KHLVVXHKHUHLVWKLV
crucial metaphysical presupposition, which according to Maxwell is denied by science in favour 
of a standard empirical model that presupposes no truth without evidence. But Quian Quiroga 
makes no such denial, and instead openly admits the quandary: that the mere possibility of truth 
is an assumption. His quixotic quest is ironicDOO\PRUHOLNHDVHFXODUYHUVLRQRIWKHµH[SODQDWRU\
OHDS¶WKDW6OHLJKFUHGLWVWR:LOOLDP:KHZHOO,I0D[ZHOO¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKHILUVWVWHSLQ
combatting rationalistic neurosis is to freely confess to suffering it, Quian Quiroga is well on the 
road to reFRYHU\%HVLGHVWKLVDGGLWLRQDOO\SUREOHPDWLFLVWKDW0D[ZHOO¶VDUJXPHQWFLUFXODUO\
rests on a Freudian model itself somewhat awkwardly diagnosed with the same problem as the 
rest of science (Maxwell 2004: 112). Similarly, his justifiably idealistic appeal to the scientific 
µTXHVW¶EHFRPHVVXEYHUWHGLQKLVFRPPHQWDU\RQWKHIDOORXWIURPWKHVR-FDOOHG6FLHQFH:DUVµ,Q






own sake, but a self-GHQLDOLQVLVWLQJWKDWRQH¶VTXL[RWLFHQGVMXVWLI\RQH¶VPHDQVZKLOVW
simultaneously decrying this delusion in others. 
 Quian Quiroga is not a lone voice in the night unwittingly invoking Don Quixote in both 
scientific thought and deed ± the briefest survey shows the contrary. Cognitive psychologists 
6WHSKHQ*ROGLQJHUDQG7DPLNR$]XPDWLWOHWKHLUSDSHUµ3X]]OH-solving science: the 
quixotic quest for units in speech perception¶ whilst quantitative psychologist Patrick Curran 
H[SUHVVHVKLVFRQWLQXRXVXQFHUWDLQW\LQKLVDUWLFOHµ7KH6HHPLQJO\4XL[RWLF3XUVXLWRID
Cumulative Psychological Science¶ Curran writes that Don Quixote juxtaposes 
 
the eager pursuit of unrealistic ideals with practical grounding in the reality of day-to-day life. The 
main character succeeded in capturing the very nature of idealistic pursuit to the point that over 
time his name developed into an adjective that describes something as foolishly impractical. So, is 
it fair to describe the pursuit of a cumulative psychological science as quixotic? On some days, I 
believe that it is, whereas on others I do not. 
(Curran 2009: 77) 
 
1HYHUWKHOHVVKHVWLOOFDOOVLWDµYLWDOO\LPSRUWDQWTXHVW¶%LJ names in neuroscience 
6HPLU=HNLDQG&KULVWRI.RFKERWKKDYHUHODWLYHO\UHFHQWERRNVZLWKWKHZRUGµTXHVW¶LQWKHWLWOH
and some might say their work on the neural correlates of creativity and consciousness 
respectively is controversially quixotic (Cf. Zeki 2009; Koch 2004). Changing disciplinary tack 
EXWQRWFRQFOXVLRQVRFLRORJLVWDQGSROLWLFDOVFLHQWLVW:ROI/HSHQLHVEROGO\DUJXHVWKDWµSRHWV
anticipated the discoveries of science. Cervantes had, in his admirable Don Quixote, sketched out 
the true nature of insanity long before any biologist had done so; with profound insight he had 
GHVFULEHGKRZRXUHPRWLRQVLQIOXHQFHRXUSHUFHSWLRQV¶/HSHQLHV±40). Interestingly, 
this tallies with what is to Maxwell a rare instance of sanity in the mire of rationalistic neurosis 
(though he ends up claiming it for himself anyway). He concedes that  
 
some things have moved in the direction of wisdom-LQTXLU\>«@7KHUHLVJUHDWHUUHFRJQLWLRQRI
WKH>«@IXQGDPHQWDOUROHRIHPRWLRQLQFRJQLWLRQ>ZKLFK@DVIDUDVQeuroscience is concerned, 
KDVEHHQVWUHVVHGHVSHFLDOO\E\'DPDVLR>«@1HDUO\WZRGHFDGHVHDUOLHU,VWUHVVHGWKDWHPRWLRQ
is essential to rationality, to rational inquiry, and to science. 
(Maxwell 2004: 117±118; also, 118, note 1) 
 
In any case, if emotions quixotically influence perceptions, and scientific commentators choose 
to align themselves with the figure of the Don, then the quest of science from its outset seems to 





 It is not, nevertheless, my intention to say Quian Quiroga is a reclusive genius who is 
currently ignored but who will be historically vindicated by the quixotic tradition. His book 
Borges and Memory is not about Don Quixote, nor even about the truth-value of science, per se. 
,WLVDERXW4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VLQWHUHVWLQD%RUJHVVKRUWVWRU\LWVXQFDQQ\FRQJUXHQFHZLWKKLV
working life as a neuroscientist, and their potentially common roots. In describing his far from 
solitary day job, he is quick to give immense credit to the forebears and teams with whom he has 
worked. However, in a book on an ostensibly literary topic, Quian Quiroga is also unabashedly 
willing to dwell in the supposedly quixotic edges of science, something which, as has been 
shown, is perhaps not as irrational (nor as uncommon) as it originally seemed.17 Like Don 
Quixote, Borges had a personal library which was the source of his imaginary adventures; and 
like the priest and the barber, characters who seek to cure Don Quixote by examining his library 
and rather haphazardly assessing his reading material, Quian Quiroga spends a whole chapter of 
KLVUHODWLYHO\VKRUWERRNGHVFULELQJLQDGXODWRU\WHUPVKLVYLVLWWR%RUJHV¶VSUHVHUYHGOLEUDU\
Bizarrely, the quest of science here becomes more of a traditionally philological endeavour, 
Quian Quiroga attempting a diagnosis of the potential philosophical, literary or theoretical 
LQIOXHQFHVFRQWDLQHGLQ%RUJHV¶VOLEUDU\ZKLFKLIBorges and Memory¶VFRPPRQ-root thesis 
were correct, would unbeknownst to hLPEH4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VRZQLQIOXHQFHV± and having 
influences in this way would not be objective, nor detached, and would thus be most unscientific 
indeed.  
%XWWKLVLVVSHFLILFDOO\4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VSRVLWLRQVRPHRQHREVHVVHGZLWKWKHPLQGEUDLQ
and not just from the angle of his fascinating (empirical) work on memory and concept 
abstraction at the neuronal level. He purposely enacts a quixotic quest because rather than 
obscure the truth, this temporary refuge from the quotidian tasks of laboratory neuroscience 
actually affords him a better view of his practice. A useful parallel can be taken from Don 
Quixote: towards the start of Part 2, the Don accidentally defeats the Knight of the Mirrors and 
his squire. Soon after, it is revealed these two are merely another pair of amateur physicians 
VHFUHWO\DLPLQJWRFXUH'RQ4XL[RWH¶VPHQWDOSUREOHPE\WDNLQJSDUWLQLW7KH\DUHKLVIHOORZ








 Indeed, one could make the argument that Quian Quiroga is simply trading off of traditional notions of Romantic Science in order 
to elevate his work above the neuroscientific norm, or to justify any reductionist or materialist accusations against him. For a selection 
of essays on Romantic Science in various specific contexts, Cf. Heringman 2003. For a more general overview of the relationship 










To which Sansón responded: 
³7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKRVHWZRPDGPHQLVWKDWWKHRQHZKRFDQ¶WKHOSLWZLOODOZD\V
EHPDGDQGWKHRQHZKRFKRRVHVFDQVWRSZKHQHYHUKHZDQWVWR´ 
(Cervantes 2005: 549) 
 
Actively participating in a delusion might gain one some bruises in the short term. But it is 
XOWLPDWHO\IDUPRUHGHVLUDEOHWKDQVLPSO\DOORZLQJILFWLRQWRVHWRQH¶VµGRUVRODWHUDOSUHIURQWDO
FRUWH[>«@ERWKIRUQRQ-DFWLRQDQGDFWLRQ>DQGWKXV@EHFRPHXQFHUWDLQDERXW>RQH¶V@RZQVtatus 
LQUHDOLW\DVZHOODVWKDWRIWKHVWRU\¶+ROODQG, as literary scholar Norman Holland 
extrapolates from the neuroscientific theories of Llinás, Passingham and others. What Sansón 
Carrasco does not realize is he is as much µa man who does act in response to fictions¶+ROODQG
2012: 86; original emphasis), which is how Holland describes Don Quixote, but could equally 
represent Borges or Quian Quiroga. In the quest for science, as in any interrogation of truth, it is 






Santiago Ramón y Cajal: The Quest of Nationalistic Quixotism 
 
 
Belief in the potential virtues available via the kind of rationalistic quixotism described so far is 
not necessarily unique to the here and now of Rodrigo Quian Quiroga. He is preceded by some 
hundred years by Santiago Ramón y Cajal, another eminent Hispanic brain researcher (this time 
Spanish, not Argentinian), who seemed to concur with this type of thinking. Cajal (as his name is 
often shortened, contrary to the norms of the Spanish naming tradition) is widely though perhaps 
anachronistically held to be the father of modern neuroscience.18 Along with the Italian physician 
Camillo Golgi, Cajal shared the 1906 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine. Golgi had 
developed a staining technique which allowed a finer grain of detail in brain tissue to become 
visible, whilst Cajal utilized and elaborated upon this hitherto overlooked technique to observe 
via microscope, and then get down on paper, the plethora of intricate drawings of neurons with 
which his name would later become so famously synonymous. His numerous publications and 
SUL]HVLQDORQJDQGGLVWLQJXLVKHGFDUHHUDWWHVWWR&DMDO¶VZLGHVSUHDGSUHVWLJHDVDSLRQHHULQJ
neuroanatomist and histologist. Aggregated to his predominantly scientific career (in which of 
course was nested a highly productive artistic one, all his neuronal draughtsmanship considered), 
&DMDO¶VLQWXLWLYHYHUVDWLOLW\OHGKLPDOVRWRZULWHDZHDOWKRIQRQ-scientific texts, including 
autobiography and social commentary. Yet unbeknownst to most at the time and perhaps even 
many still, Cajal also wrote short stories, largely concerned with reflecting upon the world of 
scientific practice (Cf. Cajal 2001; Otis 2000; Novillo-Corvalán 2015b). Importantly, his literary 
concerns also intermingled with his social and scientific ones when on 9 May 1905, arguably at 
the peak of his powers and just a year before his receipt of the Nobel Prize, Cajal addressed a 
meeting celebrating the third centenary of the publication of Don Quixote at the San Carlos 
PHGLFDOFROOHJHLQ0DGULG&I&DMDO+LVOHFWXUHZDVWLWOHGµPsicología de don Quijote y el 
quijotismo¶ which translates as µ7KH3V\FKRORJ\RI'RQ4XL[RWHDQG4XL[RWLVP¶ 
Despite several efforts to publicize this important essay, it remains under-recognized, in 
particular in the Anglophone world. Appropriately enough given its topic, it is freely available on 
WKHZHEVLWHRIWKH,QVWLWXWR&HUYDQWHVWKH6SDQLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWernational vehicle for the 
promotion of Spanish culture, and it was also relatively recently republished in eminent and long-
running Spanish science journal Arbor (Cf. Cajal 2004). However, while the Dictionary of the 
Literature of the Iberian Peninsula goes so far as to name the essay LQDOLVWRI&DMDO¶VZRUNV













VFLHQWLVW¶VLQWHOOHFWXDOWHVWLPRQ\¶%OHLEHUJHWDOits first publication in English was 
only as an afterthought in 1968, as one of the selections in The World of Ramón y Cajal: With 
Selections from his Nonscientific Writings (Cf. Horne Craigie and Gibson 1968).19 This 
translation is somewhat clunky and does not preserve some of the important biological ideas 
Cajal imports into his treatise, and though a more recent translation is interesting, it changes 
µTXL[RWLVP¶WRµTXL[RWLFLGHDO¶ ORVLQJVRPHWKLQJRIWKHRULJLQDO¶VIOXHQF\DQGVFRSHLQWKH
process (Cf. Triarhou 2015). Therefore translations KHUHIURP&DMDO¶VRULJLQDOOHFWXUHDVSRVWHG
on the Instituto Cervantes website) are my own. 
The relative paucity of English translations is in itself all the more interesting considering 
&DMDO¶VLQWURGXFWRU\SDUDJUDSKWRWKHOHFWXUHZKHUHSULRUWRDQ\Giscussion of the so-called 
quixotic psychology of the title, he alludes to a deficiency in the English canon (and presumably 
in Shakespeare): 
 
The magnificent moral figure of the Manchegan gentleman is universally admired. Turned into a 
knight errant due to the influence of nonsensical books of chivalry, Don Alonso Quijano the Good 
represents, as has been said a thousand times, the most perfect symbol of honour and altruism. 
Never did the Anglo-Saxon genius, so given to imagining energetic and original characters, create 




(or even Hispanic) cultural character, he extols the virtues of a potential English-language 
counterpart whilst bizarrely deriding it for its lack of existence, all in the same breath. However, 
Cajal goes yet further, proposing the wilful espousal of quixotism as an exertion of Spanish 
identity, and furthermore, its idealistic moral character. His comments came at a time when Spain 
found itself in crisis, fresh from what was by any measure a frankly woeful nineteenth century for 
WKHFRXQWU\7KLVSHULRGLQ6SDLQ¶VKLVWRU\ZDVERRNHQGHGE\WKHNapoleonic Wars, Bonaparte 
UXOHDQGWKHLQLWLDOPXUPXULQJVRI6SDQLVK$PHULFDQLQGHSHQGHQFHDWLWVVWDUWWKHSHULRG¶VHQG
ZDVPDUNHGE\WKHORVVRIFRORQLHVDQGUHVXOWDQWFROODSVHLQ6SDLQ¶VJOREDOVWDQGLQJIROORZLQJ
the disastrous Spanish-American war and the proclamation of Cuban independence in 1898. 
Indeed, Cajal is sometimes spoken of as a peripheral member of the so-called noventayochistas, 




 Horne Craigie and GibsRQDGPLWWKDWWKHµILUVWREMHFWLYHRIWKLVERRNLVWRSUHVHQWWRUHDGHUVDSHUVRQDOL]HGDFFRXQWRIWKHRULJLQVRI








RUµ*HQHUDWLRQRI¶ an influential group of Spanish public intellectuals who sought to shake up 
the political and cultural fallout of impeULDO6SDLQ¶VGUDPDWLFGRZQWXUQ 
In his book Médicos Escritores en España, 1885-1955 (2010),20 cultural historian 
Alfredo J Sosa-Velasco draws convincing parallels and contrasts between the ideas of Cajal and 
those of one of thH*HQHUDWLRQRI¶VPRUHFHQWUDOILJXUHVWKHQRYHOLVWDQGSKLORVRSKHU0LJXHO
de Unamuno. According to Sosa-Velasco,  
 
while Unamuno reclaims Don Quixote as a philosophical/religious treatise in which a new ideal is 
proposed for the regeneration of Spain, turning [the Don] into an icon of Spanish nationalism, 
Cajal reclaims the psychology of the character in order to explain what it is to be Spanish. For 
Cajal, it is sufficient to see that come the hour of his death, the sublime madman, transformed 
back into Alonso Quijano the Good, brusquely recovers his senses and proclaims his resignation 
LQWKHIDFHRIWKHLQLTXLWLHVRIWKHZRUOG'RQ4XL[RWHUHSUHVHQWVRQH¶VZLOOREVWLQDWHO\RULHQWHG
towards the light and happiness of the collective. 
(Sosa-Velasco 2010: 45) 
 
Much has been made, equally within the Spanish-speaking world as well as further afield, about 
WKHHTXLOLEULXPLQ&HUYDQWHV¶VJUHDWZRUNDIIRUGHGE\WKHZLOGLGHDOLVPRIWKH'RQDQGWKH
grounding, pragmatic influence of his squire Sancho Panza. Far less has been written about the 
balancing act within the humbled and impotent figure of the Don himself, metamorphosed back 
LQWRKLVDOWHUHJR$ORQVR4XLMDQRDWWKHQRYHO¶VHQGDVVXJJHVWHGE\&DMDO7KHGLVWLQFWLRQ&DMDO
makes is between the isolation and resignation of the wretched Alonso on his deathbed, almost 
stricken by his return to reason, and the optimism and unbridled enthusiasm of Don Quixote at 
WKHKHLJKWRIKLVSRZHUVKRZHYHUGHOXGHG&DMDO¶VUHDGLQJRIWKLVFHUWDLQO\VHHPVYLVLRQDU\LQ
itselIHVSHFLDOO\JLYHQKLVJDOYDQL]LQJQDWLRQDOLVWLFSXUSRVHWKHSRLQWLVWKDW$ORQVR¶V
UHLQWHJUDWLRQLQWRµVDQLW\¶ into a socially agreed reality, actually (and paradoxically) leaves him 
alone like the dejected version of contemporary Spain. This is salient because as well as Cajal, 
many noventayochistas VDZ6SDLQ¶VIXWXUHO\LQJLQJUHDWHUWLHVZLWKWKHUHVWRI(XURSHUDWKHU
than isolationism. Compared to the re-VDQLWL]HGDOPRVWTXDUDQWLQHG$ORQVRWKH'RQ¶VKLJKHU




 A note here on this Spanish-ODQJXDJHERRN¶VGLVDUPLQJO\WULFN\WLWOHTXRWDWLRQVIURPZKLFKDUHDOOP\RZQWUDQVODWLRQVWhe first 
WZRZRUGVLQWKHWLWOHWRJHWKHUWUDQVODWHDVµGRFWRUVZKRZULWH¶RUµZULWHU-GRFWRUV¶WKHVSHFLILFDWLRQRIZKLFKLPSOLHVWKDWWKHERRN¶V
topic is not simply medical men who wrote during that period in Spain (as the rest of the main title suggests, of course), but authors 
(in the broadest sense) as well as doctors, who participated in the literary culture of their age and context in some significant way. 
Sosa-9HODVFRMXVWLILHVWKLVLQKLVLQWURGXFWLRQWKXVµ,SURSRVHDQDQDO\VLVRIWKHOLWHUDU\SURducts written by doctors as a dialogic 
space (in Bakhtinian terms) within which they define themselves as intellectuals and critique their society on the basis of metaphors 
UHODWHGWRPHGLFLQHLOOQHVVDQGWUHDWPHQWWDNHQIURPPHGLFDOGLVFRXUVHLWVHOI¶010: 2). 
Patricia Novillo-Corvalán has also usefully taken up Sosa-9HODVFR¶VVWDQFHUHIHUULQJWR&DMDODVDµSK\VLFLDQ-ZULWHU¶UDWKHU
WKDQVROHO\DµUHVHDUFKVFLHQWLVW¶DVSHUSUHYLRXVVFKRODUVEHFDXVHVKHµVHHNVWRIRUHJURXQG&DMDO¶VPXOWLSOHUROHVDVGoctor, scientific 






aspirations are fundamentally social and unselfish, or as Sosa-Velasco emphatically puts it, 
µREVWLQDWHO\RULHQWHGWRZDUGVWKHOLJKWDQGKDSSLQHVVRIWKHFROOHFWLYH¶ 
In support of this position, Cajal goes back to his own specialities in the biological and 
brain sciences, in tandem with his reading of Don Quixote, to illustrate that the pain of the 
individual body is ultimately the pain of the larger body politic, and vice versa; or put another 
way, that without its cells, an organism cannot function properly, and vice versa. In a passage 
lamenting the suffering that Cervantes went through in his life, and how its avoidance might have 
made him so much more productive and less tragic in his writings, Cajal concludes that 
&HUYDQWHV¶VSDLQIXOH[SHULHQFHVLQSULVRQLQZDUDFWXDOO\KHOSHGKLPWRDFcurately reflect his 
national character in Don Quixote ± this is why the Don cannot just be an amateur do-gooder who 
is at bottom a sane, undamaged and well-adjusted person. Cajal continues:  
 
Oh what a great awakener of souls and instigator of energies is pain! Comparable to a swarm of 
marine fireflies, whose phosphorescence becomes activated upon impact with the propeller of the 
ship, the sluggish brain cells only switch on their light under the whip of painful emotions. 
Perhaps in order to reach the fever pitch of sublime inspiration, the exceptional brain of Cervantes 
likewise needed the sharp spur of pain and the devastating spectacle of misery! 
(Cajal 1905) 
 
Unpacking the metaphoric convolutions in this astounding paragraph is not easy, but proves 
ultiPDWHO\LOOXPLQDWLQJDVLWGUDZVWRJHWKHUPDQ\RI&DMDO¶VVWUDQGVRIWKRXJKWLQDQDSSRVLWHO\
poetic and interlinking manner. 
The idea of illumination in the passage coincides with Sosa-9HODVFR¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
&DMDO¶VTXL[RWLVPDVDLPHGDWVRPHEHDFRQof light. This might be read equally as a veiled 
reference to Enlightenment values of progress, or, considering that this light is reached only by 
recourse to pain and penance, a messianic hangover of Catholic proportions. This, as Sosa-
Velasco points out, would align Cajal once again with Unamuno, the latter of whom writes in a 
somewhat far-IHWFKHGZD\RI&HUYDQWHV¶VQRYHODVµWKHQDWLRQDO%LEOHRIWKHSDWULRWLFUHOLJLRQRI
6SDLQ¶DQGWKH'RQKLPVHOIDVWKHµ6SDQLVK&KULVW¶Cited in Sosa-Velasco 2010: 46±47). 
1HYHUWKHOHVVPRVWLQWHUHVWLQJDQGULFKLQ&DMDO¶VDQDORJ\RIWKHILUHIOLHVLVWKHLUVZDUP-like 
nature, precisely because this gives him recourse to the terminology and symbology of the field 
in which he would soon after be recognized by the Nobel committee: that of the brain. Cajal 
compares the illumination of the flies to neurons firing across the synapses he so famously 
postulated (in direct contradiction of his prize-sharing colleague Golgi). Creativity in this 
metaphor thus derives from the crashiQJDQGFRQWLQXRXVURWDWLRQRIWKHVKLS¶VSURSHOOHUPHDQLQJ
there is no visible swarm without the vicissitudes of life and frequent pain for the individual; but 





in a collective sense. The swarm of fireflies is a hive mind, a set of brain cells which are nothing 
ZLWKRXWHDFKRWKHU¶VOLJKWVZLOOLQJWRVKDUHHDFKRWKHU¶VSDLQLQDFRPPXQDOHIIRUW 
&DMDOUHDIILUPVWKLVQRWLRQODWHULQµ7KH3V\FKRORJ\RI'RQ4XL[RWHDQG4XL[RWLVP¶LQ
another nod to the descriptive power of biology and cells. Having rejected disparaging 
FRQWHPSRUDU\YLHZVRI'RQ4XL[RWH¶VGHOXVLRQVDQGE\FRUUHVSRQGHQFHWKHGHOXVLRQVRI6SDLQ
in favour of a quixotism that is ever-ready to sacrifice and even die for high ideals, Cajal stresses 
that figures embodying these more positive attributes of the Don certainly do exist in Spain. He 
ZULWHVWKDWµLQDOOWKHLUDFWVDQGWHQGHQFLHVWKH\ILQGDQHQGQRWLQVLGHRIWKHPVHOYHVLQWKHORZHU
regions of the avaricious soul, but in the spirit of the collective person, of whom they recognize 
themselves as humbOHDQGJHQHURXVFHOOV¶Cajal 1905). Their madness might consume them and 
make them strange and impractical at times, but the self-effacing loyalty RI6SDLQ¶V4XL[RWHVLV
unquestionable ± because together they make up the larger Don Quixote that is Spain itself. This 
leads Cajal to an astonishing claim, having earlier (and in concordance with the greater part of 
Cervantine commentary) sung the praiseVRIWKHFKDUDFWHU6DQFKR3DQ]Dµ$OWKRXJKLWPLJKWKXUW
to our core to admit it, it is a strength to recognize and declare that in Spain, outside of its most 
glorious periods, if there was ever an over-abundance of Sanchos, there was often a shortage of 
QXL[RWHV¶&DMDO9LVLRQDU\WUDLWVGHOXVLRQDORURWKHUZLVHDUHQHFHVVDU\WRWKHZHOO-being 
of the country. 
&DMDO¶VRHXYUHLQFOXVLYHRIµ7KH3V\FKRORJ\RI'RQ4XL[RWHDQG4XL[RWLVP¶ can easily 
be taken as patriarchal and imperialistic, nostalgic for a supposedly glorious but bloody age of 
conquistadors and hell-EHQWFRORQLDOLVWV$V/DXUD2WLVZULWHVHDUO\LQKLVPHGLFDOFDUHHUµ&DMDO
MRLQHGWKHTXHVW>«@DJDLQVWPLFUREHVWKDWFDXVHGLQIHFWLRXVGLVHDVHV¶DQGµKHFRQWLQXHGWRUHIHU




informed discourse of progress and modernization lies a series of metaphors relating to infection 
and disease. These indicate a fear of, for example, intra-national pluralism, something with which 
6SDLQVWLOOZUHVWOHVWRWKLVGD\,QGHHGPDQ\RIWKHµ*HQHUDWLRQRI¶VKDUHGDVLPLODUVWUXJJOH
to reconcile issues of nationalism (both as a whole and internally), modernization and cultural 
identity. According to Sosa-Velasco, this meant most leading lights advocated an economic, 
SROLWLFDODQGPRUDODVFHWLVPFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\UHWLUHPHQWIURPWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODUHQDEXWWKDWµIRU
his part, Cajal preaches that the nation should let itself be carried by that intellectual family of 
scientists, who are the only ones capable of leading it to progress, taking advantage of the 
FRXQWU\¶VUHVRXUFHVDQGPRGHOOLQJLWVSROLWLFV¶6RVD-Velasco 2010: 47). Far from shirking 





forward-looking embrace of the supposedly progressive ideology of the scientific. 
Nevertheless, the key to this is still quixotism, a tilt if not at the past, then at least to its 
spirit ± even if scientifically this is a self-proclaimed madness, knowing full well that windmills 
DUHQRWHQHPLHVEXWPDNLQJWRDWWDFNWKHPDQ\ZD\,QDQLQWULJXLQJWZLVWRQ'RQ4XL[RWH¶V
ERRNLVKGHOXVLRQV&DMDOFODLPVWKDWDVIDUEDFNDV&HUYDQWHV¶VWLPH6SDLQ¶VSURWR-scientists were 
MXVWDVµHQDPRXUHGRIROGERRNV¶ obsessed with theory but finding sufficient intrigue in the 
achievements of those Quixotes abroad to leave their own ingenious thoughts precisely there in 
the realm of theory, untranslated into praxis or concrete discovery. Cajal blames this on an 
entrenched, self-propagating utilitarianism and realism in Spanish literary, philosophical and 
scientific traditions. This meant that in Spain,  
 
thinkers and scientists mainly limited themselves to modestly utilizing the mathematical theories 
and biological and physical discoveries of foreigners, [but] always made a great show of 
disdaining the objects of pure research, of speculative truths stripped of useful application; 
without looking to see, as is the habit of many current intellectuals, that that science designated as 
practical is indissolubly united to that which is abstract or idealist, like the stream to its source. 
(Cajal 1905; original emphasis) 
 
So if science is to provide the basis for political and cultural life, it must itself take its cues from a 
pervasive policy and culture of imaginative thinking, of wide-spread idealism, of putting the 
moral collective will into practice, in short, of quixotism. 
However wild this may seem, it does not much differ from WilliaP:KHZHOO¶V
µLPDJLQDWLYHOHDS¶EHIRUHLWRU4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VTXHVWLQJIRULWVRZQVDNH:KLOH&DMDO¶V
ambitions for Spain tied the political and scientific to quixotism, Quian Quiroga, as mentioned, 
PRUHVSHFLILFDOO\HFKRHV'RQ4XL[RWH¶VLGHDRIµZDQGHULQJ DVDWHVW¶LQKLVYLVLRQIRUWKH
scientific. Science ironically depends on this departure from its own core (or quotidian) workings 
± thus questing is testing, and vice versa. The fact that Cajal came upon this same sort of notion 
but with a broader, more holistic view of society is no surprise if one takes into account his own 
biography.21 One such rendering of the events of his life certainly seems to corroborate this 
reading, starting from its very title: Don Quixote of the Microscope (1954). This entertaining and 




 $ELRJUDSK\RQHPLJKWVD\RINQLJKWGHVWLQHUUDQWU\WRERUURZDQGDGDSW'HUULGD¶VWHUPdestinerrance, which was itself mentioned 
and put on hold earlier. A preliminary way to approach this concept might be to consider its similarity to some of the notions of others 
DOUHDG\GLVFXVVHGVXFKDVZKHQ'HUULGDZULWHVWKDWµZKDW,KDYHFDOOHG³GHVWLQHUUDQFH´>± a wandering that is its own end, etc . . .] 
>«@LVFRQQHFWHGZLWKDVWUXFWXUHLQZKLFKUDQGRPQHVVDQGLQFDOFXODELOLW\DUHHVVHQWLDO¶'HUULGD 29; the parenthetical 
definition of destinerrance is from the original).  
This certainly reads somewhat like the versions of quixotism espoused (directly or otherwise) by Cajal and Quian Quiroga. 










him from following his dream of becoming an artist, resulting in his wandering away from this 
dream and instead, almost by accident, into a stellar scientific career. Additionally, Williams 
points out that in another bewildering about-face, this career issued from the recognition Cajal 




living pupil of Ramón y Cajal, [the former of whom] furnished [Williams] with first-hand 
LPSUHVVLRQVRIWKHPDVWHU¶:LOOLDPV3HQILHOGKLPVHOIEHFDPHDQLQWHUQDWLonally 
renowned neurosurgeon specializing in the fields of memory, epilepsy and cerebral anatomy ± so 
much so that Quian Quiroga also dedicates several pages of Borges and Memory to some of the 
pioneering but still-used methods that Penfield developed as far back as the mid-twentieth 
century (indeed, around the time that Williams was himself writing and acknowledging Penfield). 
After his acknowledgements, but prior to the narrative proper, Williams inserts a pair of 
epigraphs from two of Santiago Ramón y CaMDO¶VFRQWHPSRUDULHVRQHE\noventayochista 
luminary Azorín and another by one RIWKHJURXS¶Vsympathizers (like Cajal), philosopher José 
Ortega y Gasset. In his works, this latter wrote equally as impassionedly as Cajal or Unamuno on 
Don Quixote, and furWKHUPRUH2UWHJD\*DVVHWUHWDLQV&DMDO¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKHFRPSOH[TXL[RWLF
UHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQGLVFRXUVHVRIQDWLRQKLVWRU\DQGVFLHQFH:LOOLDPV¶VHSLJUDSKLFTXRWDWLRQ
from Ortega y Gasset reflects this: 
 
Everything in Spain has been done by the people, and what they did not do has been left undone. 
But a nation cannot consist solely of the common people: it needs an eminent minority. It is like a 
live body which consists not only of muscle but also of nerve ganglia and a cerebral centre. The 
absence of WKHµbest people¶ or at least their scarcity, runs through our whole history and has kept 
us from ever being like other nations, a completely normal people. 
(Cited in Williams 1954: 12) 
 
7KLVH[WUDFWVRXQGVUHPDUNDEO\OLNH&DMDO¶VDUJXPHQWLQµ7KH3V\FKROogy of Don Quixote and 
4XL[RWLVP¶ZLWKLWVDSSHDOWRWKHELRORJLFDOHYHQQHXURORJLFDOPDNH-up of the nation. Although 
Ortega y Gasset does not directly mention Don Quixote here, it is telling that these purported 
µEHVWSHRSOH¶DUHQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHµQRUPDO¶IXQFWLRQLQJRISHRSOHRYHUDOOGUDZLQJIXUWKHU
FRPSDULVRQZLWK&DMDO¶VGHOLQHDWLRQRITXL[RWLVPDQGWKHUHODWLRQVKLSRIFHOOVWRRUJDQLVPs, it 





of society and history on his or her shoulders. This also implies that widespread normality rests 
upon a minor amount of central (and moreover cerebral) abnormality. 
7KHTXRWDWLRQ:LOOLDPVFKRRVHVLVIURPRQHRI2UWHJD\*DVVHW¶VPRVWIDPRXVZRUNV
Invertebrate Spain (1921), the title of which makes an implicit connection between nation, 
biology and political will (or at least some sort of mental state or character trait related to a 
biological metaphor). But as far back as 1914, Ortega y Gasset was already making similar 
claims in his first major work, which has the English title of Meditations on Quixote. This 
FROOHFWLRQRIHVVD\VDQGLQVLJKWVGRHVQRWDOZD\VGHDOGLUHFWO\ZLWK&HUYDQWHV¶VQRYHOXVLQJLW
instead as an occasional springboard to a wide variety of topics, and as such is significant here for 
several reasons. To begin with, its Spanish title is Meditaciones del Quijote, which seems normal 
enough, except when one considers that its English translation effaces a double meaning: the 
6SDQLVKFRXOGPHDQµPHGLWDtions of WKH4XL[RWH¶DVPXFKDVWKHDFWXDO(QJOLVKWUDQVODWLRQD
subtle yet no doubt intriguing difference which suggests, if not an equivalence between the Don 
and Ortega y Gasset himself, then at least an affinity between an aspirational philosopher-cum-
political-agitator and a fictional madman. More salient is a characteristic interwoven three-
pronged attack on: Comtist positivism; on nineteenth-century literary realism; and on biological 
GHWHUPLQLVPLQ2UWHJD\*DVVHW¶VFKDSWHULQWKHMeditations calOHGµ)ODXEHUW&HUYDQWHV
'DUZLQ¶+HVWDUWVE\HPSKDVL]LQJWKHFULPLQDOO\LJQRUHGFHQWUDOLW\RIDon Quixote to the 
6SDQLVKVWDWH¶VIXWXUHE\using a highly physical and agricultural idiom:  
 
The sterility of what passes for patriotism in Spanish thought is made clear by the fact that the 
WUXO\JUHDW6SDQLVKDFFRPSOLVKPHQWVKDYHQRWEHHQVWXGLHGVXIILFLHQWO\>«@7KHUHLVQHHGRID
book showing in detail that every novel bears Quixote within it like an inner filigree, in the same 
way as every epic poem contains the Iliad within it like the fruit its core. 
(Ortega y Gasset 2000: 162) 
 
There is clearly another appeal here to the physical interior directly impacting the exterior, or in 
FRQJUXHQFHZLWKDQXFOHLFPRGHOUHPLQLVFHQWRQFHDJDLQRI&DMDO¶VPHWDSKRULFal cellular stance ± 
Don Quixote LVWKHVHHGFDUULHURI6SDLQ¶VOLWHUDU\FRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHZRUOGWKHQRYHO 
How a seed grows depends upon many things: how it is cultivated and cared for; the 
fertility of the soil into which it is placed; sunlight, water, other environmental factors; perhaps as 
important, the purpose it has been assigned and the perceived value of its growth, for food, for 
decoration, for eventual replanting. If, as Ortega and Gasset claims, the modern novel always 
carries Don Quixote within it, how has this now widespread storytelling medium been cultivated, 
repurposed, crossbred? As I have been trying to show, quixotism is a complex but important, 
even fruitful instance of cross-pollination from literary to scientific thinking. But if CaMDO¶V





seeds that Don Quixote supposedly carries ± the characters, the individuated readers, present and 
IXWXUHDXWKRUVRU&DMDO¶VVFLHQWLILFNQLJKWV-to-be ± are somewhat lost in the aspirations for a mass 
of people, rather than for the specific people themselves. Science or nation ± these are lofty 
notions indeed, but possibly even loftier is the quixotic quest for the self. The conundrum is that 
in positing an overall quixotic goal for an organism such as a nation, Cajal ironically overlooks 
the psychological disposition of the cells comprising it, that is to say, whether the individual 
people that make up a society are all also supposed to be Quixotes themselves and purposively 
take on a visionary madness of their own. 
7KHUHDVRQIRUWKLVLURQ\LVEHFDXVHRI&DMDO¶VYDXQWLQJRIWKHQHXURQGRFWULQHDQGWKH
particular saliency of the historical moment in which it began to gain traction. As 
interdisciplinary critics Laura Salisbury and Andrew 6KDLOZULWHµQHXURORJ\>SURYLGHG@WKH
period of historical modernity with new conceptions of how the self might be structured and 
organized. [A major instance] of this [was] the neuron doctrine [although] conclusive proof of the 
H[LVWHQFHRIGLVWLQFWQHUYHFHOOVZDVQRWGLVFRYHUHGXQWLOWKHHQGRIWKHV>«@¶6DOLVEXU\
and Shail 2010: 25). This µconclusive proof¶, of course, came with Cajal, and is indeed cited as 
one of the main reasons he won the Nobel Prize (Cf. López-Muñoz et al. 2006). However, this 
PHDQVWKDW&DMDO¶VRZQQHXURORJLFDODQGTXL[RWLFRXWORRNVZHUHDWRGGVZLWKHDFKRWKHUSRVLWLQJ
opposing conceptions of a personal consciousness and a national one. This quandary, of how 
societal parts relate to wholes after neurology, is described by Salisbury and Shail: 
 
The modern neurological subject needed to be regarded as fundamentally attached to a world by 
which it could both be nourished and harried. 
 $GYDQFHVLQWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIQHXURORJLFDOIXQFWLRQLQJ>«] contributed to the idea 
that nervous disorder was common, distributed throughout the body and the populace as a whole. 
[By] locating consciousness in every nerve cell, nineteenth-century neurology had remodelled the 




now ubiquitously accepted view of neurons was that they were each separate, individual cells. 
Where the modern novel, pioneered yet epitomized by Don Quixote, was to bond the people in 
nationalism, modern neurology dispersed the hitherto consistent totality of the nervous system 
LQWRLWVPLQXWHFRQVWLWXHQWSDUWVOLNHO\OHDGLQJWRµQHUYRXVGLVRUGHU¶ as Salisbury and Shail put 
it), providing a mixed metaphorical message for the agents within a modern, neurologized 
political state. 
So neurons are individual cells which nevertheless make up the nervous system, while 





up nervous societies. But if a modernity based on nervousness could be guided at the societal 
level by quixotism, then perhaps, in fact, so too could the individual person. However, this is not 
something Cajal really explores; if anything, his encouragement to the personal quests of singular 
4XL[RWHVLQ6SDLQDWWKHYHU\HQGRIµ7KH3V\FKRORJ\RI'RQ4XL[RWHDQG4XL[RWLVP¶LVQRWRQH
of unfettered individuality, but of utter self-sacrifice in the service of the nation. It is akin, he 
claims, to the vital but unnamed, unrecognized layers upon layers of coral submerged under the 
visible and beautiful part of a reef ± literally a bodily sacrifice for the sake of the edifice as a 
whole. Such a sad, dispiriting quixotism of self-immolation seems quite at odds with the 
celebratory collective fate of a nation based on rationalistic, scientific quixotism; it is essentially 
pathological, personal neurosis versus mad, nationalistic joy, and one wonders who would be left 
in this version of a quixotic state of martyrs to actually celebrate its success anyway. Indeed, it is 
like the functioning of a nervous system based upon the sacrifice of all its nerve cells: a logical 
IDOODF\$OWKRXJK2WLVLQVLVWVWKDWµIRU&DMDOWKHIXQGDPHQWDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIHYHU\ cell and 
HYHU\KXPDQEHLQJZDVLWVLQGLYLGXDOLW\¶2WLVWKLVHYLGHQWO\GRHVQRWVWUHWFKWRWKH
quixotic project, at least if any vestige of said individuality is to be preserved. To find a more 
positive (but no less complex) quixotic appreciation of the singular, individual self, one has to 






W H Auden: The Quest of Individualistic Quixotism 
 
 
W H Auden posits a type of self-IRUPDWLRQLQKLVVRQQHWF\FOHµ7KH4XHVW¶ 0XFKRI$XGHQ¶V
considerable output was geared towards delineating what he saw as this personal quest ± not just 
for himself, but personal to each and every human ± something that spurred one on as an 
individual and in interactions with others. However, this quest was predicated not on an easily 
determinable basic goal and then systematically sought after. Instead, some kind of ailment, 
trauma, problem, or even the very invisibility of any clear goal had to be the justification 
XQGHUZULWLQJWKHTXHVWDQGQRXULVKLQJWKHTXHVWHU$XGHQ¶VOLWHUary executor Edward Mendelson 
SXWVLWWKXVµ7KHKHURRIDVRQQHWLQWKHVHTXHQFH³7KH4XHVW´ZULWWHQLQWKHVXPPHURI
HOXGHVGHDGO\SHULOEHFDXVH³7KHDQJHORIDEURNHQOHJKDGWDXJKWKLP_7KHULJKWSUHFDXWLRQVWR
DYRLGDIDOO´¶0HQGHOVRQ9). Mendelson goes on to quote Auden expanding on the 
SDUDGR[LFDOVXSSRVHGO\EHQHILFLDORUQHFHVVDU\DVSHFWRIKDUGVKLSUHSUHVHQWHGE\µWKHDQJHORID
broken leg¶ 0HQGHOVRQ¶VTXRWDWLRQLVIURP$XGHQ¶VUHYLHZRI)UDQ].DINDWKXVZULWWHQ
near to the WLPHµ7KH4XHVW¶ZKHUHLQ$XGHQVD\VWKHIROORZLQJRIWKHIRUPDWLRQDOSURGXFWLYH
quality of problems:  
 
7KHWUXHVLJQLILFDQFHRIDQHXURVLVLVWHOHRORJLFDO>«@WKHVR-called traumatic experience is not an 
accident, but the opportunity for which the child has been patiently waiting ± had it not occurred, 
it would have found another, equally trivial ± in order to find a necessity and direction for its 
existence, in order that its life may become a serious matter. Of course it would be better if it 
could do without it, but unconsciously it knows that it is not, by itself, strong enough to learn to 
stand alone: a neurosis is a guardian angel; to become ill is to take vows. 
(Mendelson 1999: 99; also, Cf. W H Auden 2002: 112±113) 
 




HQGRZVOLIHZLWKYDOXHDQGPDNHVLWDµVHULRXVPDWWHU¶ Yet the idea goes further than a simple 




place, and secondly, that this something is just one of many opportunities for malady or trauma. 





nevertheless finds expression in the everyday and therefore must be actively sought if it is not to 
be simply, repeatedly overlooked. 
 7KLVLVZK\WKHUHLVFRQVLVWHQF\LQWKHLGHDRIWKHTXHVWZKLFKLQIRUPV$XGHQ¶VHQWLUH
body of work, just as he claims the quest itself can inform a fruitful life, even if this makes it 
seem like one is willingly looking for aggravations and neuroses as a form of existential 
validation. Conversely, the opposite view is held to be problematic by Auden: always seeking a 
guardian angel or an absolute truth in unfettered rationality and positivity results only in 
isolation, hesitation and failure. Ironically, however, this then presents one with the very 
µRSSRUWXQLW\¶PHQWLRQHGDERYHWRHPEUDFHDUHYHUVDORIIDWHVDQGXVHWKHIUHVKSUREOHPDVD
stepping stone ± if only one is able to recognize the opportunity as such amidst what appear to be 
unfavourable conditions. This is where the prescience mentioned enters, with the knowledge that 
a difficult life beckons, but even so this quest must be energetically, unwaveringly and perhaps 
irrationally pursued ± certainly this version of a quest is as quixotic as any. Auden sees this, at the 
time he is writing, as able to give meaning to the seeming meaninglessness of a 1940 already 
plunged into worldwide war. 
It is why Auden is so influenced by Kafka, whom he considers the greatest depicter of 
PRGHUQKXPDQLW\RIKLVGD\µ.DINDLVLPSRUWDQWWRXVEHFDXVHWKHSUHGLFDPHQWRIKLVKHURLVWKH
predicament of the contemporary man. An industrial civilization makes everyone an exceptional 
UHIOHFWLYH>«@WKHUHIOHFWLYHPDQWKHZDQGHUHUFDQQHYHUILQGLWHDV\WRKDYHIDLWKEXW>«@LI
KHORVHVLWKHLVORVW¶W H Auden 2RULJLQDOHPSKDVLV7REHDQµH[FHSWLRQDO
reflective¶ LQ$XGHQ¶VWHUPVLVWRKDYHUHDOL]HG that the quest looks inwards, not out at a horribly 
corrupted society and its hypocritical mores, and by embracing this interiority becomes worthy as 
DVHHNHU7KLVTXRWDWLRQDORQJZLWK0HQGHOVRQ¶VDERYHZKLFKFRQFOXGHVWKDWµWREHFRPHLOOLVWR
take vows¶ DUHERWKWDNHQIURPWKHUHYLHZRI.DINDWLWOHGµ7KH:DQGHULQJ-HZ¶&IW H Auden 
2002: 110±113). Although in this review Auden covers the timeless yet updated quest trope he 
LGHQWLILHVLQ.DIND¶VZRUNVKHILQLVKHVWKHSLHFHZLWKDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKe impossible yet 
LQYDOXDEOHIDLWKRIWKHµUHIOHFWLYH¶ This faith takes the form of a stubbornness at the root of the 
so-FDOOHGµYRZV¶WRLOOQHVVDFRPPLWPHQWLQWKHIDFHRIPRXQWLQJPDODLVHDQGVRFLHWDOVFRUQ
ZKLFK$XGHQFRPPHQGVLQ.DIND¶VFKDUDFWHUV%ut the abundance of religious terminology ± 
µangels, vows, faith¶ ± DOVRUHYHDOVDQRWKHUSXUSRVHWR$XGHQ¶VGHSOR\PHQWRI.DINDZLWK
relation to questing. The act of wandering in spite of hardship (indeed, because of or in search of 
it) is for Auden an important aspect of Jewish history and culture, which for him is most fittingly 
represented in the modern age by Kafka. By contradictorily underscoring µHYHU\RQH¶DVDQ
µH[FHSWLRQDOUHIOHFWLYH¶ all now undergoing the same internal wandering and questing, Auden 
seeks to both comment on the inevitable flattening out of anti-Semitism, as well as to link the 






redolent of the quixotic wandering as a test that has so far been traced from Rodrigo Quian 
Quiroga back to Santiago 5DPyQ\&DMDO$GGLWLRQDOWRWKLVLV$XGHQ¶VFRPSOH[UHODWLRQVKLSWR
science itself. Admittedly, his views fall within the framework of an ever-evolving but pervasive 
Christianity that always remained central to his work and life. But as Mendelson points out, 
µ>:\VWDQ+XJK$XGHQ@JUHZXSLQDKRXVHKROGLQZKLFKWKHVFLHQWLILFLQTXLULHVRIKLVIDWKHU
PDLQWDLQHGDQXQHDV\WUXFHZLWKWKHULWXDOL]HGUHOLJLRQRIKLVPRWKHU¶(Mendelson 1999: xvi). As 
a result, Auden gave scientific issues extensive thought as well as coverage in his poetry. His 
father, George Augustus Auden, was a trained medical doctor, but also had a plethora of interests 
which convolved his life into and out of medicine: 
 
Dr Auden gave up his quite lucrative practice in York when he was appointed School Medical 
Officer for the city of Birmingham, and Professor of Public Health at the University there. [In 
addition, he] was a voracious reader and also a published writer and translator of archaeological 
DQGSV\FKRORJLFDODUWLFOHV:\VWDQ¶VORYHRIWKHSULQWHGZRUGDQGRIOLWHUDWXUHFOHDUO\GHULYHG
from his father. 
(Osborne 1995: 2±3) 
 
%XW'U$XGHQ¶VHIIHFWXSRQKLVVRQJRHVIXUWKHUWKDQZRUGVDQGOLWHUDWXUHEHFDXVHµLQRWKHU
respects [the doctor] was a factually-PLQGHGPDQDQG>«@KLVDWWLWXGHWRNQRZOHGJHJUHDWO\
LQIOXHQFHG:\VWDQ¶H Carpenter 1983: 8). 
Even though biographies of the poet Auden are unequivocal about his far greater 
closeness to his mother, the course of his intellectual working career was most certainly fired in 
WKHFUXFLEOHRIKLVIDWKHU¶VZLGH-UDQJLQJFXULRVLW\DQGZKDWZDVIXUWKHUPRUHWKHGRFWRU¶V
epistemologically egalitarian bent: 
 
[Dr Auden] knew a lot about the history of medicine from classical times onwards, and besides 
EHLQJIOXHQWLQ/DWLQDQG*UHHN>«@KHZDVVXIILFLHQWO\DFFRPSOLVKHGLQPRGHUQODQJXDJHVWREH
able to translate works on archaeology and antiquities from German and Danish into English. 
Moreover he ignored the conventional distinctions between the humanities and the sciences. 
(H Carpenter 1983: 8)22 
 
,QGHHGGLVSHQVLQJZLWKMXVWVXFKµFRQYHQWLRQDOGLVWLQFWLRQV¶LVSHUKDSVZKDWHTXDWHVWKH
philosophical, literary doctor with his medical, psychological poet of a son, and WKHODWWHU¶V










consequent identification of an inherent quest-like quality to life stems from this multifarious, 
LQWHUODFLQJDSSURDFKWRNQRZOHGJH,QVRPHVHQVHLWLV'U$XGHQ¶VOLEUDU\KLVµKHWHURJHQHRXV
FROOHFWLRQRIERRNVRQPDQ\VXEMHFWV¶H Carpenter 1983: 8) which comprised a rather 
unorthodox literary education for the young Wystan, and the disciplinary erudition of the elder 
Auden leads readily to that of the younger:  
 




the rest of his life remained interested in the philosophy of medicine. Perhaps, too, his vision of 
KLPVHOIDVDVXUJHRQRUKHDOHUZKLFKKDXQWVPXFKRIKLVHDUO\SRHWU\UHIOHFWVKLVIDWKHU¶V
influence. 
Certainly it was during his childhood that he first became aware of psychology. His 
father was very interested in this new and controversial subject, and bought books by pioneer 
psychologists as soon as they were published. 
(H Carpenter 1983: 9) 
 
Several strands are of note here. First of all, there is something evocative of Don Quixote 
LQWKH\RXQJ:\VWDQ¶VFOHDUDQGVHOI-FRQIHVVHGSDVVLRQIRUKLVIDWKHU¶VYDULHGOLEUDU\7KLVODWHU
played out with the young Auden firmly ensconcing himself in an imaginary world based on 
geology and mining textbooks from said library. Biographies note that seeing the landscape 
around him as real, tangible and bound by certain laws did not, apparently, stop Wystan from 
perceiving it as somehow quasi-magical, empty of interfering people and subject to his own god-
like power to interchange elements of what was there.23 Secondly, as epidemiologist G Davey 
Smith writes:  
 
The interest that G A Auden and his son shared most was psychology. G A Auden wrote 
extensively about psychological problems of childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood, 
including a still-cited report of a case of auto-erotic asphyxiation. [He also] became honorary 
SV\FKRORJLVWWRWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VKRVSLWDOLQ%LUPLQJKDPDVZHOODVPHGLFDODGYLVRUWRWKH
Birmingham Institution for the Mentally Handicapped, and wrote on topics such as (what would 




 In this bookish, solipsistic narcissism shared by Auden and Don Quixote, one might interpret something of the paranoid, as 












H Auden was also fascinated with psychology, and particularly with psychosomatic disease. 




family, attests to the fact that for him the psychological and the physical were intimately linked, 
dovetailing with the abovementioned childhood fantasy amalgam of hard-edged, engineering-
based materialism, and a quixotic, idealized landscape. For Auden, what was in the head and 
what was in the world were no less real than each other. 
7KLVQRGRXEWDFFRXQWVIRU$XGHQ¶VEHOLHIWKDWQHXURVLVDQGUHVSRQVLELOLW\± the 
individual adversity of the quest and the societal, artistic propagation of its codes and myths ± go 
hand in hand. For him, psychology was not simply personal, but also political. As literary scholar 
Rod Mengham puts it: 
 
Auden became used to thinking about psychological models in relation to the customs and rituals 
of an entire society, rather than exclusively with reference to the personal history of the 
LQGLYLGXDO>«@+HZDVQRWRULRXVO\IRQGRIVWUHVVLQJWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIQHXURVLVLQWKHIRUPDWLRQ
of artistic personality, but perhaps the most significant emphasis he places in his statements on the 
uses of psychoanalysis is on the need to politicise it. 
(Mengham 2004: 165±166) 
 
However, it is important to stress that for Auden the political began with the personal, the 
societal with the individual, and this was why the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud held sway 
over Auden in some way ± because it elevated a personal crisis to a form of life-affirming, self-
fashioning event. The quest was not simply a tale of overcoming adversity, but the active search 
IRUQHXURVLVLQRQH¶VSDVWZKLFKZRXOGGHILQHWKHVHOI7KXVLQ$uden writes of Freud that 
he 
 
perceived that psychological events are not natural events but historical and that, therefore, 
psychology as distinct from neurology, must be based on the pre-suppositions and methodology, 
not of the biologist but of the historian.24 >)UHXG¶V@WKHUDSHXWLFWHFKQLTXHRIPDNLQJWKHSDWLHQW




 +RZHYHUDQDFWXDOKLVWRULDQ.DWMD*XHQWKHUZULWHVWKDWµ)UHXGDWOHDVWLQLWLDOO\GLGQot consider himself to be working on the 
mind as such; instead, he figured his psychological practice as a way of intervening on the nervous system. [His] psychoanalysis does 
not seem qualitatively different from the range of therapies [then] being developHGLQQHXURORJ\¶*XHQWKHU:KDW$XGHQ
reveals here is an ill disposition towards an institutional (read: impersonal) version of science that he does not identify with Freud, 
which by his own criteria would be incorrect, according to Guenther. Nevertheless, what Auden is driving at is individual personality 





relive his past and discover the truth for himself with a minimum of prompting and interference 
from the analyst (meanwhile, one might add, doing penance by paying till it hurts), [implied] that 
every patient is a unique historical person and not a typical case. 
(W H Auden 2008: 343) 
 
2XWRIWKHPRUDVVRIKLVWRU\HPHUJHVLQGLYLGXDOSHUVRQDOLW\µQRWDW\SLFDOFDVH¶EXWWKH
DIRUHPHQWLRQHGµH[FHSWLRQDOUHIOHFWLYH¶RI.DIND¶VPRGHUQLW\DV$XGHQVDZit. In some way, 
WKHQµWKHUHIOHFWLYHPDQWKHZDQGHUHU¶W H Auden 2002: 113), is found as much in the 
psychoanalysis of Freud as in the literature of Kafka, a pair of Wandering Jews with important 
insights for the notion of selfhood. 
 The ability to reflect on oneself is the key aspect of the above, and as such it is possible 
to compare it with what Ian Watt writes of another, different wanderer: 
 
Quixote is obviously thoughtful and reflective, [and] is in fact very self-conscious on the question 
of madness. For instance, to show his desperation at how Dulcinea has spurned him, he goes mad 
DVDSHQDQFH>«@7KLVVRSKLVWLFDWHGDZDUHQHVVRIWKHSUREOHPRIPDGQHVVLVVRRQJLYHQDIXUWKHU
complication when Quixote says that if Dulcinea is not overcome by the WULEXWHRIKLVPDGQHVVµ,
VKDOOEHFRPHPDGLQHDUQHVW%HLQJVR,VKDOOVXIIHUQRPRUH¶)UHXGZRXOGQRGRXEWKDYHDJUHHG
with this view of the therapeutic function of neuroses and psychoses. 
(Watt 1996: 70) 
 
As has been shown, this latter would also havHEHHQ$XGHQ¶VYLHZDQGDVSXUHDGHOLQHDWLRQRI
his quest trope as possible ± WKDWWREHµPDGLQHDUQHVW¶FDQHDVHRQH¶VVXIIHULQJDQGVKRXOG
WKHUHIRUHEHRQH¶VJRDO7KLVLVEHFDXVHUHFDOLEUDWLQJPDGQHVVRUQHXURVLVDVKDYLQJD




DQGXQLYHUVDOO\UHFRJQL]HG¶W H Auden 2002: 110±%HWZHHQWKHWLPHRIµWKHROGHVWRI
OLWHUDU\GHYLFHV¶DQG.DINDLQWKHtwentieth century, Auden interprets his idea of the quest to 
have undergone many a change, including most importantly, the introduction of ironic doubt. The 
post-Reformation quest, according to Auden, has but a purposeless purpose, a grotesque 
inversion of its lofty aims, and a moral ambiguity whereby quest heroes and their nemeses 
become virtually indistinguishable. But with Kafka the negation of the goal is itself negated, only 
relocated now in the somehow non-solipsistic self; the hero becomes both quixotically selfless as 
per Cajal whilst also reflectively exceptional as Auden demands. Insofar as this goal should be 





though not Jewish per se, Auden and Don Quixote (or Cervantes) are as much Wandering Jews 
as Kafka and Freud. 
 7KHSRLQWKHUHLVQRWWKHSDUWLFXODUUHOLJLRXVIDLWKRIDQLQGLYLGXDOEXW$XGHQ¶VDGYRFDF\
RIWKHµXQLTXHKLVWRULFDOSHUVRQDQGQRWDW\SLFDOFDVH¶ $XGHQ¶VLQGLYLGXDOLVWLFTXL[RWLVPIXVHV
the rehabilitation of the quest hero, as per Kafka, with the salvation of the individual from the 
clutches of mere biology, as per Freud. In this light, it is worth refocusing on those aphoristic 
sayings which, according to biographer Humphrey Carpenter, are coined or quoted by $XGHQ¶V
IDWKHUµFDUHPRUHIRUWKHLQGLYLGXDOSDWLHQWWKDQIRUWKHVSHFLDOIHDWXUHVRIKLVGLVHDVH¶DQG
µ+HDOLQJLVQRWDVFLHQFHEXWWKHLQWXLWLYHDUWRIZRRLQJ1DWXUH¶7KHILUVWLVDWWULEXWHGE\$XGHQ
himself, in his book A Certain World, to Sir William Osler, and he proceeds to explain what he 
KDVXQGHUVWRRGE\LWWKXVµDGRFWRUOLNHDQ\RQHHOVHZKRKDVWRGHDOZLWKKXPDQEHLQJVHDFKRI
them unique, cannot be a scientist; he is either, like the surgeon, a craftsman, or, like the 
physician and the SV\FKRORJLVWDQDUWLVW¶W H Auden 1971: 256). The second aphorism, though 
LQWKHVDPHSODFHSDVVLQJO\DWWULEXWHGWRµ3DSD¶ DFWXDOO\GHULYHVIURPWKHSRHWKLPVHOILQµ7KH
Art of Healing¶ an elegy for his own fallen physician Dr David Protetch. This poem, first 
published in 1969 in The New Yorker, and A Certain World, first published in 1970, together 
UHSUHVHQWVRPHWKLQJRIDQRVWDOJLFYLHZRIKLVIDWKHU¶VKXPDQLVWLFPHGLFDOLQIOXHQFHWKHODWWHU
having died in 1957. Almost certainly by the time Auden junior wrote them, he was under the 
intellectual sway of another medical man, just as the poet was indeed transmitting his own waves 
of influence in return. This man was the then little-known but soon-to-be famous neurologist and 
author Oliver Sacks, who, being too shy to approach the heavyweight literary figure of Auden 
when both had been in Oxford at the same time in the late 1950s, had finally met the poet at a 
party in 1967 in their second mutual home city, New York. 
Sacks is not the longest serving nor tKHPRVWFRQVSLFXRXVRI$XGHQ¶VZLGHFLUFOHRI




to the wisdom of his father indicates a sentimentality overlaid on the fresh, invigorating insights 
of new friend Sacks, there is no doubting what an impact Auden had upon the younger, protégé-
OLNHGRFWRU6DFNVJRHVVRIDUDVWRVD\WKHIROORZLQJµ,IHHOLQPDQ\ZD\VWKDW:\VWDQ
understood me better than I understood myself>+H@EHFDPHDOLYLQJPLUURUIRUPH>«@¶6DFNV
1975: 191). This incredible depth of feeling went beyond the limit of a personal interaction and 
on into the realms of professional life and writing style: 
 
I owe to Auden the realization of certain possibilities whose very existence might otherwise have 





thoughts which constitute the originality (and eccentricity) of Awakenings. Indeed, I feel that had I 
not known KLP>«@WKHERRNZRXOGQHYHUKDYHEHHQFRPSOHWHGRUZRXOGKDYHDVVXPHGD
different (and much more ordinary) form. 
(Sacks 1975: 191) 
 
This is significant because 6DFNV¶VAwakenings, first published in June 1973, a few short months 
EHIRUH$XGHQ¶VGHDWKLQ6HSWHPEHURIWKHVDPH\HDUZDV6DFNV¶VILUVWPDMRUVXFFHVVDQGWKH
platform upon which the rest of his lengthy and distinguished authorial career was to rest. 
Such was the success of Awakenings that it has since run to several reeditions, and in 
1976, the ILUVWHGLWLRQDIWHUWKHSRHW¶VGHDWKERUHDGHGLFDWLRQWRKLPDVROLWDU\GHGLFDWLRQXQWLO
HGLWLRQVDIWHUWKHGHDWKRI6DFNV¶VRYHUDUFKLQJLQWHOOHFWXDOKHUR$ R Luria in 1977). Luria may 
KDYHEHHQ6DFNV¶VLPSHWXVWRZULWHIURPZLWKLQWKHVFLHQWLILFZRUOG but the specifically stylistic 
contribution of Auden (in contrast to any vague, theoretical and indirectly related conversation 
WKH\PLJKWKDYHKDGLVYLYLGO\UHFDOOHGE\6DFNVLQKLVUHFHQWDXWRELRJUDSK\µ>$XGHQ@ZDVDOVR
critically important to me during the writing of Awakenings, especially when he said to me, 
³<RX¶UHJRLQJWRKDYHWRJREH\RQGWKHFOLQLFDO«%HPHWDSKRULFDOEHP\VWLFDOEHZKDWHYHU
\RXQHHG´¶6DFNV7KHHQWLUHEDVLVRI6DFNV¶VGLVWLQFWLYHDXWKRULDOHWKRVDQGPDQQHU
which he would come to characterize as Clinical Tales and which would in turn reflect back on 
the burgeoning practice of this effervescent, mentally acrobatic and increasingly renowned 
SK\VLFLDQFDQEHHQFDSVXODWHGLQ$XGHQ¶VSLWK\DGYLFH 




which Auden wrote for and dedicated to Sacks (W H Auden 2009: 309±311), is matched by the 
VPDWWHULQJRITXRWDWLRQVIURP$XGHQ¶VSRHWLFZRUNVWKDW6DFNs uses to punctuate certain points 
throughout his own oeuvre. Similarly, a concise quotation from Auden adorns the cover of some 
HGLWLRQVRI6DFNV¶VAwakeningsUHDGLQJVLPSO\µ$PDVWHUSLHFH¶ while the source of said 
quotation is an equally concise but adulatory piece of personal correspondence from Auden to 
6DFNVDERXWZKLFKWKHODWWHUFRPPHQWVµ,ZHSWZKHQ,UHFHLYHG$XGHQ¶VOHWWHU+HUHZDVDJUHDW
ZULWHUQRWJLYHQWRIDFLOHRUIODWWHULQJZRUGVMXGJLQJP\ERRN³DPDVWHUSLHFH´¶6DFNV
200). For certain these instances mount up, and show the mutual appreciation of a pair of well-
regarded writers, but going beyond this, Sacks affirms of their dialogues that, 
 
for all the variety of topics we covered, it seems to me that our conversations would always return 
WRPHGLFLQHZKDWHYHUJHRGHVLFVLWORRSHGWKURXJKLQVWUDQJHRWKHUZRUOGV$XGHQ>«@FDUULHG





[and] in this, no doubt, he was the son of his father, as he was a sort of son/father to me and other 
physicians. It is no mere coincidence that in his last book of poems, Auden dedicates no less than 
four of them to physicians he has known, who have been significant to him, as he was to them. 
(Sacks 1975: 191) 
 
7KRXJKLWLVQRWWRRFOHDUZKDW6DFNVPHDQVE\ERWKµVRQIDWKHU¶DWWKHVDPHWLPHLWLVVWULNLQJ
how much of an important effect he considers Auden to have had upon medical professionals 
other than himself. 
More importantly still, Sacks once again brings up the ever-lingering presence of George 
Auden, and appreciable in this there is a convolving thread running between father, son and 
6DFNV¶VRZQµVRQIDWKHU¶VHOI6DFNVDJDLQQRWHVHOVHZKHUHWKDW$XGHQ¶VIDWKHUZDVDGRFWRUEXW




interests included this particular kind of encephalitis (a general term for an acute swelling of the 
EUDLQZKLFKLVDOVRVRPHWLPHVNQRZQDVYRQ(FRQRPR¶s disease after the neurologist who first 
described it. George Auden, in fact, wrote on how the disease might affect the behaviour and 
even the future lives of children who had been afflicted, including an insightful article published 
in The Lancet before WKHVXSSRVHGSHDNRIWKHHSLGHPLF¶VUHDFKLQ5HLGHWDO
also, Cf. G A $XGHQ$OWKRXJK6DFNV¶VPHPRLURQO\SDVVLQJO\PHQWLRQVKLVNQRZOHGJHRI
'U$XGHQ¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQVLQWRHQFHSKDOLWLVOHWKDUJLFDLWLVVLJQLILFDQWIRUPRUHWKDQRQe reason: 
ILUVWO\EHFDXVHRI6DFNV¶VRZQSHUVRQDOLQYHVWPHQWLQWRUHVHDUFKRQWKHGLVHDVHEHJLQQLQJVRPH
40 years later, which culminated in the ground-breaking and name-making Awakenings; but 
secondly, because of the similar close attention paid to an inGLYLGXDO¶VFDVHKLVWRU\HYLGHQFHGLQ
ERWK'U$XGHQ¶VZULWLQJRQWKHWRSLFDQG6DFNV¶VODWHUDWWHPSWVWRGRWKHVDPHDQGZKLFK
largely came to characterize his overall style). 
This is not to say that one led to the other directly; Sacks was already deeply involved 
with his Awakenings patients before he even met the younger Auden, and nothing suggests he 
ZDVQHFHVVDULO\DZDUHRIWKHHOGHU$XGHQ¶VZULWLQJVXQWLOWKHQ,WLVPHUHO\WRWUDFHDOLQHDJHRI
individualized medical outlook ± that is to say, an attitude towards patients as individual people 
rather than mere sets of medical data ± from George Auden, through W H Auden, and on to 
Sacks. This is evident from the manner in which case studies are handled by Dr Auden. Although 
it is not unusual for medical articles to include such case histories ± quite the contrary ± Dr 
$XGHQ¶VRUGLQDULO\IRUPDORVWHQVLEO\REMHFWLYHWRQHLQVXPPDUL]LQJKLVH[DPLQDWLRQVRISRVW-
encephalitic children is punctuated by somewhat more personal, picturesque comments which 






GHVN¶ZKLOVWRIDQRWKHUFDVHWKLVWLPHDER\KHVD\Vµ0DQQHUVJRRGand correct. Thoughtfully 
UHWXUQHGKLVFKDLUWRLWVSURSHUSODFHRQOHDYLQJP\URRP¶*A Auden 1922: 902). Given that the 
PDMRUWKUXVWRI'U$XGHQ¶VDUWLFOHLVQRWMXVWPHGLFDOSURJQRVLVEXWWKHSRWHQWLDOVRFLRORJLFDO
legal ramifications of behavioural changes resulting from the so-FDOOHGµVOHHS\-VLFNQHVV¶WKDWLV
HQFHSKDOLWLVOHWKDUJLFDWKHDXWKRULDOµ,¶YLDWKHSRVVHVVLYHµP\¶LQWKHVHLQVWDQFHVLVWHOOLQJ
:KLOVWWKH\PLJKWRQO\EHVPDOOJHVWXUHVXQDVVXPLQJO\GUDZQIURP'U$XGHQ¶VH[DPLQDWLRQ
room, they vividly humanize children whom he foresees in the article as being let down by the 
ill-equipped medico-legal system that deals with their increasingly erratic behaviour. It is 
certainly in keeping with the thoughtful, personal approach to clinical practice that W H Auden 
DWWULEXWHVWRKLVIDWKHUHQFDSVXODWHGLQWKHUHSHWLWLRQRI2VOHU¶VDSKRULVPDVPHQWLRQHGDERYH
µFDUHPRUHIRUWKHLQGLYLGXDOSDWLHQWWKDQIRUWKHVSHFLDOIHDWXUHVRIKLVGLVHDVH¶ 
No small wonder then that Sacks prefaces his book An Anthropologist on Mars: Seven 
Paradoxical Tales ZLWKWZRUHYHDOLQJVLPLODULWLHV)LUVWWKHERRNLVGHGLFDWHGGLUHFWO\µ7R
WKHVHYHQZKRVHVWRULHVDUHUHODWHGKHUH¶6DFNVY± E\WKLVVWDJHLQ6DFNV¶VFDUHHUKHZDV
confident and committed enough to the individual cast adrift in a neurological sea to no longer 
require the blessing, implicit in a dedication, of a great writer such as W H Auden. Second, he 
DOVRTXRWHVIURP2VOHUWKHIROORZLQJHSLJUDSKµ$VNQRWZKDWGLVHDVHWKHSHUVRQKDVEXWrather 
ZKDWSHUVRQWKHGLVHDVHKDV¶6DFNV[L7KHUHLVHYLGHQWO\DSDUDOOHOLQWKHDWWLWXGHV
towards their vocations of Dr Auden and Dr Sacks, echoed in their respective choice of 
TXRWDWLRQVIURP2VOHU)RUHDFK2VOHU¶VZRUGVVHHPWRJXLGHWKHLUSractice and infiltrated the 
way they wrote about their observations and experiences. This latter is more pronounced in 
Sacks, who ruminated at length on the strategies, goals and implications of his own writing style 
(for example, Cf. Sacks 1986), but the more measured, less introspective manner of Dr Auden 
still bears an affinity down the years with Sacks. Where their theoretical clinical philosophies and 
practical research proclivities actually overlap is in encephalitis lethargica, the coincidence of 
which is not at all lost on Sacks when he writes: 
 
Among the many eminent physicians who were deeply concerned with the changes in character 
which might be wrought by the sleepy-sickness was Dr G A Auden (father of W H). Such 




potential was often discussed in the Auden household, and formed an enduring theme in W H 
$XGHQ¶VWKRXJKW 






7KLVµHQGXULQJWKHPH¶ is of course the formative nature of neurosis and disease ± the basis for 
$XGHQ¶VSRHWLFQRWLRQRIDOLIHORQJTXHVWWRGLVWLQJXLVKRQHVHOIE\RYHUFRPLQJDQGHYHQILUVW
seeking) adversity. 
,Q6DFNV¶VIRUPXODWLRQIDVKLRQHGDIWHUWKHµOHVVSDWKRORJL]LQJ¶'r Auden, this might be 
more of a positively weighted interpretation of symptoms and effects than an outright vaunting of 
GLVHDVHDVXVHIXOO\GHYHORSPHQWDO1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHLGHDRIDµ'LRQ\VLDFGLVHDVH¶LVQRWRQHWKDW
he rules out, nor even one he feels would be unappealing. The fact that Sacks could countenance 
such a notion was specifically something that W H Auden liked about and respected of him: 
 
$XGHQ>«@HQMR\HGKLVFRPSDQ\ODUJHO\EHFDXVH6DFNVZDVDPHPEHURIDVPDOOJURXSKH
particularly admired ± medical experts who could discuss the philosophy of their science. 
[Likewise] Sacks greatly admired Auden, and ± XQOLNHPDQ\RI$XGHQ¶VIULHQGV± felt he was still 
spontaneous, still capable of reacting to the world around him. 
(H Carpenter 1983: 437) 
 
It appears W H $XGHQDQG6DFNVZKROHKHDUWHGO\WRRNRQERDUG*HRUJH$XGHQ¶VWKLQNLQJEXW
additionally, just as Sacks could tease out the positive in an objectively intractable situation such 
as post-encephalitic parkinsonism (as in Awakenings), he was able to see something productive 
and inspirational in the elderly W H Auden, which others were unable (or unwilling) to see. One 
could thus say that the way Dr Auden linked the significance of individual medical cases to a 
larger sociological picture is reflecWHGLQKLVVRQ¶VOLQNLQJRIWKHFUXFLDOLQGLYLGXDOTXHVWWRD
ODUJHUSROLWLFDOSLFWXUHDQGWKLVLV\HWDJDLQUHIOHFWHGLQ6DFNV¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIDODUJHUPRUH
important goal ± the humanistic reclamation of the individual medical self which governed the 
rest of his writing career ± by attending to the specific cases of his Awakenings patients. 
(QFHSKDOLWLVOHWKDUJLFDFDQEHFRQVLGHUHG6DFNV¶VIRUPDWLRQDOQHXURVLVKLVYHU\RZQµJXDUGLDQ
DQJHORIDEURNHQOHJ¶± although he did not suffer the disease himself, his experience of it helped 
him to position himself in a quixotic narrative, seeing windmills where the supposedly banal and 
even brutal realism of the medical establishment did not permit things to be seen. In doing so, 
Sacks took up an intellectual challenge as a debilitating neurosis constitutive of his own character 
(or at least, his characterization of himself in the story of his life). 
This is evidenced when Sacks explains the genesis of Awakenings, whereupon he makes 
no effort to mask the bitterness and tension caused by his perceived rejection by certain quarters 
of the medical press. In a short piece from late 1983 on this topic in the British Medical Journal, 
which (in a slightly ironic twist) he says he was asked to contribute by the (unnamed) editor, 
Sacks evocatively describes how his breakthrough book came about. Sacks had tested the waters 





new drug L-GRSD7KHVHDUWLFOHVZHUHSUHVHQWHGµLQDQ orthodox or conventional format ± papers 
IXOORIVWDWLVWLFVDQGILJXUHVDQGWDEOHVDQGJUDSKV¶6DFNV%XWGHVSLWHWKLV
according to Sacks they only  
 
elicited vehemently censorious, even violent, rejections, as if there were something intolerable in 
what I had written. I was very taken aback at this and could not help contrasting what I was now 
encountering with the days when I had been a neurological resident and had found instant 
publication for the papers I wrote. Now, for some reason, strong objection was aroused. I was 
struck by the irony, the paradox, of all this: when I had nothing much to say I could be published 
without difficulty; now I had something to say I was denied publication.  
µ:KDWLVKDSSHQLQJ"¶,NHSWDVNLQJP\VHOI+DYH,wandered off, become an aberration? 
Or has neurology itself fallen on evil days? 





ZKDWKHLVVRGHVSHUDWHµWRVD\¶ This is contrasted with the unpredictable horror of the 
QHXURORJLFDOFRPPXQLW\¶VDOWHUnating reprobations and murky but essentially mollifying silence ± 
WKHIRUPHUZKHQVRPHWKLQJVHHPLQJO\WKUHDWHQVWKHVWDWXVTXRWKHODWWHUµSDUDGR[LFDOO\¶FRPLQJ
ZKHQUXQRIWKHPLOODQGWKXVµXQ-say-ZRUWK\¶QHXURORJ\FRQWULEXWHVOLWWOHRIYDOXH 
6DFNV¶Vrhetoric tacitly associates him with something as yet unknown but pertaining to 
some higher purpose ± that of an epistemological upheaval, a reappraisal of clinical truth-value: 
 
I felt, sadly, that I could no longer hope to publish or be published in medical journals, unless I 
betrayed my own clinical experience. Further, as clinical observation extended itself, and gave rise 
to considerations beyond the strictly clinical ± human, scientific, existential, philosophical ± it 
became clearer that I would have to break out of a purely medical format, and find another one 
that, while remaining faithful to the clinical, could go beyond it and point to something larger and 
deeper. 
(Sacks 1983: 1969) 
 
7KHLPSOLFDWLRQLVWKDWJRLQJµEH\RQGWKHVWULFWO\FOLQLFDO¶DQG WKHµSXUHO\PHGLFDO¶ZDV
something that was not allowed, and that some would find hard to swallow, but was crucial to the 
JUDQGLRVHµODUJHUDQGGHHSHU¶JRDO:KHUH6DFNVKDGEHHQQHUYRXVEHIRUHKHZDVE\WKLVSRLQW







I have always had to interfuse narration with meditation, embedding each, so to speak, in the 
other. Thus what was done in miniature [previously], this interfusion of case history and essay, 
was done at length and at leisure in Awakenings; and could never have been done within the 
format of any conventional article or book. Perhaps this is why, in 1973, Awakenings, while 
intriguing many non-medical readers, met the same cold reception from the profession as my 
articles had done earlier. There was not a single medical notice or review, only a disapproving or 
uncomprehending silence. 
(Sacks 1983: 1969) 
 
Where previous reprobations had failed to deter the knight errant Sacks from his sallies, a 
different kind of silence was now employed. 
This apparently unsettled the relatively young author Sacks still was at the time, seeking 
as he was not just recognition from the public but also from his colleagues in medicine. Though 
he proceeded to write plenty, gain a huge following, and command widespread respect and 
admiration, still the distress of this early experience stayed with him until the final years of his 
life, when he attempted to theorize in his memoirs why he was met with such disdain by his 
colleagues ± but why he went ahead anyway:  
 
I had cast doubt on predictability itself. I had cast contingency as an essential, unavoidable 
phenomenon that emerged with the continuing administration of L-dopa. 
I knew that I had been given the rarest of opportunities; I knew that I had something 
important to say, but I saw no way of saying it, of being faithful to my experiences, without 
IRUIHLWLQJPHGLFDOµSXEOLVKDELOLW\¶RUDFFHSWDQFHDPRQJP\FROOHDJXHV,IHlt this most keenly 
when a long paper I had written about the postencephalitics and their responses to L-dopa was 
rejected by Brain, the oldest and most respected journal of neurology. 
 (Sacks 2015: 178) 
 
,WLVDSSDUHQWIURP6DFNV¶VWRQHLQWKHVHFWLRQIURPZKLFKWKLVTXRWDWLRQLVWDNHQWKDWKHVWLOOµIHOW
this most keenly¶ despite his many years of commercial and critical success. It stands as 
testament to the importance of this narrative of rejection, engendered by his experience with 
encephalitis letharJLFDWR6DFNV¶VYHU\VHOI-identity, an important foundational neurosis he just 
could not let go ± and this is the case whether the details of his story were over-dramatized or not. 




cementing the doubled role of the obstacle/goal in his life story. Furthermore, if what Sacks 





Sacks ± whose memoir is entitled On the Move: A Life, thus clearly signalling his itinerant 
predilection ± is another questing, Wandering Jew. 
Sacks is under no illusion about his debt to fellow wanderer Freud. Writing of the 
resilience of the self in the face of neurological adversity, Sacks comments that  
 
µVWULYLQJWRSUHVHUYHLGHQWLW\¶KRZHYHUVWUDQJHWKHPHDQVRUHIIHFWVRIVXFKVWULYLQJZDV
recognised in psychiatry long ago ± and, like so much else, is especially associated with the work 
of Freud. Thus the delusions of paranoia were seen by him, not as primary, but as attempts 
(however misguided) at restitution, at reconstructing a world reduced to complete chaos. 
(Sacks 2011b: 7) 
 
%XWLQWKHIDFHRI6DFNV¶VRZQDGYHUVLW\WKHVXSSRVHGPDOHYROHQFHRIWKHPHGLFDOHVWDEOLVhment 
and his inability to gain any traction in those spheres via his popular writings, Sacks himself 
comes off as a touch deluded and paranoid. This by no means diminishes the interest of his work; 
on the contrary, it is merely a narrative strategy, learned from other quixotics like Freud, 
employed in the service of self-IDVKLRQLQJRIFDUYLQJRQH¶VRZQQLFKHRIµVWULYLQJWRSUHVHUYH
QHXURORJLFDOLGHQWLW\¶± which, as mentioned, applies not just to patients but also the doctors who 




better or worse, of self-IDVKLRQLQJ$V$XGHQ¶VVWDQFHVXJJHVWVWKHLURQ\LVWKDWDWKUHDWWR
identity, even if only a perceived threat, is useful, and can in fact come to be a major player in the 
make-XSRIWKDWYHU\LGHQWLW\7KLVJDLQVLQVDOLHQFHZKHQUHFRQVLGHULQJ6DFNV¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDW
$XGHQZDVKLVµOLYLQJPLUURU¶ ZKLOH$XGHQ¶VSRHPIRU6DFNVLVWLWOHGµ7DONLQJWR0\VHOI¶
(1971). Therein Auden ambiguously fuses the first and second person perspective, and claims 
WKDWµ<RXKDYHSUHVHUYHG<RXUSRLVHVWUDQJHUXVWLFREMHFW_ZKRP,>«@PXVWERZWRDV0H¶W 
H Auden 2009: 309). If as is likely the poem is not just dedicated but also addressed to Sacks, 
WKHQWKHZLOIXODEVRUSWLRQRIHDFKRWKHU¶VFKDUDFWHUVLVQRWDEUHDNGRZQRIVHOI-identity, but a 
ERRQWRLWVRPHWKLQJZRUWK\RIWKHGHIHUHQFHLPSOLHGE\DµERZ¶ 
In a coded but nevertheless biographical rumination on an intimate relationship, and 
aware of himself as a poet whose elderly body was slowly failing, Auden suggests what he has 
SUDFWLFDOO\OHDUQHGIURP6DFNV+HZULWHVRI6DFNVWKDWKHZDVµP\WXWRUDOVR_EXWIRUZKRVH
neural instructions I could never | acknowledge what is or imagine whaWLVQRW¶W H Auden 
2$JDLQWKHµQHXUDOLQVWUXFWLRQV¶FRXOGHTXDOO\VWDQGIRU$XGHQ¶VRZQEUDLQHQFDVHGLQ
WKHERG\KHFDOOVKLVµPRUWDOPDQRU>DQG@FDUQDOWHUULWRU\¶,ELGDVLWFRXOGIRUKLV





epistemological doubt regarding the world and himself, about what he can or cannot 
µDFNQRZOHGJH¶RUµLPDJLQH¶ and this doubt finds a useful contrast in another poem which he 
published more than 30 years prevLRXVO\µ7KH4XHVW¶,Qµ7DONLQJWR0\VHOI¶ $XGHQ¶V
JUDVSRIZKDWLVRUZKDWFRXOGEHUHOLHVXSRQKLVµWXWRU¶6DFNVZKRLVRIFRXUVHVRPHRQHHOVH
but also impossibly, somehow identical to him as well. By comparison, in WKHVHFWLRQRIµ7KH
4XHVW¶subWLWOHGµ7KH:D\¶ $XGHQZULWHVµKRZUHOLDEOHFDQDQ\WUXWKEHWKDWLVJRW_%\
REVHUYLQJRQHVHOIDQGMXVWLQVHUWLQJD1RW"¶W H Auden 2009: 116). From the earlier to the later 
poem, the reliability of truth remains the ultimate goal. Yet something changed during that time, 
ILQDOO\SHUPLWWLQJ$XGHQWKDWLQVHUWLRQRIµD1RW¶LQWRKLVRZQVHOI-description, and by extension, 
into his understanding of the world. 
So what was it that changed? One is tempted to give the credit to Sacks alone ± who had 
inserted Dµ1RW¶LQWRKLVVHOI-QDUUDWLYHLQRUGHUWRFKDOOHQJHWUDGLWLRQDOQHXURORJ\¶Vµ1RW¶WRKLP
in the first place ± EXWJLYHQWKHUHODWLYHO\VKRUWWLPHWKH\NQHZHDFKRWKHUDQG$XGHQ¶VKXJH
FDSDFLW\IRUPDNLQJIULHQGVDPRQJVWZKRP$XGHQ¶VELRJUDSKHUVGHVSLte the evidence of all of 
the above, deem Sacks as fairly peripheral), further explanation is needed. Closer to the truth is 
WKDWLQ$XGHQ¶VOLIHORQJTXHVWRQH¶VWUDMHFWRU\WKURXJKWKHZRUOGUDQSDUDOOHOWRDQGXOWLPDWHO\
became absorbed by, the self. Another two short passages, one from each of the two poems just 
mentioned, suffice to show that Sacks heralded for Auden the arrival of an unpredictability that 
he had predicted all along ± especially coming as Sacks did from what Auden saw as the 
normally entrenched realm of science and medicine. Many have seen the whole sonnet sequence 
µ7KH4XHVW¶WRUHSUHVHQWDVSLULWXDORUH[LVWHQWLDOMRXUQH\&IH Carpenter 1983: 296; Davenport-
Hines 2004: 20), and while the poem suggests that certain kinds of people are not up to, or 
worthy of such a quest, this is because they follow the countless, incorrect examples of others 
LQVWHDGRIHDFKH[DPLQLQJKLVRUKHURZQLGHQWLW\,QWKHVRQQHWµ7KH:D\¶IURPµ7KH4XHVW¶ the 
WLWOHGHVLJQDWHVERWKDSDWKIRUDSHUVRQ¶VMRXrney, but also the rigidity of method. In essence, 
following rules will only make one a follower, and forever indebted to an unceasingly rewritten 
rule-ERRN'HVSLWHWKHSRHP¶VRVWHQVLYH&KULVWLDQRYHUWRQHVLIWKLVDSSOLHVWRUHOLJLRQ, it does so 
just as much to science and education, as evinced at its beginning: 
 
Fresh addenda are published every day 
To the encyclopedia of the Way. 
 
Linguistic notes and scientific explanations, 
And texts for schools with modernised spelling and illustrations. 
 
Now everyone knows the hero must choose the old horse, 






And look out for a stranded fish to be kind to: 




Forgetting his information comes mostly from married men 
Who liked fishing and a flutter on the horses now and then. 
(W H Auden 2009: 115±116) 
 
The options available are redolent of chivalric knighthood, but as they are something the hero 
µmust choose¶ they become obligatory instead. The reflected images of horse, fish and implied 
marital union, idealized and heroic on the one hand but domesticated, mundane and 
LQFRQVHTXHQWLDORQWKHRWKHULQGLFDWHWKHK\SRFULV\DQGIXWLOLW\RIVHWWLQJRXWRQVRPHRQHHOVH¶V
quest ± WKHUHLVQRVLQJOHµ:D\¶EXWDYHULWDEOHPXOWLSOLFLW\RIµZD\V¶ Answers from outside of 
RQHVHOIZKHWKHUSUHVFULSWLYHWKHRQO\µ:D\¶RUSURVFULSWLYHLQVHUWLQJDµ1RW¶WRPHUHO\PLPLF
WKHµ:D\¶ but in reverse), are flawed, clichéd, and neither the deterministic obviousness of 
µOLQJXLVWLFQRWHV¶QRUµVFLHQWLILFH[SODQDWLRQV¶ZLOOGR 
 +RZHYHUE\WKHWLPHRIµ7DONLQJWR0\VHOI¶ Auden has somewhat changed tack. He 
writes: 
   
  Unpredictably, decades ago, You arrived  
among that unending cascade of creatures spewed  
IURP1DWXUH¶VPDZ. A random event, says Science.  
Random my bottom! A true miracle, say I,  
for who is not certain that he was meant to be? 
(W H Auden 2009: 310) 
 
Whether consciously or not, the vaunting of unpredictability that was levelled at Sacks as a slur 
by the medical community DURXQGWKHWLPHRIWKLVSRHP¶VSXEOLFDWLRQLVKHUHUHFODLPHGE\
$XGHQDVDYLUWXH7KLVLV6DFNV¶VHQWLUHUDLVRQG¶rWUHERUQµGHFDGHVDJR¶WRXVKHULQWKLV
XQSUHGLFWDELOLW\,QWKLVZD\$XGHQDOVRUHKDELOLWDWHVWKHµUDQGRP¶DVDWERWWRPSUHGLFWDEOHDQG
SHUIHFWO\DSSURSULDWHO\µPLUDFXORXVO\¶DGDSWHGWRZKDWHYHURQHµZDVPHDQWWREH¶ More than 
anything, this convoluted combination of unique quest-like predetermination amidst the chaos 
DQGFRQWLQJHQF\RIµ1DWXUH¶VFDVFDGH¶VKRZVWKDW6DFNVLQVRPHZD\UHhabilitated establishment 
µ6FLHQFH¶IRU$XGHQPDNLQJLWVLPXOWDQHRXVO\DSUDFWLFHRIXQSUHGLFWDEOHUXOH-bending and a 





 The manner in which one fits into this unlikely sounding schema is precisely what so 
preoccupied both Auden and Sacks, providing them each with both the start point and the end 
JRDORIWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHTXHVWV)RU6DFNVWKHµPDWWHURILGHQWLW\¶ as chapters titled as such in 




study of disease and identity cannot bHGLVMRLQHG¶6DFNVE: x; my emphasis), it is him, or the 
specific neurological doctor/researcher in question, that is implied to be doing the studying, and 
of course this studious person also has an identity defined, to some extent, by doing so. When he 
JRHVRQWRSURSRVHµDQHZGLVFLSOLQHZKLFKZHPD\FDOOWKH³QHXURORJ\RILGHQWLW\´¶,ELG
there is an echo of himself in the neo-GLVFLSOLQDU\µZH¶KHVKDUHVZLWK his patients (and 
presumably readers). Meanwhile for Auden, collapsing subjectivity into the objective world, 
which may be considered as reconciling the self with society (or a first person poetics with a third 
person science), was the simultaneous basis for a singular, personal quest alongside the idea of a 
genericalO\UHLWHUDWHG4XHVWZULWODUJHµThe theme of the Quest occurs in fairy tales, legends 
>«@ER\V¶DGYHQWXUHVWRULHVDQGGHWHFWLYHQRYHOV7KHVHSRHPV>FRPSULVLQJµ7KH4XHVW¶@DUH
reflections uSRQFHUWDLQIHDWXUHVFRPPRQWRWKHPDOO7KHµ+H¶DQGWKHµ7KH\¶UHIHUUHGWRVKRXOG
be regarded aVERWKREMHFWLYHDQGVXEMHFWLYH¶Cited in Fuller 1970: 143). As John Fuller points 
RXWWKHYDULDWLRQEHWZHHQVLQJXODUDQGSOXUDOUHJLVWHUVWKHµ+H¶DQGWKHµ7KH\¶ZKLFKPDUNV
µ7KH4XHVW¶LVVRPHWKLQJWKDWµUHSUHVHQW>V@WKHZRUOGRIWKHVHOIDQGWKHQRW-VHOI¶UHVSHFWLYHO\
(Fuller 1970: 144). 
In conclusion, if science is a quest and the brain is its ultimate goal, then more than one 
type of knight has set out in pursuit of such lofty ideals. Nevertheless, this chapter has shown 
how, at bottom, each type is quixotic. In the case of Rodrigo Quian Quiroga, quixotism can be a 
rational choice, a seemingly strange but finally, joyously enlightening attempt to avoid inaccurate 
accusations of neurosis. For Santiago Ramón y Cajal, individual neurosis is neither here nor 
there, as quixotism is a political necessity, a matter of urgency for the collective good. When it 
comes to W H Auden, he deemed the wilful, quixotic search for neurosis at once a personal and a 
political affair, influencing Oliver Sacks by making him realize that his position in neurological 




ZRUOGV¶/OR\G,IWKLVLVWUXHWKHQZKHQWKHVWRU\is the brain, interpretation of that 





comment in and of his simultaneous neuro-philosophical treatise and detective novel Radiant 
Cool (2004)µ³7KHEUDLQLVDVWRU\´2QHWKHPHRIWKLVERRNKDVEHHQWKDWHYHU\PRPHQWRI
every brain is a story unto itself. Reading this non-WH[WXDOVWRU\UHTXLUHVVSHFLDOPHWKRGV¶/OR\G
2004: 331±332). Whether there truly is a pattern or a story in the brain that lies dormant beyond 
its surface until it is found, either by a questing knight, or a detective on the case, or a 





















to psychology: the purely psychological task of making 
people talk more than they intend to talk ± and, of course, 
to find the right people to do the talking. 











Neuroscience is detective work. Neuroscientists are literary detectives. Or at least they partially 
base themselves on these detectives, whether consciously or not. Neuroscientists search for clues, 
IROORZWKHHYLGHQFHDQGXQFRYHUWKLQJVDERXWµKXPDQQDWXUH¶WKDWDUHPRVWRIWHQKidden from 
view. Appended to this is a moral imperative, one that understands both neuroscience and 
detective work as a desire to find truth and justice, things supposedly in the interest of all of 
society, but that can just as easily find both neuroscientists and detectives working outside the 
boundaries of normal human understanding (or law) as within them. Additionally, neuroscientific 
GHWHFWLYHZRUNGRHVDVPXFKRIWKHµDUWIXOFRQFHDOLQJ¶WKDWLWSXUSRUWVWREHXQGRLQJRUUHYHDOLQJ
Thus, this chapter will show that neuroscience convolves in a necessarily literary way, and ought 
to examine what the ramifications of this are. The chapter departs from the work of philosopher 
Dan Lloyd, and his amalgam of detective fiction and neuroscience, to show their basic common 
elements as well as their hidden problematics. It then moves to a discussion of the neuro-themed 
mystery television series Perception, in order to demonstrate that neuroscience surreptitiously 
learns a useful discursive trick from detective fiction: namely, the claim to have better access to 
truth than previous discourses and practices (including detective fiction itself). However, by 
IXUWLYHO\WDNLQJRQGHWHFWLYHILFWLRQ¶VFRPIRUWLQJUHVROXWLRQRIDSUREOHPWKDWLWKDGVHWXSLQWKH
first place, neuroscience does not question the ethical and epistemological implications of its 
borrowings. The final section of the chapter surveys how this plays out in the works of Oliver 
6DFNVEHIRUHUHWXUQLQJWR/OR\GYLDDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIGHWHFWLYHILFWLRQ¶VPore recent attempts to 
police its own assumptions ± something which neuroscience could also well stand to borrow from 






Dan Lloyd: The Brain is a Detective Story 
 
 
,WLVQRFRLQFLGHQFHWKDW'DQ/OR\G¶VERRNRadiant Cool is subtitled A Novel Theory of 
Consciousness/OR\G¶VPRGXVRSHUDQGLLQWKHERRNPHDQVWKHFKRLFHRIWKHZRUGµQRYHO¶LVDSW
in a number of ways. Firstly, as a philosopher relating phenomenology to cutting-edge cognitive 
QHXURVFLHQFHWKHRYHUDUFKLQJµWKHRU\¶WKDWJLves the book its title and themes is by its nature an 
attempt at something novel, or new. Secondly, rather than simply outline his case in the standard 
academic way, Lloyd stages a convoluted hoax in which his theory is first elucidated by an 
alternative author, Miranda Sharpe, an invention allowing Lloyd to explore ideas in a fictional 
VHWWLQJ7KLVFRQFHLWLVQHYHUUHYHDOHGDQG6KDUSH¶VILUVWSHUVRQPHPRLURIDXQLYHUVLW\-set 
P\VWHU\LVRQO\LPSOLFLWO\VKRZQWREHILFWLRQLQ/OR\G¶VVHFRQGKDOIRIWKHERok, the detailed 
VFLHQWLILFDQGSKLORVRSKLFDOFRPPHQWDU\RQ6KDUSH¶VSVHXGR-literary first half. Finally, this first 
KDOILV/OR\G¶VQRYHOSXUVXLWRIQRYHOLVWLFZULWLQJDPRFN-up of a detective story which self-
consciously battles to detect consciousness (of) itself. In summary, it is novel: as in a new theory; 
as in a novelty for scientific writing; and this is because it is in itself a novel, as in the literary 
form. It is as if Lloyd needs the fictional first half and its authorial alter-ego in order to more 
SURSHUO\H[SORUHWKHµQRQ-ILFWLRQDO¶ILQGLQJVRIWKHVHFRQGKDOIZKLFKZRXOGRUGLQDULO\IDOOXQGHU
WKHUHPLWRI/OR\G¶VGD\MRE 
In this quotidian role of theoretician, investigator and teacher of consciousness, Lloyd is 
undoubtedly oriented towards the literary, as evidenced both by his institutional and personal web 
SDJHV7KHIRUPHUOLVWVµ3KLORVRSK\LQ/LWHUDWXUH¶VDQGZLFKHGEHWZHHQµMinds and Brains, from 
SKLORVRSK\WRFRJQLWLYHQHXURVFLHQFH¶DQGµ&RQWLQHQWDOSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOSKLORVRSK\¶ under the 
DUHDVRIVSHFLDOLW\LQWKHµ7HDFKLQJ¶WDE0HDQwhile, WKHµ5HVHDUFK¶WDEUHYHDOVWZRLQWHUHVWV
VLPSO\µ&RQVFLRXVQHVV¶DQGµ$OWHUQDWLYHYHKLFOHVIRUSUHVHQWLQJFRPSOH[LGHDVLQFOXGLQJILFWLRQ
(Jorge Luis Borges, for example) and advanced data visualL]DWLRQ¶/OR\G 2016a). /OR\G¶V
SHUVRQDOZHESDJHHODERUDWHVIXUWKHUµ8QGHUVWDQGLQJFRQVFLRXVQHVVLVP\FRUHUHVHDUFKLQWHUHVW 
This implicates phenomenology ± the philosophical effort to characterize the essential structures 
of experience ± and cognitive neuroscience ± the empirical quest to understand the function of 
WKHEUDLQDQGQHUYRXVV\VWHP¶/OR\G 2016b7KHZRUGµTXHVW¶ used here to characterize 
cognitive neuroscience, inextricably links scientific endeavour with the literary, chivalric, 
perhaps quixotic motifs explored in the previous chapter. But in a more detailed breakdown of his 
UHVHDUFKLQWHUHVWV/OR\GWLHVKLVPDLQFRQFHUQVPRUHH[SOLFLWO\WROLWHUDWXUHµ&RQVFLRXVQHVVDQG
narrative: Stories are distinctly temporal structures, and their universality among human cultures 
suggests a close link to bDVLFEUDLQIXQFWLRQ¶E+DYLQJHVWDEOLVKHGWKDW/OR\G¶VLQWHUHVWLQ





Cool, what drives him to present his thought specifically via the mystery story medium? The 
µHPSLULFDOTXHVW¶ZKLFKXQGHUSLQV/OR\G¶VZRUNZRXOGSHUKDSVPRUHQDWXUDOO\VXJJHVW
fantastical writing, building on that tradition of chivalric epics dating back to at least the Middle 
Ages. Nevertheless, Lloyd chooses a far more modern form, the detective fiction genre, and thus 
implicit in his interrogations of cognitive/neuro science and phenomenology lie further questions 
on the history of narrative forms, their relationship to brain/mind sciences, and the very idea of 
WKHµGHWHFWLYH¶ 
In the following passage from Radiant Cool, Lloyd quotes from and expands on 
Computational Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience E\5DQGDOO2¶5HLOO\DQG<XNR
Munakata:  
 
µ7KHFHQWUDOLGHDZHXVHWo explain what the neuron is doing is that of a detector. As a 
simplification, we can think of a neuron as detecting the existence of some set of conditions, and 
responding with a signal that communicates the extent to which those conditions have been met.¶ 
Their central idea is indeed the central idea of half a century of cognitive science, and it is 
preeminent among the conceptual tools in the cognitive science toolbox. Furthermore, the detector 
idea is not just the idea of the neuron, but has been scaled up to define the business of every kind 
of component in the mind and brain (and even scaled down, in computational models of parts of 
neurons). 
(Lloyd 2004: 229±230; original emphasis)  
 
/OR\GHYHQWXDOO\UHMHFWVWKLVQRWLRQRIDµGHWHFWRU¶ but not before commenting on the resilience 
RIWKHEDVLFSUHPLVHLQWKHIDFHRIWKHDGGLWLRQRIVHYHUDOOD\HUVRIFRPSOH[LW\LQ/OR\G¶V
example, by the development of neural nets). These layers bury the neuron further and further 
away from the surface (read: sensory) detector with which it shares some mutually causal link, or 
feedback loop. Despite this, KHODWHUGLVPLVVLYHO\VXPPDUL]HVWKHGHWHFWRUPRGHODVIROORZVµ,Q
short, cognitive science sees us all as detectorheads¶/OR\GRULJLQDOHPSKDVLV7ZR
thiQJVDUHRIQRWHKHUHILUVWO\LQ2¶5HLOO\DQG0XQDNDWD¶VIRUPXODWLRQWKHUHLVDµFHQWUDOLGHD¶
to be got at. This seems instantly self-defeating if a neuron, or collection thereof, or particle 
thereof, is to be considered a detector; indeed, there will always be something for which this 
detector will be detecting, placing the detector not at the centre of anything but at the surface ± no 
PDWWHUWKHOD\HUVRIFRPSOH[LW\LQEHWZHHQ6HFRQGO\WKHWHUPµGHWHFWRU¶LWVHOIVHHPVUHPDUNDEO\
VLPLODUWRWKHWHUPµGHWHFWLYH¶± especially given that the bulk of /OR\G¶VERRN is presented as a 
neuroscientific, phenomenologically-informed detective story, a piece of updated (and to some 
perhaps over-written) genre fiction. 
The OED¶VHDUOLHVWGHILQLWLRQRIµGHWHFWLYH¶DV an adjective dates back to 1843, and in 






meaning dating back to 1541, and this word which is now more associated with technological 
equipment, from its appearance in act 3, scene 5, line 13 in the ILUVWSXEOLFDWLRQRI6KDNHVSHDUH¶V
King Lear in 1608, RYHUODSSHGLQPHDQLQJZLWKWKHZRUGµGHWHFWLYH¶ This is shown by the OED¶V
second GHILQLWLRQRIµGHWHFWRU¶µ2QHZKRILQGVRXWWKDWZKLFKLVDUWIXOO\FRQFHDOHGRUZKLFK
WHQGVWRHOXGHREVHUYDWLRQ¶$GLIIHUHQWNLQGRIµGHILQLWLRQ¶RIµGHWHFWLYH¶VXJJHVWVWKDWLWLVLQIDFW
the characteristics of fictional detectives that are WKHPVHOYHVµDUWIXOO\FRQFHDOHG¶ as crime writer 
9DO0F'HUPLGSURSRVHVRI5D\PRQG&KDQGOHU¶VPRVWIDPRXVOLWHUDU\FUHDWLRQGHWHFWLYH3KLOLS
Marlowe. McDermid writes that in the reality of non-fiction  
 
such a man would not just be a private detective but could become the archetype of what a 
gumshoe could be. This rumpled, battered, slightly tarnished knight with his surface defence of 
cynicism against his desire to fight for the underdog is the irresistible template for hundreds of 
subsequent novels, films and TV series. 
(Chandler 2005: v) 
 
)RU0F'HUPLGDVIRUPDQ\RWKHUZULWHUV0DUORZHLVPRUHWKDQDGHWHFWLYHEXWDQµDUFKHW\SH¶
DQGDQµLUUHVLVWLEOHWHPSODWH¶ the definitive detective ± the definition thereof. Cynicism may not 
EHWKHµVXUIDFHGHIHQFH¶RI every single fictional detective, but this anecdotally rings true for 
many characters in the hard-boiled detective sub-genre, and the main point is the concealment of 
motivation, a reluctance to part with the details driving the detective to his or her work. The true 
nature of the detective, what defines them as such both to themselves and to their readers, is an 
µDUWIXOFRQFHDOLQJ¶RIWKHVHVDPHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVHLWKHUE\WKHFKDUDFWHURUDXWKRURUERWK 
With regards to why this concealment is necessary, it is of note that McDermid terms 
0DUORZHDµNQLJKW¶ however much she pre-HPSWLYHO\TXDOLILHVWKLV3OD\LQJRQH¶VKDQGWRRHDUO\
in the questing hero stakes is dangerous, redolent of overly zealous chivalric forebears and 
possibly even downright mad. As 0F'HUPLGZULWHVRI&KDQGOHU¶VQRYHOThe Little Sister (1949), 
LQZKLFK0DUORZHLVWKHSURWDJRQLVWµZHVHHULJKWIURPWKHVWDUWKLVTXL[RWLFQDWXUH)DFHGZLWK
the naïve eponymous little sister, to his lasting regret he takes the case of tracking down her 
PLVVLQJEURWKHU¶&KDQGOHUY0DUORZH¶VXQFKDUDFWHULVWLFODFNRIFRQFHDOPHQWLQWKH
presence of the not-so-QDwYHWLWXODUIHPPHIDWDOHRQO\OHDGVWRµODVWLQJUHJUHW¶ Furthermore, 
0DUORZHLVDJDLQSRUWUD\HGLQFKLYDOULFPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\µTXL[RWLF¶ terms. Here McDermid is of 
course alluding to another archetype, Don Quixote, the self-styled knight who, for Chandler and 
McDermid and no doubt countless others, is himself an irresistible template of an unhesitating, 







(who becomes central to the plot but is also cast in many ways as morally dubious) ± this whole 
catastrophically flawed family has the surname Quest. 
 So if Lloyd opts to explore the scientific and philosophical study of consciousness via 
literary means, the detective fiction genre makes sense as it not only has as much linguistic 
provenance as the chivalric quest, but even contains a quixotic element ± of the simultaneously 
definitive yet marginal, of the hero who both epitomizes valour and agency whilst reaffirming the 
foolhardiness, irrationality and ultimate fatalism of the heroic endeavour. Lloyd is wise enough 
not to play this hand too soon, however, and begins his book with his own act of artful 
concealment, claiming the story is not in fact his ± which certainly follows the Cervantine 
tradition of playful insistence that Don Quixote was not his responsibility, but that he had merely 
transcribed into Spanish a second-hand oral translation from Arabic. Lloyd even conceals his 
own concealment by designating himself a friend and colleague of would-be detective Sharpe, 






I felt that the world could XVHDIXOOUHSRUWRIKHUGLVFRYHULHV>«@7KLVVWRU\LQKHURZQZRUGV
EHFDPHWKHILUVWSDUWRIWKLVERRN>«@WKHUHDO-OLIHZKRGXQLW>«@LQWHUZRYHQZLWKDUH-alignment 
in the twenty-first-century view of the mind. This re-DOLJQPHQWRFFXUUHGLQ6KDUSH¶Vthinking 
through the very encounters that embroiled her in a murderous drama. This, then, is the story that 
all the other stories have missed. 
(Lloyd 2004: xvi; original emphasis) 
 
9HLOHGLQWKHILQDOOLQHKHUHRI/OR\G¶VVXSSRVHGXQYHLOLQJLVDQRGWRRWKer theories of 
FRQVFLRXVQHVVWKHRULHVLJQRUDQWRIWKHµreal¶DQGIXUWKHU µUHDO-OLIH¶µVWRU\WKDWDOOWKHRWKHUVWRULHV
have missed¶ 
Lloyd attempts to back up these persistent claims to veracity by hinting at his own extra-
DXWKRULDOLQYROYHPHQWµLQWKHS\URWHFKQLFGHQRXHPHQWRI6KDUSH¶VDGYHQWXUH¶ZKLFKWKRXJKLW
ZDVDµPXUGHURXVGUDPD¶ZDVDOVRDµUH-alignment in the twenty-first-century view of the mind¶ 
7KHVSXULRXVFODLPVWRWUXWKRI6KDUSH¶VVWRU\FRPHDWWDFKHGWRDWUXHSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO
discovery, and Lloyd casts himself as a bit-part player, merely inspired by the unexpected 
reshuffle in thought caused by dramatic events. This ingenious mechanism of nesting narratives 
and scientific theories allows Lloyd, unironically but explicitly, to make literaU\µWKHSURFHVVRI
discovering a new theory ± RIDQ\WKLQJEXWHVSHFLDOO\RIFRQVFLRXVQHVV>«@/LNHDGHWHFWLYH





chance conversations, nagging metaphors, and backKDQGUHYHODWLRQV¶/OR\G[YLRULJLQDO
HPSKDVLV6WURQJO\UHPLQLVFHQWRIQHXURVFLHQWLVW5RGULJR4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VGHEXQNLQJRID
µ(XUHND¶PRPHQWLQIDYRXURIDVHWRIPXQGDQHEXWµQDJJLQJTXHVWLRQV¶4XLDQ4XLURJD
/OR\G¶VVWDWHGDZDUHQHVVRIWKHYDOXHRIµPHWDSKRUV¶ nagging or otherwise, leads him to build 
his character Sharpe entirely around one: the metaphorical device of himself as a detective of 
FRQVFLRXVQHVV+LVDOOXVLRQWRµEDFNKDQGUHYHODWLRQV¶LVLWVHOIRQO\DFRGHGEDFNKDQGHGZD\ of 
saying that this character, or the whole fictional half of his book, is a cypher designed to artfully 
conceal the metaphor.  
7KHSKUDVHµDUWIXOO\FRQFHDOHG¶ from the OED¶VGHILQLWLRQVRIµGHWHFWLYH¶DQGµGHWHFWRU¶ 
has been repeatedly cited or reformulated here for a reason. This is because it suggests hiding 
things with great skill, in less heavy-handed fashion than crudely covering something over ± 
indeed, something like sleight of hand. A detective, then, can be seen as the enemy of skilful, 
purposeIXOQDUUDWLYHPLVGLUHFWLRQVXFKDV/OR\G¶VRUDQ\RWKHUNLQGRIVRSKLVWU\VXFKDV
magic, which purports to create highly believable illusions. Where Lloyd uses literary techniques 
to achieve his sleight of hand, other neuroscience researchers have turned to professional 
illusionists to study the wilful subversion of perception, and how this in turn can help investigate 
SHUFHSWLRQ¶VSURSHURSHUDWLRQScientific American editor-in-chief Mariette DiChristina blogs the 
following:  
 
Why are scientists working with sleight-of-hand artists? Their tricks, honed through the decades, 
have revealed that people respond to certain situations in specific ways. Like detectives looking 
IRUQHZOHDGVWRVROYHDP\VWHU\VFLHQWLVWVFDQPLQHPDJLFLDQV¶NQRZOHGJHIRULGHDVto test in the 
lab. And for the magicians, understanding principles about the brain ± that is, why a trick works 









illegal, then something at least underhand is afoot, so much so that even collusion with 
proponents of the underhand activity is deemed acceptabOHZKHQQHFHVVDU\'L&KULVWLQD¶VEORJ
and a variety of links contained therein, focus on the work of neuroscientific husband and wife 
Stephen Macknik and Susana Martinez-Conde, whose recent co-authored book Sleights of Mind 





µ*HQWOHPDQ7KLHI¶of magic (Macknik and Martinez-Conde 2011: 5±6 and passim). It seems 
neuroscientific detective work means actively encouraging the enemy. Describing a 
demonstration by Robbins aWWKHµ1HXURPDJLF¶FRQIHUHQFHRUJDQL]HGE\0DUWLQH]-Conde 
and Macknik, DiChristina writes that  
 
narrative, which engages processing power in the brain by creating an interesting plot that the 
listener then follows, was effectively employed by attendee magicians [and] demonstrated how 
they make heavy use of a storyline to misdirect, with delightful effect. 
$VKHPDNHVMRNHVZLWKDXGLHQFHPHPEHUV5REELQV¶TXHVWLRQVDUHDOVRLQWHQGHGWR
FUHDWHLQWHUQDOGLDORJXHWKDWHDWVXSVRPHRIWKHEUDLQ¶VEDQGZLGWK. He said he tries to engage 
ZKDWKHFDOOVWKHEUDLQ¶Vµtwo security guards.¶ The idea is to get the two talking to each other 





be used to enhance their knowledge of his profession, and vice versa; story-telling becomes a tool 
both for and against cognitive sleuthing. 
 Talking about or researching cognitive faculties requires those very same cognitive 
faculties, and this type of circular problem can cast doubt upon the truth of findings. This 
FLUFXODULW\FDQEHUHJDUGHGDVDVDIHW\IHDWXUHRIVRUWVWKHµVHFXULW\JXDUGV¶5REELQVPHQWLRQV
which will not allow an object of investigation to be its own subject, or investigator.25 In some 
sense, any description of an object requires a subject to make it, and when this is the object itself, 
a further subject is sought. This might be why neuroscientists, magicians and literary writers all 
turn to narrative, and especially metaphor. Thus it is understandable that Martinez-Conde and 
0DFNQLNVHL]HXSRQ5REELQV¶VGHVFULSWLRQVRIWKHEUDLQ¶VµPHWDSKRULFDOJXDUGV¶ not only to 
make their work more widely LQWHOOLJLEOHEXWWRHOXFLGDWHLWWRWKHPVHOYHV5REELQV¶VVHOI-
identification as a petty-thieving but essentially trustworthy vagabond who nonchalantly straddles 
the legal/illegal border is also a fictionalization, reaffirmed by the neuroscientists who write 
about him in order to promote themselves as the establishment characters that counterpoise 
5REELQV¶VSOD\IXOVKDGLQHVV,QRadiant Cool Lloyd goes a step further ± the fictional premise 
serves not only to elucidate his ideas to himself and others, but additionally casts him as part of 




 However, this reflexive difficulty has been wholeheartedly faced square on by neurophenomenology. For instance, Antoine Lutz 
DQG(YDQ7KRPSVRQZULWHµ7KHDGRSWLRQRIDSURSHUO\SKHQRPHQRORJLFDODWWLWXGHLVDQLPSRUWDQWPHWKRGRORJLFDOSUHUHTXLVLWHIRr 







the just, crime-solving team that picks apart the unjust, mysterious quandary that he himself has 
so artfully concealed. 
 7KXV/OR\G¶VJDPELWRIQHXURVFLHQWLILFGHWHFWLYHZRUNKLVKLJK-wire line-walking 
significantly blurs the boundaries between what is legitimate (or legal) and what is not, but it also 
involves a significant risk ± falling down on either side, rather than carefully choosing a position 
from the relative safety of a seat on the fence, would be a long fall indeed. A tightrope act can be 
seen as a reverse magic trick, concealing a supposedly straightforward straight-line walk behind a 
death-defying stunt and immense feat of balance. Detective work, or detective writing, as Lloyd 
shows, involves very much the same type of balancing, a high-VWDNHVJDPEOHWKDW&KDQGOHU¶V
protagonist Marlowe finds himself similarly pondering in The Little Sister:  
 
$OO,NQRZLVWKDWVRPHWKLQJLVQ¶WZKDWLWVHHPVDQGWKHROGWLUHGEXWDOZD\VUHOLDEOHKXQFKWHOOV
me that if the hand is played the way it is dealt the wrong person is going to lose the pot. Is that 
P\EXVLQHVV":HOOZKDWLVP\EXVLQHVV"'R,NQRZ"'LG,HYHUNQRZ"/HW¶VQRWJRLQWRWKDW
<RX¶UHQRWKXPDQWR-QLJKW0DUORZH0D\EH,QHYHUZDVQRUHYHUZLOOEH0D\EH,¶PDn 
ectoplasm with a private license. Maybe we all get like this in the cold half-lit world where always 
the wrong thing happens and never the right. 
(Chandler 2005: 94) 
 
The evocative self-doubt Marlowe betrays in this passage brings together several strands that 
have been hinted at so far in this chapter. Marlowe is a private investigator and as such his 
µEXVLQHVV¶LVWRIXOILOZKDWHYHUDVVLJQPHQWZLWKZKLFKKLVFOLHQWVSURYLGHKLP+RZHYHUE\
questioning the precise nature of his business, Marlowe shines a moral light upon it ± working in 
KLVILHOGKDVQRWFRUUHFWHGWKHLQMXVWLFHWKDWKLVµDOZD\VUHOLDEOHKXQFK¶VHQVHVEXWLQVWHDGKDV
PDGHKLPµQRWKXPDQ¶ HQVXULQJUDWKHUWKDQSUHYHQWLQJWKDWµDOZD\VWKHZURQJWKLQJKDSSHQVDQG
never the right¶ Despite tKHZRUOGEHLQJRQO\µKDOI-OLW¶IRU0DUORZHKHLVQRWIRROHGE\FDUG
WULFNV.QRZLQJLQVWLQFWLYHO\WKDWµVRPHWKLQJLVQ¶WZKDWLWVHHPV¶DERXWWKHZD\µWKHKDQGLV
played¶ Marlowe suggests it is not a fair gamble if the deck is manipulated by someone with a 
talent for illusions. Although neither Marlowe nor Chandler are neuroscientists, the professed 
uncanny ability to read human behaviour and character accurately, even when great skill and 
effort are being employed to conceal these, is useful as a parallel between literary and scientific 
enquiry into the mind/brain. The difference is, where Lloyd revels in setting up the puzzle he then 
explains, Chandler problematizes the ethical dimensions of playing such tricks, regardless of 





Perception: The Detective is a Brain Story 
 
 
The upshot is that Dan Lloyd celebrates the blurring of boundaries, be they literary or scientific, 
legal or neurological, formal or content-based, true crime or metaphorical theories of 
consciousness, real events or illusory conceits, whereas Raymond Chandler can be seen to be 
condemning just such blurring.26 Therefore, three interlocking ideas can now be proposed for 
exploration: first, that neuroscience has a basis in detective fiction; second, that this consists of a 
common ritualistic association, as will be shown; and third, that neuroscience now purports to 
LPSURYHRQDQGUHSODFHVRFLHW\¶VHSLVWHPRORJLFDOO\DQGPRUDOO\RXWPRGHGRUIDLOHGULWXDOV± 
iQFOXGLQJWKDWRIGHWHFWLYHILFWLRQ+RZHYHUQHXURVFLHQWLILFUHDVRQ¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIVRFLHWDO
faults is itself based on techniques borrowed from the literature upon which it claims to improve. 
Thus neuroscience convolves in a literary manner, specifically that of the detective genre, 
because it creates and sets itself the task that it innocently claims to have discovered, and that 
needs to be solved. 
3UHOLPLQDU\HYLGHQFHRIGHWHFWLYHILFWLRQ¶VLQIOXHQFHRQVFLHQFHLVSURYLGHGE\Hminent 




so before we journey any further into the mysteries of the human brain, I feel that I should outline 
WKHPHWKRGVEHKLQGP\DSSURDFK¶5DPDFKDQGUDQ[Y,Ithese predetermined methods are 
JRRGHQRXJKIRUOLWHUDWXUH¶VPRVWFHOHEUDWHGPRVWSHUFHSWLYHGHWHFWLYHWKH\DOVRPXVWVXUHO\VXLW
WKHEUDLQ¶VµP\VWHULHV¶ Also writing of Holmes, James and John Kissane claim that in probably 
his most famous adventure,  
 
the detective-hero has a genuine adversary, but it is another intellect as human, and almost as 
scientific, as his own. The effect which The Hound of the Baskervilles so solidly achieves ± an 
effect perhaps fundamental to the detective story genre ± is therefore a ritualistic one. It possesses 
the characteristic quality of the predictable result whose achieving brings a special satisfaction. 
(Kissane and Kissane 1963: 360) 
 




 6RFLRORJLVW7KRPDV)*LHU\QDUJXHVWKDWLQVFLHQFHµ³ERXQGDU\-ZRUN´LVDVRFLRORJLFDOSDUDOOHOWRthe familiar literary device of the 
³IRLO´-XVWDVUHDGHUVFRPHWRNQRZ+ROPHVEHWWHUWKURXJKFRQWUDVWVWRKLVIRLO:DWVRQVRGRHVWKHSXEOLFEHWWHUOHDUQDERXt 
³VFLHQFH´WKURXJKFRQWUDVWVWR³QRQ-VFLHQFH´¶*LHU\Q+RZHYHU,ZRXOGFRQWHQGWKat actually, Lloyd takes on the roles of 






Kissane and Kissane directly equate Holmes and the entire detective genre with both ritual and 
VFLHQFHQRUPDOL]LQJWKHVSXULRXVO\VXSHUQDWXUDOFDQLQHRIWKDWSDUWLFXODUQRYHO¶VWLWOHWRWKH
GRPDLQRIWKHIDPLOLDUO\NQRZDEO\µKXPDQ¶ 7KHµSUHGLFWDEOHUHVXOW¶PHQWLRQHGLVUHGROHQWRI
scientific experiment and its tenets of logical hypothesis and demonstrability, but it goes further 
KHUH,WSURGXFHVDµVSHFLDOVDWLVIDFWLRQ¶± fact-hunting is actually pleasurable, and furthermore, 
µIXQGDPHQWDO¶ an exercise in obviousness, reason and repetition which is invaluably necessary to 
human life. HRZHYHU.LVVDQHDQG.LVVDQHDOVRSRLQWRXWWKDWµLIWKHHIIHFWRIULWXDOLVUHDVVXULQJ
WKHUHPXVWRIFRXUVHEHVRPHQHHGIRUUHDVVXUDQFH>«@&HUWDLQGHWDLOVRIWKHQRYHOJLYHD
suggestion that civilization itself has at best a precarious hold upon its hard-ZRQSRVLWLRQ¶ 
360±1). Holmes may be reasonable, but the rest of the world is decidedly less so. Although 
Kissane and Kissane make the case that medical man Sir Arthur Conan Doyle used this tension 
µWRGUDPDWL]HDVWUXJJOHRIVFLHQWLILFUHDVRQDJDLQVWVXSHUVWLWLRQDQGLUUDWLRQDOLW\¶Kissane and 
Kissane 1963: 355), there is a sense this dramatization sates the need for reassurance rather than 
GRLQJDZD\ZLWKLW,Q'R\OH¶VRHXYUHUHDVRQEHFRPHVWKHULWXDOQRWLWVRSSRVLWHDQGWKH
scientific mind XVHVGHWHFWLYHILFWLRQ¶VQHDWO\VHOI-HQFORVHGIRUPDWWRVKRZUDWLRQDOLW\¶V
superiority had always already been the case. 
,QGHHGLWLVDOODTXHVWLRQRIµFDVH¶ RUµWKLQNLQJLQFDVHV¶DVKLVWRULDQRIVFLHQFH-RKQ
Forrester has put it.27 The OED, in the sixth VHQVHOLVWHGIRUWKHQRXQµFDVH¶ GHILQHVLWDVµWKH
actual state of affairs; the way things stand¶ before the seventh sense ties it to all things legal and 
PHQWLRQVµDQLQFLGHQWRUVHWRIFLUFXPVWDQFHVXQGHULQYHVWLJDWLRQE\WKHSROLFHRUDGHWHFWLYH¶. 
:KLOVWGHWHFWLYHZRUNZKHWKHUILFWLRQDORULQµUHDOOLIH¶ presents itself as a mystery, the 
unquestioned assumption is that there is a clear, undisputable truth behind this which structures 
WKHµFDVH¶LWVHOIDQGDOORZVLWWRHYHQH[LVWDWDOO,WLVLQteresting, then, that the OED¶Veighth 
VHQVHIRUWKHQRXQµFDVH¶UHODWHVLWWRWKHUHDOPRIPHGLFLQHDVLQµWKHFRQGLWLRQRUVWDWHRID
person receiving or requiring medical treatment; clinical condition. Also: the account of the 




require investigation, both have a truth at their core which is equivalent to the story of this 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQERWKKDYHDµFDVH¶KLVWRU\DQG\HW VWLOOKDYHDµFDVH¶WRDQVZHU 






consideration of himself as the obvious first choice for the delineation of the psychoanalytic case study (Forrester 1996: 1; 10). 









histories that generally take the form of solved mysteries. Like conventional detective stories, 
they are reassuring, affirming the belief that even obscure neurological maladies can be 
GLDJQRVHG¶.HPSVWHUDQG/HHV$JDLQWKHµUHDVVXULQJ¶DVSHFWRIULWXDOLVKLJKOLJKWHG
ZLWKµFRQYHQWLRQDO¶ procedure leading to pre-HVWDEOLVKHGRXWFRPHµ0\VWHULHV¶SDUDGR[LFDOO\
µVROYHG¶LQDGYDQFHWKHSRWHQWLDOO\LGHQWLW\-skewing, function-threatening bizarreness of 
neurological conditions are reduced to commonplace biological truths. Like Kissane and Kissane, 
.HPSVWHUDQG/HHVDOVRµLQYHVWLJDWHWKHSRZHURIWKHQHXURORJLVW¶Valter ego, Sherlock Holmes 
>«@¶ identifying him directly with Oliver Sacks (Kempster and Lees 2013 374). The 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQRIµFDVHV¶LVWKXVHYLGHQWO\DVVLJQHGDVPXFKWRQHXURORJLVWV as detectives. The 
detective yarn and neuroscience, both taking recognizable shape in the mid-to-late nineteenth 
century and then swiftly expanding throughout the twentieth, are now ubiquitous; but where the 
former is designated a fanciful conceit of the culture industry, the latter now promises to 
µUHDVVXULQJO\¶UHYHDODVDOUHDG\µVROYHG¶HYHQWKHJUHDWHVWµP\VWHULHV¶RIWKHEUDLQWKLVSDUWRIWKH
human anatomy which is rapidly coming to define selfhood itself. 
7KLVWLSSLQJRIWKHVFDOHVLQQHXURVFLHQFH¶s favour can be observed in recent US 
television series Perception (2012±2015). Protagonist Dr Daniel Pierce is an eccentric but 
virtuosic American professor who lends his neuropsychiatric skills to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to help solve various complex crimes. Pierce is therefore simultaneously a 
neuroscientist and a detective, conveniently combining a mercurial, brilliant Sherlock Holmes 
FKDUDFWHUZLWKWKHVSHFLDOL]HGPHGLFDOH[SHUWLVHRID'U:DWVRQ7KHVKRZ¶VSUHPLVHLV
complicated further by the fact that Pierce, as if his plate were not full enough already, is also a 
regularly hallucinating schizophrenic ± but rather than hampering his abilities as a teacher, 
UHVHDUFKHURULQYHVWLJDWRUDFWXDOO\WKHVHµUHYHDOLQJYLVLRQVKHOSKLPXQFRYHUZKDt lies beneath 
conscious emotion¶28 7KHLGHDGULYLQJWKHQDUUDWLYHLVWKDW3LHUFH¶VGHOXVLRQVVRPHKRZDOORZDV
PXFKLIQRWHYHQPRUHDFFHVVWRZKDWLVµUHDO¶DVDQ\RQHHOVH¶VRUWKRGR[QRQ-hallucinatory 
experiences. At once neuroscientific diagnostician and patient, Pierce dissolves the boundaries 
between the subject and object of investigation, simply compartmentalizing $SROOR5REELQV¶V
PHWDSKRULFDOµVHFXULW\JXDUGV¶ Thus the ideal detective, Pierce has multiple levels of insight into 
the human mind ± the uncannily astute, the academically trained and the inherently empathetic ± 
even when the mind in question apparently goes wrong.  











 Which, as the series progresses, comes to happen quite often. Each episode showcases 
some interesting neurological conditioQSURVRSDJQRVLDRUµIDFHEOLQGQHVV¶DXWLVP&DSJUDV
delusion (where sufferers claim close friends or relatives have been replaced by impostors), 
HSLOHSV\DQGVRRQ7KHVKRZ¶VGUDPDWLFVXFFHVVWXUQVRQKRZFRQGLWLRQVOLNHWKHVHGHPDQGD
reassessment of objective reality, and by extension the legal system stemming therefrom. Legal 
authority, it is implied, is nothing without neuroscientific discourse to back it up, neuroscience 
being the highest form of knowledge around. This series-defining idea, that ZKDWLVµUHDO¶LVXS
for debate and currently neuroscience is winning this debate, is foregrounded in the opening 
moments of Perception¶VILUVWHSLVRGH'U3LHUFHLVOHDGLQJDGLVFXVVLRQLQDOHFWXUHKDOOIXOORI
students, and asks:  
 












indistinguishable from the ones banging around inside our skulls when we actually experience 
those events. So. If what we perceive is often wrongKRZFDQZHHYHUNQRZZKDW¶VUHDO± and 
ZKDWLVQ¶W"´ 
(Perception 2012: Season 1, Episode 1) 
 
With this final note on the unreliability of human perception, the lecture hall appropriately fades 
LQWRWKHVHULHVWLWOHIRFXVLQJRQWKHµF¶RIµSHUFHSWLRQ¶LQDSOD\RQµWRVHH¶ In this opening, 
Pierce establishes the contemporary authority of neuroscience ± WKHµ3K\VLFVGHSDUWPHQW¶PLJKW
have been fashionable and influential in the previous century, but in the twenty-firstµUHDOLW\¶LV
decidedly the brain expHUW¶VGRPDLQWKHRQHZKRWUXO\KDVµEUDLQV¶ 3LHUFH¶VKXPRURXVEXW
NQRZLQJDVVHUWLRQWKDWµUHDOLW\LVDILJPHQWRI\RXULPDJLQDWLRQ¶LVDFU\SWLFIRUHZDUQLQJDVVRRQ
DIWHUKHLVUHYHDOHGWRVXIIHUWKHKDOOXFLQDWLRQVKHVHHPLQJO\HTXDWHVZLWKµUHDOLW\¶LQ his 
neuroscientifically-inflected critique of perception. Like all good detective fiction, it is a clue 
allowing the viewer to participate in the ritual of investigation, but across as well as within 





cum-detective at its centre, and broader still, the ultimate vaunting of neuroscience as detective 
work itself. 
Despite Perception¶VFRQYROXWHGSUHPLVH'U3LHUFHPDLQWDLQVVRPHVHPEODQFHRIDQ
ordinary life by sticking to a strict routine, implemented by his confidant/assistant Max Lewicki. 
This is supposed to balance his work, diet, home-life and so on, and thus minimizes the 
occurrence of his intrusive hallucinations. However, fate takes another neurological twist when 
3LHUFH¶VHVWUDQJHGIDWKHULVGLDJQRVHGZLWK$O]KHLPHU¶VGLVHDVHDQGWKHWZRDUHIRUFHGWROLYH
WRJHWKHUWKUHDWHQLQJWRXSVHW3LHUFH¶VSUHFLRXVZRUNOLIHEDODQFHDQGKLVVDQLW\'HVSHUDWHWRJHW
away, he jumps at any chance to help close friend and FBI agent Kate Moretti; though the 
increased stress presumably puts him at risk of decompensation and further mental episodes, for 
3LHUFHZRUNLQJZLWKWKH)%,VHUYHVDVDPRUHSRWHQWIRUPRI/HZLFNL¶VVWDELOL]LQJURXWLQH,W
functions as a therapeutic ritual of reason where Pierce symbolically restores internal order by 
solving external puzzles, whilst also apparently deploying his schizophrenia in a focused and 
useful manner ± LQDW\SHRIGRXEOHGPLPHVLVZKHUHGHOXVLRQDLGVUHDVRQDLGVGHOXVLRQ3LHUFH¶V
hallucinations adapt themselves to the details of each neurologically-themed case, actually 
helping him investigate before benignly dissipating. The therapeutic capacity of this ritual to 
3LHUFH¶VWULSOHUROHDVGHWHFWLYHQHXURVFLHQWLVWDQGSDWLHQWLVPDGHevident in Season 3, Episode 5. 
Moretti has approached Pierce with an apt case, the bizarre death of neuroscientist Landon 
Jennings, just as Pierce is anxious to leave his house and his increasingly challenging father. 






³,EURXJKWLWWR\RXIRUWKHVDPHUHDVRQWKH>«@SROLFH brought it to the FBI ± LWGRHVQ¶W
seem possible. Whoever killed Jennings got in and out of a secure safe room and then vanished 
LQWRWKLQDLU´ 
³$ORFNHGGRRUP\VWHU\7KDQN\RX,IHHOEHWWHUDOUHDG\´ 




the ostensibly impossible scenario Moretti presents him is of utmost satisfaction and therapeutic 












EHWWHU¶± by tipping his hat to the history of detective fiction, and explicitly acknowledging this 
µORFNHGGRRUP\VWHU\¶ 
Covering approximately the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, detective 
ILFWLRQ¶VFHQWUDOILJXUHVJRIURP3RH¶VUDWLRFLQDWLQJ'XSLQWKURXJKWKHXELTXLWRXV6KHUORFN
Holmes, to various sanitized parlour-room sleuths (as in Agatha Christie), and the hardboiled 
EDFNODVKW\SLILHGE\&KDQGOHU¶VLFRQLFFUHDWLRQ0DUORZH,WLVat about this point that screen 
detectives really became prevalent, as film noir and related genres arguably hit their peak, and the 
writing of detective fiction began to pertain as much to celluloid as print. The textual detectives 
of the historical trajectory above either gave way to or themselves joined the burgeoning ranks of 
screen sleuths. Then, more than half a century of variations later (including police procedurals, 
true crime exposés, and so on), Dr Daniel Pierce the fictional detective comes with more baggage 
than just his schizophrenic delusions. If the detective figure has been considered a preternaturally 
intuitive expert on human behaviour, literary scholar Ronald R Thomas nevertheless writes that 
µFRQYHQWLRQVRIWKHIRUPJHQHUDOO\UHTXLUHWKHGHWHFWLYHWRH[SODLQZKDWVHHPVWREHKLVXQFDQQ\
act of second sight as the simple application of a technique, or even a technology, to the variables 
RIWKHSUHVHQWRFFDVLRQ¶7KRPDV 1999: 3). When making accurate snap judgements on opaque 
characters and events, or on truth and justice, the methods and fruits of science, that is, 
µWHFKQLTXH¶RUµWHFKnology¶ FRXQWDERYHWKHODZRIWKHODQG7KHODZ¶VGLVFXUVLYHO\-appended 
machinery, such as the medical judgement of the psychological community, occupies a grey area, 
as often suspected as trusted. Neuroscience has usurped and improved upon this position of the 
traditional psychological sciences, and in Perception, how this relates to detective work is 
depicted as a simultaneously technological and epistemological issue. 
In Season 1, Episode 3, the plot hinges on a severe case of post-head-trauma anterograde 
amnesia. Lacey, survivor of a 1986 spate of murder-kidnappings, unwittingly suffered a head 
LQMXU\ZKLFKUHQGHUHGKHUXQDEOHWRSURGXFHQHZPHPRULHV8WWHUO\FRQIXVHGDQGµVWXFN¶LQ
1986, after her escape Lacey was tragically misdiagnosed as dangerously delusional and kept 
continuously sedated and institutionalized ever since. Having originally sought her testimony to 
help solve a resurgence of the serial killings, Pierce decides to redress this additional injustice. 














(Perception 2012: Season 1, Episode 3) 
 
A bygone authority is doubl\FULWLTXHGKHUH0RGHUQQHXURVFLHQFH¶VWHFKQRORJLFDOO\VXSHULRU
knowledge allows Pierce and Moretti to re-diagnose a grave medico-psychological error, but also 
JLYHVWKHPDQHZµSODQ¶IRUDSSURDFKLQJFULPHVXQVROYHGE\DSUHYLRXVJHQHUDWLRQ¶VOHJDO
establishment ± to interrogate their star witness, they do not treat Lacey as mentally unstable, but 
as a 17-year-old, trapped in that age as she is by her memory. The inadequacies of the former 
epistemological regime are framed as bordering on criminal, almost worse than the serial murders 
themselves; technological, neuroscientific advances are thus aligned with an urgently necessary 
recalibration of justice. 
 Palpable here is a blossoming cultural confidence in the authority of neuroscience to 
identify truth where legal and medical discourses have failed. However, the relationship between 
fictional detectives and neuroscience is not as simple as it seems. This is appreciable in the 
examples cited from Perception so far: on the one hand, modern imaging technologies coupled 
ZLWK3LHUFH¶VQHXURVFLHQWLILFH[SHUWLVHDUHXVHGWRVXSSODQWRXWPRGHGLQYHVWLJDWLYHWHFKQLTXHVDV
PXFKDVWRVROYHFDVHVDQGWKXVFODLPSULYLOHJHGDFFHVVWRµUHDOLW\¶RQWKHRWKHU3LHUFHEULQJV
into question the very possibility of that reality, this questioning itself complicated by his own 
neuroscientifically analysable set of delusional behaviours. The writers of this detective fiction at 
once place their trust in the workings of brain science just as they undermine this trust. Providing 
dramatic tension and scope for characterization, this type of central self-contradiction is in itself 
QRWKLQJQHZ)RUH[DPSOH6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶VQRWRULRXVSHQFKDQWIRUFRFDLQHVHHPVFRQWUDU\WR
his otherwise impeccable rationality; Dr Watson has no qualms WHOOLQJKLPKLVµEUDLQPD\>«@EH
roused and excited, but it is a pathological and morbid process, which involves increased tissue-
FKDQJHDQGPD\DWODVWOHDYHDSHUPDQHQWZHDNQHVV¶&RQDQ'R\OH%XWDVPXFKDVWKH
detective genre is manipulated and turned on its head in order to find its limits, so too 
neuroscience is fictionalized or dramatized in an attempt to comprehend its consequences. This is 
taken to extremes by another television series, called Dexter, which was originally based on (but 
then diverged from) JHII/LQGVD\¶VILUVWQRYHOLQDVL[-book series, Darkly Dreaming Dexter 
(2004). The show premiered in 2006 and after eight successful series drew to a close as recently 
as 2013, making it of interest as a comparison with its contemporary series Perception.30 









 Ronald R Thomas writes that 
 
invariably, the mangled corpse the literary detective scrutinizes reveals a code that his trained eye 





7KLVFRQVWDQWO\XSGDWHGµQHZNLQGRIUHDGLQJ¶UHTXLUHVQROHVVWKDQIDQWDstic vision, either 
WKURXJKDJUHDWVHWRIH\HVRUHYHQDVTXRWHGHDUOLHUIURP7KRPDVDQµXQFDQQ\DFWRIVHFRQG
sight¶ If this outstanding visual capacity is traditionally the characteristic of the literary 
detective, then the latest updates confer the uncanny knack to phenomenologist Sharpe and 
QHXURVFLHQWLVW3LHUFHEXWEH\RQGYLVXDODVVRFLDWLRQVWKHZRUGVµVKDUS¶DQGµSLHUFH¶DFKLHYHD
NLQGRIGHHSHUVLJKWRQLQWRLQVLJKWDVLQOLWHUDOO\µVHHLQJLQWR¶WKURXJKDexter protagonist 
Dexter Morgan. Just like the others, his name is a pun: the Latin dexter PHDQVµULJKW¶RUVLPSO\
µGH[WURXV¶ DQGFRPELQHVZLWK0RUJDQ¶VQHDUKRPRSKRQHµPRUJXH¶ to signify something like 
µVWUDLJKWWRGHDWK¶RUµVNLOIXODWNLOOLQJ¶ Thus Dexter is relevant to this discussion in a number of 
other, sometimes grotesque ways. Not only is he a forensic pathologist specializing in blood 
spatter and working for the police in Miami ± PHDQLQJWKDWKHLVFRKHUHQWZLWK7KRPDV¶V
GHVFULSWLRQRIVRPHRQHYHUVHGLQWKHµDSSOLFDWLRQRIDWHFKnique, or even a technology, to the 
variables of the present occasion¶ or in other words, the crime scene ± he is also himself a serial 
killer who uses his knowledge of crime scenes to cover up his own crimes. 
In a bizarre subversion of the ordinary detective/criminal, Dexter utilizes his police 
resources and training, along with his heightened investigatory instincts, to stay ahead of the 
police department he works for. He then exacts a type of homicidal vigilante justice upon 
dangerous criminals he perceives to have slipped through the cracks of the normal judiciary 
system (even though this is often because of his own involvement). Dexter is presented, just as 
3LHUFHDVVRPHRQHZLWKDVHULRXVPHQWDOLOOQHVVLQ'H[WHU¶VFDVHWKHVWHUHRW\SLFDOFDWFK-all 
condition of psychopathy, though he frequently experiences hallucinations which are never fully 
explained); but in spite of or even because of this illness, he has an incredible insight into human 
EHKDYLRXU,QGHHG'H[WHUXVHVµVKDUS¶LQVLJKWWRµSLHUFH¶into the true character of those he 
pursues ± EXWWKHQKHVLPSO\XVHVVKDUSLPSOHPHQWVWRSLHUFHKLVYLFWLPV¶ERGLHVDVKH
dismembers them in a variety of gory ways. These are parallel skills to him, perceptive 
behavioural detective work and forensically informed dead body disposal. As the series 
progresses, Dexter is revealed to be the way he is because he suffered a severe early childhood 
trauma, watching his mother get chopped up with a chainsaw, setting him on a fatalistic path and 





event, Harry Morgan, adopts him out of pity. But recognizing in Dexter the urge to kill, and 
deciding that curbing this urge is impossible, Harry trains Dexter to strategically direct his 
EORRGOXVWWRZDUGVYLFWLPVZKRVHDEVHQFHIURPWKHZRUOGZRXOGDFWXDOO\EHµEHQHILFLDO¶WR
society. Effectively, Harry trains Dexter only to kill other killers, and to do so in a legally, 




until the eighth and final season of Dexter. Towards the beginning of this season, it is brought to 
light that Harry had not been working alone to establish his elaborate programme of alternative 
childhood development; Dr Evelyn Vogel, a neuropsychiatrist with a particular interest in 
SV\FKRSDWKVKDGEHHQJXLGLQJ+DUU\LQKLVWUDLQLQJRI'H[WHUDOODORQJ9RJHO¶VHQWUDQFHLQWR
proceedings coincides with the emergence of a new serial killer in Miami, who carefully removes 
DSLHFHRIDYLFWLP¶VEUDLQEHIRUHGHSRVLWLQJWKHUHVWRf the body in a public place; the killer is 
SURPSWO\GXEEHGWKHµ%UDLQ6XUJHRQ¶E\LQYHVWLJDWRUVDQGORFDOPHGLD9RJHODSSURDFKHV'H[WHU
at a moment of weakness, revealing her clandestine role in his upbringing, and once Dexter 
manages to wrap his mind around this life-altering news, Vogel expresses fear that the Brain 
6XUJHRQ¶VXOWLPDWHJRDOPD\LQYROYHKHUDVVKHKDVVHFUHWO\EHHQUHFHLYLQJKLVYLFWLPV¶PLVVLQJ
brain portions. Eventually, it is revealed that the Brain Surgeon is indeed targeting Dr Vogel, 
because he is her son, who was institutionalized by her as a teenager, but long thought dead. 
Although his original name was Daniel, he had kept himself hidden by assuming the alias Oliver 
Saxon. After this, the plot hurtles on to a chaotic and bloody conclusion, with Dexter outliving 
almost everyone else around him. In any case, what is of note here is not the fanciful and 
melodramatic denouement of the whole series, but that the final season centres on: a 
neuropsychiatrist; parts of brains removed because they might be the causes of aberrant, violent 
behaviour; scenes once again involving MRI scans as sources of evidential authority; and most 
LPSRUWDQWO\WKDWWKHQHXURSV\FKLDWULVW¶VVRQWKHRQHLGHQWLI\LQJDQGUHPRYLQJWKHSDWKRORJLFDO
brain portions, is named Oliver Saxon. This name is, of course, but a syllable away from the 
name of renowned physician, neurologist and author Oliver Sacks. A person of interest in the 
SUHYLRXVFKDSWHU¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQVDVZHOODVWKLVRQH,ZRXOGQRZOLNHWRVKLIWIRFXs off of Saxon 





Oliver Sacks: The Story is a Brain Detective 
 
 
During his lengthy and endlessly productive career, Sacks combined his clinical duties with a 
growing body of written work. While not at all divorced from his everyday experiences as a 
practising doctor, as discussed in the previous chapter, his writing is mainly not the typical 
scholarly, journal article fare one might expect from a medical man. Instead, across books such as 
Awakenings (1973), The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat (1985) and An Anthropologist on 
Mars (1995), Sacks has straddled the supposed divide between his authorial and medical roles 
and developed the self-styled Clinical Tale. Though at first this generic neologism might appear 
self-contradictorily problematic, it has nevertheless proved successful enough a blend to prompt 
New York Times HGLWRUDQGOLWHUDU\FULWLF$QDWROH%UR\DUGLQWRGXEELQJ6DFNVµDNLQGRISRHW
ODXUHDWHRIFRQWHPSRUDU\PHGLFLQH¶%UR\DUG Indeed, this oft-reformulated yet 
chimerical description of Sacks (for example: Cf. Anthony 2010; Evans 2012) ± µWKHSRHWODXUHDWH
RIPHGLFLQH¶± sums up the perhaps paradoxical nature of his writing, where Clinical Tales are 
RIIHUHGXSLQWKHQDPHRIµSRHWLFPHGLFLQH¶1RWRQO\LVRQJRLQJXVHRI %UR\DUG¶VHQLJPDWLF
hyperbole rarely accredited to him personally,31 EXWWKHHGLWLRQRI6DFNV¶VThe Man Who 
Mistook His Wife for a Hat QRORQJHULQFOXGHVWKHDXWKRU¶VSUHIHUUHGSKUDVHµClinical TaleV¶DVD
subtitle, while the phrase itself only makes one brief appearance in the preface (Sacks 2011b: x). 
The reasons for this omission are unclear, HVSHFLDOO\FRQVLGHULQJ6DFNV¶VHLJKW-page justification 




some; to me it seemed entirely natural, indeed, unavoidable, for the sort of narratives I presented. 
But what is meant by the term? And what relation has it to µFDVHKLVWRU\¶RQWKHRQHKDQG± and to 
µOLWHUDWXUH¶RQWKHRWKHU" 
6XFKWDOHVDUHµFOLQLFDO¶LQVRIDUDVWKH\KDYHDIDFWXDOFOLQLFDOEDVLVDQGOHQGWKHPVHOYHV
WRDFOLQLFDORUPHGLFDODQDO\VLV$QGWKH\DUHµWDOHV¶LQVRIDUDVWKH\KDYHDVXEMHFW± and a theme 
± neither of which is possessed by a description or case history. 
(Sacks 1986: 16; original emphasis) 
 





professor, both use the phraVHµWKHSRHWODXUHDWHRIPHGLFLQH¶WRGHVFULEHKLPEXWQHLWKHUPHQWLRQV%UR\DUGLQVWHDGDQRQ\PRXVO\






Clinical Tales cannot be reduced to mere case histories, but neither are they simply allegorical 
writing.32 Sacks continues by dramatically asserWLQJWKDWKLVµXQDYRLGDEOH¶DQGµHQWLUHO\QDWXUDO¶
recourse to Clinical TaleVDFWXDOO\LQYROYHGEHLQJµforced WR¶WDNHXSWKLVµHOHPHQWDOIRUP¶,ELG
original emphasis). Perceptible here is a clear alignment for Sacks of the given, the normal, with 
the destined, the inevitable, meaning that he sees Clinical Tales as normative, a form of natural 
generic law. The rest of the article is a considered yet ardent rationale for the seamlessness 
EHWZHHQµFDVHKLVWRU\¶DQGµOLWHUDWXUH¶EHWUD\LQJ6DFNV¶VEHOLHIWKat this will be the main 
component, or angle, of the criticism levelled at him for the coinage of Clinical Tales, or for his 
style in general. Though he is quick to admit his lack of bona fide literary credentials, Sacks is at 
pains to stress the centrality of personal narratives, not just to patients, but to doctors, to writers, 
and to anyone else in between, such as himself or his cherished hero, the Russian pioneer of 
neuropsychology A R Luria.33 
6DFNV¶VHVSRXVDORIClinical Tales informs his much-noted personal style just as it 
provides the urgency impelling him to elaborate a genre based on his own medical experiences 
LQFOXGLQJDWWLPHVDVDSDWLHQWPLUURULQJ'U3LHUFH¶VFRPSOLFDWHGPXOWLSOHUROH in Perception; 
for example, Cf. Sacks 2010b; 2012). Speaking as much about himself as his patients, Sacks 
LQVLVWVRQWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIVXEMHFWLYLW\WRZKDWKHFDOOVµRQH¶V³ZRUOG´WKHLQWHJUDWLRQRIRQH¶V
QHUYRXVV\VWHPRQH¶VPLQGRQH¶Vself¶6DFNV: 18; original emphasis). As any such 
existential realm, or so-FDOOHGµZRUOG¶ZLOOHYHQWXDOO\UHTXLUHVRPHNLQGRIPDSSLQJ6DFNV
FRQWLQXHVE\FRPSDULQJSDWLHQWV¶DFFRXQWVRIWKHLUPRYHPHQWVZLWKLQWKHLURZQµZRUOGV¶WRWKH
genre of travel or exploration narratives. This leads him to once again admit his wide-ranging 
debt to Luria ± both in terms of clinical outlook and literary style: 
 
Luria was always fond of comparing scientific investigations to detective stories (he had a great 
passion for these!), and the expORUDWLRQVRISDWLHQWVWRERWKµMystery Tales,¶ he would say of all 
three. For one cannot, as a reflective human being, be precipitated into illness without finding 
RQH¶VQHZFRQGLWLRQRUVLWXDWLRQDproblem. 
(Sacks 1986: 19; original emphasis) 
 




 ,QGHHG6DFNV¶VGHVLUHWRDIILUPWKH&OLQLFDO7DOHDVVRPHWKLQJDSSURDFKLQJDOLWHUDU\JHQUHILWVLnto a far older schema. As historian 
RIOLWHUDWXUHDQGVFLHQFH6DOO\6KXWWOHZRUWKZULWHVµOLWHUDU\WH[WVZHUHURXWLQHO\LQYRNHGE\QLQHWHHQWK-century psychological texts as 





psychology of the higher psychologiFDOIXQFWLRQV¶%XWKHZDVDOVRUHIOH[LYHHQRXJKWRµSRLQWRXWWKDW>KLV@ZRUNGLGQRWWDNHSODFHLQ







7DNLQJ/XULD¶VOHDG6DFNVIDVKLRQVKLPVHOIDVDGHWHFWive, a solver of problems and interpreter of 
mysteries; but these problems and mysteries extend beyond simple medical analyses of patients 
and on into the realm of self-FRQVFLRXVQHVVZKHUHWKHWUXHUHYHODWLRQWREHVRXJKWPLJKWEHRQH¶V
very self. 
Quoting philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche on how the problems (in the purposefully 
ambiguous sense of both questions and difficulties) involved with being a patient are always 
trumped by a boundless curiosity, Sacks acknowledges that such a philosophical engagement 
ZLWKWKHLURZQSDUWLFXODUVLWXDWLRQVPLJKWQRWEHWRDOOSDWLHQWV¶WDVWHVRUFDSDFLWLHV5HJDUGOHVV
he points out that  
 
all patients are thrown LQWRD>«@µphilosophical emergency.¶ )RUDQ\DOWHUDWLRQLQRQH¶VZRUOG
especially a deep and singular alteration, must present itself to the patient as a problem or 
FKDOOHQJH>«@(TXDOO\HYHU\ VXFKSDWLHQWLVWKURZQLQWRDµtale,¶ a real-life narrative or drama, 
whether he knows it, or likes it, or not. He is thrown into the problematic, and thrown into the 
dUDPDWLF>«@$QGWKHSUREOHPDWLFDQGWKHGUDPDWLFDUHIXVHGWRJHWKHUVRKHILQGVKLPVHOI
playing the central (and sole) role in a philosophical or symbolic drama. 




the mirror of his chosen writing format, creating an equivalence at the philosophical, theoretical 
level. If SaFNVKDVEHHQµIRUFHG¶LQWRZULWLQJClinical Tales as mentioned, this is because, in an 
inversion of his own quandary on how to present his materials, those he writes about have just as 
PXFKEHHQµWKURZQ¶LQWRDIXVLRQRIWKHSURIRXQGSHUVRQDOFKDQJHWKDWWhey have experienced 
(potentially both physically and mentally), and the story of that very change itself. In proposing 
this fusion Sacks implies a parallel between his case studies and the real people on whom they 
are based, as he considers this method of viewing patients a fruitful way of bringing closer 
together first and third person accounts of existence. To appreciate properly the experiential, 
theoretical and private fusion, one must combine the analytic and investigative tools of detective, 
writer and clinical neurologist in a practical, written fusion, open to objective scrutiny. 
7RUHFDSZKHQDµSKLORVRSKLFDOHPHUJHQF\¶FDXVHVDSURIRXQGµDOWHUDWLRQLQRQH¶V
ZRUOG¶WKLVµWDOH¶WKLVµUHDO-OLIHQDUUDWLYHRUGUDPD¶SRVHVDµSUREOHPRUDFKDOOHQJH¶ whose 
resolution requires analysing the tale itself (that is, the change to a patient and its resultant 
philosophical ramifications). In essence, Sacks advocates a type of neurological detective work, 
illuminating the murky features of the human condition by investigating its more interesting 






reveal is mostly about himself, his predilections as a reader and a writer who just happens to also 
be a neurologist, and his repeatedly avowed intention (à la Luria) to rehabilitate two relatively 
unfashionable things: firstly, the notion of a Romantic Science which paints a more accurate and 
more accommodating likeness of human nature;34 and secondly, to salvage the central concept of 
µVHOI¶ZKLFKKDVEHHQVTXDVKHGE\VFLHQFHLQLWVRQZDUGPDUFKWKURXJKFXOWXUDOOLIH7KHZD\WKDW
6DFNV¶VµVHOI¶-recuperating scientific detective work is conducted is modelled on the literary 
genre that bears its name ± DJHQUHZKLFKMXVWOLNHWKHVXEMHFWVRI6DFNV¶VSURMHFWVUHTXLUHVDW
base a problem to be solved in order to be effective, instructive or at the least intriguing. A 
detective needs something to investigate. Otherwise, one cannot truly be called a detective in any 
sense of the word. 
Of course, one could simply decide to investigate anything and call it detective work ± so 
long as the object of investigation can be shown to be problematic enough, again in both the 
sense of difficulty and curiousness, to be deemed worthy of investigation. One of the best ways to 
narrativize even the most quotidian of mini-mysteries is to marry it with the literary aspects of 
detective fiction: a missing sock becomes a mysterious and long-lost item which has puzzled 
great minds for ages, a secret ingredient is the future of all cooking and its obfuscation a crime of 
proportions to match any other. The purpose of these undoubtedly unlikely and trivial examples 
is simply to demonstrate that accessing this literary quality allows investigation of the everyday 
to become a matter of potential intrigue, a ritual bestowing symbolically-charged status upon 
even the least important minutiae of life. It is this access to the literary in his neurological 
ZULWLQJVWKDWKDVVSHFLILFDOO\DOORZHGIRU6DFNV¶VVXFFHVV)HOORZQHXURVFLHQWLVWV3HWHU.HPSVWHU
and Andrew Lees make the case yet more plainly: 
 
Oliver Sacks is the most widely read neurologist physician-writer, and his books belong with a 
broader heritage of medical literature. [During the nineteenth century] medical writers [discerned] 
that the narrative methods used by novelists could help to organise and connect information in 
FOLQLFDODFFRXQWV2QHVRXUFHRI6DFNV¶success has been his ability to draw on these latent literary 
properties by writing books that consist of anonymised neurological case histories. In many of 
them, Sacks gives himself the role of detective ± observing, gently questioning and sometimes 
searching out clues in the streets or in the homes of his patients. 
(Kempster and Lees 2013: 374) 




 In his autobiography, Luria distinguishes between what he sees as a necessary but reductionist side to science and medicine, the 
µFODVVLFDO¶VLGHDQGLWVREYHUVHµURPDQWLF¶VLGH+HJRHVRQWRZULWHµ7KHREMHFWRIREVHUYDWLRQLV>«@WRDVFHUWDLn a network of 
important relations. When done properly, observation accomplishes the classical aim of explaining facts, while not losing sight of the 
URPDQWLFDLPRISUHVHUYLQJWKHPDQLIROGULFKQHVVRIWKHVXEMHFW>«@,QDJRRGGHDO of [my] work my approach has been as much that 
RIWKHFODVVLFDOVFKRODUDVWKHURPDQWLFRQH¶/XULD$OVRIRUPRUHLQIRUPDWLRQRQ5RPDQWLF6FLHQFHEH\RQG/XULD see 







In this portrayal, Kempster and Lees have Sacks going beyond the medical exam, the clinical 
FDVHKLVWRU\RUHYHQWKHQRYHOLVW¶VQDUUDWLYL]DWLRQRIHYHQWV± his detective work, spurred on by a 
deep appreciation of the literary genre confirmed through correspondence with Sacks himself 
,ELGH[WHQGVSDVWWKHFRQVXOWLQJURRPRUZULWWHQSDJHDQGVSLOOVRXWRQWRWKHµVWUHHWV¶DQGLQWR
WKHµKRPHV¶RIWKRVHXQGHULQYHVWigation. 
As his star has risen, cases have in fact been brought to Sacks from outside his own pool 
of patients, permitting his philosophical concerns to also spill out from the rehabilitation of the 
medical self onto broader theoretical, cultural and scientific issues ± but still under the aegis of a 
well-RUFKHVWUDWHGGHWHFWLYH¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQ$JRRGH[DPSOHLV6DFNV¶VDUWLFOHIRUWKH
HYRFDWLYHO\WLWOHGµ$1HXURORJLVW¶V1RWHERRN¶KLVORQJ-standing occasional column for The New 
Yorker magazine. This aUWLFOHLVFDOOHGµ$0DQRI/HWWHUV¶DQGLVVXEWLWOHGµ:K\ZDVWKHPRUQLQJ
SDSHUVXGGHQO\LQDIRUHLJQODQJXDJH"¶6DFNVD)URPWKHRXWVHWWKLVVXEWLWOHSRVHVD
question, or problem, concisely mystifying the quotidian aspect of the morning paper to the level 
of intrigue. The defamiliarization of something so ordinary makes investigation seem utterly 
necessary and inevitable, and so the ritual of reason supersedes and interjects into the ritual of the 
everyday mundane. The article is about the eponyPRXVµPDQRIOHWWHUV¶ZULWHU+RZDUG(QJHO
and his post-stroke development of a reading disorder called alexia (essentially translatable from 
LWVHW\PRORJLFDOURRWVDVµZLWKRXWZRUGV¶$JDLQWKHSUREOHPLVQRWVLPSO\VXPPDUL]HGLQWKH
DUWLFOH¶VWLWOHEut set up by it, announcing the loss of selfhood in advance: first one is told the 
article concerns a person who deals with words, and next that words can fail one at any moment. 
From here the bulk of the article covers the history of alexia and related afflictions, the 
complicated relationship between evolution and brain plasticity, and the philosophical issues 
raised by alexia. However, all this is tackled in light of the basic premise: a man of letters who is 
PLVVLQJKLVOHWWHUV+RZRQHSHUVRQ¶VORVVRI identity relates to the larger picture is precisely the 
challenge that Sacks the author-detective sets himself by framing the story this way, and though 
discernible throughout, this is most clearly appreciable in three places which simultaneously 
obscure the subtext of how neurological detective work is intimately tied to notions of literariness 
and writing themselves. 
7KHILUVWLQVWDQFHLVLQWKHDUWLFOH¶VRSHQLQJOLQHVZKLFKUHDGOLNHDSRVWPRGHUQVHOI-
referential piece of detective fiction: 
 
In January of 2002, I received a strange letter from Howard Engel, the Canadian writer who 
created the Benny Cooperman series of detective novels. One morning a few months before, he 
had got up feeling fine. He dressed and made breakfast and then went to the front porch to get his 
newspaper. But the paper on his doorstep seemed to have undergone a transformation. 






As discussed above, suspense is provided by the juxtaposition of run-of-the-mill, everyday 
rituals, with the pre-provided knowledge that VRPHWKLQJµVWUDQJH¶LVDERXWWRLQWUXGH,QWKHPLGVW
of this comes explicit mention of detective novels and their fabricated nature. This creates a 
connection between detective writer Engel and article author Sacks, this latter presenting his 
(ostensibly XQIDEULFDWHGPDWHULDOLQ(QJHO¶VRZQJHQHULFLGLRP7KHQHZVSDSHUWKHQLQWHUFHGHV




his own investigation, reinstating the missing authority of the written word and explaining away 
the mysterious newspaper. Ironically perhaps, given his incumbent alexia, Engel first writes to 
6DFNVDIWHUUHDGLQJDERXWDFDVHVLPLODUWRKLVRZQHOVHZKHUHLQ6DFNV¶VRHXYUH)RU(QJHOWKLV
cements SaFNV¶VPHGLFDOGHWHFWLYHSHGLJUHHUHLQIRUFLQJ6DFNV¶VJHQHUDODXWKRULW\DVH[SHUW
LQWHUSUHWHURI(QJHO¶VRZn situation, regardless of its Clinical Tale specificity. 
Instead, a wider discussion of neuroscience and psychology develops, with the goal of 
summiQJXSWKHFOXHVJDWKHUHGDQGLOOXPLQDWLQJDOH[LD¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRQDODUJHU
VFLHQWLILFVFDOH7KLVFRQFOXVLRQLVVWDJHGE\6DFNVLQWZRSDUWVWRZDUGVWKHDUWLFOH¶VHQG+DYLQJ
JRQHWKURXJKWKHUHVWRI(QJHO¶VFDVH± the months of diagnosis, tentative treatment, and eventual 
reintegration into something resembling the pre-stroke course of his life ± Sacks neatly brings the 
postmodern self-FRQVFLRXVQHVVRIWKHSLHFH¶VRSHQLQJIXOOFLUFOH7KRXJKXQDEOHWRUHDG(QJHO¶V




his alter ego, the detective Benny Cooperman, but it would be a Cooperman transformed: the great 
detective, waking in a hospital bed, finds himself not only alexic but amnesiac as well. His powers 
of inference, however, are intact, and enable him to stitch together disparate clues, to figure out 
how he landed in the hospital and what happened in the mysterious few days he can no longer 
remember. 
(Sacks 2010a: 28) 
 
Engel directly uses his own extraordinary experience to refashion his protagonist and continue 
his writing career, and in aligning himself with his detective character, it seems only fitting 
&RRSHUPDQ¶VREMHFWRILQYHVWLJDWLRQVKRXOGEHKLPVHOIGUDPDWLFDOO\PLUURULQJZKDW(QJHOZHQW
WKURXJKWRµUHGLVFRYHU¶KLVOLWHUDF\,WLVDPDWWHURIDUWLPLWDWLQJOLIHLPLWDWLQJDUWDQG6DFNV









So too did Oliver Sacks become cleverer at solving problems, the newfound awareness of 




LWLQVSLUHVVRPXFKRIKLVZULWLQJ¶5LFK%XWLWLVHYLGHQWWKDWZULWLQJcame to greatly 
inspire his clinical work, expanding the scope of the ritual of reason. By incorporating stories 
VXFKDV+RZDUG(QJHO¶VLQWRKLVUHSHUWRLUHRQHZKHUH6DFNV¶VVHFRQGDU\LQYHVWLJDWLRQPHUHO\
followed the primary detective work of Engel and his team of doctors, Sacks claims authority 
over a greater swathe of human knowledge and expertise than before. Having rescued the 
individual self in his earlier work, later writings move to a wider concern for humanity ± a 
PRYHPHQWIURPWKHSHFXOLDULWLHVDQGP\VWHULHVRIRQHSHUVRQ¶VEUDLQDWDWLPH, to the much more 
JHQHUDOµDGDSWDELOLW\RIWKHKXPDQEUDLQ¶ZULWODUJH7KHLPSOLFDWLRQLVWKDWQHXURORJLFDOGHWHFWLYH
work, through the growth in popularity of the initially tentative and niche format of the Clinical 
Tale, now stakes a claim over a larger terrain than just some occasional neuro-quirk on the 
landscape. Despite deriving its methods and force from genre fiction, the authority of the 
neurological detective has come to outstrip that of his or her largely under-acknowledged literary 
forebear. This is particularly interesting because Sacks is arguably much more famous or 
influential as an author than as a doctor or a scientist, something which, in fact, he can use to 
retrospectively narrate and therefore bolster his clinical, scientific reputation ± in this case, as in 
others tKDW&KDUORWWH6OHLJKKLJKOLJKWVµLWZDVWKURXJKVHOI-fashioning as a writer that the 
VFLHQWLVWZDVPDGH>«@HPHUJLQJIURPWKHFRFRRQRIWKHVFLHQWLILFRXWVLGHU6OHLJK; 
original emphasis).  
$QGUHZ$QWKRQ\VXPVXS6DFNV¶VVFLHQWLILF-via-literary acumen when he writes that 
 
Sacks has long been praised and criticised for the manner in which he combines hard science and 
literary observation. For many, he is the pioneer of a particular form of personalised essay that has 
helped rejuvenate scientific wrLWLQJ>«@ 
)RURWKHUVOLNHWKHODWHSV\FKLDWULVW$UWKXU6KDSLUR6DFNV¶VEOXUULQJRIWKHERXQGDULHV
between art and science is problematic and potentially misleading. Not alone among medical 








For Sacks, whose abiding subject is the duality of the mind and the brain, the intrusion is 
another means of exposing the interplay between subjective perception and objective reality. Or, 
as he once put it: µI regard everything I write as being at the intersection of the first and third 
person, biography DQGDXWRELRJUDSK\DVLWZHUH¶ 
(Anthony 2010) 
 
If Anthony can be forgiven for naïvely trespassing on the ever-contentious ground of mind/body 
GXDOLVPKLVGHVFULSWLRQRI6DFNV¶VµLQWUXVLRQ¶RIµVXEMHFWLYHSHUFHSWLRQ¶XSRQµREMHFWLYHUHDOLW\¶
is highly illuminating. Whether or not Sacks is literarily laudable or scientifically dubious, 
whether or not he is an essayistic pioneer or a medical impostor, whether or not he is writing 
about specific people or the human condition in general ± whatever the case, by his own 
DGPLVVLRQKHLVDOZD\VDOVRZULWLQJDERXWKLPVHOIDQµDXWRELRJUDSK\¶GLVSHUVHG across all his 
ZULWWHQZRUNDQGVROLNHRWKHUGHWHFWLYHDXWKRUVKHLVZULWLQJDERXWKLVRZQZULWLQJRUµWKLQNLQJ
LQFDVHV¶LQFOXGHVWKLQNLQJDERXWKLVRZQFDVHDVTXRWHGIURP)RUUHVWHUHDUOLHU 
 The best example of this reflexive detective writing is 3DXO$XVWHU¶VThe New York 
Trilogy. This ostensible novel was, as its name suggests, originally published as three separate 
sections between 1985 and 1986, before first being brought together as a trilogy in 1987. Despite 
being distinct entities, the sections have many common concerns, including intertextuality itself, 
which runs throughout the trilogy as both a binding and a dismantling force. In setting up this 
commentary on the essence of writing and reading, Auster (like Sacks) is talking about himself 
too; he goes so far as to name a character after himself, confounding what, up till the fictional 
$XVWHU¶VHQWUDQFH, had been the natural identification of protagonist Quinn with the author. 
Alison Russell puts it this way: 
 
The three novels comprising the trilogy ± µ&LW\RI*ODVV¶µ*KRVWV¶DQGµThe Locked 5RRP¶± are 
essentially retellings of the same story. All three employ and deconstruct the conventional 
elements of the detective story, resulting in a recursive linguistic investigation of the nature, 
function, and meaning of language. The trilogy also parodies and subverts the Romance, 
µUHDOLVWLF¶ fiction, and autobiography, thereby exploding the narrative traditions associated with 
these genres. 
(Russell 1990: 71) 
 
The list of genres mentioned ± deteFWLYHILFWLRQ5RPDQFHµUHDOLVWLF¶ILFWLRQDQGDXWRELRJUDSK\± 
DUHWKHNH\FRPSRQHQWVRI6DFNV¶VRHXYUHDQGLWVSHUVLVWHQWFDOOIRUDUHWXUQWR/XULD¶VVR-called 
Romantic Science. By exploding them all in one place, Auster does not so much contradict 
SackV¶VEOHQGDVDFWXDOO\MXVWLI\LWFROODSVLQJWKHLUJHQHULFERXQGDULHV+RZHYHUWKHUHLQOLHVD





PRYHVRFLRORJLVW0DOFROP$VKPRUHGHVFULEHVDVDµWXTXRTXH¶± Cf. Ashmore 1989: 85±86). The 
self that Sacks is so eager to recuperate is wilfully left to float away by Auster. Ironically, the 
implication is that in the detective fiction stakes, neuroscience trumps literature. More or less 
uniformly successful, the neuURORJLVWGHWHFWLYHRI6DFNV¶VZULWLQJVDFKLHYHVWKHFORVXUHKLVSLHFHV
demand, traversing the beginning and the middle of a story on the way to the reassuring, 
µSUHGLFWDEOHUHVXOW¶WKDWLVVRµIXQGDPHQWDOWRWKHGHWHFWLYHVWRU\JHQUH¶ as Kissane and Kissane 
put it (1963: 360). Thus the irony ± the neurological detective is more strictly speaking literary 
than the never-ending, never-FORVLQJORRSVRI$XVWHU¶VOLWHUDU\GHWHFWLYHIXWLOHO\VHDUFKLQJIRU
himself or his author.  
7KLVLVGHPRQVWUDWHGLQµ*KRVWV¶WKHVHFRQGVWRU\RI$XVWHU¶VWULORJ\$GHWHFWLYHVLPSO\
known as Blue is disguised as a tramp. He is supposed to be merely observing Black, but cannot 
resist investigating him too; and so Blue has positioned himself on a street corner so that Black 
will encounter him falsely begging for change. When the ruse works, Blue repeats it the next day 
to engineer a more extensive conversation, into which Black quite willingly throws himself, 
remarking that Blue is the spit of long dead American poet par excellence Walt Whitman. Blue 
UHVSRQGVµ(YHU\PDQKDVKLVGRXEOHVRPHZKHUH,GRQ¶WVHHZK\PLQHFDQ¶WEHDGHDGPDQ¶
$XVWHU1RWH:KLWPDQ¶VGRXEOHGµ:V¶KHUHZKLFKDUHUHGRXEOHGLQµ&LW\RI*ODVV¶ 





Clinical Tales. +HEHJLQVZLWKµWKHRQHDERXW:KLWPDQ¶VEUDLQIRUH[DPSOH$OOKLVOLIH:KLWPan 
believed in the science of phrenology ± \RXNQRZUHDGLQJWKHEXPSVRQWKHVNXOO>«@:KLWPDQ
was interested in brains and skulls ± WKRXJKWWKH\FRXOGWHOO\RXHYHU\WKLQJDERXWDPDQ¶V
FKDUDFWHU¶$XVWHU$FFRUGLQJWR%ODFNWKLVGHHSLQWHUHVt in the brain led Whitman to 
bequeath his own brain to science, because  
 
people thought he was a genius, you see, and they wanted to take a look at his brain to find out if 
WKHUHZDVDQ\WKLQJVSHFLDODERXWLW>%XW@MXVWDVWKH\¶UHDERXWWRZRUNRQLWRne of the assistants 
GURSVLWRQWKHIORRU>«@,WVSODWWHUHGDOORYHUWKHSODFHDQGWKDWZDVWKDW7KHEUDLQRI$PHULFD¶V
greatest poet got swept up and thrown out with the garbage. 
(Auster 2011: 175±6) 
 
This grisly but comical anecdote elicits a great deal of laughter from the pair, and Black 
FRQFOXGHVLQDVLPLODUYHLQRIEODFNKXPRXUµ,W¶VVDGWRWKLQNRISRRU:DOWO\LQJLQKLVJUDYH





are manifested here as an implicit threat to Blue, which goes unnoticed at the time but surfaces 
from his subconscious later: literary endeavour, detective work and neurological fatalism are all 
MX[WDSRVHGDV%OXHWKHLQYHVWLJDWRUZKRLVWKHGHDG:KLWPDQ¶VGRSSHOJDQJHUZLOOHQG up 
ORVLQJKLVPLQGµDORQHDQGZLWKRXWDQ\EUDLQV¶ should he continue to pry into the mind (or the 
writing process) of the writer Black. 
<HWPRUHH[SOLFLWLVDQRWKHURI%ODFN¶VµFXULRXVVWRULHV¶DERXW:KLWPDQZKHQYLVLWHGLQ
New York by friends and fellow writers Henry David Thoreau and Bronson Alcott from 
0DVVDFKXVHWWV$FFRUGLQJWR%ODFNHYHU\WKLQJSURFHHGHGQRUPDOO\XQWLOWKHYLVLWRUVµQRWLFHGD
full chamber pot right in the middle of the floor. Walt was of course an expansive fellow and paid 
no attention, but the two New Englanders found it hard to keep talking with a bucket of 
H[FUHPHQWLQIURQWRIWKHP¶(Auster 2011: 177). Black then elucidates: 
 
That chamber pot, you see, somehow reminds me of the brains on the floor. And when you stop to 
think abRXWLWWKHUH¶VDFHUWDLQVLPLODULW\RIIRUP7KHEXPSVDQGFRQYROXWLRQV,PHDQ7KHUH¶VD
definite connection. Brains and guts, the insides of a man. We always talk about trying to get 
inside a writer to understand his work better. But when you get right GRZQWRLWWKHUH¶VQRWPXFK
to find in there ± DWOHDVWQRWPXFKWKDW¶VGLIIHUHQWIURPZKDW\RX¶GILQGLQDQ\RQHHOVH 
(Auster 2011: 177) 
 
µ1RWPXFKWKDW¶VGLIIHUHQW¶LQ:KLWPDQLQSDUWLFXODUZKR%ODFNVXJJHVWVZRXOGKDYHEHHQDV
happy to display his diJHVWLYHV\VWHP¶VFRQWHQWVDVKLVEUDLQVZLWKDOOKLVSHUVRQDOSRHWLFDQG
philosophical interiority laid bare on the floor, as open to scrutiny as his writing or even his face. 
Again, the implicit threat (or at least warning) is that investigation into thHZULWHU¶VPLQGOHDGVWR
nothing but abyssal failure, and so a budding detective ± whether literary, neuroscientific or the 
standard legal/policial variety ± might just as well be searching for clues in brains as sifting 
through excrement; and for that matWHUDQ\ERG\¶VH[FUHPHQWOHWDORQHDVR-called genius writer. 
&HUHEUDOµEXPSVDQGFRQYROXWLRQV¶SURYLGHQRVROXWLRQWRWKHP\VWHULHVRIEUDLQZULWLQJRU
GHWHFWLYHZRUNDQGLQVWHDGDUHDVSURVDLFDVWKRVHRWKHUPHWDSKRULFDOµFRQYROXWLRQV¶ the 
intestines. Auster thus makes a larger point about the writing and reading of detective fiction, 
with literary convolutions offering no hidden meaning, no artfully concealed depths beyond the 
generic structural elements themselves, mirrored in his own impenetrable or even empty psyche 
as the unreliable author of this particular undetectable anti-fiction. 
 ,IRQHDFFHSWV%ODFN¶VYLHZRIWKHZULWHU¶VPLQGDVDQLPSUHJQDEOHKXPDQFRPPRQSODFH
devoid of any special meaning, a deceptive counterpoint is found in Scott BakkeU¶VNeuropath 
(2009)7KHXQSDJLQDWHGµ$XWKRU¶V1RWH¶ZKLFKSUHFHGHV%DNNHU¶VQDUUDWLYHSXUSRUWVµ7KH
following story is based on actual trends in neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive science. 





ZHDUHQRWZKDWZHWKLQNZHDUH¶Bakker 2009). Two things are noteworthy here: firstly, the 
UHFRXUVHWRµDFWXDO¶QHXURVFLHQFHDQGUHODWHGGLVFLSOLQHVLVPHDQWWROHQGWKHQRYHODQ
authoritative and cohesive air, as in 6DFNVZKLFKDV$XVWHU¶VWULORJ\FRQYLQFLQJO\GHPRQVWUDWHV
is no longer otherwise available to detective/crime fiction; but secondly, that same confidence in 
VWDEOHLGHDVGUDZQIURPUHDOVFLHQWLILFµWUHQGV¶LVLPPHGLDWHO\VXSSODQWHGE\WKHIRUHZRUG¶VVHOI-
negating conclusion, so evocative of the equally paradoxical Iago in William 6KDNHVSHDUH¶V
OthelloWKDWµZHDUHQRWZKDWZHWKLQNZHDUH¶ While Auster concocts an entire detective trilogy 
out of red herrings regarding his authorial position, even cheekiO\SODFLQJµKLPVHOI¶LQWRWKH
narrative, Bakker instead uses science to utterly undermine his own authorial position in advance, 
ZLWKRXWDVLQJOHPRPHQWRIQDUUDWLYHKDYLQJWDNHQSODFH,I%DNNHU¶VWDNHRQQHXURVFLHQFH
psychology and cognitive science is correct, then he himself is not what he thinks he is ± that is to 
say, the author of a violent, sexual thriller based on a highly mechanistic view of the mind/brain. 
In a way, though, Neuropath LVDFWXDOO\VFLHQFHILFWLRQRUDV%DNNHUSXWVLWµIXWXUHIDFWV¶
(Bakker 2009: 377) ± a speculative look at what might happen were the brain totally manipulable 
E\DEULOOLDQWEXWGHUDQJHGNLOOHU,QWKLVUHVSHFWWKHQRYHO¶VSHVVLPLVWLFZDUQLQJUHJDUGLQJ
contemporary brain-centred rhetoric, and its authority-giving status, is commendable. 
$GGLWLRQDOO\%DNNHU¶VSRVWVFULSWDOHOXFLGDWLRQVRIKLVVFLHQWLILFDQGSKLORVRSKLFDOVRXUFHVLV
helpful, like a shorter version of Radiant Cool¶VVHFRQGKDOI+RZHYHULIKLVFRQFOXVLRQV
regarding the brain are to be taken seriously irrespective of the narrative content of Neuropath, 
WKHQHYHQWKHIRUHZRUGRQLWVRZQVHUYHVWRQHJDWH%DNNHU¶VRZQUROHDVDXWKRU 
 Just as Auster is fictionalized and doubled in The New York Trilogy, so too is Dan Lloyd 
in Radiant Cool. Lloyd further pluralizes his own roles as would-be literary author and scientific 
SKLORVRSKHULQµUHDOOLIH¶KHLVDQDFDGHPLFEXWKHLVRQHILFWLRQDOO\WRRSOD\LQJKLPVHOILQWKH
story, so to speak. Lloyd thus writes science and fiction simultaneously, in the unusual sense of 
separately but together, at the same time in the same volume ± like science fiction, only rendered 
DVµVFLHQFH-and-ILFWLRQ¶RUµILFWLRQ-and-VFLHQFH¶)XUWKHUPRUHKHSDUWLFLSDWHVLQLWLDOO\DVD
character, only properly reassuming the narratorial reins late on. As mentioned, this echoes 
Neuropath¶VWZRSDUWVDWHQVHGUDPDWLFSORWLQWKHGHWHFWLYHP\VWHU\WUDGLWLRQDQGDUDWLRQDO
sober exposition in the philosophical, scientific tradition. Radiant Cool¶VILUVWSDUWµ7KH7KULOORI
Phenomenology¶ takes up the bulk of the book, and begins with all the hallmarks of a classic 
hard-ERLOHGGHWHFWLYHVWRU\µ+HZDVDIRRODQGDPRURQEXW,QHYHUZDQWHGWRVHHKLPGHDG¶
/OR\G2IFRXUVHWKHVHDUHSXUSRUWHGO\0LUDQGD6KDUSH¶VZRUGVEXW/ORyd pre-empts 
the confusion, complexity and suspense to come in his Preface, which begins in equally as 
JULSSLQJDPDQQHUµ,QWKHILUVWGD\VRI$SULORIODVW\HDUD\RXQJSKLORVRSKHU0LUDQGD6KDUSH






to lay full claim to them. Ironically, this lends credibility to the story rather than undermining it, 
because here is an established academic vouching for it in his Preface, never intimating its 
spuriousness until the story is over. However, if Lloyd outsources his consciousness to Sharpe, 
this is because consciousness is precisely the main topic of Radiant Cool. By first externalizing 
KLVWKRXJKWYLD6KDUSHKHFDQWKHQORRNDWLWREMHFWLYHO\LQWKHERRN¶VVHFRQGSDUWµ7KH5HDO
Firefly: Reflections on a Science of Consciousness¶ The result is a melding of first and third 
SHUVRQYLHZVIRUHJURXQGLQJ/OR\G¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIthe many-nuanced project of 
neurophenomenology. 
 7KLVPHOGLQJRIJUDPPDWLFDOSHUVRQVUHFDOOV'DYLG/RGJH¶VZRUGVRQWKHKXJHSRWHQWLDO




Lodge then evaluates the relative merits of different approaches to said study, taking as an 
example the narrative focus on interiority in the novelistic technique of Henry James: 
 
There is no empirical reality against which we can check the truth of Henry JDPHV¶VDFFRXQWRI>D
FKDUDFWHU¶V@FRQVFLRXVQHVV,WFDQQRWEHUHJDUGHGDVVFLHQWLILFNQRZOHGJH+RZHYHULWLVDOVRWUXH
that we read novels like The Wings of the Dove because they give us a convincing sense of what 
the consciousness of people other than ourselves is like. 
(Lodge 2002: 30) 
 
The reason that this description of what anothHU¶VFRQVFLRXVQHVVµLVOLNH¶LVµFRQYLQFLQJ¶ in 
/RGJH¶VYLHZLVEHFDXVHRIWKHµHVVHQWLDOO\narrative nature of human consciousness, recognized 
by a number of scientific writers on the subject. But it is a narrative full of lacunae. We are 
conscious of existing in time, moving from a past that we recall very patchily, and into a future 
WKDWLVXQNQRZQDQGXQNQRZDEOH¶RULJLQDOHPSKDVLV/RGJH¶VSRLQWLVWKDWOLWHUary 
ILFWLRQILOOVLQWKHVHµODFXQDH¶E\RIIHULQJVRPHWKLQJREMHFWLYHDWH[WWKDWPDNHVWKHRWKHUZLVH
impenetrable first person subjectivity of consciousness in some small measure available to third 
person scrutiny, thus approaching scientific analysability. Literature gives a firm foothold in time 
to the ever-fleeting conscious moment of now-QHVVZKLFK+HQU\¶VEURWKHUSV\FKRORJLFDO
SLRQHHU:LOOLDP-DPHVFDOOHGWKHµVSHFLRXVSUHVHQW¶ it is an attempt to firmly record that 
RWKHUZLVHHYDQHVFHQWµSDVWWKDt we recall very patchily¶ as mentioned by Lodge, an attempt 
ZKLFKXVHIXOO\FDQDOVREHUHWXUQHGWRDQGFRQVXOWHGDVQHFHVVDU\LQWKHµXQNQRZQDQG
unknowable future¶ 
 Lloyd concurs with this view, since he not only invents a fiction to explore the science of 





consciousness. But once again: why detective fiction in particular? One answer lies in what 
/RGJHVD\VRI+HQU\-DPHV¶VDXWKRULDOVXFFHVVKHDUJXHVWKDW-Dmes fulfils the readerly need to 
JHWµDFRQYLQFLQJVHQVHRIZKDWWKHFRQVFLRXVQHVVRISHRSOHRWKHUWKDQRXUVHOYHVLVOLNH¶ 
$FFRUGLQJWR/OR\GLWLVWKLVLPSXOVHWRNQRZµZKDWLWLVOLNH¶WKDWKDVKLVWRULFDOO\EHHQFRUHWR
WKHVWXG\RIFRQVFLRXVQHVVµ7KH what-it-is-like formulation swiftly became the standard 
invocation of the miasmal mystery of consciousness, and has almost become a definition of the 
term. The grammar of the question demands a search for a singular something that it is like to be 
a bat, or a rhinoceros, or a human ± LW¶VOLNHthis¶/OR\GRULJLQDOHPSKDVLV/OR\G¶V
XVHRIWKHZRUGVµP\VWHU\¶DQGµVHDUFK¶KHUHPHDQWKDWFRXQWHULQWXLWLYHO\FRQVFLRXVQHVVLVQRWDW





finality is therefore an unrealistic, mammoth task for Lloyd, and he instead advocates 
compartmentalizing the science of consciousness in order to systematically analyse elements of 
its structure. And as a corollary, Lloyd seems concerned that taking down the consciousness 
monolith by oneself puts too much pressure on the capacities of a would-be detective-cum-
scientist working alone. He does not avow this outright but it is implicit in the decision to 
distribute his thought almost equally across fiction and science-writing in Radiant Cool. In 
DGGLWLRQDIWHUWKHILFWLRQLVRYHUDQG/OR\GGLVFXVVHVWKHµGHWHFWRUKHDG¶QRWLRQKHVees as central 
to cognitive science, he concludes the following: 
 
Where there are brains, there are detectors, and cognitive science is hard at work to describe them. 
>«@%XWWKHTXHVWLRQKHUHLVZKHWKHUGHWHFWLRQWXUQVRXWWREHDXVHIXOFRQFHSWLQWKHSXrsuit of 
consciousness. I think not, [and] hope to embark on consciousness science, a new science, as it 
could look after we set aside detection. 
(Lloyd 2004: 239; original emphasis) 
 
µ'HWHFWLRQ¶FDQPHDQPRUHWKDQRQHWKLQJKHUH/OR\G¶VIXQGDPHQWDOFODLP is that descriptions of 
cognition do not necessarily translate well into descriptions of consciousness, and so the 
GHWHFWRUKHDGVFRQFHSWVWDUWLQJZLWKVHQVRU\µGHWHFWLRQ¶DQGSDVVLQJXSward to brain processes, 
QHHGVWREHµVHWDVLGH¶ But less innocently than first appears (given that he says consciousness is 
XQGHUµSXUVXLW¶ as if it were being tracked down by the police), by using detection against itself 







more recent example has already been mentioned ± $XVWHU¶VThe New York Trilogy. As much as  
detective stories offer a seductive explanatory ideal, the ultimate problematic of detection as a 
guiding force for cognitive/neuro science is highlighted in literary self-questioning. This is 
HPERGLHGLQZRUNVVXFKDV/OR\G¶VDQG$XVWHU¶VZKHUHLQQDPLQJDQGLGHQWLILFDWLRQPDNH
detective work look like it approaches solubility briefly, before actually shooting away 
FKDRWLFDOO\,QGHHG'DYLG/RGJHZULWHVWKDWµLQDQRYHOQDPHVDUHQHYHUQHXWUDO7KH\DOZD\V
VLJQLI\LILWLVRQO\RUGLQDULQHVV¶/RGJH or as literary scholar John Sutherland puts it, 
with a VRPHZKDWPRUHSV\FKRORJLFDOEHQWµQDPHVKDYHYDOXHVHPERGLHGLQWKHP7KH\FDUU\
EDJJDJH¶6XWKHUODQG Lloyd is evidently aware of the power of naming, displaying 
this in a multifaceted way. As has been discussed, the perceptiveness of Miranda Sharpe is tied to 
KHUVXUQDPHEXWZKHQVKHGRHVQHHGKHOSVKHWXUQVWRµ'U&ODUH/XFLGVKULQNWRWKHVWDUVDQG
RFFDVLRQDOO\WRSDWKHWLFJUDGXDWHVWXGHQWV¶/OR\GWKHGRFWRULVVRLQVLJKWIXOWKDW/OR\G
names her twice for her clarity and lucidity. He goes yet further with the central figure of mystery 
LQWKHVWRU\6KDUSH¶VYDQLVKHGJUDGXDWHVFKRRODGYLVRU3URIHVVRU0D[*UXH± µJUXH¶EHLQJD
UHIHUHQFHWRSKLORVRSKHU1HOVRQ*RRGPDQ¶VSURSRVLWLRQRIDµ³QHZULGGOHRILQGXFWLRQ´7KH
³JUXH-EOHHQ´ paradox, as it is better known, challenges our thinking about categories [and so] 
³*UXH´FDQEHGHILQHGLQ(QJOLVKDVIROORZV,IVRPHWKLQJLVJUHHQEHIRUHPLGQLJKW'HFHPEHU
DQGEOXHWKHUHDIWHUWKHQLWLVJUXH¶3RXQGVWRQH±46). 
Popular science author William 3RXQGVWRQHUHODWHVWKDWE\µFKDOOHQJLQJRXUWKLQNLQJ
about categories¶ *RRGPDQ¶VLQWHQWLRQLVWRSUREOHPDWL]HWKHSULQFLSOHVRIORJLFDORUVFLHQWLILF
LQGXFWLRQWKHQHWUHVXOWEHLQJWKDWµE\VXLWDEOHFKRLFHRIWHUPVDQG]HURKRXU anything confirms 
that it will be anything else at any ODWHUWLPH¶3RXQGVWRQHRULJLQDOHPSKDVLVµ*UXH¶
means that naming something does not guarantee its consistent identification on the mere basis 
that it had always been a certain way beforeDQG/OR\G¶VSOD\IXOQDPLQJVWUDWHJ\IRUDSLYRWDO
but absent character draws on this notion. Lloyd later extends this sceptical stance on 
QRPHQFODWXUHZKHQPRUHVHULRXVO\GLVFXVVLQJGHWHFWLRQQDPLQJDQGWKHEUDLQµ&XWWLQJWKHFRUGV
of detection overthrows just about everything. All of the components, from neurons on up, have 
long been identified through their function in a detectorheaded, information-processing system. 
>«@1RZ,¶PVXJJHVWLQJWKDWDOOWKRVHLGHQWLILFDWLRQVDUHLUUHOHYDQWWKHQLFHODEHOV merely 
FRQIHWWL¶/OR\G7RGHPRQVWUDWHWKHVFUDPEOHIRUWKHFRPIRUWRIXQGHUVWDQGDEOHEXW
essentially arbitrary) names engendered by disavowing detection-metaphors, Lloyd points out 
that 
 
the names still in use for many parts of the brain originated [with Renaissance anatomists], and the 








(Lloyd 2004: 246) 
 
The list is much longer than this, but the sample from Cherniak shows the widespread necessity 
for the explanatory sanctuary of known items in the face of early modern ignorance about the 
brain. Nevertheless, the point is that parts of the brain may be named so, but they are not in 
actuality snails nor chandeliers nor moss. 
 And neither are brains detectors nor neuroscientists detectives, however theoretically 
useful such ideas may be. This is because neuroscience finally rests on a desire to describe 
something real and present which it thus necessarily presupposes,35 while detective fiction just as 
often shows that underneath such a presupposition there is nothingness. Just as Lloyd and Auster 
ORVHWKHLUµUHDO¶VHOYHVLQWKHDUELWUDULQHVVRIQDPLQJILFWLRQDOFKDUDFWHUVDIWHUWKHPVHOYHV
neuroscience as pure detection risks debunking a myth of self that neurological narrative line-
walkers such as Oliver Sacks have fought so hard to restore in the medico-scientific context. 
Moreover, taking metaphors of detection too far could conceivably be dangerous; to think of 
detection as equivalent throughout the body implies a devaluation of the senses and perhaps of 
any part that is not the brain ± after all, why not cut to the chase of the final link in the 
detectorhead chain? Thus one gets the warning signs of just such a conclusion from fictional 
ZRUNVLQH[DPSOHVOLNHWKHµDGDSWHG>«@VWHUHRWDFWLFQHXURUDGLRVXUJLFDOGHYLFH¶µFDOOHG
0DULRQHWWH¶%DNNHUZKLFKWKHWLWXODUNeuropath LQ%DNNHU¶VVWRU\XVHVWRPDQLSXODWH
his victims into nastily maiming and killing themselves; or the less severe but nevertheless 




of science fiction; the bizarre novelty of bypassing non-cerebral bodily functions has always 
LPSOLFDWHGWKHSUREOHPRIQDPLQJDQGUHDUVLWVKHDGLQµ7KH,PPRUWDOV¶E\+%XVWRV'RPHFT
Here, the part-comical, part-menacing Dr Narbondo tells the author-narrator about his business 
plan to mechanically extend the life of his client-patients:  
 
None of your philosophical niceties here; the body can be vulcanized and from time to time 
recaulked, and so the minGNHHSVJRLQJ6XUJHU\EULQJVLPPRUWDOLW\WRPDQNLQG/LIH¶VHVVHQWLDO












aim has been attained ± the mind lives on without fear of cessation. Each of our immortals is 
FRPIRUWHGE\WKHFHUWDLQW\EDFNHGE\RXUILUP¶VJXDUDQWHHRIEHLQJDZLWQHVVin aeternum. The 
brain, refreshed day and night by a system of electrical charges, is the last organic bulwark in 
which ball bearings and cells collaborate. The rest is Formica, steel, plastics. 
(Borges and Bioy Casares 1982: 138) 
 
The issue of naming here is in the author himself, who is placed into the narrative à la Auster and 
/OR\GEXWZKRKDGQRRULJLQDOµUHDOLW\¶DVDSHUVRQ+%XVWRV'RPHFTLVDILFWLRQDOGHWHFWLYH
writer, invented as a cipher by Jorge Luis Borges and Adolfo Bioy Casares to revel in the limits 
of the genre they both loved so much. 
 Further anxieties abound at the nexus of naming, detection and their joint failure. Bustos 
'RPHFT¶VSXUSRVHLQµ7KH,PPRUWDOV¶LVWRGUDZSDUDOOHOVEHWZHHQ1DUERQGRDQGWKH
intriguingly named amateur surgeon Guillermo %ODNHWKHODWWHURIZKRPµFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHILYH
senses obstruct or deform the apprehension of reality and that, could we free ourselves of them, 
ZHZRXOGVHHWKHZRUOGDVLWLV¶%RUJHVDQG%LR\ Casares 1982: 134). This leads Blake to 
experiment on his RZQVRQDQGµDQHVWKHWL]HKLPIRUOLIH>«@WRHPDQFLSDWHKLPIURPWKHVHQVHV
>WR@PDNHWKHFKRVHQRQHXQDZDUHRIKLVRZQERG\>DQGFXWKLPRII@IURPDOOKXPDQFRQWDFW¶
(Ibid.). This horrific experiment is uncannily similar to another in The New York Trilogy, where 
Auster describes the cruel experimental upbringing of Peter Stillman, also at the hands of his 
IDWKHUµ$QHQWLUHFKLOGKRRGVSHQWLQGDUNQHVVLVRODWHGIURPWKHZRUOGZLWKQRKXPDQFRQWDFW
H[FHSWDQRFFDVLRQDOEHDWLQJ¶$XVWHU36 Stillman is severely marked by this treatment 
and finds it difficult to maintain a coherent line of thought. He repeatedly remarks to protagonist 
4XLQQZKRLVPDVTXHUDGLQJDVWKHILFWLRQDOGHWHFWLYHµ3DXO$XVWHU¶KLPVHOIWKDW6WLOOPDQ¶s 








 Not quite in the same league, but of a perhaps disturbingly similar ilk are experiments done by founding behaviourist psychologist 
-RKQ%:DWVRQµ,QWKHIDOORILQVSLUHGE\WKHWKLUWHHQWK-century experiments of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II, Watson 
started experimenting with babies. According to legend, on the instructions of the emperor, several babies were nursed on an island, 
where they were exposed to no language and no culture, to see how they would turn out. The babies not only failed to speak Greek or 
Hebrew, as had been hoped, but they all died. Social scientists typically rued the impossibility of conducting any such human 
H[SHULPHQWVWKHPVHOYHVEXW:DWVRQZHQWDKHDG>«@7KHWHVWVZHUHGRQHLQDEUHDWKWDNLQJO\VWUDLJKWIRUZDUGPDQQHUFRQVidering 
the tender ages of his research subjects: Present a burning candle to a curious infant and see what happens, and how many times it 
happens. Introduce different animals and ascertain whether the infant fears them naturally or only after repeated traumatic 
H[SHULHQFHV0DNHDKLVVLQJQRLVHREVHUYHUHVXOWV¶/HPRY±41). These tests inspired by legend are amongst several 
GLVTXLHWLQJSUDFWLFHVRIWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\SV\FKRORJ\EUD]HQHQRXJKWRDFWGHVSLWHHWKLFDOTXDQGDULHVEHFDXVHµWKHSRLQWRI







Quinn later looks up cases similar to that of the Stillmans throughout history, and this 
OHDGVKLPWR6WLOOPDQVHQLRU¶VDFDGHPLFZRUNRQJohn 0LOWRQ¶VParadise Lost, in which the 
VFKRODUKDGLGHQWLILHGWKDWµHDFKNH\ZRUGKDVWZRPHanings ± one before the [Biblical] fall and 
one after the fall. [He] showed how their prelapsarian use was free of moral connotations, 
ZKHUHDVWKHLUXVHDIWHUWKHIDOOZDVVKDGHGDPELJXRXVLQIRUPHGE\DNQRZOHGJHRIHYLO¶$XVWHU
2011: 43). It is this moral ambiguity that leads Stillman senior to lose his mind and try to prevent 
KLVVRQIURPOHDUQLQJDFRUUXSWHGEHGHYLOOHGODQJXDJH7KLVLVEHFDXVH$GDP¶VQDPLQJRIWKLQJV
LQWKH*DUGHQRI(GHQKDGµOLWHUDOO\EURXJKWWKHPWROLIH$WKLQJDQGLWVQDPHZHUe 
interchangeable. After the fall, this was no longer true. Names became detached from things; 
ZRUGVGHYROYHGLQWRDFROOHFWLRQRIDUELWUDU\VLJQVODQJXDJHKDGEHHQVHYHUHGIURP*RG¶$XVWHU
4XLQQ¶VUHDGLQJRI6WLOOPDQVHQLRURQO\GUDJVKLPLQWo the madness exhibited by the 
object of his research; studious investigation of names is shown to be no guarantee of protection 
from their negative effects. As Lodge states, 
 
in all three stories [of The New York Trilogy] the impossibility of pinning the signifier to the 
signified, of recovering that mythical, prelapsarian state of innocence in which a thing and its 
name were interchangeable, is replicated on the level of plot by the futility of the routines of 
detection. Each narrative ends with the death or despair of the detective-figure, faced with an 
insoluble mystery, lost in a labyrinth of names. 
(Lodge 2011: 40) 
 
,QGHHGDQµLQVROXEOHP\VWHU\¶DQGDµODE\ULQWKRIQDPHV¶LVSHUKDSVWKHRQO\IDWHDZDLWLQJ
neuroscience if it leans too heavily on the detective trope.37 
I do not agree with Lloyd that the neurocognitive deployment of detection ought to be 
completely whitewashed, but think more that any lessons or warnings gained from detective 
fiction must be taken along with its more productive and inspirational aspects. Neurology and 
detective fiction share common roots in the mid to late nineteenth century and in this respect they 
are both representative of fledgling Western modernity. It is unsurprising, then, that early on they 
also freely shared ideas across porous boundaries. For example, literature and neurology scholar 
Anne Stiles FRPPHQWVWKDWµOLNHODWH-Victorian cerebral localization theories, phrenology was 
often explored and exploited in [fiction]. Edgar Allan Poe critiqued phrenological theories in  




 Indeed, as philosopher of science Ian Hacking notes, the supposed cultural gap between dichotomized entities such as science and 
literature often gets played out as a rehash of the age old metaphysical debate between realism and nominalism (Cf. Hacking 1999). 
Roughly, this is to say that one side contends that there are real things in the world which are then given names (realism), whilst the 
other side says it is only the names and the way they interact that exists (nominalism). Neuroscience is barred from any meaningful 







11). Poe, commonly acknowledged to be the initiator of modern detective fiction, was even-
KDQGHGZLWKKLVXVHRIVXFKHDUO\ORFDOL]DWLRQWKHRULHVµH[SORULQJ¶ZKLOVWµH[SORLWLQJ¶ 
µFULWLTXLQJ¶ZKLOVWµHPSOR\LQJ¶ Additionally, as shown above, ever since Poe detective fiction 
has also been willing to self-critique and self-ironize in order to avoid simply taking its own 
tenets for granted. However, as neurology and detective fiction developed into and beyond the 
twentieth century, there has been no such even-handedness in return from the neurological 
sciences, nor any similar self-critique. This uneven distribution of respect between sibling 
discourses could EHSHUQLFLRXVWRQHXURVFLHQFH¶VLPDJHRILWVHOIDVDSURJUHVVLYHDQGPRUDO
bastion of truth. 
This is especially so if all it does is seek this abstract truth at the expense of the self, and 
WKHPDWHULDOLVWORJLFRIµ0DULRQHWWH¶DQGWKHµWUDQVLHQWOHVLRQLQJ PDFKLQH¶EHFRPHUHDOLWLHV± 
because so long as the structure and functioning of the brain are known in ever greater detail, 
why bother attending to the messy problem of the person attached? Such an admonitory view is 
corroborated by literary critic John T Irwin: 
 
,QFUHDWLQJWKHGHWHFWLYHVWRU\3RHSURGXFHGWKHGRPLQDQWPRGHUQJHQUH>«@SUHHPLQHQWO\WKH
genre of an age dominated by science and technology, an age characterized by mental-work-as-
DQDO\VLV>«@)URPSV\FKRDQDO\VWWROLWHUDU\FULWLFIURPSDUticle physicist to diagnostician, the 
most (self-)satisfying description of what one does (and thus what one is) seems to fall naturally 
into the scenario of a knotty problem and its solution ± the patient amassing of clues, the false 
leads, the painstaking analysis, and the ultimate triumph ± culminating with the observation 
KRSHIXOO\PDGHE\VRPHRQHRWKHUWKDQRQHVHOIµ:K\\RX¶UHUHDOO\PRUHLQWHUHVWLQJWKDQ\RX
ORRN,QIDFW\RX¶UHOLNHDGHWHFWLYH¶%XWZHVKRXOGQRWHWKDWLQFUHDWLQJWKHGHWHFWLYH story Poe 
DOVRJDYHXVDFDXWLRQDU\WDOHDERXWWKHPDVWHU\RIPLQGDQGRXUPRGHUQVFLHQWLILFZRUOG>«@
$QG3RHWXUQVWKHGHWHFWLYHVWRU\LQWRVXFKDFDXWLRQDU\WDOHE\VHWWLQJDVWKHWDVNIRUWKHPLQG¶V
exhibition of its mastery the analysis of its own structure. 
(Irwin 1994: xvi±xvii) 
 
Analysing the structure of the mind with the mind itself is a convoluted prospect, which, if it is to 
truly be PRUHµLQWHUHVWLQJ¶WKDQLWµORRNV¶ QHHGVWRGRPRUHWKDQVLPSO\µH[KLELWLWVPDVWHU\¶DW
the cost of all else. In effect, it could learn this from the detective fiction which it has taken as its 
basis in other facets. 
 If no such further learning from the genre is possible, then the mysteries of the brain may 
EHJUDGXDOO\VROYHGEXWZLOOUHVXOWRQO\LQ/RGJH¶VµODE\ULQWKRIQDPHV¶± this is to say, all 
aspects of the brain will be known and neatly labelled, but no-one will know anything about who 
they are, how to behave, or what to do with themselves. The complexity, confusion and 





the complexity of a trope such as detective work needs to be fully explored rather than only 
partially, if it is not to lead to such an abyssal scenario. It is fitting that this scenario can be 
described as a labyrinth, because the next chapter will address the incredible complexity of mazes 
and labyrinths. These have also served as a metaphorical spur to action in neuroscience, typified 
by the physical resemblance of the cerebral convolutions to the twists and turns of a labyrinth, 
not to mention the extensive use of mazes in neuropsychological research. However, whereas 
detective work is a process likened to neuroscience, and therefore neuroscientists are detectives, 
the next chapter will suggest an added layer of convolution. It is not only the brain that is 
labyrinthine, but brain science itself as well, shifting the argument from relatively straightforward 
epistemological detective-like activity, to a metaphorical blurring of epistemological and 
ontological endeavours, an accretion into activity-as-material-object. Forbiddingly complicated 
as this is, neuroscience has sought to reduce such a picture of its workings by claiming to map the 
brain, the map metaphor supposedly serving as a guide and a comfort. But as with the disavowal 
of aspects of detective fiction, this reduction merely amplifies the complexities rather than 
FXUELQJWKHP:KHQLWFRPHVWRGLVFXVVLRQRIODE\ULQWKVPDSVDQGEUDLQVLWLVZRUWKµIROORZLQJ
the convolutions of their individual arguments, [thus] isolating a thread that runs through all 














exterior spaces of the Labyrinth collapse into one another as 
each narrative inevitably folds back upon itself. Utopia 
remains a narrative fragment, an ephemeral collection of 
sights and sounds and gestures that takes place in the 
distended present of text. 




thieves who know all the alleys of Paris as well as the back 
of their hand, though ignorant of what is going on inside the 
houses. 







With its convoluted twists and turns, the surface of the brain appears to be a maze seen from 
above. Accordingly, this labyrinth is best navigated (and indeed mapped) by cognitive/neuro 
science; the currency of these scientific efforts means that previous attempts to reach the truth at 
the centre are revealed as fruitless and valueless. However, if the brain is a labyrinth as 
neuroscience deems it to be, then so too is brain science itself. From mind maps to rats in mazes, 
neuroscience (as well as its history) has been infected by the labyrinthine nature of the object it 
seeks to explicate, a challenge to simplistic notions of interiority and exteriority. Even the 
difference between mazes and labyrinths is obscured by the complexity of the matter, and this 
chapter begins by attempting to untangle this difference (if one even exists anymore). As the 
chapter progresses I suggest that, where the reductive aspects of the concept of mapping fail to 
deal with the complexities of labyrinthine thinking in neuroscience, the multifaceted and 
longstanding engagement with mazes and labyrinths in literature is better served to deal with 
such problematics, and this is typified by the works of Jorge Luis Borges, amongst others. The 
chapter draws to a close by discussing how the literary and the neuroscientific labyrinths might 
be reconciled and even synthesized, via a reading of the work of Douglas Hofstadter. Thus, 
continued literary analysis and theory of the figure of the labyrinth is still necessary to demystify, 
reinvigorate and furthermore celebrate the complexity of that same figure, especially with regard 





Mazes, Maps and Minds: The World as Labyrinth and Laboratory 
 
 
This chapter will focus on the motif of labyrinths and mazes. However, stating this 
straightforwardly like this masks some complexities. I have written that the motif is singular, yet 
WKHFRQFHSWVFRPSULVLQJWKHPRWLIDSSHDUWREHSOXUDOµ/DE\ULQWK¶DQGµPD]H¶DUHHVVHQWLDOO\
synonymous terms and they will be treated as such in this chapter (more on this later). Yet they 
are still two different terms, a situation requiring clarification. Already, thinking about labyrinths 
and mazes is revealed to be in itself labyrinthine; in other words, and as per the second sense for 
µODE\ULQWKLQH¶JLYHQLQWKHOEDWKLQNLQJDERXWODE\ULQWKVDQGPD]HVLVµLQWULFDWHFRPSOLFDWHG
involved, inextricable¶ So before going too far down what might turn out to be a blind alley, 
some definitions and examples of use are in order, as points of reference for the discussion to 
follow. First, and turning back to the OED, it is necessary to point out straight away that both the 
QRXQµODE\ULQWK¶DQGWKHQRXQµPD]H¶38 include each other several times over amongst their 
respective lists of definitions. This reciprocal definition would tend to suggest the synonymy of 
the two terms. However, there are indubitable variances and nuances in meaning and use in both 
of these originally medLHYDOZRUGV¶H[WHQVLYHHQWULHV 
 Mentioning the very first sense in each dictionary entry will suffice to illustrate the 
SRLQW)RUµODE\ULQWK¶ WKLVLVDVIROORZVµ$VWUXFWXUHFRQVLVWLQJRIDQXPEHURI
intercommunicating passages arranged in bewildering complexity, through which it is difficult or 
impossible WRILQGRQH¶VZD\ZLWKRXWJXLGDQFHDPD]H¶6DOLHQWKHUHRWKHUWKDQWKHDOUHDG\
UHPDUNHGXVHRIµPD]H¶DVDGHILQLQJWHUPLVWKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQDSK\VLFDOµVWUXFWXUH¶DQG
WKHµEHZLOGHULQJ¶IHHOLQJRIQHHGLQJµJXLGDQFH¶ A labyrinth in this sense is experienced as 
confusing, but is still primarily a material structure, a constructed, physical thing. By contrast, the 
ILUVWRYHUDUFKLQJGHILQLWLRQRIµPD]H¶DVVHUWVWKDWLWUHIHUVWRµ$VWDWHRIPHQWDOFRQIXVLRQDQG
related senses¶ Any semblance of physicality is here succinctly dispensed with, and remains so 
in subsidiary senses in the OED¶VHQWU\XSXQWLOWKHVHFRQGRYHUDUFKLQJPHDQLQJLVJLYHQDVµ$
labyrinth, and related senses¶ whereupon the notion of a physical structure is first mentioned in a 
subentry. 
 What this slight distinction between definitions seems to suggest is nevertheless 
something that is common to both labyrinths and mazes: that they are both somehow physical 
and mental instantiations of perplexity at the same time, a meeting point of the literal and the 




 The OED OLVWVDVHSDUDWHVHFRQGQRXQµPD]H¶ZKLFKUHIHUVWRWKHODLURIDKDUHDQGKDVQRH[DPSOHRIXVDJHVLQFHDSSUR[LPDWHO\
the year 1740. Though interesting in its warren-like associations, I am taking it to be obscure enough a meaning to disregard in the 






figurative experience of confusion. If anything, the minor emphasis the OED implies is that 
µODE\ULQWK¶VWDUWVRIIDVDVWUXFWXUHDQGEHFRPHVDV\PEROLFILJXUHZKLOHµPD]H¶EHJLQVDVDVWDWH
of mind which is eventually cemented as a material construction. In essence, mazes and 
labyrinths are ambiguous in this important way: they are simultaneously and undecidably the 
tangible manifestation of a metaphor and the metaphorization of a built environment or space. In 
either case, what lingers in the ambiguity is the sensation of bafflement which requires 
µJXLGDQFH¶ To get to a better distinction requires the consideration that bafflement might not 
actually be undesirable. In the following quotation, maze and labyrinth expert Jeff Saward notes 
the cultural specificity of just such a consideration: 
 
Throughout much of the non-(QJOLVKVSHDNLQJZRUOGSUDFWLFDOO\HYHU\PD]H>«@ZRXOGEHFDOOHG
DµODE\ULQWK¶IRUWKHZRUGµPD]H¶LVDSHFXOLDUO\(QJOLVKZRUGRIPHGLHYDORULJLQWKDWUHIHUVWRD
VWDWHRIFRQIXVLRQIURPZKLFKWKHWHUPµDPD]HG¶LVGHULYHG7REHFRQIXVHGOHWDORQHDPD]HG
there must be some element of choice in the pathway that you are following, some opportunity to 
become bewildered. Many current writers, designers, and commentators within the field have this 
as a point of definition: to qualify as a maze, a design must have choices in the pathway. 
[Conversely]: to qualify as a labyrinth, a design should have but one path. 
(Saward 2002: 8) 
 
6DZDUG¶VREVHUYDWLRQVXJJHVWVWKDWLIPDzes can be designed to amaze (or simply confuse), then 
labyrinths can be designed to guide. So if many people think of a maze as a puzzle designed to 
challenge and amuse, if not to befuddle, then describing a labyrinth as a map could be equally as 
valid. 
 Unpicking this cartographic idea benefits from a distinction, as many have drawn, 
between a helpful, orderly labyrinth and a hindering, chaotic maze. This dichotomizes something 
that facilitates location and something that wilfully prevents it. However, in his pioneering study 
of mazes and labyrinths (first published in 1922), W H Matthews resists just such a distinction: 
 
What is the difference, it may be asked, between a maze and a labyrinth? The answer is, little or 
none. [Though it] would certainly seem VRPHZKDWLQDSSURSULDWHWRWDONRIµWKH&UHWDQ0D]H¶RU
µWKH+DPSWRQ&RXUW/DE\ULQWK¶>«@JHQHUDOO\VSHDNLQJZHPD\XVHWKHZRUGVLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\
UHJDUGLQJµPD]H¶DVPHUHO\WKHQRUWKHUQHTXLYDOHQWRIWKHFODVVLFDOµODE\ULQWK¶ 









view, and in fact noting that the interchangeability of labyrinths and mazes may be extremely old, 
David Willis McCullough writes that in more recent times such a distinction has still been handy: 
 
A labyrinth is a single circuitous path that leads uninterrupted to a centre, while a maze is a puzzle 
with many forks in the road that demand choices. [It is possible] to think in terms of the single-
path, nonjudgmental labyrinth versus the tricky, perhaps entrapping maze. A labyrinth appears on 
one of the oldest minted coins, and it might be useful to think of the labyrinth and the maze as the 
heads and tails of a coin, the rather solemn labyrinth (heads, of course) and the raffish, devil-may-
care maze. It would be a mistake not to consider them together. To maintain, as some have, that 
the maze is a frivolous distraction from a more serious subject is to miss the complexity ± and the 
ambiguity ± of a labyrinth. 
(McCullough 2004: 3±4) 
 
Similarly, social theorist Jacques Attali writes that the cultural dissolution of the solemn labyrinth 
into the mere entertainment of the maze ± ZKHUHWKHIRUPHUKDGEHHQµUHGXFHGWRDQLURQLFDOO\
SOD\IXOFKDOOHQJHDQGHQWLUHO\HUDVHGIURPWKHSDWKVRIZLVGRP¶$WWDOL±40) ± served a 
certain historical, ideological purpose which Attali claims is nevertheless being challenged in the 
modern day. 
 7KLVWDOOLHVZLWK6DZDUG¶VYLHZWKDWDUHFHQWVSLNHRILQWHUHVWLQPD]HVDQGODE\ULQWKV
starting in the 1970s and continuing into the present day, reflects an increased demand for leisure 
activities, ironically coupled with a need for the certainty of a surer path in troubled modern 
times (Cf. Saward 2002: 11±12). Either way, as McCullough suggests, to distinguish between 
mazes and labyrinths does not mean that they cannot be spoken about together in a meaningful 
manner. Indeed, the difference between them does not preclude this but rather suggests it, 
because as the discussion in this section so far has shown, there is even ambiguity about their 
ambiguity, and any claim to a settled definition for either term only reiterates their potential 
LQWHUFKDQJHDELOLW\DQGFRPSOH[LW\$V6DZDUGFRQFOXGHVGHVSLWHKLVRZQFOHDUGLVWLQFWLRQµWKH
dividing line between what constitutes a maze or a labyrinth can sometimes become blurred and 
GLIILFXOWWRGHILQH¶ 
 Turning, then, from fuzzy definitions to concrete examples of use, I would like to take 
0F&XOORXJK¶VDGYLFHDQGµWKLQNRIWKHODE\ULQWKDQGWKHPD]HDVWKHKHDGVDQGWDLOVRIDFRLQ¶
only with a slight inflection on his metaphor; that is to say, the terms themselves will be treated 
as largely substitutable, but in the context of heads and tales, brains and stories, minds and 
narratives. In order to do this, here are some preliminary examples of the words in action. 
%HJLQQLQJIURPWKHWRSDWWKHKHLJKWRIK\SHUEROH:LOOLDP3RXQGVWRQHZULWHVµ7KHZRUOGLVD
labyrinth of madly interlocking connections and relationships [and this description typifies] a 






comparison emphasizes how things within the world connect and relate, much like passages and 
nodes in a labyrinth. However, this focus on structure in the world ± WKRXJKµIXQGDPHQWDO¶ 
µXQLYHUVDO¶ µSUDFWLFDO¶DQGµSKLORVRSKLFDO¶± LVVWLOOVRPHKRZµPDGO\¶FRPSOH[DPDWWHURI
PHQWDOFRQIXVLRQ,QWKHFDVHRIWKHµZRUOG¶ for Poundstone, the labyrinth is no guide at all, but a 
PDUNHURISX]]OHPHQWDQGKRZHYHUXVHIXODµSUREOHP¶ Contrastingly, there is an effervescent 
positivity in the words of an anonymous writer in New Scientistµ7KHKXPDQEUDLQLVDIDQWDVWLF
maze of connections, a vast network of networks that circulates information and determines how 
we think and act. One of the many big puzzles left in neurology is working out which parts of the 
brain are connected ± and how the networks function¶µ&RQQHFWRPH¶$VLQ
Poundstone, the focus is again on µFRQQHFWLRQV¶DQGWKHLPSOLFDWLRQWKDWWKHVHDUHLPPHQVHLQ
quantity. However, the scene of these connections in the latter quotation is of a much more 
OLPLWHGVFDOHWKLVWLPHGRZQIURPWKHZKROHµZRUOG¶WRMXVWµWKHKXPDQEUDLQ¶ Puzzlement is 
also now mitigated by a sense of wonder ± WKHµIDQWDVWLFPD]H¶LVDQRSSRUWXQLW\UDWKHUWKDQ
merely a problem. 
 6WLOOWKHSX]]OHVµOHIWLQQHXURORJ\¶DUHµPDQ\¶DQGµELJ¶ and one ponders how 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJO\YDVWDILHOGPXVWEHWKDWKDVDVLWVREMHFWDµYDVWQHWZRUNRIQHWZRUNV¶OLNHWKH
brain and nervous system. Compare this to a yet larger field, the one in which neurology 
XOWLPDWHO\UHVWVDQGWKLQJVVWDUWWREHWUXO\SHUSOH[LQJRQFHPRUHµ6FLHQFHLVDODE\ULQWKEXLOWRI
questions, and a single researcher is able to creep down only a few passageways in his or her 
OLIHWLPHDQGRQO\DVKRUWGLVWDQFHLQHDFKRQH¶'DYLGVRQ+HUHµVFLHQFH¶LWVHOILVD
labyrinth, a labyrinth that must contain neurology, which in turn studies the brain, which is itself 
structured like a maze, which is mentally confusing and problematic and leads to questions ± 
which, as journalist Osha Gray Davidson evocatively writes in the above quotation, are the very 
EXLOGLQJEORFNVRIWKHODE\ULQWKWKDWLVVFLHQFH'DYLGVRQ¶VTXHVWLRn-labyrinth cannot just be 
entered and explored at walking pace ± IRUVRPHUHDVRQLWUHTXLUHVVORZµFUHHSLQJ¶ even the 
WUDYHUVDORIDµVKRUWGLVWDQFH¶WDNLQJXSDIDLUSURSRUWLRQRIWKHµOLIHWLPH¶RIDµVLQJOHUHVHDUFKHU¶ 
In opposition to the labyrinthine optimism of the brain as connectome in the New Scientist article, 
Davidson paints a picture of a dark, subterranean maze, where scientific knowledge lies murkily 
in potentially unreachable corners. As will be shown, perhaps this picture is too bleak for 
3RXQGVWRQHZKRFRXQWHUVKLVRZQDVVHUWLRQWKDWµWKHZRUOGLVDODE\ULQWK¶E\FODLPLQJWKDW
µVFLHQFHLVDPDS¶ VRWKDWLIWKHµLQWHUORFNLQJFRQQHFWLRQVDQGUHODWLRQVKLSV¶RIWKHZRUOGVHHP
intractably maddening, science can serve to escort one through its convoluted corridors. 
 Thus Poundstone, after an appropriately maddening, supposedly mind-cleansing detour 
through paradox and alternative logic (such as in the works of Jorge Luis Borges), offers an 






brain.39 Poundstone then relates both to mapping, and though oxymoronic ± one thing being 
located/contained in a second which is in turn located/contained in the first ± it is a logical 




and the whole story about how memories are stored and recalled is probably a lot more 
complicated than we can imagine today. That granted, engrams are not infinitely small [and each] 
PHQWDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ>«@RFFXSLHVDSDUWRI\RXUEUDLQ¶VVWRUDJHFDSDFLW\WKDWFDQQRWEHRFFXSLHG
simultaneously by anything else. 
(Poundstone 1991: 19±20; original emphasis) 
 
The reason that geo-FDUWRJUDSKLFPHWDSKRUVRIµVLWHV¶VHHPVVRQDWXUDOLQLQVWDQFHVOLNHWKLVLV
that the topic boils down to cerebral localization, a long-sought goal going back to the 
pseudoscience of phrenology (whose dubiousness does not detract from its historical, 
neurological importance).40 Definitive physical localization of mental functions is a double-edged 
sword, however: not only does Poundstone draw attention to the undoubted complexity of 
memoULHVDVRQHH[DPSOHRIPHQWDOSURFHVVHVWKDWµZDQGHUDQGLQWHUSHQHWUDWH¶DVKHVRYLYLGO\
SXWVLWEXWNQRZLQJZKHUHDµEUDLQVLWH¶LVPHDQVLWKDVDVL]HDFHUWDLQSURSRUWLRQDWOHDVWµQRW
LQILQLWHO\VPDOO¶RIWKHVSDFHWDNHQXSE\WKHZKROHEUDLQThis is problematic because it both 
UHGXFHVWKHZKROHZRUOGLQFOXGLQJRQH¶VKHDGLQWRVRPHWKLQJWKDWFDQILWLQDKHDGMXVWDVLW
also enlarges the traditional immateriality of mind or mental processes into something with a 
definitive mass, at least larJHUWKDQµLQILQLWHO\VPDOO¶  
 Poundstone qualifies this by highlighting that representations in the brain are therefore 
QRWµVFDOHPRGHOV¶ZLWKRXWDQ\IODZVEXWWKDWLQIDFWµWKHVHPRGHOVPXVWOHDYHRXWPXFKGHWDLO
>«@7KHUHLVQRZD\DKXPDQEUDLQFDQFRQWDLQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIHYHU\WKLQJLQWKHZRUOG¶
(Poundstone 1991: 20).41 Considering that one component of the world requiring representation  













WKDQWKHUHDUHDWRPVLQWKHXQLYHUVH¶/RGJH±8; also, Cf. Smith 2005). Debate on this has mostly focussed on the appropriate 
GHILQLWLRQRIWKHZRUGVµSRVVLEOH¶DQGµFRQQHFWLRQV¶RUZKHWKHURUQRWWKHVWDWHPHQWKDVDQ\YDOXHUHJDUGOHVVRILWVYHULILFation. In any 
FDVHµHYHU\WKLQJLQWKHZRUOG¶DV3RXQGVWRQHSXWVLWZRXOGFertainly be less than either atoms or potential neuronal connections if 
taken concretely to be something that takes up space in the universe ± but representations, amongst umpteen other abstract concepts 









kept or left out in these metaphorical models: µ7KDWRXUEUDLQVZRUNDVZHOODVWKH\GRLQGLFDWHV
that they are selective in what they retain. The primary tool for condensing the complexity of the 
ZRUOGLVJHQHUDOL]DWLRQ>«@6FLHQFHLVDFRQVFLRXVDQGFROOHFWLYH way of simplifying through 
JHQHUDOL]DWLRQ¶Poundstone 1991: 20). How the brain is represented in the brain is generalized 
with the tool that is science ± EXWWKLVWRROLVDOVRLQWKHEUDLQDQGWKLVPHDQV3RXQGVWRQH¶V
metaphor for the situation convolves LQDODE\ULQWKLQHZD\µ6FLHQFHLVDPQHPRQLFGHYLFH>«@
It is a map of the external world. Like any map, it omits detail. Small towns, trees, houses, and 
rocks are left out of road maps to make room for highways, coastlines, national boundaries, and 
othHUIHDWXUHVMXGJHGPRUHVLJQLILFDQWWRWKHPDS¶VXVHUV&RPSDUDEOHMXGJPHQWVIDFHWKH
VFLHQWLVW¶,ELG&XULRXVO\WKLVSDUDGR[LFDODUUDQJHPHQWZKHUHVFLHQFHLVRXWVLGHWKHEUDLQEXW
LQVLGHLWZKLOVWDOVRRXWVLGHWKHµH[WHUQDOZRUOG¶LWLVPHDQWWREHmapping, is part of a larger 
discussion of paradox in general. The map of science is used to map the brain ± which already 
contains a map of science. The brain thus seems an intractable riddle, and the only clear thing is 
that something remains to clear up. If it exists, the map is a convoluted labyrinth, with every path 
forwards somehow bending back upon itself and the goal only feeling further away with every 
step. To understand the map, one must understand the labyrinth. 
 Although mazes came to be seen as devices to puzzle and outwit, McCullough 
nevertheless explains that originally the opposite purpose is equally plausible. He claims that, 
WKRXJKVWLOOP\VWHULRXVVRPHRIWKHHDUOLHVWODE\ULQWKSHWURJO\SKVZHUHOLNHO\FDUWRJUDSKLFµ2YHU
the years the map theories have been the most popular, partially because the same images appear 
on out-croppings hundreds, even thousands of miles apart, as though Neolithic travellers had 
FRPPRQV\PEROVWRJXLGHWKHPIURPSODFHWRSODFHRUWRRULHQWWKHPXQGHUWKHVWDUV¶ 
(McCullough 2004: 11). Indeed, it seems that both sides of the labyrinth/maze coin are valid, one 
side to distract and one to guide. McCullough also speculates on the famous labyrinth of Crete 
depicted on the thirteenth-century Mappa Mundi at Hereford Cathedral. He says that the 
HYROXWLRQRIFKXUFKODE\ULQWKGHVLJQLQPHGLHYDOWLPHVZDVµWKHZRUNRIDJHRPHWULFLDQ¶DVµWKH
KDQGWKDWGUHZLWXVHGDFRPSDVVDQGUXOHU¶DQGWKHUHIRUHµFRXOGKDYHDOVREHHQDPDSPDNHU¶
(McCullough 2004: 19). This makes sense if one adheres to the mythological sources of the 
&UHWDQODE\ULQWKDVµDIWHUDOODFFRUGLQJWROHJHQGERWKWKHODE\ULQWKDQGWKHFRPSDVVZHUH
LQYHQWLRQVRI'DHGDOXV¶V¶0F&XOORXJK$QRWKHUSDUDGR[LFDOGLPHQVLRQRIWKH
labyrinth is thus revealed: Daedalus designed the first famous labyrinth at the behest of King 





man who created this labyrinth knew how to make it so challenging precisely because he also 
knew how to measure, guide and set free.42 
 Feeling both lost and found within the labyrinth, McCullough asks an appropriately 




landscape via spirals DQGFLUFXODUFDUYLQJVKHSRVLWVWKDWDµODE\ULQWKRIFRXUVHLVQRWPDGHRI
FRQFHQWULFFLUFOHVZLWKDFXSDWLWVKHDUWDQGLWLVQRWDJUDFHIXOVSLUDO>«@7KDWWKHODE\ULQWKLVD
FUHDWHGDQGQRWDQDWXUDOVKDSHLVLPSRUWDQW¶0F&XOORXJK7KLV emphasis that mazes 
or labyrinths are not observable in nature appears at odds with a later statement on how the 
JHQHUDOVKDSHZDVVSUHDGE\KXPDQVµ2QHWKLQJVHHPVFOHDU>«@LWVHHPVWRHPHUJHQDWXUDOO\¶
(McCullough 2004: 17). In both instances, McCullRXJKSRLQWVRXWKRZHYLGHQWµRIFRXUVH¶RU
µFOHDU¶WKHPDWWHULVFRQIOLFWLQJDVKLVYLHZVDUH3HUKDSVWKHWZRFDQEHUHVROYHGLILWLVVLPSO\
taken that whether the labyrinth occurs in nature or not, early human communities always 
somehow found it lurking within the swirling mass of theretofore unexplained and confusing 
sensory data (to provisionally impose an anachronistic scientism on them) that they encountered 
in the world. 
 Attali is far less equivocal in stating (and listing examples of) the occurrence of 
labyrinthine structures in nature, and despite his protestations, McCullough himself betrays a 
KLGGHQSUHGLOHFWLRQIRUWKLVLGHDLQKLVUHFRXUVHWRWKHµZHOO-RUGHUHGFKDRV¶RIWKHODE\ULQWK7KLV
LVEHFDXVHVRPHWKLQJERWKµZHOO-RUGHUHG¶DQGµFKDRWLF¶LVQRWDVVWUDQJHRUXQQDWXUDODVLWVHHPV
to him, and is certainly evocative of the science of chaos, which as scholars have pointed out, has 
metaphorically infiltrated discussions in many disparate fields (Cf. Maasen and Weingart 2000: 
91±133). Literature and science theorist N Katherine Hayles describes this prevalence 
evocatively:  
 
the orderly disorder of chaos is all around us, from cream swirling in coffee to the rise and fall of 
the Nile River, from global weather patterns to outbreaks of measles epidemics. In fact, so 
extensive are chaotic systems that they dwarf the ordered systems which science has traditionally 
regarded as norms for the universe. 
(Hayles 1989: 306±307) 
 













point is that against any received wisdom, chaos is pervasive, both in the natural world and in its 
representation (in literature, in art, in public discourse, and so forth). When both McCullough and 
Attali list the symbolic underpinnings of the labyrinth motif in nature, this ceases to be such a far-
flung thing and instead seems quite in keeping with chaos, or with the notion of pareidolia ± that 
is, the common psychological phenomenon of compiling bits of predominantly random visual (or 
aural) information into significant figures, much like seeing shapes in clouds. Seeing labyrinths is 
natural, so to speak. 
 So to see them in brains (or brains in labyrinths) is not that far-fetched either, and both 
McCullough and Attali attest to the consistency of this perception throughout history, part of a 
wider series of metaphors aligning concepts with biological features and structures. A good pair 
of examples (which also serves to demonstrate, once more, the entangled relationship of the 
WHUPVµODE\ULQWK¶DQGµPD]H¶FRPHVIURPDVIDUEDFNDVDQG+HONLDK&URRNH¶V
Microcosmographia, as quoted in the OED,QVHQVHDIRUWKHQRXQµODE\ULQWK¶ Crooke 
PHQWLRQVµ$PD]H\ODEHU\QWKRIVPDOOYHLQHVDQGDUWHULHV¶ while in sense II4b for the noun 
µPD]H¶ hHVSHDNVRIµ7KH/DE\ULQWK DQMazes and web of the small arteries¶ 7KLVµPD]H\¶
description of arteries also extends to the brain itself, and the labyrinthine artery which connects 
EORRGIORZIURPEUDLQWRLQQHUHDUZKHUHXSRQLWµSDVVHVLQWRWKHWHPSRUDO bone and supplies the 
RUJDQRIHTXLOLEULXP¶+LUVFK7KLVODWWHUµRUJDQRIHTXLOLEULXP¶LVLQDSDUWRIWKHHDU
also itself sometimes called the labyrinth, and though technically this places a biological 
labyrinth outside of the brain, it does of course bring an important influence to bear on the 
QHUYRXVV\VWHPVRPXFKVRWKDWLQHDUO\QHXURDQDWRPLVWµ>3LHUUH)ORXUHQV@VXJJHVWHGWKDW
WKHODE\ULQWKLQHDSSDUDWXVH[HUFLVHGDPRGHUDWLQJLQIOXHQFHRQWKHEUDLQ¶(Jeannerod 1985: 101). 




45). Typically unequivocal in delivery yet rich in potential meanings, he explicitly ties markers of 
individual selfhood, identifying features like fingerprints and brains, and their encompassing 
domains of anatomy and physiology. Though McCullough is more circumspect in approach, he 
still also links disparate biological structures in their labyrinthine nature:  
 
>$ODE\ULQWK¶V@VLQXRXVV\PPHWU\UHPLQGVVome of the coils from entrails of sacrifices studied and 
poked over by ancient mystics to predict the future. It reminds others of the convolutions of the 
brain. Indeed a medieval Indian manuscript about the brain is illustrated not with an anatomical 
drawing but with a sketch of a labyrinth. 






Where Attali chooses to be definitive but general, McCullough takes a more historically 
FRQWLQJHQWWDFNUHSRUWLQJRQRWKHUV¶UHSRUWV 





turns of the labyrinth reminded me of the brain, my brain. If I was walking in my brain, I was 
ZKROO\SDUWRILWDQGLWZDVSDUWRIPH7KXVP\3DUNLQVRQ¶VZDVSDUWRIPHQRWDQH[WHUQDOµ,W¶
WKDWKDGDVHSDUDWHOLIH¶,WZDVDWXUQLQJSRLQWLQKHUEHLQJDEOHWROLYHZLWKKHUGLVHase. 




patient avows the undecidable interchangeability of interiority and exteriority, of brain and 
ODE\ULQWKRIVHOIDQGZRUOG,WLVRQHWKLQJWRFODLPµ,DPP\EUDLQ¶ reducing all of human 
H[SHULHQFHWRDFRPSUHKHQVLEO\SK\VLFDOVWUXFWXUHEXWLWLVTXLWHDQRWKHUWKLQJWRFODLPµ,was 
walking in my brain¶ This helpful exteriorization of the brain through use of the labyrinth 
demonstrates the possibility that the two items, brain and labyrinth, might be complexly 
coterminous.43 
 This principle of exteriorization has informed much of the scientific investigation into 
brain, mind and behaviour. It has necessitated the widespread use of representation, either of the 
physical structures of the brain, or of the physical substantiation of the interior life of the mind, 
such as it has been construed or imagined. The former camp includes imaging techniques such as: 
positron emission tomography (PET); electroencephalography (EEG); functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI); or simply anatomical drawings, heuristic devices to study, interpret 
and predict what happens in an otherwise unavailable, skull-encased organ. In the latter camp are 
the techniques and devices used to simulate the mind in the world, so as to investigate externally 




 -RXUQDOLVW0DU\(FNYHQWULORTXL]LQJDIULHQG¶VH[SHULHQFHRIDVWURNHZULWHVRIKHUUHFRYHU\µ,W¶VDODE\ULQWKthis path back to 
P\VHOI¶(FN+HUHLWLVWKHHQWLUHVHOIDQGQRWMXVWWKHEUDLQWKDWLVH[WHULRUL]HGDQGLVFKDUDFWHUL]HGLQDIDr less positive 
fashion. However, return to the self is the result of recuperation from brain injury, and thus a labyrinthine path which leads back to the 
self is like an accretion of epistemologies (wandering to find knowledge) into an ontology (the object of knowledge, the brain). 
 Just such a labyrinthine exteriorization of self is difficult to conceptualize, let alone remedy, but can be usefully contrasted 
ZLWKZKDWELRHWKLFLVW-DPHV/LQGHPDQQ1HOVRQKDVGHVFULEHGDVWKHµPHGLFDOODE\ULQWK¶&I1HOVRQ7KLVYLHZRIWKH
complicated and impersonal bureaucracy faced by those seeking healWKFDUHWDOOLHVZLWKWKHQDUUDWLYL]HGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI(FN¶V
IULHQG¶VH[SHULHQFHZKRLVPDGHWRVXIIHUDOPRVWDVPXFKE\WKHPHGLFDOHVWDEOLVKPHQWDVE\KHUFRQGLWLRQLWVHOI1DYLJDWLQJ all these 
multi-dimensional takes on the labyrinth ± interior/exterior, institutional/personal, narrative/medical ± may well require an 







how organisms react internally. In either camp, however, there is a marked stage of mediation 
between the object of study (the mind/brain) and its representation; a repeated figural attempt to 
close this gap has been the labyrinth. The reason that the labyrinth is used so extensively in 
science, as will be shown below, is perhaps because its metaphorical qualities are both abstract 
and concrete; a maze has a known physical structure but has extensive and well established 
figurative connotations too, and in these respects it acts as a way of embodying mind in matter, or 
vaporizing brain into thought. Not only is this an attempt, successful or otherwise, to bridge that 
divide between mind and brain that mainstream science has long disavowed; it also complicates 
the relationship between parts and wholes, or layers of existence and the relative distances 
between them. 
 So what is it that actually connects labyrinths with the brain? Are they the same thing? 
If not, is the brain part of a labyrinth or is it the other way round? Is there any literal or physical 
link beyond the figurative ones mentioned above? There are a number of possible answers: one is 
the way that classical antiquity had of describing the ventricular system of the brain as a series of 
interconnected chambers. For a long time, this system was considered to be where the soul of the 
individual was housed, and in fact served as an early precursor to theories of functional 
localization, with each chamber corresponding to a mental faculty (Cf. Clarke and Dewhurst 
1972; Clarke and Jacyna 1987: Finger 2000). Neuroscientist Susan Greenfield summarizes the 
GHVLUHWRORFDWHWKHVRXOWKXVµ7KH*UHHNSK\VLFLDQ*DOHQ$'±199) pointed to a part of the 
brain that was the least solid, the most ethereal, and clearly discernible to the naked eye. Deep 
within the brain is a labyrinth of interconnecting cavities, formed during development in the 
ZRPEDQGFRQWDLQLQJDFRORXUOHVVIOXLG¶*UHHQILHOG*UHHQILHOGFRYHUVWKLVDVKLVWRULFDO
background for a description of cerebrospinal fluid, highlighting the early speculation on how 
personhood, somehow imbued into this fluid, flows through this part of the brain.44 Although 
Greenfield intends to demystify such a theory before passing on to others, she seems to retain 
VRPHRI*DOHQ¶VODE\ULQWKLQHWKLQNLQJ*UHHQILHOGODWHU writes about the development of 
embryonic brain cells, which form a cylindrical shape in the womb: 
 
It is due to the closed neural tube that cavities in the brain ± ventricles ± are formed. These 
ventricles constitute an interconnecting labyrinth that finally opens onto the spinal cord, and 
through which pores allow for the circulation of the colourless fluid that is going to bathe the 
HQWLUHEUDLQDQGVSLQDOFRUGIRUOLIH,WLVWKLVFHUHEURVSLQDOIOXLGWKDWWKHSKLORVRSKHU*DOHQ>«@ 
 




 The ventricular system of the brain is not to be confused with the vestibular system, which forms part of the earlier mentioned 







had thought many ceQWXULHVDJRZDVWKHµSV\FKLFSQHXPD¶WKHVHDWRIWKHVRXO 
(Greenfield 1998: 123) 
 
This account of the cerebrospinal fluid and its movement through the ventricles might have been 
updated into a more scientific idiom, but the use of the labyrinth as an explanatory image remains 
the same. Though the discussion has moved on from ancient notions of the soul, the ancient 
symbol of the labyrinth, which predates the thought of Galen (whom Greenfield first calls a 
µSK\VLFLDQ¶DQGWKHQDµSKLORVRSKHU¶VWLOOLQIRUPV*UHHQILHOG¶VPRGHUQSK\VLFDOGHVFULSWLRQRI
part of the brain.45  
 In the above, the labyrinth is inside the brain, formed along with the rest of the foetus in 
the womb. Compare this with the view of early nineteenth-century physiologist Friedrich 
Tiedemann, also from the standpoint of developmental neuroanatomy, but different in an 
LPSRUWDQWVXEWOHZD\µ,QP\RSLQLRQWKHRQO\WZRSDWKVWKDQFDQOHDGWRDNQRZOHGJHRIWKH
structure of the brain, but that are still infrequently used, are those of comparative anatomy and 
the anatomy of the foetus; for [the investigation of] this labyrinth they are like the thread of 
$ULDGQH¶7LHGHPDQQcited in Clarke and Jacyna 1987: 22). Here, the labyrinth is not a 
structure in the brain, but is WKHµWKHVWUXFWure of the brain¶ with the study of infant and animal 
DQDWRP\WKHWUXHZD\WRDUULYHDWWKHµNQRZOHGJH¶DWLWVFHQWUH,WDSSHDUVLWLVQRORQJHUD
question of constituent parts, because the brain is the labyrinth is the brain. The metaphor 
becomes complicated once again, however, if one notes that neuroanatomy, a type of study of the 
brain, is considered as part of that same brain ± LWLVRQHRIWKHµSDWKV¶RIWKHODE\ULQWKZKLOVWDOVR
WKHµWKUHDG¶VKRZLQJWKDWWKLVSDWKLVFRUUHFW7LHGHPDQQ¶VODE\ULQWKLne metaphor simultaneously 
contains and exceeds itself in an overly convoluted way. Perhaps it is better to simply take his 
advice and fully externalize the problem, by turning to the animal models provided by 
comparative anatomy, or just the realm of animal experiment in general, as will be considered 
below. 
 From Galen to Tiedemann to Greenfield, it appears that maze and labyrinth metaphors 
have endured well in cultural memory, including in neuroscientific thought. This longevity is 
intimated by science jRXUQDOLVW(PPD:HLVVPDQQµ)URPP\WKWRPRYLHVPD]HVDUHDFXOWXUDO
LFRQDQGDSRZHUIXOWRROIRUVWXG\LQJWKHEUDLQ¶:HLVPDQQ&RQWUDVWWKLVZLWKDGLIIHUHQW
VFHQDULRZKHUHLQVWHDGRIWKHODE\ULQWK¶VREGXUDF\DFURVVWKHDJHVUHFROOHFWLRQIDLOVLnstead of 




 $OVRLWLVRILQWHUHVWWKDWRQWKHKHDGHUEDQQHURI*UHHQILHOG¶VSHUVRQDOZebsite, there is a small icon next to her picture and above 
WKHZRUGVµ6XVDQ*UHHQILHOG6FLHQWLVW:ULWHU%URDGFDVWHU¶&I*UHHQILHOG7KHLFRQLVZKDWVHHPVWREHDVPDOO\HOOow 
cerebrally-shaped object composed of stylized and angled lines which lend it the distinct appearance of a puzzle-book labyrinth. 
Appropriately enough, wherever one navigates to on the site, clicking on this icon brings one directly to the front page, or µKRPH¶± 










different portions of cortex to see if he could ideQWLI\ZKHUHWKHPHPRU\>«@PLJKWEHVWRUHG7R
his surprise and consternation, removal of different parts of the cortex did not result in a precise 
matching between one specific area and the retention of a specific memory. Rather the more 
cortex was removed, irrespective of specificity of region, the worse the rats became at the memory 
task. Perhaps not surprisingly, the entire cortex plays an important role in the storage of memory.  
(Greenfield 1998: 169±170) 
 
This, as Greenfield notes, has parallels with the brains of humans, and lessons learned about 
SHRSOH¶VPHPRU\IURPQHXURVXUJHU\/DVKOH\¶VUDWVVWDQGLQIRUKXPDQEHLQJVDVLWLVKDUGHUWR
justify letting humans loose in a maze to study them WKRXJK:HLVPDQQ¶VDERYH-cited article 
does suggest this), much less with part of the brain purposely removed to see how memory is 
affected. But the point is the same ± understanding the priority of parts versus wholes.46 The 
ventricular labyrinth is part of the brain, but then rats are let loose in a maze, with different parts 
of their brains removed ± the desire is to see if a missing portion of an internal labyrinth will 
affect movement through an external labyrinth, which in turn is somehow represented or coded or 
mapped back onto the internal labyrinth (so long as the relevant portion is not the missing one, 
which as it turns out, could be any or every portion). 
 Hence the mapping of the brain onto mazes and labyrinths became equivalent to the 
mapping of mazes and labyrinths onto the brain ± such experimentatioQµVOLSSHGLQWRVRFLHW\DW
large and overflowed its boundsQRORQJHUFRQWDLQHGRUFRQWDLQDEOHLQDODERUDWRU\>«@7KH
PLFURFRVPEHFDPHWKHPDFURFRVP7KHODERUDWRU\EHFDPHWKHZRUOGDQGH[WHQGHGLQWRLW¶
(Lemov 2005: 247; 249). This extends beyond the ventricles in the way that the cerebral 
convolutions can be described as branches of a labyrinth (for example, as mentioned by 
McCullough above); but these convolutions spill over from their designated boundaries, forming 
part of a larger convolution that is their scientific description (just as the convolutions somehow 
µFRQWDLQ¶ERWKWKHFRQFHSWRIµODE\ULQWKV¶DQGµFRQYROXWLRQV¶LQPLQLDWXUH,QWHULRUDQGH[WHULRU
dimensions multiply, as one considers together: the labyrinth of the ventricular system deep in 
the brain; the labyrinth of the convolutions at its surface; outside, studying this, the labyrinth that 




 For an excellent, in-depth discussion of parts and wholes, content and form, literature and science, Cf. Rogers 2014. For a detailed 






is science; and as William Poundstone contended, that labyrinth that is the world itself. All of 
these can somehow, again, be found in the labyrinth that is the brain. 
 This is undoubtedly a lot to cram into a brain ± an entire world which includes that brain 
itself, in fact ± and it is no wonder that if the brain is a maze, it is so because it is bewilderingly 
easy to get lost in the glut of supposed FRQWHQWV3RXQGVWRQH¶VLGHDRIDPDSWRJXLGHRQHWKURXJK
this all is therefore a seductive one. Indeed, mapping the labyrinth of the brain has been the 






with his colleagues, as well as the equally influential work of -RKQ2¶.HHIHDQG/\QQ1DGHOLQ
the 1970s, which posited a material location for such a cognitive map in the brain, specifically in 
WKHKLSSRFDPSXV&I2¶.HHIHDQG1DGHO,WLVDOVRHYLGHQWLQWKHEURDGFXUUHQWVSHFWUXP
of flavours of mapping in psychology and neuroscience, from less to more materialist (but all 
equivalently positivistic), as shown by titles such as Mapping the Mind (Cf. Carter 1998) and 
Brain Mapping: From Neural Basis of Cognition to Surgical Applications (Cf. Duffau 2011). 
Despite its obvious explanatory power, a cognitive map can be disarmingly simply 
GHILQHGDVµ$PHQWDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDSRUWLRQRIWKHSK\VLFDOHQYLURQPHQWDQGWKHUHODWLYH
ORFDWLRQVRISRLQWVZLWKLQLW¶&ROPDQ)RUKLVRZQSDUW7ROPDQLVUHSHDWHGOy 
humorous and self-deprecating (perhaps as a rhetorical strategy) in his ground-breaking paper. 
)RULQVWDQFHKHZULWHVµ:KDW,DPJRLQJWRVD\PXVWEHFRQVLGHUHG>«@VLPSO\DVLQWKHQDWXUH
of a rat SV\FKRORJLVW¶VratLRFLQDWLRQVRIIHUHGIUHH¶7ROPDQ948: 207; original emphasis). What 
LVLQWHUHVWLQJJLYHQKLVWLWOHµ&RJQLWLYH0DSVLQ5DWVDQG0HQ¶LVWKHGLVWLQFWODFNRI
H[SHULPHQWDOIRFXVRQµPHQ¶RUKXPDQVZKLFKLQVWHDGIDOOVVTXDUHO\RQUDWV alone. Where this 
influential paper does talk about people is briefly at its start and its end. In the latter, the then 
barely nascent cognitive maps theory is not employed in the simple sense quoted from Colman 
above, but instead as an ethical, psychosocial rumination on the future of humanity, which 
concludeVWKXVµ:HPXVWLQVKRUWVXEMHFWRXUFKLOGUHQDQGRXUVHOYHVDVWKHNLQGO\
experimenter would his rats) to the optimal conditions of moderate motivation and of an absence 
of unnecessary frustrations, whenever we put them and ourselves before that great God-given 
PD]HZKLFKLVRXUKXPDQZRUOG¶7ROPDQ7KHµKXPDQZRUOG¶LVDOVRDµPD]H¶WR
Tolman, which renders intriguing the opening of his paper, with its description of competing 







provide a means for findinJRQH¶VZD\LQDQXQNQRZQGRPDLQ$QGDOVROLNHPDSVWKH\DUHD
VRFLDOSURGXFWWKHFXOPLQDWLRQRIFRQVLGHUDEOHHIIRUWE\DODUJHQXPEHURISHRSOH¶2¶.HHIHDQG
Nadel 1978: vii). Amongst these people they mention on the same page are geographers, 
explorers, surveyors, geometers, draughtsmen and parchment-makers, but they forget to point out 
that in general, there is often something of the colonial about map-making. 
 Herein lies the crux of the matter as regards brain science: it is itself the labyrinth it seeks 
to map; it contains the world it aims to describe, and in which it is itself contained. Brain science 
is the brain, insofar as it is also the brains of those who conduct brain science, an almost 
unbearably convoluted paradox better served by surrogacy to rats, which can then be generalized 
to humans, providing mastery over the facts whilst masking the labyrinthine abyss at the centre of 
the knowledge thus produced. But the problem in such attempts to colonize the terra incognita of 
the brain/mind is tKDWµWKHSURPLVHRIOLEHUDWLQJRQHVHOIE\FRQWUROOLQJRWKHUV± by building 
[maze] structures in tiny rooms ± proved elusive [and] experiments rebounded, like some karmic 
UXEEHUEDQG¶/HPRY$FFRUGLQJWRKLVWRULDQRIVFLHQFH5HEHFFD/HPRYWKHstill-
current) fashion for testing albino rats in laboratory mazes ± and the wealth of subsequent 
VFLHQWLILFDVZHOODVJHQHUDOO\SXEOLFDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWµKXPDQQDWXUH¶GLUHFWO\OLQNHGWRVXFK
tests ± can be traced almost exclusively to the originator of behaviourism, John B Watson.47 
Lemov affirms: 
 
Watson cemented a specific equation: the activities of animals under experimental conditions 
were equivalent to human activities under all conditions. Understanding animal behaviour was the 
key to understandiQJKXPDQEHKDYLRXULQDOOLWVIRUPVHYHQWKHµKLJKHVW¶>«@,WYDOLGDWHGWKHXVH
of animals as experimental stand-ins. 
(Lemov 2005: 27) 
 
This, of course, is the principle that then permits Tolman to so freely describe himself and his 
children (and those of others) as rats, as well as extrapolate from his experiments with rats in 
mazes to humans in the world. 
It is the very desire to map from animals to humans that provides for cognitive mapping. 
But as Lemov observes, it is not just the lab rat as test object that was standardized during 
:DWVRQ¶VWLPHWRWKHSRLQWRIVHHPLQJFOLFKpRUHYHQFUXFLDOWRDQ\SV\FKRORJLFDOH[SHULPHQW± 
it is also the maze itself that became standard. As Lemov writes: 




 For illuminating discusVLRQVRIEHKDYLRXULVP¶VLQWHUUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKOLWHUDU\FULWLFLVPDQGZLWKOLWHUDU\PRGHUQLVP&I*DQJ







Mazes won out because in a sense they were the most general, the most representative, and the 
PRVWSHUIHFWPRGHOVDYDLODEOHRIWKHRULJLQDOSUREOHPVLWXDWLRQOLIHLWVHOI>«@7KHPD]HKDGORQJ
VWRRGIRUWKHVWUXJJOHWRILQGRQH¶VZD\ZKHQWKHWUXWKZDVHOXVLYHDQGWKHZD\IUDXJKWZLWK




,QWKLVUHVSHFWWKHWLWOHRI/HPRY¶VERRNWorld as Laboratory, is telling, because her sketch of 
the human maze based on the rat maze also suggests the laboratory as the design for the world, 
UDWKHUWKDQLWVUHIOHFWLRQµ/LIHLWVHOI¶LVWKHµRULJLQDOSUREOHP¶EHLQJPRGHOOHGE\WKHPD]H6KH
GUDZVKHUFKDSWHURQEHKDYLRXULVPWRDFORVHE\ZULWLQJWKDWWKLVVWUDQGRISV\FKRORJ\KDGµVHW
about changing not only ODERUDWRU\SUDFWLFHVEXWWKHRUGLQDU\OLIHRXWVLGH>«@7KHPD]H-running 
WUDGLWLRQKDGDUULYHG¶/HPRY+RZHYHUDVSHRSOHWKHPVHOYHVWKHEHKDYLRXULVWVDQG
the multitudes of brain/mind researchers who have followed them are also subject to the 
cRQFOXVLRQVRIWKHLURZQORJLF/HPRYVWDWHVWKDWµWKHVFLHQWLVWVZHUHDOVRLQDVHQVHODEDQLPDOV
and human subjects. Although they believed in a firm separation between themselves and those 
ZKRUDQWKHLUODE\ULQWKLQHPD]HV>«@LQIDFWVXFKVHSDUDWLRQQever existed. The experimenter 
FDQQRWEHGLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPWKHH[SHULPHQW¶,QHIIHFW7ROPDQEHFDPHRQHRIKLV
rats after all, just as his logic dictated, and the terrain being mapped was exceeded by its 
representation, or indeed the representation became the terrain being mapped ± only with 
uncanny little versions of the cartographers included in the representation, which of course 
resembled a labyrinth leading inwards.48 It is a situation exemplified by, though by no means 
limited to, the bizarre literature of Jorge Luis Borges, and how such labyrinthine literature ties in 
with neuroscience will be the basis of the next section.  




 1RYHOLVW7KRPDV3\QFKRQHYRNHVVRPHWKLQJDOPRVWLGHQWLFDOWRWKLVVHQWLPHQWZKHQKHZULWHVµthis lab here is also a PD]HL¶Q¶WLW
QRZEHKDYLRXULVWVUXQWKHVHDLVOHVRIWDEOHVDQGFRQVROHVMXVWOLNHUDWVµQ¶PLFH5HLQIRUFHPHQWIRUWKHPLVQRWDSHOOet of food, but 






Jorge Luis Borges: That Patient Labyrinth of his own Face 
 
 
At the end of the previous section, I delineated a convolution, a paradoxical way of thinking 
about thinking which re-enacts in its procedures the problem it seeks to clear up. Roughly 
recapitulated, science maps the world onto the human brain, the human brain onto the animal 
brain, the animal brain onto the maze, and finally, the maze back onto the world ± or onto life 
itself. The aim of this process is successful, in a way, yielding a kind of knowledge on which 
future brain science is predicated and may proceed ± but in another way, it ever so narrowly 
misses its target and veers away unpredictably, leaving psychologists and neuroscientists 
stranded in tiny labyrinths on their maps of the brain. As Jorge Luis Borges hauntingly phrases it, 
ZKHQµDPDQVHWVRXWWRGUDZWKHZRUOG>«@KHGLVFRYHUVWKDWWKDWSDWLHnt labyrinth of lines traces 
WKHOLQHDPHQWVRIKLVRZQIDFH¶%RUJHVE<HWFRJQLWLYHPDSVDQGFHUHEUDO
localization, for instance, are current, authoritative concepts, legitimately part of the 
neuroscientific edifice despite having labyrinthine foundations, as discussed. Ironically, this is 
because mapping the convolutions of the labyrinth, a powerful figure borrowed from literature, 
actually serves to demarcate science from literature and buttress its authority over the nature of 
the brain/mind in the eyes of society, whether labyrinthine aspects are avowed or not. Sociologist 
Thomas F Gieryn observes that 
 
people all over learn about science from maps of it. The layered interpretations that surround 
scientists and scientific facts with a special believability often come in a rhetorical form best 
GHVFULEHGDVFDUWRJUDSKLFµ6FLHQFH¶EHFRPHVDVSDFHRQWKHPDSVRIFXOWXUHERXQGHGRIIIURP
other territories, labelled with landmarks showing travellers how and why it is different from 
common sense, politics, or mysticism. 
(Gieryn 1999: x) 
 
To this closing list one might easily add literature, and thus I suspect it is cold comfort for 
VFLHQWLVWVWU\LQJWRORFDWHWKHPVHOYHVRQVXFKPDSVWKDWWKHµOD\HUHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV¶RIUKHWRULF
surrounding them offer little insulation against the alienating, confusing chill of the labyrinthine. 
,IµSHRSOHDOORYHU¶OHDUQIURPµPDSVRIFXOWXUH¶ then this includes scientists themselves too, and 
there is therefore no harm in recognizing the contribution and authority RIRWKHUµWHUULWRULHV¶ 
especially considering that in science the labyrinth is something that has been steadily assimilated 
from literature and philosophy since at least the early days of neurology, perhaps before. 










the reliance of both the scientist and the poet on metaphors as an essential form of representation 
is a result of our privileging of images as a conceptual means. This practice dates back to the 
EHJLQQLQJVRIWKRXJKW2QHH[DPSOHLVWKHDQFLHQWV¶µPDSSLQJ¶RIWKHQLJKWVN\ZLWKIDPLOLDU
images as a way of rendering it an accessible surface which mirrored their own terrestrial 
environment. 
(Pilz 2005: 83) 
 
For Pilz, this tradition is exemplified in the modern day by author Italo Calvino, whose interests 
VSDQQHGODE\ULQWKVDQGVFLHQWLILFPHWDSKRUVLQJHQHUDO3LO]GHVFULEHVKRZµWKHGRPLQDQW
PHWDSKRUVRINQRZOHGJHLQUHFHQWGHFDGHVKDYHEHHQLQVSLUHGE\JDPHWKHRU\>«@DQG




LQYHVWLJDWLRQV+RZHYHUWKHLGHDRIµPDSSLQJWKHODE\ULQWK¶LVMXVWDVYDOLG± only with the 
labyrinth already acting as a map for doing so. The brain is a map used to map the brain is the 
typically convoluted nature of the logic in play. 
 This chimerical idea persists because of the modern-day inurement to its antithetical 
aspects. The labyrinth motif masks its own complexity or self-contradiction, and bizarrely, 
instead stands in as a paragon of confident stability and order. As science journalist Carl Zimmer 
writes, this is in stark contrast to the pioneers of what is now brain science, who lived in 
uncertainty about their place in the universe. They then projected this misgiving onto the 
anatomical structure they were investigating, so that unveiling the brain would in turn unveil a 
comforting new cosmological, ontological stance. Zimmer sets up this distinction between eras in 
HYRFDWLYHDOPRVWSRHWLFODQJXDJHµ7RGD\ZKen we look at a brain, we see an intricate network 
of billions of neurons in constant, crackling communication, a chemical labyrinth that senses the 
world outside and within, produces love and sorrow, keeps our hearts beating and lungs 
breathing, composes RXUWKRXJKWVDQGFRQVWUXFWVRXUFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶=LPPHU7KLV
µFKHPLFDOODE\ULQWK¶LVQRWDILJXUHRIGLVRULHQWDWLRQEXWRQHRIZHOO-known terrain, easily 
QDYLJDEOHDQGSURYLGLQJDGLUHFWOLQNEHWZHHQµWKHZRUOGRXWVLGHDQGZLWKLQ¶ ± WKHEUDLQ¶Vmany, 
YDULHGUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDUHVRPHWKLQJVLPSO\µVHHQ¶XSRQµORRNLQJ¶ By contrast, the heyday of 







by Zimmer as far less existentially confident: 
 
Willis and hiVIULHQGV>«@ZHUHVHHNLQJVLJQVRI*RG¶VZRUNLQDXQLYHUVHWKDWKDGEHFRPH
terrifying and alien. They were scarred by civil war and hoped that a new conception of the brain 
would bring order and tranquillity to the world. Their claims were often accepted not so much 
because they were true (which, fairly often, they were not), but because the world itself had 
developed an appetite for them. 








but to our conception of ourselves¶ While WillLV¶VFLUFOHRISURWR-VFLHQWLVWVµFUHDWHGDQHZZD\
RIWKLQNLQJDERXWWKLQNLQJ¶IRUDOOWKHSURJUHVVVLQFHRXU1HXURFHQWULF$JHVWLOOKDVWRFRQWHQG
ZLWKPDQ\IUHVKQHZREVWDFOHVµ7KHPDSVWKDWQHXURVFLHQWLVWVPDNHWRGD\DUHOLNHWKHHDUO\
charts of the 1HZ:RUOGZLWKJURWHVTXHFRDVWOLQHVDQGEODQNLQWHULRUV¶=LPPHU
&RQILGHQFHLQµEUDLQPDSSLQJ¶LVEDVHGRQDQDWEHVWSDWFK\SLFWXUH<HWPRUHDQGPRUHGHWDLOLV
perennially expected of these maps, to an impossibly infinitesimal degree, so that what is charted 
of the brain somehow comes to exceed what is charted of the world. As Borges puts it in the 
DSSURSULDWHO\WLWOHGµ2Q([DFWLWXGHLQ6FLHQFH¶ 
 
In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a 
Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. 
The following Generations, who were not so fond of the study of Cartography as their Forebears 
had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless. 
(Borges 2000b: 325; capitalization from original) 
 
1RWIRUQRWKLQJDUHWKHDGMHFWLYHVµ8QFRQVFLRQDEOH¶DQGµ8VHOHVV¶FDSLWDOL]HGDORQJZLWKWKH
more understandably capitalized nouns; the map that strives for direct equivalence with what it 




 Though Raymond Tallis rightly points out that in fact cerebral centrality is a much older phenomenon than Zimmer has it, Tallis 







maps gets so huge it comes to be part of that same landscape and thus needs to include itself, 
becoming unforgivably, uselessly bigger than the terrain mapped.  
 The conflation of cartographic and labyrinthine idioms, though designed to illuminate 
and simplify, can have unexpected, complicated, perhaps even dangerous and unwanted 
outcomes. This is because the measure of control they imply is in the hands of one who becomes 
lost in the labyrinth being mapped; the authority of a literary author, a scientific investigator or a 
labyrinthine architect is superseded by the labyrinth itself, producing fear and discomfort. 
Labyrinth mapping is supposed to provide clarity in shorthand, miniaturizing and making 
manageable the world; what mapping is not supposed to entail is the undoubted claustrophobia of 
FUDPPLQJRQHVHOIIXOO\LQWRVRPHRQHHOVH¶VKHDGDORQJZLWKthe rest of the world one inhabits, as 
the idea suggests. But following the world as it crams and convolves itself into the labyrinth of 
the head need not be seen solely as a negative option. For as literary scholar Wendy B Faris 
notes, the loss within the maze of its own designer offers an opportunity: 
 
Often the wanderer in the labyrinth is also its creator, the prisoner of the labyrinth is also the 
liberated spirit, the potential victim also the potential victor. The path is at once the means and the 
end, the voyage and the destination. And like a text, a labyrinth is a half-closed, half-open space, 
which both reveals and hides, invites entry and prevents easy penetration; like any puzzle, it 
incites and delays its own solution. 
(Faris 1988: 8±9) 
 
And like a labyrinth, neuroscience is as likely to attract attention, as it is to entrap, as it is to 
emancipate ± leaving a scientist, who is a mere mortal after all, to wander about both lost and 
liberated in his or her own creation, a mapped out version of his or her own aspirations which 
have exceeded the fleshy bounds of the brain. 
 Aspirations, brains and mere mortality are all traits that scientists share with every other 
human, so the labyrinth is traversed and grappled with by everyone, which explains its confusing 
allure for wide-ranging spheres of society. Faris posits that the labyrinth is so ubiquitous because 
it has passed into and beyond culture, now actually guiding ways of thinking; it has gone from 
myth, through literature and art (in all eras, as Faris and Weissmann note), and on into the modes 
RIWKRXJKWXQGHUO\LQJVFLHQFHDPLGP\ULDGRWKHUFXOWXUDOSUDFWLFHV)DULVZULWHVWKDWµWKH
presence of the labyrinth as a significant figure of thought extends beyond literature to other 
DUHDVRIFXOWXUHDV8PEHUWR(FRKDVVXJJHVWHGE\GHVFULELQJDOOWKRXJKWDVDODE\ULQWK¶)DULV
1988: 189). Faris also quotes mathematician Pierre Rosenstiehl, saying that the labyrinth also 
preserves a great variaELOLW\RIPHDQLQJLQGLFDWLQJWKDWµLWFDQQRWKDYHDQRIILFLDOIXQFWLRQDQG
WKDW³LWVUROHLV>UDWKHU@WRSURYLGHDUHFHSWLYHJHRPHWU\IRUWKHVSDWLDOYLVLRQRIWKHZRUNLQJVRI





labyrinthine thinking is helpful in all ambits because it permits a link between verbal and visual 
µZRUNLQJVRIWKHPLQG¶ giving actual shape to thought whilst also making it easily explicable in 
words. 
 The endurance and impressively varied discipline-hopping of maze and labyrinth 
ILJXUHVLVTXLWHVLPSO\EXLOWLQWRWKRXJKWDVDµUHFHSWLYHJHRPHWU\¶ Faris continues by outlining  
how this applies to science: 
 
The receptive geometry of the labyrinth is demonstrated in [an] article in Science magazine, which 
claims that our mouse in his maze is the most common form of scientific joke, and thus suggests 
that our current multicursal, decentred spatial vision of the labyrinth encompasses the process of 
scientific inquiry as well. This is because it really encodes the design of inquiry itself, of the 
routes of exploration and error, the experience of taking a wrong turn and correcting it before 
proceeding forward. 
(Faris 1988: 189±190) 
 
This also underpins, she contends, labyrinthine images of computing, diagrammatic associations 
RIIRUNLQJSDWKVUXQQLQJEHWZHHQVRPHQRGHVEXWQRWRWKHUVGHSHQGLQJZKLFKµWXUQLVWDNHQ¶DW
each RQHDQGWRXSGDWH)DULV¶VODWH-1980s context, one can now add in the Internet, not to 
mention computational models of the brain and the supposed binary of neuronal states.  
 +RZHYHULIDODE\ULQWKKDVQRµRIILFLDOIXQFWLRQ¶± just like surfing the web can be 
aimless or pointed ± then simply treating it as a puzzle requiring as rapid a solution as possible is 
only one option. As Faris highlights, 
 
WKHUHLVDQLPSRUWDQWGLVWLQFWLRQWREHPDGH>«@EHWZHHQWKHODE\ULQWKVRIVFLHQWLILFLQTXLU\DQG
the labyrinths of language [in her book], and that is the value accorded efficiency in the scientific 
varieties. [The] mathematical solution to a labyrinth consists of never taking the road already 
travelled except as a last resort, when there is no other way. But the repetitions, backtrackings, 
and alternate paths that intrigue the voyager in literary labyrinths distinguish his journey from the 
mathematical one, for they induce him to value the journey equally with arrival at its end. 
(Faris 1988: 190) 
 
,IWKLVZHUHQRWWKHFDVHZLWKµOLWHUDU\ODE\ULQWKV¶ one could simply turn to the last page straight 
from the first and thus have the supposed answer ± there would be no more efficient way of 
reading, however insubstantial, valueless or downright befuddling this would be. It is, after all, 
WKHµUHSHWLWLRQVEDFNWUDFNLQJVDQGDOWHUQDWHSDWKV¶WKDWJLYHDZRUNLWVFRORXUDQGPDNHLWD
labyrinth instead of a straight line drawn between events. Occasionally wandering away from a 
straightforward, sequential account may take longer, but can be a more interesting way of 





UDLOZD\WLPHWDEOH1HYHUWKHOHVV)DULV¶VWDNHRQVFLHQWLILFHIILFLHQF\intimates that science is not 
DOZD\VFRQGXFWHGWKHPDWKHPDWLFDOZD\DQGFDQHTXDOO\LQYROYHµUHSHWLWLRQVEDFNWUDFNLQJVDQG
DOWHUQDWHSDWKV¶WKDWFKDUDFWHUL]HWKH opaque quotidian aspects of human scientific labour. 
 This non-linearity and reversibility is well represented in the relationship of 
experimenter and experimentee. The life of the rodent destined for the maze in the lab ± a 
creature unlike the morally ambiguous Theseus, who in some mythical accounts of the Cretan 
labyrinth coldly abandons his saviour Ariadne after their escape ± is governed by a different but 
related ambiguity: that of the simultaneous exteriority and interiority of the labyrinth. The lab 
maze is exterior whilst the brain and guiding labyrinth of the inner ear are interior to the rodent. 
As mentioned previously, this ambiguity is exacerbated if the labyrinth is taken to exist as a 
guiding principle for the experimenter, again external to the rodent, but both exterior and interior 
to the experimenter (the lab maze and the conceptual puzzle in (or that is) the brain). Again, the 
experimenter is thus a human mouse in his or her own maze, surrogating the search for selfhood 
that is brain science to the rodent. Though likely unconscious, this is no accident but a wilful 
piece of self-fashioning, perhaps even celebratory in its positivism ± the comforting, liberating 
certainty of outsourcing this confusingly reflexive task to an extraneous, observable lab rodent 
and objectively ensuring the verifiable (or falsifiable) position of the brain-bound self amidst the 
chaos of existence. 
 This is the seduction of the labyrinth, counterbalanced by the dismayingly intermittent 
awareness that metaphorical walls are being raised around oneself as this self-fashioning occurs. 
It is, again, something prefigured in literary study, itself infected by the labyrinths it seeks to 
describe. For example, in his introduction to literary FULWLF1RUWKURS)U\H¶VFROOHFWHGnotes, editor 
Robert D Denham writes that 
 
the late notebooks are a kind of labyrinth that Frye is both building and trying to extricate himself 
from: he sometimes ascends to moments of pure illumination; he sometimes descends into the 
dark abyss; he often gets lost in the maze; he is beleaguered by false starts and dead ends; he is 
haunted by a multitude of ghosts that keep flashing across his inward eye, which is clearly not the 
bliss of solitude. 
(Frye 2000: xxi) 
 
Frye himself suggests the labyrinth of sHOIKRRGKHLVLQDQGORFDWHVLWLQKLVKHDGµ,¶GOLNHWR
think (or perhaps only my ego would) that my greater simplicity came from a deeper level than 
the labyrinth of the brain (Frye 2000: 62±)U\H¶VFKDUPLQJEXWR[\PRURQLFIRUPXODWLRQZKHUH






EUDLQ¶± an expression floating on the taught meniscus of a linguistic-scientific ocean hidden 
underneath. 
 To briefly recap, then, neuroscience convolves because its pursuit by sentient, culturally 
embedded human beings casts doubt on whether it is inside a labyrinth looking out, or outside 
looking in. Brain science, itself a labyrinth, has as its goal itself, which is why it constantly 
retains an air of mystery, or paradox; one that constantly demands but blocks investigation of 
itself.50 6LPLODUO\LWLVIDLUWRVD\WKDWRQHFDQQRWORRNGLUHFWO\DWRQH¶VRZQH\HVXVHRIDPLrror, 
RUDSKRWRRUVRPHRQHHOVH¶VUHSRUWLVDOZD\VGLVWDQFLQJDQGWKXVDOZD\VPDLQWDLQVDIODYRXURI
otherness. This is reminiscent of the high-VLGHGµKHGJHPD]HZKRVHDYDLODEOHSDWKVZHUHGLFWDWHG
E\WKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOG¶DVGHVFULEHGE\'RXJODV+RIVWadter (2007: 339), or a maze which 
PRGHOVWKHµRULJLQDOSUREOHP¶RIµOLIHLWVHOI¶ DV/HPRYSXWVLW$ELUG¶VH\HYLHZLVEHVWIRU
appreciating the overall structure but allows no direct experience of actually being in the maze, 
while the knowledge acquired through being inside can be simply confusing51 ± though 
potentially exhilarating at the same time. Full knowledge, from outside, is relatively pointless, 
but inside knowledge is always partial. Thus these two ways of knowing the labyrinth exist in 
oscillaWLRQPRYLQJEDFNDQGIRUWKEHWZHHQHDFKRWKHU+RIVWDGWHUGHVFULEHVLWOLNHVRµ$
combination of pressures, some internal and some external, collectively dictates our pathway in 
WKLVFUD]\KHGJHPD]HFDOOHG³OLIH´¶+RIVWDGWHU7KHODE\ULQWKcast as life itself, is 
DJDLQPDGGHQLQJ+RZHYHUJLYHQWKDWµWKURXJKRXW:HVWHUQKLVWRU\>WKHPD]H@KDGVHUYHGDVD
SRWHQWOLWHUDU\DQGUHOLJLRXVV\PERORIWKHGLIILFXOWLHVRIILQGLQJPHDQLQJ¶/HPRY
could looking at labyrinthine literature, for example, usefully harness the push and pull of 
+RIVWDGWHU¶VµLQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDOSUHVVXUHV¶" Faris writes about the labyrinth and its history of 
just such a productive tension in literature ± but she could just as well be writing about scientific 
preoccupation with the brain/mind:  
 
The labyrinthine space is the realm that is always beyond our reach and therefore the object of our 
desire, our curiosity, our investigation, and it is also, paradoxically, the trace of that very 
investigation. In a sense, thHQLWILJXUHVERWK>«@WKHIRUZDUGPRWLRQRIWKHPLQGDQGWKH
anteriority that is the opposite of that forward motion, but which is often its object; it represents 
both quest for knowledge and origin of life. 
(Faris 1988: 194±195) 




 3HWHU3HVLFFODLPVWKDWµQDWXUHKDVVHFUHWV7KLVLGHDLVVWUDQJHGHVSLWHLWVIDPLOLDULW\>DQG@UHTXLUHVYLHZLQJIDPLOLDUWKings as if 
they were strange and questionable. This reflects the emergent character of humaQWKRXJKW¶3HVLF 
 
51
 /HPRYFODLPVWKDWµVLQFHWKH>UDW@³VXEMHFW´UXQQLQJWKHPD]HZDVDVWDQG-in, a throwaway, the scientist, having stepped aside to 







7KHµPRWLRQ¶RISXVKDnd pull through the maze is here reconstituted in temporal terms. The 
FRPSOLFDWHGVHQVHRIWLPHLVVRPHWKLQJ)DULVVD\VPRGHUQZULWHUVERUURZIURPWKHODE\ULQWK¶V
occurrences in mythology and religion, refiguring it in narrative techniques which disturb 
straightforward notions of chronology or causality. They may be modern but their concerns are  
just wanderings down uncharted forks of an age-old maze. 
 However, Zimmer goes further, narrativizing the enigmatic, labyrinthine objectives of 
neuroscience, only with a broader, deeper historical remit: 
 
The brain is far more interesting than that. It is a mysterious network, made of hundreds of 
billions of cells joined by trillions of connections. Somehow it gives rise to our feelings, our 
memories, and our sense of ourselves. It is not three pounds of perfection; it is the quirky result of 
billions of years of evolution, and its history is folded into its convolutions. 
(Zimmer 2010: xi) 
 
=LPPHU¶VVXSHUILFLDOSRLQWLVWKDWWKHKXPDQEUDLQLVDSURGXFWRILWVRZQµTXLUN\KLVWRU\¶RI
evolution, imperfect among many other examples thereof. But underlying this is the history of 
KRZWKHEUDLQLVFDWHJRUL]HGDQGTXDQWLILHGDµP\VWHULRXVQHWZRUN¶HQXPHUDWHGLQFRORVVDO
efforts to understand its vast inner, temporal scale, ZKHUHµELOOLRQVRI\HDUV¶DQGµKXQGUHGVRI
ELOOLRQVRIFHOOV¶DQGµWULOOLRQVRIFRQQHFWLRQV¶DUHDOOµIROGHGLQWRLWVFRQYROXWLRQV¶ This leaves 
OLWWOHVSDFHIRUIXUWKHUQXPEHUVRULWHPVµWKUHHSRXQGVRISHUIHFWLRQ¶LVQHJDWHGZKLOHµIHHOLQJV
memories aQGVHQVHRIVHOI¶DUHOHIWµVRPHKRZ¶YDJXHDQGXQQXPEHUHGDPLQRUUHPDLQGHURIWKH
mystery still haunting the unknown, uncatalogued corridors of the labyrinth. If one takes Faris 
DQG=LPPHUWRJHWKHUDUHDVRQDEOHVXPPDU\LVWKDWWKHEUDLQWKHREMHFWRIµinvestigation¶ is also 
µWKHWUDFHRIWKDWYHU\LQYHVWLJDWLRQ¶± WKDWWKHµKLVWRU\¶RIWKHEUDLQLVDOVRWKHKLVWRU\RI
QHXURVFLHQFHZKHUHµERWKWKHTXHVWIRUNQRZOHGJHDQGRULJLQRIOLIH¶ the end and the beginning, 
DUHµIROGHGLQWRLWVFRQYROXWLRQV¶ 
 In this version of things, history and mystery are both folded neatly away into the brain, 
UHDG\WREHSXWDZD\LQRQH¶VSRFNHWDVLILWZHUHDSRUWDEOHPDSRIDODQGVFDSHQHYHUWKHOHVV
populated by a nigh-infinite number of entities such as those Zimmer lists above. Massively 
FRPSUHVVLQJWKHWLPHEHWZHHQOLIH¶VRULJLQZKLFKOLHVDWWKHVWDUWRIWKHODE\ULQWKDQGWKH
knowledge at its centre, which is the future goal, the study of the brain is narrativized as an 
arcane, privileged pursuit reserved for the worthy few. Masking the complexity of this 
arrangement is achieved by recasting a figure of motion, that of wandering through the labyrinth, 
as a concrete aim, the labyrinthine brain, underscoring the mysterious complexity of the goal 
rather than the process of getting there. The way of knowing is hidden behind the thing known, 
an epistemological journey through passageways blocked from view by the ontological walls 





prehistoric and natural in order to narrate the supposedly secretive mystery of the brain, and 
simplify the labyrinthine rationale of its investigation.52 It is a combination in science of both the 
detective and the quest trope at once, where there is clearly an adventure of universal importance 
afoot, but the way to its goal remains utterly shrouded in mystery. Historian Peter Pesic describes 
WKLVZHOOµ7KHQHZVFLHQFHWXUQHGDZD\IURPWKHWUDGLWLRQDOSXUVXLWRIWKHRFFXOWZKLFKUHSHDWHG
old arcana rather than seeking fresh understanding. Nature seemed a labyrinth requiring new 
KHURHVFDSDEOHRIILQGLQJWKHLUZD\WKURXJKWKRVHXQNQRZQLQWULFDWHSDVVDJHV¶3HVLF
In this maze-like admixture, the brain is the (unknowable) goal, the way to the goal, the place 
where the goal is, and, of course, the hero of the piece who is seeking the goal. When confusion 
OLNHWKLVUHLJQVµPDSVRIVFLHQFHJHWXQIROGHGDQGUHDGE\WKRVHRIXVQRWVRVXUHDERXWUHDOLW\RU
about which accounts of it we should trust and acWXSRQ¶*LHU\Q[,WLVP\IHHOLQJWKDW
maps of labyrinths from literature might serve just as well, if not better, or at least 
complementarily. 
 Above, Pesic is writing generally of the historical beginnings of modern science, 
however literarily he puts it. Yet more contemporary, explicitly literary examples are available, 
VXFKDVLQ'DQ/OR\G¶VRadiant Cool$WWKHQRYHO¶VDSH[LVLWVPRVWIRUPDOO\XQRUWKRGR[
VHFWLRQZKHUHLQ0LUDQGD6KDUSHHQFRXQWHUVµ7KH/DE\ULQWKRI&RJQLWLRQ¶7KLVLVDFRPSXWer 
SURJUDPVXSSRVHGWRVLPXODWHZKDWWKHQRYHOFDOOVµEUDLQVSDFH¶RUµPLQGVSDFH¶ described as: 
µ7KHEUDLQIURPWKHEUDLQ¶VRZQSRLQWRIYLHZ¶/OR\G6KDUSHH[SHULHQFHVWKH
SURJUDP¶VDWWHPSWHGPDSSLQJRIEUDLQPLQGVSDFHYLDDGLVFXVVLRQRIKHUown consciousness and 
thoughts. This is presented in the book as a deviation from the otherwise standard text-block 
format, into twelve pages of something between a graphic novel and a data-imaging software 
SDFNDJH7KHUHDGHU¶V6KDUSH-mediated experience RIµ7KH/DE\ULQWKRI&RJQLWLRQ¶LVWKXV
multimodal, textually intermingled into the visual, cognitive and phenomenological substance of 
the section. At one point, in a typical free-floating text box, where who or what is speaking is not 
entirely clear, it VD\Vµ,LPDJLQHGDQDUURZVZRRSLQJOLNHDEODFNELUGWKURXJKWKHODE\ULQWK,W
VD\V³<28$5(+(5(´LQDSRLQWWKDWJHWVLWVPHDQLQJIURPWKHPDS7KHODE\ULQWKZDVWKH
SDWWHUQRIDOOSDWWHUQV2XWWRWKHHGJHRIEHLQJ³<RXDUHKHUH´¶/OR\Goriginal 
emphasis). The map mentioned refers to the computer-programmed 3D map of the contents of 
consciousness, but is curiously counterpoised with the idea that the contents of consciousness 
themselves comprise a map ± a map that is also a labyrinth. In summary, consciousness is both an 




 The title of a book by neurologist Richard Restak, which accompanies a five-part documentary of the same name by filmmaker 
David Grubin, actually allocates the agency for investigation of such a mystery to the brain itself ± it is called The Secret Life of the 
Brain &I5HVWDN$WUXHLQVWDQFHRIFRQYROXWHGµEUDLQKRRG¶LQHIIHFWWKLVLPSOLHVWKHEUDLQKDVLWVRZQµOLIH¶SUHVXPDEO\ 
separate to that of the SDUWLFXODUSHUVRQDWWDFKHGWRLWEXWWKLVOLIHLVµVHFUHW¶DQGVRWKLVPHDQVWKDWWRVROYHWKLVP\VWHU\WKHEUDLQ






internal and an external map, but this map, rather than acting solely as a key to clarify positions, 
attributes, distances, etc., acts also as a puzzle (which is obviously a commonly interpreted 
purpose for a labyrinth). Furthermore, whatever the interior/exterior status of this labyrinth/map, 
LWLVµWKHSDWWHUQRIDOOSDWWHUQV¶ which makes it a (or the) meta-SDWWHUQDQGµPHDQLQJ¶LV
FRQWDLQHGLQRUGHULYHGIURPHDFKµSRLQW¶RIZKLFKLWFRQVLVWV 
 With his discussion of labyrinths and patterns of patterns, it is unsurprising that Lloyd 
makes extensive use of Borges in Radiant Cool,QGHHGWKHµSDWWHUQRIDOOSDWWHUQV¶LVKLJKO\
HYRFDWLYHRI%RUJHV¶VFDUWRJUDSKLFODE\ULQWKLQHUXPLQDWLRQVLQµ7KH*DUGHQRI)RUNLQJ3DWKV¶
(ILUVWSXEOLVKHGLQ6SDQLVKDVµ(OMDUGtQGHVHQGHURVTXHVHELIXUFDQ¶LQ7KRXJKEULHIWKH
story is an in-depth contemplation of the labyrinth motif, cunningly using the motif itself to do 
so, a meta-labyrinthine complement of form and content. This LVHQFDSVXODWHGE\WKHVWRU\¶V
narrator when he imagines the landmarks of a lost labyrinth melded into the background 
landscape of the world, a mind-mapped hybrid maze-ZRUOGZKLFKLVµLQILQLWHQRORQJHU
composed of octagonal kiosks and returning paths, bXWRIULYHUVDQGSURYLQFHVDQGNLQJGRPV«,
thought of a labyrinth of labyrinths, of one sinuous spreading labyrinth that would encompass the 
SDVWDQGWKHIXWXUH¶%RUJHVD,QGHHGµ7KH*DUGHQRI)RUNLQJ3DWKV¶FRXOGEH
GHVFULEHGDVWKLVVDPHµODbyrinth of labyrinths¶ an attempt to map a concept which by virtue of 
attempting to do so cannot help but be labyrinthine itself. It is a form which fuses readers and 
characters, reality and fiction, in a confusingly entwined geography of the mind. But before 
unpacking this further, it is worth asking why Borges was at all concerned with labyrinths in the 
first place.  
 Even answering this has its unanticipated maze-like twists and turns. Literary and art 
historian 5H[%XWOHUSDUDSKUDVHV%RUJHV¶VVHOI-avowed predilection for certain ideas when he 
ZULWHVµ2IWKH³QLQHRUWHQZRUGV´WKDWJRWDORQJZLWK%RUJHV¶s VRXOWKHZRUG³ODE\ULQWK´LV
undoubtedly the one with which he is most closely identified. It is an association that first begins, 
for English speakers at least, with the publication in 1964 of Labyrinths, which was a collection 
RIVWRULHVDQGHVVD\V¶FRPSLOHGIURPVHYHUDORWKHUSXEOLFDWLRQV%XWOHU7KHILUVWWZLVW
however, is that it was this translated collection (whose title was in turn based on Roger 
&DLOORLV¶VGHFLVLRQWRQDPHKLV)UHQFKWUDQVODWLRQHTXLYDOHQWO\UDWKHUWKDQDQ\FRQVFLRXV
FKRLFHRQ%RUJHV¶VSDUWZKLFKSXOOHGIRFXVIURPWKHPDQ\RWKHUFRQFHSWXDOVSRWOLJKWVLQ
%RUJHV¶VRHXYUH$V%XWOHUUHPDUNVµ,WLVFHUWDLQO\SRVsible to argue that the international 
UHFHSWLRQRI%RUJHVLQWHUPVRIWKHODE\ULQWKUHWURVSHFWLYHO\EHJDQWRDIIHFWKLVZRUN¶,ELG
This means that the labyrinth somehow reaches back and insinuates itself into the history of 






The Borges quotation above (originally from a 1958 translation by Donald A Yates) therefore 
merits examination, as well as comparison with a different, more recent translation. 
 In his explanatory notes accompanying this later version, translator Andrew Hurley 
quotes Borges (who was also a notable practitioner and theoretician of translation) on the 
importance of more than one interpretation: 
 
Borges makes it unmistakably cleDUWKDWHYHU\WUDQVODWLRQLVDµYHUVLRQ¶ ± not the translation of 
Homer (or any other author) but a translation, one in a never-ending series, at least an infinite 
possible series. The very idea of the (definitive) translation is misguided, Borges tells us; there are 
only drafts, approximations ± versions, as he insists RQFDOOLQJWKHP+HFKLGHVXVµ7KHFRQFHSW
RI³GHILQLWLYHWH[W´ is appealed to RQO\E\UHOLJLRQRUZHDULQHVV¶ 
(Borges 2000b: 519; original emphasis) 
 
6REDFNWR%RUJHV¶VZRUGVRQWKHPHWD-ODE\ULQWKWKLVWLPHDVUHQGHUHGE\+XUOH\µ,SLFWXUHGLW
as infinite ± a labyrinth not of octagonal pavilions and paths that turn back upon themselves, but 
of rivers and provincHVDQGNLQJGRPV«,LPDJLQHGDODE\ULQWKRIODE\ULQWKVDPD]HRIPD]HVD
twisting, turning, ever-ZLGHQLQJODE\ULQWKWKDWFRQWDLQHGERWKSDVWDQGIXWXUH¶%RUJHVE
122). Though both versions capture the essence of the original Spanish (Cf. Borges 1999: 58) and 
are perhaps largely interchangeable, there are nevertheless some subtle and revealing differences 






ODEHULQWRFUHFLHQWH¶LVPDWFKHGLQ<DWHV¶VµRQHVLQXRXVVSUHDGLQJODE\ULQWK¶ but not quite 
SUHVHUYHGLQ+XUOH\¶VLQIODWLRQLQWRµDWZLVWLQJWXUQLQJHYHU-widening labyrinth¶  
 ,ILWVHHPVKRZHYHUWKDW+XUOH\GRHVQRWGLVSOD\DVPXFKILGHOLW\WR%RUJHV¶VZRUGVDV
he says he does, then this is perhaps because of a more global feature of HuUOH\¶VWUHDWPHQW
which arguably does comply with a Borgesian world-view. Adding further convolutions to the 
ones already present in the 1941 original and in the best known (and predominantly faithful) 
English translation of 1958, Hurley betrays as strong a FRPPLWPHQWWR%RUJHV¶VSKLORVRSK\RI
the meta-labyrinth as its first professor. As opposed to mere description, Hurley has been infected 
by the labyrinthine strand of thinking that Borges proposed. This is why the choice of word, and 
furthermore, grammatical mood and tense to translate the third person imperfect subjunctive 
µDEDUFDUD¶LQWKH6SDQLVKLVWKHPRVWLQWHUHVWLQJDVSHFWRIWKHVHFWLRQLQKDQG:KHUH<DWHV





colODSVLQJRIWLPHLQWRWKHVSDFHRIWKHODE\ULQWKFKRRVHVWKHSDVWVLPSOHµFRQWDLQHG¶± this latter 
LPSO\LQJWKDWWKHSUHGLFWHGHQIROGLQJRIWKHIXWXUHLQWRWKHSDVWKDVE\+XUOH\¶VWLPHFRPHWR
SDVVDQG%RUJHV¶VODE\ULQWKLQHSURSKHF\KDVH[WHQGHGLWVUHDFh over all modes of thought. That 
UHDFKLQJWKLVVWDWHRIDIIDLUVWRRNDGHYLDWLRQIURPWKHVWULFWVHQVHRI%RUJHV¶VZRUGVLVQRWDV
startling as it seems,53 DQG+XUOH\GRHVZHOOWRFRYHUKLVWUDFNVE\XQGHUVFRULQJWKHµFKLGLQJ¶WRQH
RI%RUJHV¶VYLHZWKDWWKHµFRQFHSWRI³GHILQLWLYHWH[W´LVDSSHDOHGWRRQO\E\UHOLJLRQRU
weariness¶ The concept of the labyrinth is just as perplexing and perpetually partial in its 
definition, and if as Butler claims the tangled history of its translation and dissemination has 
FDXVHGWKHODE\ULQWKWRLQVHUWLWVHOIUHWURVSHFWLYHO\LQWR%RUJHV¶VZRUNWKHQ%XWOHUDOVRQRWHVWKDW
µLQKLVODWHU\HDUVHYHQ%RUJHVKLPVHOIFRXOGGHFODUHWKDWKHZDV³ZHDU\RIODE\ULQWKV´¶%XWOHU
2010: 16). If the definitive labyrinth is turned to only as a result of weariness, even by its chief 
literary and philosophical champion, what can be done to salvage it ± or at least come to terms 
with it? How is one to approach the ever-present yet unresolved matter of the labyrinthine? If so 
endlessly elusive, can the labyrinth ever be fully comprehended, and what implications does this 
have for the sciences of the mind/brain? It is with these questions in mind that a different angle 
will be sought in the next section.  




 2QHPLJKWDOVRQRWHKHUHWKHWHDVLQJUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµSDWLHQFH¶DQGµODE\ULQWKV¶DVVXJJHVWHGLQWKHVXEtitle of this section of 
this chapter. It is precisely to attempt to do justice to the Borgesian notion of the labyrinthine that I wandered away from sustained 






Douglas Hofstadter: An Eternal Golden Brain 
 
 
Via various purposeful turns which have resulted in as much back-tracking as forward 
progression, I have made the claim that brains are labyrinthine and labyrinths are brain-like, an 
accretion of the epistemological wanderings in Convolutions 1 and 2, Quest and Detective, into a 
concrete (if elusive) object of ontology. This is a claim that is itself subject to labyrinthine 
thinking, a complicated convolution which jumps around from level to level of discourse, at 
points seemingly talking about itself. The claim is made on the basis, as has been mentioned in 
previous chapters, that discussions of brains and brain science by their intrinsic nature require 
digressions onto topics of perceived disciplinary heterogeneity, prominent among which (but by 
no means sole) are literature and literary study. A prime example of this digressional centrality, 
or explicitly formalized non-OLQHDULW\LV'RXJODV+RIVWDGWHU¶VWKLFNWRPHGödel, Escher, 
Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, whose twentieth-anniversary editiRQLQFOXGHVDQDXWKRU¶V
SUHIDFHDOPRVWDVIDVFLQDWLQJDVWKHPDLQWH[W7KHSUHIDFHZKLFKPDLQO\GHWDLOVWKHERRN¶V
circuitous genesis, acknowledges the unexpected, sometimes lucky and sometimes not so lucky 
forks in the road taken by Hofstadter while wriWLQJDQGKHVWUHVVHVWKDWWKHRULJLQDOHGLWLRQ¶V
ambiguities or misdemeanours have for this very reason been preserved, without being updated 
for a later audience. However, even without recourse to this retrospective preface, it is 
abundantly clear that HRIVWDGWHU¶VYLHZRIWKHEUDLQLVUHOLDQWXSRQILHOGVRWKHUWKDQWKHFRJQLWLYH
VFLHQFHGRPDLQLQWRZKLFKKHIHOODIWHUVWDUWLQJRXWLQSK\VLFV,QGHHGHYHQ+RIVWDGWHU¶VVWDWHG
priority in Gödel, Escher, Bach, to get back to his roots and his childhood love of mathematics, 
does not make him commence by discussing Austrian born mathematical logician Kurt Gödel, as 
one might expect. He begins the book instead with some anecdotal ruminations on the life and 
works of composer J S Bach. 
 As his title suggests, this is not the limit of his digressions away from cognitive science 
DQGDUWLILFLDOLQWHOOLJHQFH+RIVWDGWHU¶VGD\MRE7KURXJKRXWWKHERRNKHLQWHUVSHUVHVWKH
argument with figures taken from Dutch graphic artist M C Escher. It is as if Hofstadter has taken 
to heart some words of philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, actually first published 
(in French) a year after Gödel, Escher, Bach LQLQWURGXFLQJWKH)UHQFKSDLU¶VFRQFHSWRIWKH
µUKL]RPH¶µ+HUHZHKDYHPDGHXVHRIHYHU\WKLQJWKDWFDPHZLthin range, what was closest as 
ZHOODVIDUWKHVWDZD\¶'HOHX]HDQG*XDWWDUL)URPJHQHWLFVWR=HQ%XGGKLVP± 
Hofstadter even wanders into these in his extended preamble to talking directly about brains. 
Indeed, Zen is deployed as a sort of mind-clearing corrective for the concerted effort of formal 
logic which dominates large swathes of the book. Zen, lacking any full explanation here nor 






Carollian loan characters Achilles and the Tortoise stray onto the subject after attending a heavy-
going talk on genetics. Trying to give some rational account of the seemingly irrational twists and 
WXUQVRI=HQ$FKLOOHVRIIHUVWKHIROORZLQJµ,WVHHPVWRPHWKDW\RXPD\EHJLQDSSURDFKLQJ=HQ
through any path you know ± even if it is completely antithetical to Zen. As you approach it, you 
gradually learn to stray from that path. The more you stray from the path, the closer you get to 
=HQ¶+RIVWDGWHU$LPLQJIRU=HQWDNHV\RXDZD\IURPLWZKLOHGHYLDWLQJIURPWKLV
original aim paradoxically somehow brings you back to being on course for Zen. 
 To recap, then, everything Douglas Hofstadter wants to say about mathematics (and 
eventually about the brain) first leads him away from discussion about maths and into many other 
realms, principally those of music and visual art. For sure, the examples he chooses are in 
keeping with a mathematical view of the world. The works of Escher and Bach are of interest as 
much for their encapsulation of mathematically, logically extrapolable patterns, as they are for 
more traditionally aesthetic reasons. But it is not merely out of admiration that Hofstadter 
includes them, nor even for their undoubted overlap with the (admittedly sprawling) main topic 
of his book. It is also because of their explanatory power ± even, one senses, their inevitable 
centrality to his mathematical argument. This is why digression into other fields is not where 
Hofstadter draws the line; the strongest, most elucidating feature of his thesis is not the esoteric 
breadth of content, but of form. He wilfully meanders away from scientific disquisition and 
punctuates every orthodox chapter with a dialogue.54 A suggestive allusion on the cover of 
Gödel, Escher, Bach is its secondary subtitle ± µ$PHWDSKRULFDOIXJXHRQPLQGVDQGPDFKLQHVLQ
WKHVSLULWRI/HZLV&DUUROO¶± and these dialogues are overtly, purposefully literary, a re-
appropriation of characters already appropriated by Carroll from the history of literature, 
P\WKRORJ\DQGSKLORVRSK\:KLOVWWKHWLWOHRI+RIVWDGWHU¶VERRNORXGO\SD\VKRPDJHWR
luminaries of mathematical logic, graphic art and baroque music, it is clear that its quieter literary 
intertextuality is the real engine driving the delineation of his ideas. Wandering away from 
cognitive science precisely in order to talk about it is itself the type of recursive meta-narrative, 
WKHµVWUDQJHORRS¶ that Hofstadter so painstakingly and admirably preaches in Gödel, Escher, 
Bach.  
 +RIVWDGWHU¶VLVDJHVWXUHFRQWUDU\WRWKDWRI%RUJHV in many of the pieces in Labyrinths. 
In this latter, and supposedly in the name of literature, alternative versions of mathematics and 
scientific logic are postulated DQGHYHQSUHVHQWHGDVIDFW0XFKKDVEHHQPDGHRI%RUJHV¶V




 The dialogue is itself an important generic form which historically unites literature, science, politics and philosophy (Cf. Cox 1992), 
and stretches back to the argumentation style attributed to the Socratic method. The form is used in many contemporary fields, such as 
in the sociology of scientific knowledge (Cf. Ashmore 1989; Mulkay 1985), or in environmental studies (Cf. Briggle 2014; in passing, 






imaginative connections to logic and philosophy (for instance, Cf. Sassón-Henry 2007; Bloch 
&XEDQSURSRQHQWRIµ6FLHQFHSRHWU\¶5DIDHO&DWDOiSXWVLWEDOGO\µ%RUJHVLVRQHRIDIHZ
writers who can make scientific principles emerge as literature. Many times scientists cite his 
VKRUWVWRULHVDVH[DPSOHVLQWKHLURZQZRUN¶&DWDOi,QWKLVUHQGHULQJVFLHQWLVWVRZH
some debt to Borges, in whose work they find allegorical value or powerful explanatory clarity of 
scientific concepts; and although many tend to emphasize his mathematical and physical 
scientific aspects, Catalá cites neurobiologist Steven Rose, whose The Conscious Brain (1973) 
linked the writings of Russian neuropsychologist A R Luria with those of Borges (as explored 
PRUHUHFHQWO\LQ4XLDQ4XLURJD¶VBorges and Memory). It is evident that Borges has had a 
marked impact on the envisioning and writing of science. So what is it that associates Borges and 
Hofstadter specifically? It is their shared interest in the labyrinthine ± QROHVVLQ%RUJHV¶V
aforementioned Labyrinths WKDQLQ+RIVWDGWHU¶VLQWHU-FKDSWHUGLDORJXHWLWOHGDIWHU%DFKµ/LWWOH
+DUPRQLF/DE\ULQWK¶+RIVWDGWHU3±126). Their mutual treatment of labyrinths is 
emblematic of the wider cultural identity uniting brain science and literature. The aim of this 
section is to trace this joint labyrinthine identity, of which Borges eventually grew weary, but in 
which self-dHVFULEHGµVWUDQJHORRS¶+RIVWDGWHUUHYHOV&I+RIVWDGWHU,QGRLQJVR
Hofstadter sees himself in miniature, included on the neuroscientific map of the labyrinth, and 
heartily waves hello, acknowledging this self-recognition as the true boon of the maze metaphor 
in brain science. 
 5DWKHUWKDQORRNDWRQH¶VRZQXQPHGLDWHGEUDLQGLUHFWO\± and for good reasons to do 
with the current physical impossibility of just such a scenario ± it is the habit of the neuroscientist 
to disavow this end goal, and surrender to a more generalized purpose, that of the externalized 
ODE\ULQWKRIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VEUDLQVDQGWKHRYHUDOOFRQFHSWRIµWKHEUDLQ¶ in general. However, 
though this surface goal is less self-consciously complicated than the underlying goal of stable 
self-identity, the study of brains is still a vast and rocky terrain. This is why a map is so desirable. 
Hofstadter describes the objectivity of mapping as a way of masking the urge to avoid solipsistic 
GLVFRPIRUWµ+RZIDUEDFNGRZHRUGLQDULO\WUDFHWKH³,´LQDVHQWHQFH"7KHDQVZHULWVHHPVWR
me, is that we look for a sentient being to attach the authorship to. But what is a sentient being? 
6RPHWKLQJRQWRZKLFKZHFDQPDSRXUVHOYHVFRPIRUWDEO\¶+RIVWDGWHU7KHFRQWUDVW
RIWKHFROOHFWLYHµZH¶ +RIVWDGWHUHPSOR\VWKURXJKRXWZLWKµLWVHHPVWRPH¶VDQGZLFKHGLQWKH
centre of this extract shows an overall understanding but also a central non-conformity. It seems 
to me, just as is the intention of this entire chapter, that Hofstadter does not want to eschew brain 
science because of its simultaneous use of labyrinths and effaced labyrinthine thinking, but 
merely for science (or any theoretical view of selfhood) to recognize and perhaps even celebrate 





 Of course, far from eschewing science, Hofstadter is a cognitive scientist, with plenty to 
say about minds and brains; but again, his discussion of brains in Gödel, Escher, Bach is 
concentrated in the centre of this long book, therefore beginning relatively late on ± despite 
RVWHQVLEO\EHLQJRQHRIWKHERRN¶VSULPDU\JRDOV$GGLWLRQDOO\PDSSLQJPDNHVDSURPLQHQW
DSSHDUDQFHLQWKLVVHFWLRQQRWOHDVWLQWKHVXEVHFWLRQµ0DSSLQJVEHWZHHQ%UDLQV¶ wherein 
Hofstadter asks:  
 
If thinking does take place in the brain, then how are two brains different from each other? How is 
my brain different from yours? Certainly you do not think exactly as I do, nor as anyone else does. 
But we all have the same anatomical divisions in our brains. How far does this identity of brains 




reducing the riddles of the brain, or his own brain, that he is confronting. Mapping here is 
concerned with differentiation, not just identification or representation, and so instead of using 
the labyrinth as a map, Hofstadter uses the map as a labyrinth. His startling answer about the 
SRWHQWLDOVDPHQHVVRIEUDLQVDOOWKHZD\GRZQµWRWKHQHXUDOOHYHO¶LVWKDW± based on the brains of 
worms, admittedly ± yes, essentially all brains are the same. Therefore, all neurons in all brains 
correspond to each other, or map onto each other neatly in a way that should be comforting ± but 
is clearly QRWDVWKHIDFWWKDWµ\RXGRQRWWKLQNH[DFWO\DV,GR¶VHHPVXQTXHVWLRQDEO\FHUWDLQ
This is one of the many playful false turns that Hofstadter takes in order to illustrate his ideas, 
and soon after the brain identity of all worms is established, he coQFHGHVWKDWµVXFKRQH-to-one 
PDSSDELOLW\EHWZHHQLQGLYLGXDOV¶EUDLQVGLVDSSHDUVYHU\VRRQDV\RXDVFHQGLQWKHWKLQNLQJ-
hierarchy and the number of neurons increases ± FRQILUPLQJRQH¶VVXVSLFLRQVWKDWWKHUHLVQRWMXVW
RQHKXPDQ¶+RIVWDGWHU'espite the sarcastic tone, the message is not that mapping 
is pointless, only that it is not without its complications, and Hofstadter continues to oscillate 
EHWZHHQSRVLWLRQVRQWKHEUDLQEHWZHHQHDFKµRQH¶DFURVVWKHGLYLGHRIµPDSSDELOLW\¶ In doing 
so, he demonstrates what he wants to say instead of baldly saying it, the demonstration serving to 
KHLJKWHQWKHSHUVXDVLYHQHVVRIRQHRIWKHERRN¶VFHQWUDODUJXPHQWV± the desirability yet 
perpetual elusiveness of isomorphism. 
 Isomorphism manifests itself in many ways in Gödel, Escher, Bach, including across 
many different levels of abstraction ± so additional to the above isomorphism of form and content 
LQWKHUHIOHFWLRQRQEUDLQµPDSSDELOLW\¶ Hofstadter also takes in the potential isomorphism 
between something and part of itself, claiming Escher to have done just the same in the woodcut 





make up larger black and white fish, implying that every individual is merely the fish-scale on 
some other. There are labyrinthine ramifications in this sameness across levels: 
 
these fishes and scales are the same only when seen on a sufficiently abstract plane. Now 
HYHU\RQHNQRZVWKDWDILVK¶VVFDOHVDUHQ¶WUHDOO\VPDOOFRSLHVRIWKHILVKDQGDILVK¶VFHOOVDUHQ¶W
VPDOOFRSLHVRIWKHILVKKRZHYHUDILVK¶V'1$VLWWLQJLQVLGHHDFKDQGHYHU\RQHRIWKHILVKFHOOV
is DYHU\FRQYROXWHGµFRS\¶RIWKHHQWLUHILVK± and so there is more than a grain of truth to the 
Escher picture. 
(Hofstadter 2000: 146±7; original emphasis) 
 
$WWKHKHDUWRI+RIVWDGWHU¶VWKLQNLQJWKHQLVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIHTXLYDOHQFH± what counts as the 
same and what does not, and what can adequately stand in for something else, adequately enough 
to carry at OHDVWDµJUDLQRIWUXWK¶IURPRQHOHYHORIDEVWUDFWLRQWRDQRWKHU5HSKUDVHGKHDVNVLI
µRQH-to-RQH¶PDSSLQJFDQHYHUPDNHLQWHOOLJLEOHHYHQYLVLEOHVRPHODE\ULQWKLQHXQZLHOG\DQG
complex structure. It is a philosophical issue which, as Hofstadter rightly points out, most 
conspicuously arises in the field of neuroscience in the pursuit of localization; that is to say, in 
the idea that mental functions and processes can be precisely located inside the brain.  
 The pursuit of localization is again a cartographic impulse, an urge to be able to assuage 
uncertainty by assigning specific human attributes to the different points on the map of the brain. 
However, cartography often deals with contested territories. The various parallel vicissitudes that 
the specLILFFRQFHSWRIµEUDLQPDSSLQJ¶KDVWDNHQDORQJVLGHWKHKLVWRU\RIFHUHEUDOORFDOL]DWLRQLV
extensively demonstrated by historian Katja Guenther in her suggestively titled Localization and 
its Discontents (2015). These intertwined histories of mapping and localization, which could be 
said to map onto each other, reveal the convoluted problematics of the enterprises themselves, 
and indeed, as Guenther mentions early on in her discussion of brain mapping, 
µNeuropsychiatrists did not simply map psychological functions onto brain anatomy. Rather, this 
mapping was coQGLWLRQHGE\WKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOSUDFWLFDODQGVRFLDOFRQWH[WRIKRVSLWDOPHGLFLQH¶
(Guenther 2015: 14). This implies the need to localize the very process of localization; there will 
always be a highHUOHYHOPDSQHHGHGWRJXLGHZKDWLVEHLQJPDSSHGZKLFKµFRQGLWLRQV¶KRZ
these activities are carried out. Cartography does not dispel complexity, but merely reduces and 
codifies it, perhaps even totally obscuring the picture of a historical and ongoing debate. 
 In principle, cerebral localization is a meritorious practice which, since the time of 
aphasia pioneers Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke in the mid-nineteenth century, has yielded 
productive working theories for scientist and clinician alike. In practice, however, the wish for a 
simple picture has not been vindicated by research and still today there are debates about the 
DSSOLFDELOLW\RUHYHQWKHEDVLFYDOLGLW\RIORFDOL]DWLRQ,QDUHFHQWDUWLFOHµ&HUHEUDO/RFDOL]DWLRQ





neurologist Elliott D Ross claims the picture has actually only become more complex. This has 
become especially so with the advent of imaging technologies, the mounting ways of 
representing the brain introducing potential pseudoscientific obscurity to the overall picture. He 
ZULWHVWKDWµWKHUHLVDQHHGWRUHDVVHVVZKDWORFDOL]DWLRQRIIXQFWLRQVLVDQGLVQRW2WKHUZLVH
there is no rational way to interpret the escalating claims of localization in the functional imaging 
OLWHUDWXUHWKDWLVWDNLQJRQWKHDSSHDUDQFHRIQHXURSK\VLRORJLF³SKUHQRORJ\´¶5RVV
Phrenology is here invoked as a cautionary tag, scare quotes and all, an indication of the 
confusion inherent to the topic of localization. 
 7KLVFRQIXVLRQLVHFKRHGE\+RIVWDGWHULQWKHWLWOHRIWKHVXEVHFWLRQµ/RFDOL]DWLRQRI
%UDLQ3URFHVVHV$Q(QLJPD¶+RIVWDGWHU+HUHKHLQWULJXLQJO\FRQWUDVWVWKHIDWHVRI
two men mentioned briefly in this chapter: Karl Lashley and Wilder Penfield. Hofstadter writes 
WKDW/DVKOH\µLQDORQJVHULHVRIH[SHULPHQWVEHJLQQLQJDURXQGDQGUXQQLQJIRUPDQ\\HDUV
WULHGWRGLVFRYHUZKHUHLQLWVEUDLQDUDWVWRUHVLWVNQRZOHGJHDERXWPD]HUXQQLQJ¶+RIVWDGWHU
2000: 343), but found his well-documented failure to do this utterly perplexing and dismaying, 
somewhat spoiling his long career in memory-research just at its zenith. On the other hand, 
Penfield built no mazes and instead studied humans, patients already undergoing epilepsy surgery 
and thus with conveniently exposed brains. During such surgical procedures, Penfield used 
electrodes to precisely isolate and stimulate one neuron or another, triggering discrete memories 
DQGRWKHUVHQVDWLRQVLQWKHSDWLHQWV7KHUHIRUHKLVUHVXOWVµGUDPDWLFDOO\ oppose the conclusions of 
/DVKOH\VLQFHWKH\VHHPWRLPSO\WKDWORFDODUHDVDUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUVSHFLILFPHPRULHVDIWHUDOO¶
+RIVWDGWHU1RWRQO\DUHHDFKLQYHVWLJDWRU¶VH[SHULPHQWDORXWFRPHVGHSLFWHGDV
confusing binaries, Hofstadter essentially posits a fallacious isomorphism between rats and 





be a labyrinth. Hofstadter knows this caution well from his job as an Artificial Intelligence 
researcher. In proposing an abstract isomorphism between how computers and brains deal with 
arithmetical problems, Hofstadter remarks that  
 
this seems quite plausible when the domain referred to is number theory, for there the total 
universe in which things happen is very small and clean. Its boundaries and residents and rules are 
well-defined, as in a hard-edged maze. Such a world is far less complicated than the open-ended 








investigated, but simply recognized as a much softer-edged labyrinth, where meaning spills over 
the walls with ease and regularity. This is why anchoring meaning in such a shifting sea seems so 
pressing; to provide a much clearer way of navigating it. It appears, then, that neither maps ± nor 
mice ± will be dispensed with any time soon. 
 For instance, fundamentally lucid and well-informed science writers such as Zimmer 
VWLOOOHDQKHDYLO\RQPDSVDVH[SODQDWRU\GHYLFHV+HZULWHVDERXW3HQILHOG¶VSUHYLRXVO\
mentioned open-brain experiments and what patients reported at the time regarding their own 
ERGLHVµ3HQfield drew a map of these responses. He ended up with a surreal portrait of the 
human body stretched out across the surface of the brain. In a 1950 book, he offered a map of this 
so-FDOOHGKRPXQFXOXV¶=LPPHU=LPPHUWKHQGLVFXVVHVQHZHUUHVHDUFKZKHre, contrary to 
+RIVWDGWHU¶VLVRPRUSKLVP3HQILHOG¶VSULQFLSOHVZHUHXVHGWRVWXG\WKHERG\SHUFHSWLRQVRIPLFH
± UHVXOWLQJLQDFRUUHVSRQGLQJµPRXVHXQFXOXV¶ The reliance on a cartographic metaphor barely 
conceals the twisting labyrinthine paths where clean, direct relationships are assumed: 
 
The sensory map and the neurons that feed it data turn out to be entangled in an intimate 
FRQYHUVDWLRQ6LJQDOVULVLQJIURPWKHVNLQVKDSHWKHPDSZKLOHWKHJHQHVLQWKHPDS¶VQHXURQV
influence it as well ± and their influence extends downward into the pathway. This dialogue may 
be crucial for fine-tuning the entire nervous system, so that we develop sensory maps and sensory 
neurons that match each other tightly. 
(Zimmer 2013) 
 
Zimmer employs a simplistic yet convolutHGVHWRIQDWXUDOL]HGLGLRPVZKHUHPDSVDUHµIHG¶E\
QHXURQVZKLOVWDOVRHQJDJHGLQDµGLDORJXH¶ZKLFKVRPHKRZUHVXOWVLQµILQH-WXQLQJ¶WRHOXFLGDWH
a complicated, intertwining set of ideas, and pattern-spotting unwittingly becomes the pattern 
itself. ThLVLVEHFDXVHLWLVQRWMXVWWKHVHPL[HGPHWDSKRUVWKDWDUHDWVWDNHWKHµVHQVRU\PDS¶ 
LGHDOO\VRµWLJKWO\PDWFKHG¶WRLWVFRUUHVSRQGLQJQHXURQVLVVXSSRVHGO\DOUHDG\LQRXUKHDGVDQG
those of other creatures, amongst them mice), yet also tightly matched to schematic drawings 
XVHGE\VFLHQWLVWVWRVWXG\WKHEUDLQ7KHVLWXDWLRQLVQRWKLQJLIQRWµHQWDQJOHG¶ as Zimmer 
unintentionally suggests. 
 This larger pattern of entanglement, and the possibility of yet higher levels of 
entanglement (or meta-patterns), deserves attention from a science itself entangled therein. It is 
this ZKLFKQRPDSRIDPRXVH¶VERG\-image can offer, and which underpins a pull towards 
codification, or reduction of human self-consciousness. The map and the code are useful and 
important, not to mention almost unavoidably alluring. It would be foolhardy to claim otherwise, 
and there is no reason not to continue with their employment ± but not without questioning their 





to attach meaning to existence. As Hofstadter says throughout Gödel, Escher, Bach, 
consciousness arises in the change from meaningless to meaningful symbols, or to put it in terms 
just used, in the deciphering of a previously impenetrable code. If the code is at the microscopic 
level (and Hofstadter indeed relates alphabetic letters to numerals, then to characters used in the 
notation of a formal system, to musical notes, to biological cells, to neurons) then meaning is 
recursively imbued backwards upon each particle of the code as it combines with every other 
particle ± a letter on its own has little relevance to anything, but gains steadily more as it 
combines with other letters to form morphemes, then words, then sentences, chapters, stories, life 
narratives, histories of the universe and so on. So language, a labyrinth of labyrinths and a 
product of the workings of the brain, is itself the most powerful metaphor for how meaning 
springs from those very workings, and thus understanding a brain depends on decoding its 
constituent parts. 
 Although this can proceed at the neuronal level, there is not much to say other than 
bare-IDFHGRUµPHDQLQJOHVV¶IDFWVDERXWWKHVWDWHRIHDFKQHXURQ± each one is active or not. But 
it is when taken collectively, at progressively higher levels of complexity and greater 
sophistication of arrangement, that some understanding, that some appreciation of meaning, 
occurs. According to Hofstadter, it is at these higher levels that what happens in the brain more 
and more recognizably matches what happens in the world. At the very highest levels ± what is 
called consciousness in its common interpretation as self-awareness ± WKHEUDLQ¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
and monitoring of itself is symbolically matched to its place in the world. Letters are not 
equivalent to objects in the world and neither are the states of neurons, but brought together in 
larger pattern-IRUPLQJFROOHFWLRQVWKH\HGJHHYHUFORVHUWRHTXLYDOHQFH7KLVLVZK\+RIVWDGWHU¶V
justification of drawing parallels between formal logic, computer language and operation of the 
brain/mind LVUHPLQLVFHQWRI2OLYHU6DFNV¶VDUWLFOHµ$0DQRI/HWWHUV¶ as mentioned in the 
previous chapter. Hofstadter writes that 
 
compared to a typical formal system, human language is unbelievably fluid and subtle in its 
patterns of tracking reality, and for that reason the symbols in formal systems can seem quite arid; 
indeed, without too much trouble, one can look at them as totally devoid of meaning. But then 
again, one can look at a newspaper written in an unfamiliar writing system, and the strange shapes 
seem like nothing more than wondrously intricate but totally meaningless patterns. 
(2000: xxi) 
 
But they are not meaningless when viewed as part of a larger pattern of patterns, one that is itself 
evolving as part of another, larger pattern of evolution, and so on. 
 In this respect, it is interesting that Zimmer, a meticulous, knowledgeable and sensitive 





wholeheartedly to science writing (Cf. Romero 2004). It is not that an English degree is needed 
IRUWKLVPDQ\ZRXOGDUJXHWKHRSSRVLWHQRGRXEWEXW=LPPHU¶VFDUHHUWUDMHFWRU\VKRZVWKDW
ZDQGHULQJDZD\IURPRQH¶VWRSLFFDQRIWHQJLYHRne a better overview of it. Indeed, the messy 
admixture of labyrinthine perspectives advocated here is a good metaphor for neuroscience or 
HYROXWLRQWKHWZRPDLQIRFXVHVRI=LPPHU¶VZRUN7KLVLVHYLGHQFHGE\WKH'DUZLQLDQWLWOHRI
one of his books on evolution, The Tangled Bank (2009), because what Hofstadter calls a 
µVWUDQJHORRS¶DQGZKDW,KDYHEHHQWU\LQJWRH[SRVHDVDFRQYROXWLRQLVDOVRV\QRQ\PRXVIRU
KLPZLWKDµWDQJOHGKLHUDUFK\¶ This latter term is important because it conveys something about 
level swapping whilst also implying an order of importance. What the tangled hierarchy suggests 
is that consciousness emerges from the inherent recursiveness of symbols at one level talking 
about another level of understanding above or below, which in turn responds in kind or refers to 
another level beyond or before, and so on. This interaction between levels is for Hofstadter what 
JLYHVDV\VWHPRIV\PEROVZKHQFRPSOH[HQRXJKVXFKDVLQWKHEUDLQ¶VQHXUDOQHWZRUNWKH
vastly entangled self-referentiality to engender a sense of self in a person. 
 %XWLWVHHPVLPSRUWDQWWRGZHOORQWKHRWKHULPSOLFDWLRQRIWKHZRUGµKLHUDUFK\¶KHUH,I
cognitive and neuroscience are given untold amounts of resources and an unchallenged remit on 
the objects of their study, whilst other fields are left to languish and stagnate (if not largely peter 
RXWZKDWUDPLILFDWLRQVGRHVWKLVKDYHIRUDQLQWHOOHFWXDORUHSLVWHPRORJLFDOµWDQJOHGKLHUDUFK\¶" 
Would this not mean that eventually this one level of understanding of the world would have 
nowhere to go above itself in order to seek a thorough meta-understanding? The gist of the 
µWDQJOHGKLHUDUFK\¶LGHDreadLO\DSSUHFLDEOHLQµVWUDQJHORRSV¶ µFRQYROXWLRQV¶RUµODE\ULQWKV¶ is 
that knowledge needs to go somewhere else before coming back and attaining its full relevance. 
As much as a fuller understanding of the brain occasionally requires a pinpoint, neuronal focus, 
just as vitally this very focus needs to be examined, treated and played with by sources outside of 
itself in ordeUWRSURSHUO\FRQVLGHULWVOLPLWV+RIVWDGWHU¶VµWDQJOHGKLHUDUFK\¶ a term coined in an 
exceedingly digressional work on the mind/brain, suggests that this nuanced, level-jumping 
interpretation of a hierarchy of interpretations needs to be remembered and respected if the true 
possibilities of knowledge are to be explored. 
 Note again that in its subtitle, Hofstadter describes Gödel, Escher, Bach DVµD
metaphorical fugue on minds and machines¶ *LYHQWKDWWKHERRN¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFGLVFXVVLRQRI
loops and recursion proceeds by first examining the music of J S Bach, particularly centring on 
KLVIXJXHVDQGFDQRQVLWLVVDIHWRVD\WKDWWKLVµPHWDSKRULFDOIXJXH¶VLJQLILHVDOLWHUDU\RUYHUEDO





WRWKHµIXJXH¶LQWKHLUGHILQLWLRQRIWKLVPXVLFDOIRUP55 However, as both the OED and Merriam-
Webster FRQILUPLQDGGLWLRQWRLWVPXVLFDOPHDQLQJWKHZRUGµIXJXH¶DOVRGHQRWHVVRPHWKLQJ
completely different ± a psychiatric, peUKDSVQHXURORJLFDOFRQGLWLRQLQZKLFKRQH¶VPHQWDOVWDWH
DQGEHKDYLRXUEHFRPHHQWLUHO\GLVVRFLDWLYHDQGPHPRU\RIWKLVµIXJXHVWDWH¶FDQQRWWKHUHDIWHUEH
recalled by the affected. Not only is this intriguingly congruent with my neurological theme, but 
a fXJXHLQHLWKHULQVWDQFHLVHW\PRORJLFDOO\WLHGFRPLQJIURPWKH/DWLQIRUµIOLJKW¶RUµWRIOHH¶ 
HYRFDWLYHRIWKHQHFHVVLW\WRZDQGHUDZD\RUHVFDSHIURPRQH¶VLQWHOOHFWXDOVWDUWLQJSRLQW
Turning to the canon, the musical definition is related to that of the fugue in its reiterative, 
imitative, looping aspect, but it again has meanings beyond that of music. 
$µFDQRQ¶FDQYDULRXVO\EHDPHPEHURIWKHFOHUJ\DUHOLJLRXVODZDJHQHUDOUXOHRUDV
in the idea of a Western literary canon, a supposedly definitive set of texts against which items of 
a cultural ambit are judged. Most interesting, however, is that although etymologically unrelated 
to the above, according to the OED WKHVSHOOLQJVRIWKHZRUGVµFDQRQ¶DQGµFDQQRQ¶ZHUHIRU
much of their history interchangeable when referring to a large gun or piece of ordnance. Besides 
WKHLUPXWXDOSRO\SKRQ\ERWKµFDQRQ¶DQGµIXJXH¶DUHEHJXLOLQJO\SRO\VHPRXVDQGLIZDQGHULQJ
DZD\IURPµIXJXH¶FDQ\LHOGIUXLWIXOHODERUDWLRQRQWKHPRYHPHQWRIFRQYROXWLRQVVRWRRPight 
WXUQLQJWRWKHEDOOLVWLFH[SORVLYHFRQQRWDWLRQVRIµFDQRQ¶ Thus, in the chapter that follows, I 
would like to change the topic of convolving puzzle from labyrinths to ballistics, contending as I 
do that the writing of neuroscience is riddled with conceptual bullets taken from the world of 
firearms and long-range weaponry. In doing so, the stakes also change, from the physical and 
external, mental and internal ambiguity of the brain labyrinth, to the compression of time and 
space offered by the literary, metaphorical basis of neuronal guns firing. 
  



















The forces of relativism are gathered about the last and 
most well-GHIHQGHGFDVWOHRIUHDOLVP>«@OD\LQJVLHJHWRLW
and in the process suffering a blistering bombardment ± 
Bang! Bang! Bang! 




somewhere in his brain now two foci sweep together and 
become one . . . zero ellipse . . . a single point . . . a live 
warhead, secretly loaded, special bunkers for everyone else 
\HVWKDW¶VZKDWKHZDQWVDOOWROHUDQFHVLQWKH
guidance cooperating toward a perfect shot. 








Every neuron is a gun ± it does not simply interact with its neighbour in a friendly manner, but 
instead fires at it. The idea of neurons µfiring¶ is so normal and idiomatic as to seem entirely 
natural and unquestionable. But by the extension of this logic, every brain module or neural 
assemblage is a tactical unit and every brain is an arsenal or perhaps a missile silo. At the 
neuronal level, whose finger is on the trigger? And at the brain level, whose finger hovers above 
the red button? In either case, the major issue is speed: be quick or be dead, an arms race of sorts. 
The action of neurons firiQJFRQVWLWXWLYHRIFHUHEUDOSURFHVVHVZKLFKLQWXUQFRQVWLWXWHRQH¶VVHOI
happens much more quickly than that self is capable of assimilating, or cognizing. A single 
neuron has no intelligible agency of its own, meaning it does not fire itself ± so it is more proper 
to say that neurons are fired, not that they fire. However, if this is the case, and yet it still happens 
too fast for one to be aware of in oneself, who is it that is doing the firing? One answer is the 
totality of other neurons that together contribute to the firing of each single neuron; but of course 
this simply defers the issue backwards indefinitely, with no originary moment of firing to speak 
of ± all of this in a fraction of a second, unnoticeable and fundamentally incomprehensible to the 
human consciousness which somehow arises from the whole neuronal volley of shots. As I will 
argue in this chapter, the thread running from small measures of time and space through to the 
evanescent agency propelling ballistically-charged cerebral functions means that brains and 
bullets convolve in a necessarily political way, relating the notions of military and biological 
defence. The metaphorical, temporal implications of thinking about neurons alongside guns and 
missiles has remained unexplored since they were silently yet wholeheartedly incorporated into 
scientific jargon by early neurophysiology. Conversely, metaphorical ballistic ramifications, as 
this chapter will demonstrate, have been much better examined by literary study than science, 
despite bDOOLVWLFV¶RYHUZKHOPLQJFHQWUDOLW\WRVFLHQWLILFWKRXJKWRQWKHEUDLQ7KLVLPEDODQFHG
convolution requires swift attention if weapons are not to fall into the wrong hands ± if they have 
not already.56 




 $VQHXURHWKLFLVW1HLO/HY\ZULWHVµ7KHVFLHQFHVRIWKHPLQGWKUHDWHQRXUFRnception of ourselves as able to engage in rational 
UHIOHFWLRQLQPDQ\ZD\V>«@7KHHYLGHQFHKHUHFRPHVODUJHO\IURPZRUNLQVRFLDOSV\FKRORJ\RQWKHautomaticity of actions. 
Automatic actions are effortless, ballistic (uninterruptible once initiated), and typically unconsciously initiated; that is, they are not 
made in response to conscious reasons of ours but are instead more like reflexes, triggered by features of the situation in which we 
ILQGRXUVHOYHV¶*LRUGDQRDQG*RUGLMQ[YLRULJLQDOHPSKDVLV7KHPLQGEUDLQLVDQµDXWRPDWLF¶ZHDSRQµWULJJHUHG¶E\






Ballistic Metaphor: Standard (Phineas) Gage Rounds 
 
 
Douglas Hofstadter writes that 
 
ZKHQHYHUDQHXURQ¶VWKUHVKROGLVVXUSDVVHGE\WKHVXPRIWKHLQFRPLQJVLJQDOV%$1*± it fires. 
It never happens that a neuron forgets its arithmetical knowledge ± carelessly adding its inputs and 
getting a wrong answer. Even when a neuron dies, it continues to function correctly, in the sense 
that its components continue to obey the laws of mathematics and physics. Yet as we all know, 
neurons are perfectly capable of supporting high-level behaviour that is wrong, on its own level, 
in the most amazing ways. 
(Hofstadter 2000: 575; original emphasis) 
 
,LQFOXGHWKLVPHORGUDPDWLFµEDQJ¶DQGLWVOLQNVWRKLJKHU-level moral (mis)behaviour to 
foreground the coming discussion ± WKDWULJKWO\IXQFWLRQLQJQHXURQVµILUH¶GHVSLWHWKHFRQVequent 
actions of wrongly functioning humans. There is nothing odd, or unethical, or destructive, it 
VHHPVLQDQWKURSRPRUSKL]HGQHXURQVµIRUJHWWLQJ¶ µDGGLQJ¶ µVXSSRUWLQJ¶RUµILULQJ¶ The actions 
of neuronal agents are supposedly reliable and above suspicion, regardless of how a person ends 
up behaving. So for the time being, one can instead ask of this last, most common neuronal 
procedure of firing: is neuro-time faster than a speeding bullet? Or is it more like the topmost 
section of a loop, disguised as a straight line but actually best described by the movement of a 
cannonball arcing through the air, racing away yet somehow appearing to be statically suspended 
at the same time? Even these thoughts themselves have sped away. To catch up, I suggest a brief 
detour through something more familiar, more visible to the naked eye. 
%RUJHV¶VVKRUWVWRU\µ'HDWKDQGWKH&RPSDVV¶LVDODE\ULQWKLQHZRUNRIGHWHFWLYHILFWLRQ
To start with, it explicitly and repeatedly plays with the idea of the labyrinth, culminating in 
detective Lönnrot, who is staring down the barrel of his imminent death at the time, speaking 
WKHVHZRUGVµ,NQRZRIRQH*UHHNODE\ULQWKZKLFKLVDVLQJOHVWUDLJKWOLQH$ORQJWKDWOLQHVR
many philosophers have lost themselves that a mere detective PLJKWZHOOGRVRWRR¶%RUJHV
2000a: 117). Like a labyrinth, the title of the story is a simultaneous gesture towards chaos and 
order, the measureless oblivion of death and the measured orientation of the compass. Similarly, 
the story itself is a commentary on the tension between these two poles, not just in the narrative, 








of his arch nemesis Red Scharlach at the VWRU\¶VHQG± there is at least the possibility of 
XQFHUWDLQW\LQWKDW/|QQURWLVVKRWµRIIFDPHUD¶ so to speak.  
This leads Miller to question his own presuppositions in this regard and thus to a curious 




image of the labyrinth of a single straight linHµ+HILUHG¶LVDILJXUHRIVSHHFKLQERWK(QJOLVKDQG
Spanish, but it is even more obviously so in Spanish. The locution is a metonymy turned into a 
catachresis. It displaces the actual expulsion of the bullet from the barrel to a prior act, the striking 
of a spark. In antique pistols, that spark starts a fire that ignites the fuse that ignites the gun 
powder that expels the bullet. What is temporally contiguous to the movement of the bullet, prior 
WRLWDQGLWVSUR[LPDWHFDXVHWKHQEHFRPHVWKHQRUPDOµOLWHUDO¶ZRUGIRUWKHSXOOLQJRIWKHWULJJHU
in a more modern weapon. By another series of mechanical displacements pulling the trigger 
VWULNHVWKHFDUWULGJHDQGµfires¶ WKHJXQ7RVD\µKL]RIXHJR¶LVVWULFWO\VSHDNLQJDFDWDFKUHVLV
since it is not realO\µPDNLQJILUH¶EXWVD\LQJWKDWGRHVQRWVXEVWLWXWHIRUVRPHRWKHUPRUHOLWHUDO
ZRUGRUWHUPµ+HPDGHILUH¶WKDWLVWKHSURSHUZD\WRVD\LW7KHHIIHFWRIWKLVILJXUHLVWRKLQW
that a potentially endless series of delaying relays intervenes between the intentional act of pulling 
the trigger and the actual speeding of the bullet to its goal.  
(Miller 1992: 252)  
 
This extended consideration of the temporality and physicality in the metaphorical figure of 
firing a gun is revelatory. As Miller shows, ballistics is inevitably thought of in this literary way, 
a product of its metaphoric roots in the physical processes of old-fashioned weaponry. But a 
FRQYROXWLRQLVLQSOD\KHUHXVLQJRQH¶VEUDLQWRWKLQNOLWHUDULO\DERXWEDOOLVWLFVLQYROYHVQHXURQV
which aOVRµILUH¶ meaning that in a manner of speaking, this ballistic metaphor is used to think 
about itself. Why is it so normal for people to speak about this aspect of the mind and brain in the 
same fiery, explosive terms? And which is quicker: the bullet or the brain? 
 However, simply comparing the speed of bullets with that of nerve impulses only jumps 
the gun, so to speak. This is because the way each is measured does not stem from the analogy, 
but vice versa; historically, methods of ballistic measurement were fundamentally constitutive of 
how nerve experiments were conceived in the first place, and thus of the now widely accepted 
ballistic metaphor. As historians Marco Piccolino and Marco Bresadola write, in 1850 the 
*HUPDQVFLHQWLVW+HUPDQQYRQµ+HOPKROWz succeeded in measuring the nervous signal speed by 




 There have been many discussions and expansions of this riddle, and Borges himself was an astute collector and commentator of 







successful nerve-reading of its kind, it is appreciable here that ballistic thinking was foundational 
to the very possibility of talking about nervous impulses.58 Laura Otis also shows that this 
ballistic thinking was not limited to Helmholtz alone, but was a product of the overall intellectual 
and technological milieu in which he found himself:  
 
In addition to university lecturers, the [Berlin Physical Society, founded by Emil du Bois-
Reymond in 1845] included instrument makers and technicians from the Prussian military who 
wanted to collaborate with physicists. As they shared technical tips, these young experimenters 
inspired each other and formed passionate scientific bonds. 
(Otis 2007: 111) 
 
Indeed, even before this µ+HOPKROW]DJUHHGZLWKKLVIDWKHUWKDWWKHEHVWZD\WRlearn science was 
RQDPLOLWDU\PHGLFDOVFKRODUVKLS¶2WLV)RUSK\VLRORJLFDOSLRQHHUVsuch as 
Helmholtz and du Bois-5H\PRQGWKHµEHVWZD\WROHDUQVFLHQFH¶± and thus to think about nerves 
and electrophysiology ± was utterly entangled with techniques and tools borrowed from the 
military.59 
 Naturally, this could simply be interpreted as the interrelated notions of medical and 




army means the ballistic metaphor might be subsidiary, a mere by-product of pragmatically 
VKDUHGYRFDEXODULHVDQGHQYLURQPHQWV+HOPKROW]¶VDGDSWDWLRQRIEDOOLVWLFPHDVXUHPHQW
procedures would be just a coincidental one-off. However, other examples of the direct influence 
upon neurophysiology of weapons, warfare and the military abound. For instance, 
 
Gustav Fritsch and Eduard Hitzig, two German physiologists, [obtained] evidence of localization 
of function in soldiers who had sustained brain wounds during the Franco-3UXVVLDQ:DU>«@




 ,WVHHPVFHUWDLQWKDWDUHODWHGEDOOLVWLFFRQYROXWLRQLVDWSOD\ZKHQLWFRPHVWRWKHWHUPµWRUSHGR¶WKRXJKRQHEH\RQGWKHUemit of 
the current chapter). This begins with proto-electrophysiological experiments by Luigi Galvani and others on the torpedo ray, a type 
of electric fish (Cf. Finger and Piccolino 2011; Piccolino and Bresadola 2013), and leads to the more common current usage of the 
word as an underwater missile. 
 
59
 The various important relationships between the military and electrophysiology (as well as other biological sciences) in mid-
nineteenth-FHQWXU\*HUPDQ\DUHHYLGHQWWKURXJKRXW2WLV¶VERRN0OOHU¶V/DE (2007). Her insistence upon the rhetorical literariness of 
WKHVHUHODWLRQVKLSVLVZHOOHQFDSVXODWHGE\KHUGHVFULSWLRQRIELRORJLVW5XGROI9LUFKRZµ9LUFKRZODXQFKHGKLVSROLWLFDOFDUHer as he 






Fritsch and Hitzig continued with laboratory studies on animals, using excitation and extirpation, 
after the idea of doing such experiments had come to Fritsch on the battlefield. 
(Wertheimer 2000: 25) 
 
Neither are such examples restricted to nineteenth-century Germany. Piccolino and Bresadola 
trace the ballistic influence upon physiological thinking from eighteenth-century Italy, via the 
Germans already mentioned, through to twentieth-century Britain and the Nobel-prize-winning 
work, first of Edgar Douglas Adrian, and later his student Alan Hodgkin (Cf. Piccolino and 
Bresadola 2013: 285±289). Specifically, they note that 
 
the analogy between the explosion of gunpowder and the muscle contraction had been already 
evoked by [proto-physiologist] Felice Fontana in his elaborations on the theory of irritability, and 
KDGSUREDEO\LQIOXHQFHG*DOYDQLLQKLVHOHFWULFUHVHDUFK>«@,WZDVDOVRLQYRNHGE\+HOPKROW]
when he published in full form the results of his measurement of nerve conduction speed. 
(Piccolino and Bresadola 2013: 287) 
 
%RWKµPXVFOHFRQWUDFWLRQ¶DQGµQHUYHFRQGXFWLRQVSHHG¶ZHUHLPDJLQHGLQWHUPVRIWKH
SURJUHVVLYHµILULQJRIDWUDLQRIJXQSRZGHU¶ as neuroscientist Keith Lucas wrote of an 
experiment by his student, the abovementioned Edgar Douglas Adrian (Cited in Piccolino and 
Bresadola 2013: 286). 
 Therefore, one sees a clear lineage here, which continues into the present day, from the 
µH[SORVLRQ¶RIJXQSRZGHUµILULQJ¶WRQHXURQVµILULQJ¶ A differing perspective on such 
FRQWHPSRUDU\ELRORJLFDOµH[SORVLRQV¶LVIRXQGLQ&DWKHULQH0DODERX¶VWDQWDOL]LQJ\HWFDXWLRQDU\
commentary on the prevalent neuroscientific discourse of brain plasticity. She emphasizes that 
plasticity is as much about giving form as receiving it ± a plastic brain is changeable just as it 
actively changes things ± but then makes an unexpected and perhaps darker connection: 
 
it must be remarked that plasticity is also the capacity to annihilate the very form it is able to 
receive or create. We should not forget that plastique >«@LVDQH[SORVLYHVXEVWDQFHPDGHRI
nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose, capable of causing violent explosions. We thus note that 
plasticity is situated between two extremes: on the one side the sensible image of taking form 
(sculpture or plastic objects), and on the other side that of the annihilation of all form (explosion). 
(Malabou 2008: 5) 
 
,QWKLVOLJKW0DODERX¶VHW\PRORJLFDOVLGH-step here buttresses the view that the history of 
investigation into brain function has at least a partial ballistic, explosive basis, as well as 
highlighting its potential violence. Plasticity underpins some of the foundational phrases and 





fire togeWKHUZLUHWRJHWKHU¶+HEE2000; cited in Armstrong 2013: 39, note 27). But long before 
plasticity achieved its widespread currency in the neuroscientific literature, the history of brain 
function has had an important, if haphazard, relationship with the history of brain structure. 
Debates have raged over the centuries about how function and structure are related, if at all, but 
these debates reached their apex in the mid-to-late-nineteenth century, centring on two 
experimental practices remarkably similar tR0DODERX¶VIRUPXODWLRQRIµWDNLQJIRUP¶DQGLWV
µDQQLKLODWLRQ¶ Basically, the function of the frontal lobes was investigated either by stimulation 
RUDEODWLRQRUDVPHQWLRQHGRI)ULWVFKDQG+LW]LJDERYHE\WKHHTXLYDOHQWWHUPVµH[FLWDWLRQDQG
extirpatiRQ¶UHVSHFWLYHO\,QRWKHUZRUGVH[SHULPHQWVLQWREUDLQIXQFWLRQRIWKHVHVWUXFWXUHV
either tried to make something happen in particular convolutions of the brain ± or simply 
removed and destroyed them. 
 Seemingly there is a parallel between plasticity-oriented descriptions of destruction and 
generation in the brain, and a history of destroying and generating activity in the brain in the 
name of experimentation ± a perhaps problematic relationship between what the brain does and 
what the brain has had done WRLW7KLVWRSLFLVJLYHQDJRRGDLULQJLQ0DOFROP0DFPLOODQ¶V
exhaustive account of the case of Phineas Gage, titled An Odd Kind of Fame: Stories of Phineas 
Gage 0DFPLOODQ¶VSXUSRVHLVWRSODFHDWFHQWUHVWDJHWKHYHU\RGGQHVVRI*DJH¶VQRZ
induELWDEOHIDPHDQGWKXVWKHWLWOHRIWKHERRN7KHUHDVRQIRUWKLVLVWKDW*DJH¶VFDVHLVRIWHQ
invoked yet rarely deeply explored; in this respect, resorting to Gage is essentially resorting to his 
fame, an aporia which clearly leads to exacerbating itself with each mention. Thus Macmillan 
surveys what is actually, concretely known of Gage (remarkably little, it turns out), how it has 
historically been deployed in the service of various scientific theories about the brain and its 
workings, and how Gage therefore came to represent a kind of neuroscientific and psychological 
standard, a go-to reference in arguments and new hypotheses on the mind and brain. This is 
because during an accident in 1848, hapless railroad worker Phineas Gage had an iron rod pass 
entirely through his skull and brain, yet lived on for a further 11 years. The episode especially 
WXUQVRQWKHVXSSRVHGO\GUDVWLFDOWHUDWLRQWR*DJH¶VSHUVRQDOLW\DIWHUWKHLQFLGHQW+HQFHLQDQ
equally accidental way, Gage had an important, albeit indirect effect upon how the brain and 
cerebral localization were regarded thereafter. Of interest in the present chapter is that the 
accident and injury he suffered was the result of a small but uncontrolled explosion of his own 
making, a ballistic mishap. 
 SummarL]LQJ*DJH¶VVWRU\DVDQµDFFLGHQWDOH[SORVLRQRIKLVRZQPDNLQJ¶DSSRVLWHO\WLHV
together ballistics, literature and the brain, suggestively encapsulating how their shared 
UHODWLRQVKLSFRQYROYHVLQVHYHUDOZD\V)LUVWO\0DODERX¶VGXDOUHDGLQJRISODVWLFLty is again 
invoked: Gage inadvertently facilitated a step forward in knowledge about the brain by 





GHVWUXFWLRQQRUWKHP\WKRORJL]LQJRI*DJH¶VOLIHWKHUHDIWHU, happened immediately ± they all 
KDYHGLIIHUHQWUHODWLYHVSHHGVWRWKDWDWZKLFKWKHURGZDVILUHGWKURXJK*DJH¶VKHDG'LIIHUHQW
temporal dimensions of the historical brain are here opened up to scrutiny. To rephrase, the speed 
of brain processes has a history, while this history itself has its own speed, both of which are 
related to the speed of ballistic entities and how these are variably rendered in writing. 
Creation and destruction are obviously not the same thing, but have a shared, paradoxical 
influence on how time figures in the idea of speed. Something in this spirit is captured by the 
work of cultural theorist 3DXO9LULOLR,Qµ/RJLVWLFVRI+DELWDEOH&LUFXODWLRQ¶%HQMDPLQ+
%UDWWRQ¶VLQWURGXFWRU\HVVD\WRWKHUHHGLWLRQRI9LULOLR¶VSpeed and Politics (1977), Bratton 
VXPVXS9LULOLR¶VVWDQFHRQWKHVRFLHWDOFHQWUDOLW\RIWKHFRQFHSWRIVSHHGDQGWKLVFOHDUO\
UHVRQDWHVZLWKWKHEUDLQEDOOLVWLFVQH[XV,DPWU\LQJWRGHILQHµ³+LVWRU\SURJUHVVHVDWWKHVSHHG
RILWVZHDSRQVV\VWHPV´WKDWLVDWWKe speed of the competitive capacities to envision, draw, map, 
FXUWDLOPRELOL]HFRQWRXUVWDELOL]HDQGSROLFHWKHSROLV¶9LULOLR2006: 11). This is to say that the 
PHWDSKRURIDQµDUPVUDFH¶LVPLUURUHGLQVRFLHWDOYDOXHVDQGSUDFWLFHVWKHKLVWRU\RIFRmpetition 
to improve weapons systems means that the speed of the weapons themselves is as important as 
how quickly the innovation was made or the technology developed. That this crucially shapes 
social relations and policing is hardly surprising, and means an emphasis on speed pervades all 
walks of cultural life ± as information and communication technologies also emphasize speed, 
there is a natural connection between an everyday conception of the increasing pace of modern 
life, and the weapons designed (and designed more rapidly each time) to end this life ever more 
quickly and efficiently. That neuroscience extensively uses, recycles and concretizes the now 
naturalized and widespread expression of ballistic speed is therefore no great departure. 
 Can a literary analysis of such metaphors provide important corrective insights? To begin 
ZLWK3DXO%$UPVWURQJWDNHVWKHRSSRVLWHWDFN+HLQVWHDGLQYHVWLJDWHVQHXURVFLHQFH¶VLQIOXHQFH
on discussions of long-held literary-theoretical intuitions, and the resulting research on the social 
and personal value of reading. Taking a phenomenological, embodied stance, Armstrong covers 
DQH[KDXVWLYHDPRXQWRIPDWHULDOH[SORULQJWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQµ7KH6RFLDO%UDLQDQGWKH
Paradox of the Alter Ego¶ in his recent book How Literature Plays with the Brain (2013). The 
µDOWHUHJR¶UHIHUUHGWRLVWKHRWKHUWH[WXDOVHOIWKDWRQHLQKDELWVZKHQUHDGLQJDSDUDGR[EHFDXVH
RQHREYLRXVO\VWLOOUHPDLQVRQHVHOIGXULQJWKLVSURFHVVVRPHWKLQJ$UPVWURQJFDOOVDµGRXEOLQJ¶
of the self. This is something akin to empathy, he suggests, and may have a biological, 
evolutionarily advantageous underpinning. According to Armstrong, 
 
the neurobiological explanations of our ability to understand others should make sense of the 
paradoxes of reading, and the paradoxes of reading are in turn a good test of the claims made by 





neurobiology of intersubjectivity, and what does WKHEUDLQ¶VFDSDFLW\WRµGRXEOH¶ self and other tell 
us about how we read? 
(Armstrong 2013: 136) 
 
&RQFHGLQJWKHSURYLVRWKDWRIWKHVHµFRPSHWLQJWKHRULHVRIWKHVRFLDOEUDLQ¶µWKHHPHUJLQJ
consensus is that none alone can account for the complicated, messy work whereby the self and 
others PHDQLQJIXOO\LQWHUDFW¶$UPVWURQJJRHVRQWRIRFXVRQPLUURUQHXURQV60 In 
these much-debated cells, he sees the greatest potential for discussing the similarities and 
GLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQµGRXEOLQJ¶DWWKHQHXURELRORJLFDOOHYHODQGDWWKHH[SHULential level (while 
reading literature, for example). 
Mirror neurons are interesting because imaging techniques have suggested they 
contribute to the linking of perception with action; their activation occurs not only when 
conducting an activity, but also when observing another person conducting that same activity. 
Armstrong notes (after neuroscientist Marco Iacobini) that this signals a possible neural basis for 
HPSDWK\DQGVRFLDOFRJQLWLRQ7KLVIRUHJURXQGV$UPVWURQJ¶VFODLPWKDWµGRXEOLQJ¶WUDYHUVHV
discLSOLQHVLIPLUURUQHXURQVLQGLFDWHOHDUQLQJE\LPLWDWLRQRUKHOSLQIHURWKHUV¶LQWHQWLRQVE\
internally simulating their actions, he says that the same kind of intersubjectivity is in play when 
UHDGLQJ,PPHUVLRQLQDQRWKHU¶VZRUOGRIPRWRUVNLOOVDQGLQtentions, Armstrong hypothesizes, is 
DOWHUQDWHGZLWKRQH¶VRZQWKRXJKWVDQGFRJQLWLYHSURFHVVHVUHJDUGLQJZK\DQGKRZWKDWZRUOG
exists as it does. This lends literary fiction its aesthetic, affective force, just as participation in the 
social realm allows people to learn from and communicate with each other. However, 
$UPVWURQJ¶VHYHQ-handed, completist manner involves weighing up the variously overinflated 
claims or underestimated ramifications of all the social brain theories. Thus, he squarely 
dismisses any overly self-congratulatory conclusions drawn from a neuroscientifically-supported 
interpretation of reading as the ultimate source of cultural and moral value. Alluding to brain 
plasticity and its role in the genesis of social life, Armstrong argues thDWWKHµVRFLDOO\LQGXFHG
neuronal recycling through which the brain learns to read is a primary example of [cultural 
DQWKURSRORJLVW0LFKDHO7RPDVHOOR¶VFRQFHSWFDOOHG@WKHUDWFKHWHIIHFW¶ This means that due to 
KXPDQµFROODERUDWLYHDFWLYLW\FXOWXUHFDQ³UDWFKHWXS´VSHFLHVZLGHFKDQJHPRUHUDSLGO\DQG
PRUHEURDGO\WKDQELRORJLFDOHYROXWLRQFRXOGDFFRPSOLVK¶$UPVWURQJ,QWKLVYLHZ
culture (including literary aesthetic effects) and nature (including the neurobiological correlates 
of these same aesthetic effects) have a reciprocal, mutually-affecting relationship. However, 




 $PLUURUQHXURQLVµDQHXURQWKDWLVDFWLYDWHGZKHQDSHUVRQperforms a certain action or has a certain experience and also when the 
SHUVRQREVHUYHVVRPHRQHHOVHSHUIRUPLQJWKHVDPHDFWLRQRUKDYLQJWKHVDPHH[SHULHQFH¶&ROPDQ)RUDQRYHUYLHZRI 






$UPVWURQJVWUHVVHVWKDWWKLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKHµWR-and-fro play of reciprocal social interaction 
staged in aesthetic experience [such as] reading is inherently benevolent and socially productive, 
DQ\PRUHWKDQRXUPLUURUQHXURQVPDNHXVHVVHQWLDOO\PRUDOEHLQJV¶ 
 Even if mirror neurons offer some insight into the social brain, such as what role 
imitation plays in learning, there is nothing to say that any particular instance of imitation is not 
motivated by something immoral, or conversely, innocently imitative of covertly immoral 
behaviour, or devoid of morality altogether. Armstrong points to the example of represented 
violence, such as in movies and video games, and its effect on the behaviour of children. He 
usefully surveys the debate still surrounding this issue, which goes back at least to the oft-cited 
study by Albert Bandura et al. entitled µ,PLWDWLRQRI)LOP-0HGLDWHG$JJUHVVLYH0RGHOV¶
$UPVWURQJ¶VDUJument is that neither mirror neurons nor aesthetic experience definitively prove 
anything about violence and its representations; if imitation is not intrinsically moral, then it is 
not intrinsically immoral either, with other factors tipping the scales on an individual, case by 
case basis. This is because the doubling he writes about is not a direct duplication of the self 
(which would problematically suggest a dissolution of all identities into each other), but again a 
SDUDGR[LFDOµPH¶DQGµQRW-PH¶DWWKH same time. 
'HVSLWHWKHIDQIDUHVXUURXQGLQJPLUURUQHXURQVWKHRYHUDOOµPH¶LVVWLOOLQHIIHFWDQG
EULQJVRYHUDOOLQIOXHQFHWREHDULQGHFLVLRQVUHJDUGLQJZKDW$UPVWURQJFDOOVDQµDVLI¶VFHQDULR
(which, it is worth remembering, only occurs in a certain pRUWLRQRIRQH¶VQHXURQVEHWKH\RIWKH
mirror variety or otherwise).61 Armstrong writes that  
 
2EVHUYDWLRQDOOHDUQLQJRIDJJUHVVLRQLVQRWDQDXWRPDWLFUHVSRQVHWKHQEXWLVDQµDVLI¶UHODWLRQ
that may vary according to how the behaviour is received, understood, and processed by the 
recipient. A doubling of me and not-PHFKDUDFWHUL]HVDQREVHUYHU¶VUHVSRQVHWRUHSUHVHQWHG
violence. Doubling is an inherent feature of all imitative behaviour, and doubled relationships 




equally left open to both literary study and neuroscience to continue assessing what the self is and 
how it relates to society. He makes no conclusive remarks, whether positive or negative, about 














the significance of mirror neurons, other than to dismiss the conclusiveness of previous remarks 
and call for a reinvigorated atmosphere of collaboration: 
 
What we need from both neuroscience and the lettered humanities is, not politically correct 
programs for social and moral improvement, but, rather, explanations from their different 
perspectives of the mixed picture of weal and woe that is repeatedly evident in human history. At 
least part of that story is to be found in the wonderfully and horribly disparate possibilities for 
how self and other can relate to each other that are inherent in the paradox of the alter ego and the 
capacity for doubling of the social brain. 
(Armstrong 2013:174) 
  
With this, Armstrong concludes the chapter. However, it seems to me that some aspect of 
his undoubtedly balanced analysis and useful commentary on doubling leaves open a problem 
which itself contains a sort of doubling ± a double-edged problem. First edge: if neuroscientific 
explanation of imitative behaviour unreflectively relies upon terminology couched in the 
language of violence, such as the ballistic-LQIOHFWHGµQHXURQVILULQJ¶ who is to say that violence 
does not creep into the equation here? This leads to the VHFRQGHGJHZKLOH$UPVWURQJ¶V
VXJJHVWLRQWKDWµGRXEOHGUHODWLRQVKLSV¶PD\ZHOOµOHDYHRSHQYDULDEOHSRVVLELOLWLHVRIUHVSRQVH¶ 
ZKHUHXSRQDQLQWHUVXEMHFWLYHVRFLDOFRPSRQHQWFDQVZD\DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHKDYLRXURQHZD\RU
another, what if this social and cultural component is explained using that same, essentially 
unquestioned ballistic language? This is why, although collaboration is indeed a commendable 
goal and not one that is being disputed here, an analysis of the explosive linguistic suppositions at 
the heart of a dominant cultural paradigm such as neuroscience continues to be necessary. These 
suppositions may well be metaphorical, but this is very much what is at stake, because is not a 
metaphor precisely a ubiquitous linguistic instantiation of that doubling that is being considered? 
Neurons are not guns, so they do not fire ± yet they do at the same time. 
 Ballistic metaphors are not new and certainly not limited to discussions of the brain and 
nervous system. Historian of science Geoffrey N Cantor has noted their extensive use in 
eighteenth-century scientific hypotheses on the nature and movement of light (Cf. Cantor 1987). 
Meanwhile, philosophers of science Bernadette Bensaude Vincent and Sacha Loeve write that the 
early-twentieth-century concept of WKHµPDJLFEXOOHW¶ proposed by Nobel laureate Paul Ehrlich to 









current context of crisis of pharmaceutical innovation where military metaphors foster a general 
mobilization of resources from multiple fields of cutting-edge research. 




popular journals and scientific publications have shaped the conceptual structure of the research 
field¶. AV,KDYHVWLSXODWHGDERYHRIQHXURVFLHQFHKRZHYHUWKH\DOVRVWUHVVWKDWµ7REHVXUHWKLV
is not specific to nanomedicine. Warfare metaphors have pervaded medicine and healthcare for a 
YHU\ORQJWLPH¶%HQVDXGH9LQFHQWDQG/RHYH; as Susan Sontag notes, military 
metaphors have dominated descriptions of treatment as well as disease (Cf. Sontag 2002: 65±68). 
While Bensaude Vincent and Loeve survey nanomedical uses and abuses of such metaphors, they 
openly admit that their main emphasis is the insufficiency and impracticality of ballistics as a 
metaphorical framework for research in nanomedicine, regardless of moral objections. 
Cultural semiotician Irene Machado extends this analysis of ballistic metaphors, beyond 
ZHDSRQU\RUSURMHFWLOHVLQIOLJKWWRWKHQRWLRQRIWKHµLPSDFW¶WKHVHPDNH+HUFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI
µLPSDFW¶GRHVQRWVROHO\WDNHLQVFLHQFHEXWDOVRWKHEURDGHUGLVFXUVLYHUHJLPHVXQGHUSLQning 
academia, and in particular the inflated character of technological explanations. Thus, the 
µLPSDFW¶RQH¶VZRUNKDVRQWKHZRUOGWKHGLVVHPLQDWLRQLWPLJKWDFKLHYHYLDWRGD\¶VGLJLWDO
WHFKQRORJLHVLIDOOQHXURQVDUHDOVRSHUFHLYHGWREHµILULQJ¶FRUrectly ± this can be seen as doubly 
technologically ballistic. Machado, basing her position on the semiotic and anthropological work 
RI&OLIIRUG*HHUW]0LNKDLO%DNKWLQDQG-XUL/RWPDQZULWHVWKDWLWLVµQHFHVVDU\WRHYDOXDWHWKH




instance, also impossibly implying the destruction wrought by his or her writing), while on the 
RWKHUKDQGµH[SORVLRQ¶H[SUHVVHVWKHRSSRVLWHSDUDGR[± the slowly progressing, deeply 
productive, evolutionary starting point of the Big Bang invested in each and every smaller 
cultural sphere of human life. It is a position not without its complications, not least of which is a 
somewhat simplistic trade-off of SDUDGR[HVEXWLWVHHPVIDLUWRVD\WKDW0DFKDGR¶VDQDO\VLVLVDW
least correct in bringing to the fore the paradoxical nature of the items under investigation. This is 
LQFRQWUDVWWRWKHREIXVFDWLQJRUDVVKHSXWVLWµQHXWUDOL]LQJ¶WHQGHQF\RIµLPSDFW¶ something 
which quietly and without challenge divests itself of its ballistic roots, just like the firing of 
neurons. 
/RWPDQ¶VHVSRXVDORIµH[SORVLRQ¶DVDFUHDWLYHUDWKHUWKDQDGHVWUXFWLYHIRUFHLVFHUWDLQO\





µSODVWLFLW\¶ For his part, Lotman writes in Culture and Explosion (first published in Russian in 
WKDWDERYHDOOµ7KHPRPHQWRIH[SORVLRQLVWKHPRPHQWRIXQSUHGLFWDELOLW\¶/RWPDQ
2009: 123). He then unpredictably comments on the similarities of the deaths by pistol duel of 
5XVVLDQSRHW$OH[DQGHU3XVKNLQDQG3XVKNLQ¶VRZQOLWHUDU\FUHDWLRQWKHQDwYHURPDQWLF
Vladimir Lensky, killed by the eponymous protagonist of verse-novel Eugene Onegin. Lotman 
considers the various factors in this extraordinary instance of life imitating art before 
pronouncing: 
 
These reflections are necessary if we are to consider, following Pushkin, what potential 
SRVVLELOLWLHVUHPDLQHGXQUHDOL]HGDWWKDWPRPHQWZKHQ2QHJLQ¶VEXOOHt was still located in the 
FDQQRQRIKLVSLVWRO>«@,QWKHQRYHOWKHGHDWKRI/HQVN\ZDVSUHGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHSRHW¶V
intention; in real life, at the moment when the shot takes place, there is no predetermined future ± 
there is only a cluster of equally prREDEOHµfutures¶ >«@7KXVWKHPRPHQWRIH[SORVLRQFUHDWHVDQ
unpredictable situation. 
(Lotman 2009: 124±5) 
 
7KHH[SORVLRQFRXOGHTXDOO\NLOODUHDOSRHWRUFUHDWHDQLPSRUWDQWSRHPZKRVHOLWHUDU\µLPSDFW¶ 
in deference to Machado, will not be overstated here); the shot in either case could remain in the 
barrel, nobody ultimately choosing to shoot, and both creation and destruction are avoided as 
possibilities. As it stands, the actual occurrences, both fictional and real duels, recast their 
previously wavering, ephemeral possibility as something that had always been written in stone. 
Thus the semiotic reading of Lotman gives ballistic metaphors a different timbre, opening up a 
curious rift in time and possibility. 
However, such a rift, just like the ballistic roots of neurons firing, is smoothed over by 
neuroscience, along with the consequent yet tacit implication of the subject with the object of its 
scope. This is to say that if aspects of the human brain are couched in ballistic or militaristic 
terms, humans are inevitably thought of, a priori, as ballistic selves.62 Since it is still human 
beings (and thus ballistic selves) that hypothesize, propose and conduct brain science, the values 
and cultural presumptions that come attached with ballistic metaphors must in some way 
propagate themselves in this research, a cycle that once again places conflict at the core of the 
KXPDQDQLPDO¶VH[LVWHQFH$OWKRXJK&DQWRUOLPLWVKLVVWXG\RIEDOOLVWLFVWRRQHRIVHYHUDO
metaphors in eighteenth-century texts on optics, his conclusions are still pertinent here. Not only 
GRHVKHZULWHWKDWEDOOLVWLFPHWDSKRUVDUHµKLJKO\PDOOHDEOH>DQG@FRXOGEHXVHGWRHVWDEOLVKD




 This is true of the neurons and brains of animals other than humans too, but only insofar as humans, the inventors of ballistics, are 







variety of incompatible tensive relationships¶ KHDOVRDUJXHVWKDWWKH\µFDQDFWVLOHQWO\DQG
imperialistically [which] suggests a further role for metaphor in connection with cognitive 
SV\FKRORJ\VLQFHPHWDSKRUPD\OHDGVFLHQWLVWVWRSUHVXPHWKHVWUXFWXUHRIQDWXUH¶&DQWRU
142). Cantor then questions what he sees as a common but erroneous distinction between 
metaphor as a didactic tool and a mere descriptive measure, used to guide or elucidate future 
research. His analysis of metaphors from ballistics leads him to write that while the 
WHDFKLQJUHVHDUFKGLVWLQFWLRQKDVVRPHXVHVµWKHSRVLWLRQWRZDUGVZKLch I am moving makes 
metaphor constitutive RIVFLHQWLILFGLVFRXUVH¶RULJLQDOHPSKDVLV 
If this is so, then it is not unfair to say that ballistic metaphors are constitutive of 
neuroscience, guiding theory, informing the empirical research to back up that theory, and 
providing the basis for the training of the next generation of scientists who then plug back into 
that theory. Merely looking at how the metaphors play out within the discipline never breaks out 
of this circle. Therefore, the next sHFWLRQDWWHPSWVWRGRMXVWWKLVWRUHLQVWDWH/RWPDQ¶VSURGXFWLYH
rift and leave the circle of neuroscience for a while. The goal is to inspect the literary use of 
ballistics, to see if this provides a convoluted loop back to neuroscience, or conversely, the bullet 
simply flies straight and true at its new mark. As mentioned, ballistics becomes a nexus for both 
neuroscience and literature in the relationship between time and space captured by the concept of 
speed. The brain, after all, can be considered thaWORFXVZKHUHWKHPLQG¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWLPHDQG
its actual, physical extension in space find some manner of conceptual overlap ± as Dan Lloyd 
ZULWHVµ,VZXQJWKHDQDO\WLFDOWRROVIRUGHFLSKHULQJWHPSRUDOLW\DURXQGWRZDUGWKHEUDLQDQG
found strong evidence that we are time in the flesh¶ (Lloyd 2004: 329). Generally, science only 
seems capable of offering a third-person picture of speed which jars with the experiential aspect 
of existing in time and space. Phenomenology, and more recently neurophenomenology, have 
both worked to correct this picture, sometimes in dialogue with science.63 But far before this, 
literary authors and theorists experimented with textual depictions of time and space, experiments 
which compress and expand both in a way that is legible and comprehensible. In this way, they 
provide an accessible third-person account, but recognizable also as an adequately realistic 
YHUVLRQRIOLYHGILUVWSHUVRQH[SHULHQFH6RWKHQH[WVHFWLRQFRQVLGHUVWKUHHGLIIHUHQWµEDOOLVWLF¶
texts from different places and times, to see if they manage to converge upon a target. The aim is 
to see if the wilful use of warfare and weaponry as material for themes as well as forms means 
that overtly, ballistically-charged literature can offer any insights to neuroscience, and its tacit, 
uncritical adoption of ballistic metaphors. 
  




 For an overview of neurophenomenology, Cf. Lutz and Thompson 2003; for an extensive set of discussions, Cf. Petitot et al. 1999; 






B S Johnson: Mean Point of Impact on the Brain 
 
 
In Corpsing (2000), Toby Litt punctuates his contemporary hard-boiled novel with six ballistics 
reports ± italicized descriptions distributed evenly through, and distinct from, the narrative 
proper. The reports consecutively detail the flight and damage of each bullet fired at protagonist 
narrator Conrad and his ex-JLUOIULHQG/LO\DWWKHQRYHO¶VVWDUW7KXVWKHUHLVDVWUDQJHULIWLQ
temporality DWWKHQRYHO¶VFRUHWKHVHEXOOHWVSURGXFWRIWKHILUVWHYHQWRIJUHDWVLJQLILFDQFHLQWKH
narrative, give the entire story its impetus, but they also carry through into its development, shot 
as they are through the text. The bullets occur at the beginning of the narrative in the blink of an 
eye yet simultaneously they reoccur in print throughout the text, skewing any stable interpretation 
of their speed or temporal nature. One can appreciate something similar sixteen years previously, 
when Jacques DerridDZULWHVWKDWµAt the beginning there will have been speed¶'HUULGD
original emphasis) ± this statement not quite beginning his own projectile-LQIXVHGWH[Wµ1R
$SRFDO\SVH1RW1RZ)XOO6SHHG$KHDG6HYHQ0LVVLOHV6HYHQ0LVVLYHV¶7KHQXPEHUPDy be 
GLIIHUHQWEXWLQDSDUDOOHOPDQRHXYUHWR/LWW¶VLQCorpsing'HUULGD¶VHVVD\LVSHSSHUHGZLWK
seven of these typographically divergent (that is to say, once again italicized) statements to 
represent the missiles that suffuse and are also the topic of the text. Going yet further back in 
time, and in a pre-emptive strike to both of these ballistically-informed writings, B S -RKQVRQ¶V
VKRUWSURVHSLHFHµ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶PRUHRUOHVVEHJLQVZKHUH'HUULGD¶VHVVD\HQGV
with the name John. In JohnVRQ¶VWH[WWKHZLOORIWKLVSVHXGR-historical figure John is to erect a 
cathedral in honour of St Anselm, and the narrative outlines the obstacles, architectural 
innovations and fluctuating opinions this project encounters over time, starting with its inception 
in some unspecified but seemingly medieval age. Careening at intervals throughout this all is an 
ostensibly modern series of radio messages, military style, explaining the bombing of the same 
cathedral from the point of view of some unknown agency as they adjust and aim the rocket-
launcher ± again, these interjections presented as distinct from the main text by nesting within it 
in an easily appreciable set of typographic variations. 
All three texts begin with the launching of missiles which are both inside and outside 
their main discourses, virtually instantaneous as they are fired yet with devastating and longer-
lasting consequences. This raises some questions: what is the phenomenology of ballistic writing 
and reading? What is it about the temporality and trajectory of ballistic objects that attracts these 
three disparate writers, Litt, Derrida and Johnson? What impels them to so similarly fire 
projectiles through their own writings, upsetting the linear flow of meaning through time and 





congruencies between these pieces of writing might be teased out through a process touched upon 
LQ-RKQVRQ¶VFKLOOLQJ\HWVRPHKRZDOVRKXPRURXVWH[WZKHUHWKHRII-camera bomber fires 
VSHFXODWLYHO\DQGFRQFOXGHVWKDWWRHIIHFWLYHO\DWWDFNDWDGLVWDQFHRQHPXVWµobserve, split 
difference, two more ranging shots, observe, split difference, which should then give me the mean 
point of impact¶B S Johnson 1973a: 48; original emphasis). $QLQLWLDOVXFKµUDQJLQJVKRW¶LVWKH
µ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶WRWKHUHFHQWUHHGLWLRQRI-RKQVRQ¶VAlbert Angelo, which was written by Litt (Cf. 
/LWWD/LWW¶VZRUNLVJHQHUDOO\VKRWWKURXJKZLWKD-RKQVRQLDQVSLULWDQGWKXVKHSURYLGHV
an interesting perspecWLYHRQKLVIRUHEHDU,QGHHGµVKRWWKURXJK¶LVDQDSWZD\WRVHHWKH
relationship between Litt and Johnson. A shot fired through a body is almost instantaneously 
outside and inside, passing imperceptibly quickly through this object ± unless of course said shot 
ends up wholly lodged within its target. In Corpsing, Litt treats the book itself as the object of six 
shots, bullets which are both periodically its subject, inside the text, but also themselves racing 
through it as discrete, italicized and numbered sections cleaving or nesting in the regular flow of 
chapters. The singular narrative event of the shooting is described relatively quickly at the 
beginning of the book, yet still the bullets that pierce it mean its otherwise regular chronological 
progression is ruptured as they appear like open wounds throughout.  
7KLVDSSHDUVWRDSH-RKQVRQ¶Vµ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶ILUVWSXEOLVKHGLQWKH
anthology $UHQ¶W<RX5DWKHU<RXQJWREH:ULWLQJ<RXU0HPRLUV". µ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶GRHVD
similar thing to Corpsing: a missile attack is both subject and object, the primary story perforated 
by the shrapnel of the typographically variant secondary story, the first occurring over a long 
period of the history of a cathedral and the second occurring in the short period leading up to the 
ERPELQJRIVDLGFDWKHGUDODWWKLVKLVWRU\¶VDSH[$Vliterary theorist Miriam Havemann explains, 
µ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶LQYROYHVµWKHFRQFXUUHQWSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWZRHQWLUHO\VHSDUDWHO\DQG






in his work has yielded new editions of his oeuvre in 2013, thus bringing to the surface concrete 
HYLGHQFHRI/LWW¶VLQWHUHVWLQ-RKQVRQYLDWKHDIRUHPHQWLRQHG,QWURGXFWLRQWRAlbert Angelo. 
Ballistics therefore appears to be both a trope and a logic that ties one writer to another across the 
expanse of years.  
So what did Johnson actually know of ballistics? In Like a Fiery Elephant: The Story of 








as a teenager, he belonged to a rifle club in Barnes, which was how he came to own a gun. Years 
ODWHULQWKHFRXUVHRIWKHLUWDSHGLQWHUYLHZLQ>-RKQVRQ¶V@IDWKHU6WDQOH\ZRuld tell him that 
KLVSDWHUQDOJUDQGIDWKHUKDGEHHQDNHHQPDUNVPDQDQGµWKDW¶VSUREDEO\ZKHUH\RXJHW\RXU
VKRRWLQJIURP¶ 
(Coe 2004: 59; unnumbered footnote) 
 
Evidently Johnson had some formal knowledge, if not of ballistic science itself, then at least of 
JXQVDQGWKHLUJHQHUDOSULQFLSOHVDQGRSHUDWLRQ'UDZLQJRPLQRXVFRQFOXVLRQVDERXW-RKQVRQ¶V
potential propensity for suicide (to which he eventually did succumb, though not with a gun), 
Coe comments on an episode in which Johnson describes shooting a UDEELWµThe bullet makes ³a 
bluish hole in its flank towards the tail,´ and there is a good deal of detail, rather morbidly dwelt 
XSRQ>«@-RKQVRQWKHQNLOOVWKHFUHDWXUHRIIZLWKDQRWKHUEXOOHWDQG³watched as the blood 
flushed over the edges of the smashed bone and across the mass of grey-white brDLQ>«@´¶(Coe 
2004: 59). &RHLVTXRWLQJIURPDVKRUWSLHFHFDOOHGµ&OHDQ/LYLQJLVWKH5HDO6DIHJXDUG¶ in 
ZKLFK-RKQVRQGHSLFWVZLWKSUHFLVLRQWKHULIOHLQYROYHGDQGDOVRFODLPVWKDWµWKHEXOOHWVIDVFLQDWH
PH¶B S -RKQVRQ5DWKHUWKDQµGZHOO¶HTXDOO\µPRUELGO\¶XSRQ-RKQVRQ¶VGHDWKKHUH
the episode highlights instead that during his life, in addition to knowledge of guns, he had some 
actual experience of gunshot wounds ± the subspecies of knowledge formally designated, in 
FRQWUDVWWRWKHµLQWHUQDO¶RQHRIILUHDUPVDQGWKHµH[WHUQDO¶RQHRIWKHWUDMHFWRU\RISURMHFWLOHVDV
WKHUHDOPRIµWHUPLQDO¶EDOOLVWLFV&I'HQQ\ 
 Like a Fiery Elephant is also intriguing because the strange temporality of missiles or 
bullets, instantaneous yet with potentially long-lasting consequences, seems to have infected Coe 
LQKLVGHVFULSWLRQRI-RKQVRQ¶VOLIH&RHMXVWLILHVKLVFKRLFHIRUWKHERRN¶VVWUXFWXUHE\DSSHDOLQJ
WR-RKQVRQ¶VRZQEHOLHILQWKHLQWULQVLFchaos and messiness of life. Thus, instead of a linear 
narrative, he opens with an Introduction which includes the above justification, followed by short 
but involved summaries-cum-potted-KLVWRULHVRIWKRVHEHVWNQRZQSDUWVRI-RKQVRQ¶VRHXYUHKLV
novels. After this, Coe recounts his own archival rummaging, resulting in his first experience of 
what might be seen as textual empathy with the long dead Johnson ± a supernatural experience 
-RKQVRQFODLPHGWRKDYHKDGZLWKWKHYDJXHILJXUHRIµ7KH:KLWH*RGGHVV¶. The point is that it is 
only at the end of this prefatory chapter, itself already preceded by the Introduction and novel 
V\QRSVHVWKDW&RHVWDWHVWKHIROORZLQJµ$QGQRZEXOOHWVPXVWEHELWWHQGHFHQFLHVPXVWEH
observed, and it really is time to start DWWKHEHJLQQLQJ¶:KDWFDQ&RHSRVVLEO\PHDQ
E\µVWDUWLQJDWWKHEHJLQQLQJ¶ZKHQKHKDVDOUHDG\FRYHUHGVRPXFKJURXQG" 
 The OED JLYHVWKHPHDQLQJRIµWRELWHRQWKHEXOOHW¶DVµWREHKDYHFRXUDJHRXVO\WR





nothing more than a throwaway gesture, a self-conscious mental build-up to the actual nitty-gritty 
RIUHODWLQJ-RKQVRQ¶VFRPSOLFDWHGOLIHZKLFKKLVFRPPHQWSHUKDSVVXJJHVWVKHKDGEHHQ
delaying. HRZHYHUJLYHQ&RH¶VFRQYROXWHGSUHDPEOHWRDFWXDOO\µELWLQJ¶WKHPWKHPHQWLRQRI
bullets can be interpreted as a fear of starting at the beginning itself ± a worry that the starting 
pistol has already gone off and the cartridge is already speeding through RQH¶VPRXWKEHIRUHRQH
has had the chance to bite down, let alone speak about the experience ± a fear that starting will 
only reveal that starting had already occurred. A version of this aversion is also displayed in 
'HUULGD¶VHVVD\µ1R$SRFDO\SVH1RW1RZ)XOO6SHHG$KHDG6HYHQ0LVVLOHV6HYHQ0LVVLYHV¶




the beginning there will have been speed¶'HUULGD20; original emphasis). The unsettling 
QDWXUHRIWKHIXWXUHSHUIHFWWHQVHLQµWKHUHZLOOKDYHEHHQ¶GHULYHVIURPLWVLQFRQJUXHQFHZLWKWKH
GLUHFWO\SUHFHGLQJµDWWKHEHJLQQLQJ¶ finding self-QHJDWLRQLQWKDWWKLVVXSSRVHGµEHJLQQLQJ¶LV
still to come ± nevHUWKHOHVVLWDOUHDG\GUDJVDORQJZLWKLWWKHEDJJDJHRIVRPHSULRUµVSHHG¶ the 
latter of which has already been twice mentioned but remains as yet undefined. With the text 
RVWHQVLEO\EHJXQRQHUHDGVWKDWVRPHWKLQJµVSHHG¶FDPHEHIRUHLWEXWWKDWWKHbeginning is still 
only on its way anyway. A complex state of affairs, undoubtedly confused further by the fact that 
this italicized, emphasized line is indeed not the first line, but the second; awareness of the 
coming beginning only comes after the beginning. 
Asking permission of his invisible audience, Derrida playfully proceeds to say he is 
about to pronounce his first word ± which of course has already happened in saying this. This 
UHODWHVWRKLVFRQFHSWRIWKHµVXSSOHPHQW¶ something both inside and outside a given text, 
extraneous but additional to it. As creative and critical theorist Nicholas Royle explains, the 
supplement LVµDWRQFHZKDWLVDGGHGRQWRVRPHWKLQJLQRUGHUIXUWKHUWRHQULFKLW>«@and it 
makes up for something missing, as if there iVDYRLGWREHILOOHGXS¶5R\OH±49; original 





itself, of course, preceded by the essay title, which is preceded by the journal title, which has 
itself been historically preceded by other journals, other writings and so on). Whilst not a new 






main body of text, printed in the margin but overlapping, coming both before and during the text, 
inGLFDWLQJSRLQWVZKHUHWKHUHLVDVKRUWLWDOLFL]HGVHFWLRQOLNHWKHDIRUHPHQWLRQHGµAt the 
beginning there will have been speed¶ These piercing written projectiles leave visible 
typographical wounds in the body text and are a visual display of the supplement at work, both in 
terms of their simultaneous status as subject and object of the essay, but also in that they exist on 
the page at the same time as the rest of the text but were shots fired at the start, providing the 
WH[W¶VVWUXFWXUHE\FRQWLQXLQJWKURugh it. 
 'HUULGD¶VPDLQWRSLFLQµ1R$SRFDO\SVH«¶LVWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDILQDOµUHPDLQGHUOHVV¶
nuclear war, something very much still in the minds of writers, politicians and the general public 
at the time he was writing in 1984. Rather than make outright claims about such a disastrous 
RFFXUUHQFH'HUULGD¶VVWUDWHJ\LVWRLQVWHDGcomment on the rhetoric of others ± hence his 
insistence in the third missile/missive WKDWµWe can therefore consider ourselves competent [to 
comment] because the sophistication of the nuclear strategy can never do without a sophistry of 
belief and the rhetorical simulation of a text¶ (1984: 24; original emphasis). Crucially, the 
µQXFOHDUUHIHUHQW¶64 he refers to subsequently and throughout is something that thus far exists only 
in writing ± nuclear war belongs solely to the realm of argumentation and commentary that 
would be wiped out were it to ever actually, really happen. A similar tack, mutatis mutandis, is 
WDNHQLQ/LWW¶VQRYHOdeadkidsongs. Set in a fictional English town, the novel tells of four 
young boys with vivid imaginations and obsessed by playing at war, who are involved in what 
WKH\VSHFLI\LVFDOOHGµ*DQJ1RW7KH*DQJ-XVW*DQJ¶/LWW([SOLFLWO\GURSSLQJWKH
definite article serves to colourfully illXVWUDWHWKHVWURQJVHQVHRILGHQWLW\µ*DQJ¶SURYLGHVWKH
four boys, and their rigidly observed, militaristic rituals and beliefs are described in detail. 
What seem like highly organized but nonetheless childish games take on increasingly 
sinister (if occasionally humorous) overtones throughout the novel. An early description of the 
ER\V¶FROOHFWLYHPLQG-set hints at this progression:  
 
Between us, we felt as if we could cope with just about anything that might come along. This 
FRQILGHQFHGLGQ¶WPDNHXVFRPSlacent, however. Gang-life was a constant preparation for the 
unexpected. The greatest fear we had was that the coming war would be nuclear right from the 
start, and that we would none of us get the opportunity to perform the glorious actions we had so 
often imagined. 
(Litt 2001: 11±12) 




 )RUDQH[WHQGHGGLVFXVVLRQRIWKLVWHUPDQGLWVKLVWRU\&I6RORPRQ+RZHYHUVHHLQJDVµWKHXVHRIORQJ-range buzz-bombs 
DQGEDOOLVWLFPLVVLOHV>«@JUHZRXWRIWKHWHFKQRORJ\DQGXWRSian enthusiasm of [Frit]@/DQJ¶V>ILOP@Woman in the Moon¶
(Frayling 2005: 82), the thus far solely rhetorical, written nature of the nuclear referent does not necessarily preclude the outbreak of 
nuclear war, and can even make it happen. The literary LPDJLQDWLRQFDQFDXVHWKLQJVWRRFFXULQWKHµUHDO¶ZRUOG± if fantasies of 






The escalation of war to a nuclear level and the realm of the imagination are here connected ± 
war is inevitable, something always on the horizon and deserving of mental preparation, along 
with the dream-like prospect of glRULRXVLQYROYHPHQW7KHVWRU\¶VHVVHQWLDOO\EXFROLFSHDFHWLPH
VHWWLQJSURYLGHVPXFKRIWKHGUDPDWLFLPSHWXVWKLVVHWWLQJEHLQJVRDWRGGVZLWK*DQJ¶V]HDORXV
belief in an altogether improbable Russian invasion of Britain, not to mention that the nuclear 
WKUHDWDORQJZLWKDOOOLIHZRXOGREOLWHUDWHWKHER\V¶FKDQFHDWKHURLFDOO\SDUWLFLSDWLQJLQEDWWOH
This glorification of war, and the almost unthinkable disappointment of its potential fictionality, 




SHULRG¶VPHGLDFRYerage of the Cold War, that elevates nuclear conflict to a war beyond wars. 
But it is precisely this, the lack of direct knowledge of nuclear conflict and its consequent uptake 
by the imagination that makes it what it is ± for Derrida, a solely textual, literary beast. Tying in 
with this, philosopher /LDP6SURGSURYLVLRQDOO\GHILQHVµWKH+HLGHJJHULDQVFKHPDRIWKHRQWLFR-
ontological difference [as] the difference between particular scientific, technological, cultural or 
historical knowledge of the world (which is ontic) and the conditions of possibility of both the 
ZRUOGDQGWKDWNQRZOHGJHZKLFKLVRQWRORJLFDO¶6SURG+HWKHQJRHVRQWRH[SODLQ
'HUULGD¶VWKLUGPLVVLOHPLVVLYHLQµ1R$SRFDO\SVH«¶WKHµFRPSHWHQFH¶PHQWLRQHGPHDQV
literary (or the QHZO\WLWOHGµQXFOHDU¶FULWLFVDUHXQLTXHO\TXDOLILHGWRFULWLTXHWKHPDFKLQDWLRQVRI
WKHQXFOHDUUXPRXUPLOOVSHFLILFDOO\EHFDXVHRIWKHWH[WXDODQGUKHWRULFDOQDWXUHRIWKHµQXFOHDU
referent¶65 As Sprod points out, 
 
the integration of the ontico-ontological difference within the textuality of nuclear war means that 
while at one level the text will be and at the same time produce µUHDOLW\¶DWDQRWKHULWZLOODOVR
allow a way of understanding and interpreting reality, a way clearly within the domain of the 
nuclear critic as a mechanic of texts. 
(Sprod 2012: 22; original emphasis) 
 
To return to Gang in deadkidsongs then, it could be argued that Litt, in his critical capacity of 
DXWKRUXVHVWKHER\V¶DQWLFLSDWLRQRIZDUWRFRPPHQWRQWKHWH[WXDOOLWHUDU\ways that nuclear 
ZDULVWKHUHE\µSURGXFHG¶ 




 As Daniel Cordle puts it in the introduction to his book States of SuspenseµWKLVLVDERRNDERXWWKLQJVWKDWGLGQRWKDSSHQDQGWKH
FXOWXUDOFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHLUQRWKDSSHQLQJ¶&RUGOH2WKHUVKDYHDOVRUHPDUNHGWKDWWKHµQXFOHDUUHIHUHQW¶± and the debate, 









strange (a)temporal (non)climax of both in the nuclear. Litt even shows an irreverent appreciation 
RI+HLGHJJHU¶VRQWLFR-ontological difference ± only here with reference to the constituent parts of 
a knickerbocker glory ± in a sKRUWVWRU\FDOOHGµ7KH*ORRS¶ 
 
We here are the chocolate sauce and the strawberry sauce and the vanilla ice cream and the 
whipped cream, flaked almonds, sliced strawberries, quartered grapes, cubed melon chunklets; we 
are all of these edibles equally and at once. (Friend.) But we are not the tall ice cream sundae 
knickerbocker glass, and not the long metal stirring spoon. 




VWDUWRIµ1R$SRFDO\SVH«¶$V6SURGSRLQWVRXW'HUULGD¶VSUHRFFXSDWLon with nuclear war is 
inextricably tied to a concern about the future, not only in the banal (or ontic) sense of things to 
come, but in a more pervasive (ontological) sense of temporality and the meaning of the futural 
in general. Litt obviously demonstrates the same preoccupation, seeing as his story is published 
in a collection that overtly sets out to deal with futurity in the present, titled Beacons: Stories for 
Our Not So Distant Future. 
,QWKHJORRS¶VRZQFRQVLGHUDWLRQRILWVHOILQµ7KH*ORRS¶HYHU\ possible facet of 
existence starts to fold in upon itself and become ± of course ± gloop. The narrating gloop then 
DVNVµ³:KDWWKHQ"´¶7KLVUHVXOWVLQDUHMHFWLRQRIWKHTXHVWLRQLWVHOIDVVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVDOVR
subsumed by the all-encompassing logic of the gloop:  
 
µ:KDW¶LQµ:KDWWKHQ"¶EHLQJZURQJEHFDXVHZKDWQHVVDVDTXDOLW\ZLOOKDYHEHHQVXEVXPHGLQ
total is-ness or un-ness or post-ness or sur-ness (sur-sur-ness, sur-sur-ness-ness, etc) ± DQGµWKHQ¶
LQµ:KDWWKHQ"¶EHLQJHYHQPRUHZURQJEHFDXVe temporality depends upon event and event 
depends upon change and change depends upon integrating or disintegrating forms. When all is 
EDFNJURXQGZKHQµZKHQ¶LQµZKHQ¶LVPRRWDOODVDOOZLOOFRQWLQXHLWVGLVVROXWLRQVLQWR
unending, even though once provably beginning, all-all-all. 
(Litt 2013b: 113±114)  
 
In this undeniably convoluted passage, Litt nevertheless displays an intricate understanding, not 
GLVVLPLODUWR'HUULGD¶VHYRFDWLRQRIWKHµDEVROXWH¶LQµ1R$SRFDO\SVH«¶RIWKHµZKDWQHVV¶DV









in this fatalistic rendition, was always already in effect, with multiple beginnings and ends 
beyond our control or awareness as mere ontic beings. Funny, yet idiomatically almost 
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOLQFKDUDFWHUWKLVFXULRXVO\HFKRHV'HUULGD¶VILUVWPLVVLOHPLVVLYHLQµ1R
$SRFDO\SVH«¶WKDWµDW the beginning there will have been speed¶ 
5XQQLQJDQXFOHDUUHOD\UDFH6SURGWDNHVXS/LWW¶VEDWRQE\FRQQHFWLQJWZRFRQFHSWLRQV
RIµVSHHG¶± that of Derrida plus that of Futurism, the early-twentieth-century art movement.66 
Within the collision of the ontic and the ontological experience, Sprod writes that  
 
Derrida explicitly spells out what is at stake in this new double experience, both as a 
reformulation of the idea of speed and as a new experience which will be speed itself. What is 
required is a rethinking of the very foundations of temporality itself, or, to give a literal meaning 
WR>OHDGLQJ)XWXULVW)LOLSSR7RPPDVR@0DULQHWWL¶VFDWFKSKUDVHWLPHDQGVSDFHGLHG\HVWHUGD\ 
(Sprod 2012: 17) 
 
For Derrida, this rethinking resides in nuclear rhetoric, not just in the physical manifestation of 
the warhead as a missile, but also as a missive (a letter or a message). The warhead can thus be 
ZULWWHQDQGGHSOR\HGILJXUDWLYHO\WKLVFDSDELOLW\DULVLQJRQO\EHFDXVHDµUHDO¶GHSOR\PHQWZRXOG
signify a remainderless end. This results in the impossible but necessary situation whereby the 
future allows the present to exist, by rendering itself (the future) utterly erasable. All this is 
contained for Derrida in the new variability of speed ± WKHDUPVµUDFH¶ mass destruction at the 
swiftest push of a button, one strategic decision being quicker than another, and so forth ± that is 
represented by the missive/missile.  
,Q/LWW¶VCorpsing, this commentary on the temporal effects of literature or text is 
achieved by a more modest projectile: the bullet. Litt has been taken by many critics to be a 
postmodern, conspicuously self-conscious writer of genre, and there are strong grounds for such 
an interpretation (Cf. Wilson 2006: 105±106). However, it is also safe to say that Litt uses genre 
in a highly thoughtful way to make larger points about writing and its history. Interviewed in 
KHVD\Vµ:LWKCorpsing I wanted to do something where the action, and the speed of the 
writing about that action, was at points very mismatched. I was fascinated by the writing of 
action, partly as it is the great twentieth-FHQWXU\DFKLHYHPHQWLQSURVH¶/LWW1RWHKHUH
WKDW/LWWPHQWLRQVVSHHGLVVRPHWKLQJSHUYDGLQJERWKDFWLRQDQGZULWLQJVSHHGVZKLFKDUHµYHU\
mismatched¶ But action is not merely a genre or its trait; it is also a phenomenological category, 











a facet of perceptual experience with which writing has had to, and only recently managed, to 
catch up. Bearing in mind this non-generic aspect of action, Litt later says of Corpsing WKDWµ,
wanted to write action. The first bullet section, which takes six or seven minutes to read, is 
describing something which takes place in less than a second, and to have a huge mismatch 
between the time of the action and the telling of thHDFWLRQZDVLQWHUHVWLQJ¶/LWW7KLV
considered approach to the temporality of bullet and text, and how these two might interact, is 
ZKDW/LWWPHDQVE\ZDQWLQJWRµZULWHDFWLRQ¶± a seemingly impossible but necessary task.  
As literary critic Philip Tew observes, Litt goes beyond mere genre or self-ironizing 
postmodern features. So, despite  
 
the shifting ground of perception [when Corpsing¶V@SURWDJRQLVW&RQUDG5HGPDQLVDEOHWRSDVV
off his public brandishing of a gun as a rehearsal for a filP>«@/LWWLQGLFDWHVVRPHWKLQJRIWKH
perceptual persists, for the textual replay of the bullets that strike Conrad and his girlfriend 
reminds the reader of an ultimately physical law, that of materiality, causality and death. 
(Tew 2007: 120) 
 
,IµVRPHWKLQJRIWKHSHUFHSWXDOSHUVLVWV¶± QDPHO\WKHSURVSHFWRIERGLO\KDUPDQGRQH¶V
inevitable mortality ± WKHQ7HZ¶VUHDGLQJKDUPRQL]HVZLWK'HUULGD¶VORJLFRIWKHQXFOHDUUHIHUHQW
The latter can only ever be textual, precisely because of its self-erasure were it to become a 
material reality. Thus in Corpsing WKHµWH[WXDOUHSOD\RIWKHEXOOHWV¶DFWVQRWMXVWDVDUHSOD\EXWDV
DSRUWHQWWKDWWKHFKDUDFWHUVDUHRQO\µDOLYH¶EHFDXVHWKH\FDQµGLH¶ and that in these terms, death 
does not only occur at the end of life, but throughout it. So the first bullet section in the novel, 
ZHGJHGEHWZHHQµSURSHU¶FKDSWHUVDQGDQGEHIRUHWKHVKRRWLQJKDVHYHQWDNHQSODFHLQWKH
main narrative, says:  
 
The first bullet (there are to be six: evenly distributed ± three for her, three for me ± though not 
HTXDOO\GHVWUXFWLYHHQWHUV/LO\¶VERG\DSSUR[LPDWHO\WZRLQFKHVEHQHDWKKHUOHIWEUHDVW6ORZO\
or if not slowly then gradually, or if not gradually then at least moment by moment, leaving no 
gap in actual proceeding time, jumping no millimetre completely, the bullet begins its inevitable 
SDVVDJHLQWR/LO\¶VWKRUD[. 
(Litt 2000: 12; original emphasis) 
 
7KDWµWKHUHDUHWREHVL[¶GHILQLWHO\UHDGVOLNHDQRPHQQRWMXVWDEDOGVWDWHPHQWRIIDFWEXWD
glimpse into the future for the reader, reminiscent of the (in)famous cut-out pages of B S 
-RKQVRQ¶VAlbert Angelo/LWW¶V,QWURGXFWLRQWRAlbert Angelo EHJLQVDVIROORZVµ7KHUH¶VDVKRFN
FRPLQJXS$ELJJORULRXVWUXHVKRFN,W¶VDWWKHERWWRPRISDJH¶/LWWDY7KLVis 





justifying. Additionally, and intriguingly, the cut-RXWVLQ-RKQVRQ¶VQRYHOUHYHDODFRPLQJVQLSSHW
of text which has the same clinical, pathology-report tone of /LWW¶VEXOOHWVHFWLRQVµVWUXJJOHGWR
take back his knife, and inflicted on him a mortal wound above his right eye (the blade 
SHQHWUDWLQJWRDGHSWKRIWZRLQFKHVIURPZKLFKKHGLHGLQVWDQWO\¶± this text is printed on page 
153 of Albert Angelo, but can be read because of the cut-out from as early as page 149 (Cf. B S 
Johnson 2013). 
Returning to the first bullet in CorpsingDOVRRIQRWHLVWKDWWKHVL[EXOOHWVZLOOEHµHYHQO\
distributed¶ meaning distributed amongst Conrad and Lily, but Litt surely also means amongst 
WKHERRN¶VVFDWWHUHGEXOOHWVHFWLRQVWKHWH[WXDOEXOOHWVWKXVRQFHDJDLQUHWXUQLQJWRVROLG
PDWHULDOLW\LQWKLVFDVHRIWKHSULQWHGSDJH7KLVµLQHYLWDEOHSDVVDJH¶EDFNWRPDWHULDOLW\DQGWKXV
as Tew puts it, to the grave, is invoked in the inexorable, excruciatingly slow movement of the 
EXOOHWWKURXJK/LO\¶VERG\OLNHWKHVXSSOHPHQWDU\EXOOHWVHFWLRQVWKURXJKWKHQRYHO¶VERG\WH[W
TKLVUHFDOOV=HQR¶VSDUDGR[as in Borges, but this time the bullet duplicates the dimensions of the 
paradoxE\µOHDYLQJQRJDSLQDFWXDOSURFHHGLQJWLPHMXPSLQJQRPLOOLPHWUHFRPSOHWHO\¶ This 
massive spatiotemporal distortion is then totally reversed in the fifth bullet section, which 
FRQVLVWVHQWLUHO\RIµThe fifth bullet missed me completely¶/LWW199; original emphasis). 
Whilst fairly humorous, almost providing some darkly comic relief from the overall bleakness of 
the novel, this also serves to highlight the strong possibilities and effects of the bullet sections 
upon the text. This particular bullet speeds up time enormously whilst the other five do the 
opposite, both for the reader and also ostensibly for the here rather blithely glossing narrator 
Conrad.67 
To recap briefly, then, both Derrida and Litt use a series of ballistic supplements, neither 
LQVLGHQRURXWVLGHQHLWKHUEHORQJLQJQRURWKHUWRVRPHµPDLQ¶WH[WWKH\KDYHZULWWHQ7KH\GR
WKLVLQRUGHUWRPDNHDFRPPHQWDU\RQRUVLPSO\GHPRQVWUDWHVRPHWKLQJDERXWWKHµVSHHG¶RUWKH
µWLPH¶RIWKHWH[W,QWKHFDVHRI'HUULGDLWLVXQNQRZQKRZmuch technical knowledge he had 
about ballistics or arms ± and clearly his chief point is that being a philosopher or a critic 
provides technical knowledge enough, albeit of a different sort, to pass comment on such matters 




 Another Conrad, the author Joseph Conrad, also considers embodied, ballistic, time distortions. In his novel The Secret Agent, first 
SXEOLVKHGLQ&KLHI,QVSHFWRU+HDWLVSRQGHULQJWKHVXSSRVHGLQVWDQWDQHLW\RIGHDWKE\H[SORVLRQµ1RSK\VLRORJLVWDQGstill less 
of a metaphysician, Chief Inspector Heat rose by the force of sympathy, which is a form of fear, above the vulgar conception of time. 
Instantaneous! He remembered all he had ever read in popular publications of long and terrifying dreams dreamed in the instant of 
waking; of the whole past life lived with frightful intensity by a drowning man as his doomed head bobs up, screaming, for the last 
time. The inexplicable mysteries of conscious existence beset Chief Inspector Heat till he evolved a horrible notion that ages of 
atrocious pain and PHQWDOWRUWXUHFRXOGEHFRQWDLQHGEHWZHHQWZRVXFFHVVLYHZLQNVRIDQH\H¶&RQUDG 
 <HWPRUHVWULNLQJLV%RUJHV¶VFKDUDFWHU-DURPLU+ODGLNLQWKHVKRUWVWRU\µ7KH6HFUHW0LUDFOH¶DILFWLRQDOZULWHUZKRVHVDG
destiny is to be executed by a Nazi firing squad. Feeling not only terror, but that his life has amounted to nothing, Hladik prays to God 
IRUPRUHWLPHWRILQLVKKLVILQDOPRVWVLJQLILFDQWERRN-XVWDVWKHULIOHVDUHUDLVHGWRVKRRWDWKLPµ7KHSK\VLFDOXQLYHUse came to a 
KDOW>«@+HKDGasked God for a whole year to finish his work; His omnipotence had granted it. God had worked a secret miracle for 
KLP*HUPDQOHDGZRXOGNLOOKLPDWWKHVHWKRXUEXWLQKLVPLQGD\HDUZRXOGJRE\EHWZHHQWKHRUGHUDQGLWVH[HFXWLRQ¶%RUges 






± but with Litt in Corpsing, his ballistic knowledge is easier to establish. In parallel with his 
FKDUDFWHU&RQUDGZKRVD\VKHµVWD\HGKRPHDOOGD\VSHQGLQJHTXDODPRXQWVRIWLPHUHDGLQJ
ERRNVRQDQDWRP\ILUHDUPVDQGEXOOHWZRXQGV>«@¶/LWW/LWWDGPLWVUHDGLQJH[DFWO\
these same books while preparing the manuscript, but in a different kind of supplementary text, 
the post-narrative Acknowledgements section (2000: 376). Whilst not claiming deep 
understanding or ownership of the technical knowledge therein, nor any less textual (rather than 
hands-RQ/LWW¶VLVDGLIIHULQJWDNHWR'HUULGD¶V,QDQ\FDVHDVphysicist Mark Denny observes, 
µWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIILUHDUPVKDVJUHDWO\LQIOXHQFHGWKHFRQGXFWDQGRXWFRPHRIZDUV0XFKRI
our understanding of ballistics principles came GLUHFWO\DVDUHVXOWRIPLOLWDU\GHYHORSPHQW¶
(Denny 2011: 1). The spur for knowledge of ballistics and projectiles has always stemmed from a 
concern with war, a concern which as shown earlier is something that Litt and Derrida definitely 
do share, and which is yet more strikingly evident in the writings and biography of B S Johnson. 
Writing during the 60s and 70s, with global events like the Cuban missile crisis occurring 
in 1962, Johnson was living like everyone else beneath the shroud of the Cold War and its 
nuclear threat. Yet his work only seems to allude to this in an off-hand, perhaps even parodic 
PDQQHU&RHFRPPHQWVRI-RKQVRQ¶V days as a supply teacher that  
 
by March 1960, as [Johnson] wrote to one correVSRQGHQWKHKDGDOUHDG\WDNHQµ(QJOLVK>«@, 
Basket-PDNLQJ>«@VRPH0DWKVORWVRI/LEUDU\SHULRGV5HOLJLRXV.QRZOHGJH&XUUHQW$IIDLUV
(I nearly got them to send a telegram to Macmillan over Nuclear Disarmament; but failed because 
sufficient money could not EHUDLVHG>«@¶ 
(Coe 2004: 92) 
 
Later references to nuclear arms come across as even more flippant, for example in the novel 
&KULVWLH0DOU\¶V2ZQ'RXEOH-Entry (1973). In a characteristically mischievous metafictional 
gesture, protagonist and proto-terrorist Christie recalls something that occurs not in his narrative, 
EXWLQWKHSK\VLFDOSDJHVRIWKHERRNFRQWDLQLQJLWµ&KULVWLHILUVWFRQVLGHUHGWKDWDOLPLWHGWDFWLFDO
nuclear weapon of a type similar to that referred to on page 111 [of the novel] would be most 
VXLWDEOHIRU>KLV@SXUSRVH¶B S Johnson 2001: 171). So, while certainly conscious that his was an 
DWRPLFDJH-RKQVRQ¶VSUHRFFXSDWLRQZLWKZDUVWHPPHGLQVWHDGIURPWKDWSUH-Cold-War time 
when nuclear power was first harnessed: World War 2. 
$ERUQDQGEUHG/RQGRQHU-RKQVRQ¶VHYDFXDWLRQDt school age from the city during the 
Blitz generated his interest in war and its effects upon the civilian population. War pervades 
much of his oeuvre, both as a topic and a site of trauma, a constant coming to terms with it. From 
the memory dredge that is the novel Trawl (1966), effectively a memoir of his evacuation, to the 
FRPSLODWLRQRIYDULRXVSHRSOH¶VUHFROOHFWLRQVRIWKHSHULRGThe Evacuees (1968), which Johnson 





surfaced again and again. Indeed, the nuclear spectre (including its temporal aspect) is briefly 
mentioned in a rare instance of seriousness by Johnson in his Introduction to The Evacueesµ,W
had never been necessary before, and there will not be time IRULWLQDQXFOHDUZDUHYDFXDWLRQ¶B 
S Johnson 1968: 9). Johnson goes on to explain the circumstances and logistics of the relocation 
programme, but constantly focuses on how painful it all was despite the ultimately life-preserving 
goal, and the manner in which he concludes the Introduction highlights his almost radical 
ambivalence towards wartime memories: 
 
Evacuation undoubtedly did result in the saving of life. The figure of 60,595 civilians who died in 
the bombing of British cities would certainly have been increased without it. Whether the number 
of lives saved was worth the psychological damage to several million schoolchildren is one of 
those unanswerable questions of balance which war throws up. 
(B S Johnson 1968: 20) 
 
µ8QDQVZHUDEOH¶SHUKDSVEXt questions wrestled with interminably and in a variety of manners by 
Johnson, such as in another edited collection, All Bull: The National Servicemen (1973), or more 
WRWKHSXUSRVHKHUHµ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶ 
In his Preface to the anthologization RI-RKQVRQ¶VVKRUWHUSURVHDQGGUDPDWLWOHGWell 
Done God! (2013) ± which includes the Introduction to The Evacuees DQGµ0HDQ3RLQWRI
,PSDFW¶± co-editor Coe claims the latter µSURFHHGVIURPD>«@FRQWUDSXQWDOGHYLFH¶DQGLV one 
µRI>-RKQVRQ¶V@ILQHVWSLHFHVRIZRUNLQDQ\PHGLXP³0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW´EULOOLDQWO\
juxtaposes the building of a cathedral in medieval France with its destruction by aerial 
ERPEDUGPHQWLQWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU¶&RH[LLLIt is strange that, given his high praise 
here, WKHUHGRHVQRWDSSHDUWREHHYHQRQHUHIHUHQFHWRµ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶LQ&RH¶V
otherwise comprehensive Like a Fiery Elephant. I also cannot find anything within the story 
LWVHOIWRLQGLFDWHGHILQLWLYHO\WKDWLWLVµVHW¶LQ)UDQFHRULQHLWKHUWKHPHGLHval or WW2 periods. 
However, these are still fair assumptions if some of the historical features are taken less as facts 
WKDQDVV\PEROLFFOXHV)RUH[DPSOHµ(OLDVRI&DHQ¶RUµ0DJLVWHU(OLDV¶B S Johnson 1973a: 45) 
might serve as a composite character, mostly based on Master Elias of Dereham, who in the 
thirteenth cHQWXU\GLGLQGHHGZRUNDW6DOLVEXU\DVWKHVWRU\¶V(OLDVGLGDQGVSHQWVRPHWLPHLQ
exile in France too (Cf. Vincent 2004). Tew sketches out another potential clue to this riddle:  
 
The irony of the passage is that Caen was destroyed by allied bombardment and bombing during 
the liberation of France [during WW2], a curious accident to history that Johnson uses as an 
intersection inserted into his narrative of its grandeur and significance as architectural and cultural 







(Tew 2001: 233) 
 




aforementioned use of the same. Just as the bullet sections in Corpsing offer a re-evaluation of 
QDUUDWLYHWLPHDQGKRZWKLVXOWLPDWHO\UHODWHVWRGHDWKWKHµFRQWUDSXQWDOGHYLFH¶GHVFULEHGE\
Coe affords Johnson a ballistically-informed wa\RIUHFDOFXODWLQJDV7HZSXWVLWµWKHPHDQSRLQW
for a variety of lives and periods across the historical divide¶ 7KRXJKQRWVSHFLILFDOO\DµQXFOHDU¶
WH[WSHUVHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHPLVVLOHVWULNHRUFKHVWUDWHGWKURXJKRXWµ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶
E\µ%$7&20¶RU%DWWDOLRQ&RPPDQG± DQGWKHXQNQRZQSLORWZKRFODLPVWRµjust fire and 
KRSHLW¶VQRWDVFLHQFHOLNHWKH\PDNHRXWLWLV¶B S Johnson 1973a: 49; original emphasis) ± is 
WKDWWKLVLVH[DFWO\KRZWKHVWRU\KLQJHVRQ'HUULGD¶VODVWPLVVLOHPLVVLYHLQµ1R$SRFDO\SVH«¶
µThe name of nuclear war is the name of the first war which can be fought in the name of the 
name alone, that is, of everything and of nothing¶'HUULGDRULJLQDOHPSKDVLV7KH
PHDQSRLQWRILPSDFWLQ-RKQVRQ¶VVKRUWSLHFHoccurs both at its beginning and its end, the 
GHVWUXFWLRQRILWVFHQWUDOµFKDUDFWHU¶ which is in fact a cathedral and precisely what allows the 
history of its construction to be told. 
'HUULGD¶VILQDOPLVVLOHPLVVLYHVRIRFXVHGRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSRIQXFOear war to war in 
JHQHUDODQGPRVWLPSRUWDQWO\WRQDPLQJOHDGVRQWRWKHHVVD\¶VXQFDQQ\FRQFOXGLQJVWDWHPHQW
µ7KHQDPHRIWKHPDQWRZKRPKHZDVVSHDNLQJWKHRQHZKRZDVDSSRLQWHGWRVHQGPHVVDJHV
WRGHOLYHUWKHVHYHQPHVVDJHVZDV-RKQ¶'HUULGD 31). As Sprod points out, this mysterious 
final passage refers to an  
 
DSRFDO\SWLFWUDGLWLRQRIOLWHUDWXUH>«@VWDUWHGE\WKH%RRNRI5HYHODWLRQZKLFKZDVDPLVVLYH
which St John sent to the seven churches of Asia Minor. [Thus Derrida foreshadows] the 
importance of experimental literature and the place of the [missive, but also] explicitly ties it to an 
apocalyptic tradition beyond the idea of total nuclear destruction as some sort of secular 
apocalypse, such as Marxism, socialism, or in some ways fascism. 
(Sprod 2012: 125±126, note 29) 
 
0XFKKDVEHHQPDGHRI-RKQVRQ¶VGLVWDVWHDWEHLQJFDOOHGDQµH[SHULPHQWDO¶ZULWHURXWOLQHGVR
eloquently in the Introduction to $UHQ¶W<RX5DWKHU<RXQJWREH:ULWLQJ<RXU0HPRLUV (Cf. B S 
Johnson 1973b: 19±20), but it seemVXQGHQLDEOHWKDW6SURG¶VPHQWLRQRIµVRPHVRUWRIVHFXODU






experimentation alongside remorseless rejection of poor work, and thus the confluence of a 
destructive and creative moment.68 
7KLVLVWKHPHDQSRLQWRILPSDFWWKDWLQ'HUULGDXQFDQQLO\HQGVµ1R
$SRFDO\SVH«¶ZLWKWKHDSRFDO\SWLFUHYHODWLRQRI-RKQZKLOH-RKQVRQ 14 years previously begins 
µ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶ZLWKWKHFUHDWLYHZLOORIDQRWKHU-RKQ(OLDV¶VHPSOR\HUWKDW\HDUV
DIWHU-RKQVRQ¶VSURVHSLHFH/LWWDOPRVWLQHYLWDEO\UHSHDWVWKHEDOOLVWLFVORZLQJGRZQDQG
speeding up of text and death in Corpsing, as if Johnson knew he was to come; that it was 
-RKQVRQ¶VDSSUHFLDWLRQDQGGUHDGRIWKHFRPLQJFKDRVRIWKHSRVVLELOLW\DQGLURQ\RIWKH
destruction by friendly-fire of a cathedral, that allows him to write the history of its building, or 
as co-editor Julia Jordan puts it in her Foreword to Well Done God!µLI-RKQVRQFDQEHVDLGWREH
reading contingency backwards, he is also concerned with its forward trajectory; one of his great 
WKHPHVFRXOGEHGHVFULEHGDVDNLQGRISUROHSWLFDQ[LHW\¶-RUGDQ[YLii). Across and 
through space and time, in writing and beyond death, traced in the trajectories both backwards 
and forwards of various missiles, texts and lives ± and perhaps even with some prescient and 
µSUROHSWLFDQ[LHW\¶DERXWZKHQWKHVHZRUGV,DPZULWing will be read, that they will outlive me in 
the mind/brain of someone else reading them ± this is the mean point of impact.69 







exasperatingly pronounced as it has been more recently, or because Johnson is quite wilfully employing the term ironically. My 
IHHOLQJLVKLVVRFLDOSUHVFLHQFHWRVRPHGHJUHHWKHPDWL]HGLQµ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶DQGKLVVRPHZKDWIUDFWLRXVUHODWLRQVKLp with 
academia mean that Johnson may well have been aiming somewhere in between these two possibilities. 
 
69
 ,QVRPHZD\V7KRPDV3\QFKRQ¶VQRYHO*UDYLW\¶V5DLQERZ could be considered an extended rumination on the relationship 
between ballistics and literature. This is appreciable not only in its discussions of (and digressions from) trajectories in rocketry, but in 
WKHVSUDZOLQJQRYHO¶VRZQQDUUDWLYHWUDMHFWRU\DQGIRUP7KDWWKLVPLUURUVZKDW,KDYHEHHQVD\LQJDERXWµ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶LV
demonstrated neatly and microcosmically when in *UDYLW\¶V5DLQERZ, pacifist aerodynamics expert and Zen practitioner Fahringer 
JXLOWLO\EOXUWVRXWµ'R\RXILQGLWDOLWWOHVFKL]RLG>«@EUHDNLQJDIOLJKWSURILOHXSLQWRVHJPHQWVRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\",WZas half bullet, 
half arrow. It demanded this, wHGLGQ¶W6R3HUKDSV\RXXVHGDULIOHDUDGLRDW\SHZULWHU6RPHW\SHZULWHUVLQ:KLWHKDOOLQWKH
Pentagon, killed more civilians than our little A4 [rocket] could have ever hoped to. You are either alone absolutely, alone with your 
own death, or you taNHSDUWLQWKHODUJHUHQWHUSULVHDQG\RXVKDUHLQWKHGHDWKVRIRWKHUV$UHZHQRWDOORQH"¶3\QFKRQ±






Speed versus Timing: Rhizomes, Frog Pistols and Military Neuroscience 
 
 
:LWKWKLVZHLJKLQJKHDY\XSRQDQ\ERG\¶VVKRXOGHUV± the unnerving ballistic insights of 
literature into the compressed, looping nature of space-time ± it is a fitting moment for a brief 
story interlude:  
 
It had worked! A loud explosion echoed around the valley and a satisfyingly enormous cloud of 
grey smoke enveloped the excited boys. The blast had almost knocked them off the orchard wall. 
The thick wooden barrel of the cannon had remained intact, but the tacks and cobblestones that 
the boys had selected as projectiles had vanished. It was soon to become apparent where they had 
gone. The billowing plume slowly cleared and Santiago and his comrades were greeted by the 
ZRQGHUIXOVLJKWRIWKHGHYDVWDWLRQWKH\KDGH[DFWHGRQWKHLUWDUJHW7KHQHLJKERXU¶VEHDXWLIXOQHZ
garden gate was torn into tiny splinters, and the proud gateway was now filled with nothing but its 
angry owner, soon to launch himself toward his tormentors with immense ferocity. The 
cobblestones were soon flying in the other direction, albeit with slightly less speed, but a few of 
them clipped the boys as they fled into the Iberian afternoon. 
One boy, Santiago, was caught, and as the manufacturer of the homemade artillery, he 
had to bear the brunt of the punishment. The mayor was soon informed of his explosive 
misdemeanour and the eleven-year-old was soon locked in the local prison cell, a stinking and 
cockroach-infested pit into which the locals peered and yelled through a small barred window. His 
father was fully in favour of this punishment, and the boy was allowed to languish in the small 
rural prison for four days and nights with neither food nor water. Even the cockroaches had started 
to look succulent by the time his mother and aunts started to smuggle meat and pies to the captive. 
Some youngsters learn slowly, however, and on his eventual release Santiago would redouble his 
attempts at cannonry, although the next weapon was to destroy itself rather than any intended 
target. It also sent a sliver of brass deep into his eye, tearing through his iris to leave a permanent 
scar. 
(Bainbridge 2008: 93±94) 
 
One might be forgiven for thinking, at least for the majority of the first paragraph of this short 
QDUUDWLYHWKDWWKLVZDVDQRWKHUH[WUDFWIURP/LWW¶Vdeadkidsongs. After all, it concerns a group of 









Indeed, it is actually popular science writer 'DYLG%DLQEULGJH¶VDFFRXQWRIDQHSLVRGHLQ
WKHHDUO\OLIHRI6DQWLDJR5DPyQ\&DMDOµ,WKDGZRUNHG¶DUHWKHRSHQLQJZRUGVRIWKHVHFRQGRI
three parts in The Zonules of Zinn: A Fantastic Journey Through Your Brain (2008). They 
UHSUHVHQWDµ(XUHND¶PRPHQWLQ&DMDO¶VOLIHEXWDVFDQEHDSSUHFLDWHGLQWKHTXRWDWLRQQRWLQKLV
stellar career as histologist and neuroanatomist. This explosive moment, so explosively 
H[FODLPHGLQ%DLQEULGJH¶VZRUGVFRPHVWRXQGHUSLQDQGWKXVFKDUJHLQLWVYLYLGO\EDOOLVWLFDQG
bellicose terms, this chapter on Cajal. The chapter opens the centrepiece section of the book, 
FRORXUIXOO\HQWLWOHGµ$Q$VVDXOWRQWKH6HQVHV¶,QWXUQWKHILQDOFKDSWHULQWKHVHFWLRQ± in which 
Bainbridge recounts helping a colleague and friend with a fMRI experiment, thus having to 
announce any piece of metal that had pierced him in his lifetime and which could affect the 
PDFKLQH¶VPDJQHW± LVVXEWLWOHGµ6KUDSQHODQG0DJQHWV¶*LYLQJVRPHWKRXJKWWRZK\DQ\VXFK
metallic trace might be in him, Bainbridge cheerily attests that he has no body jewellery, but in 
DGGLWLRQµ$OWKRXJK,IHHO,KDve lived a full life so far, I have not to my knowledge been 
showered by shrapnel in a combat sitXDWLRQ¶%DLQEULGJH±2). As he reminds the reader 
MXVWEHIRUHWKLVµ7KHPLGGOHSDUWRIWKLVERRNUHDOO\KDVEHHQDQDVVDXOWRQWKHVHQVHV¶
220). Cumulatively, these instances become more than an attempt to overwhelm or analyse the 
sensory organs, the double meaning Bainbridge is aiming for, and actually evoke a modern, 
technologized assault. Warfare and ballistics clearly pervade this middle third of his book, and 
the way Bainbridge introduces Cajal allows one to interpret a gleefully explosive formative 
experience of the so-called father of modern neuroscience as something that then carried through 
into the resulting field ± a suggestion that the field is foundationally ballistic. 
 7KHµSHUPDQHQWVFDU¶&DMDOUHFHLYHGDVD\RXWKDIWHUµUHGRXEOLQJKLVDWWHPSWVDW
FDQQRQU\¶LVLQGHHGVRPHWKLQJKHWRRNZLWKKLPLQWRKLVODWHUFDUHHUDQHYHU-present reminder of 
the need for speed motivating a man BaiQEULGJHLURQLFDOO\LPSOLHVZDVDVORZOHDUQHU&DMDO¶V
undiminished fascination with the violent speed of the cannon contrasts sharply with the slow 
violence of his punishment, and that Cajal copes with the latter at all is testament to his hard-
headed commitment to the ideal of speed, even when faced with the languorous prospect of a 
repeat stint in prison. This as a young boy, too, shows an early ingrained obstinacy, not an 
inability to learn quickly. Most children play war in an unserious manner, but just as with the 
protagonists of /LWW¶Vdeadkidsongs, for Cajal it was no doubt a real and important manifestation 
of an obsession with the exciting, explosive swiftness of near-instant annihilation. That Cajal had 
the intellect, concentration and patience for his undoubtedly glittering scientific research career 
cannot be questioned ± that he had a life-long taste for the eruptive pace of the Eureka moment, 
DV%DLQEULGJHVXJJHVWVLVSHUKDSVVSHFXODWLYH%XWLWLVLQWHUHVWLQJQRQHWKHOHVVJLYHQ&DMDO¶V
fomentation of a modern neuroscience centred on the neuron doctrine he so fiercely defended ± 





 Is there any reason to think that Cajal was alone in this impulse to the fast and the fiery, 
or is it at the heart of any other (or all) scientific effort? Speculating about Cajal is one thing, but 
there is no doubt at all that Oliver Sacks and speed are intimately related, and this is because he 
H[SOLFLWO\VD\VVRLQKLVDUWLFOHµ6SHHG¶ 
 
As a boy, I was fascinated by speed, the wild range of speeds in the world around me. People 
moved at different speeds; animals much more so. The wings of insects moved too fast to see 
>«@2XUSHWWRUWRLVHZKLFKFRXOGWDNHDQHQWLUHGD\WRFURVVWKHODZQVHHPHGWROLYHLQD
different time frame altogether. But what then of the movement of plants? I would come down to 
the garden in the morning and find the hollyhocks a little higher, the roses more entwined around 
their trellis, but, however patient I was, I could never catch them moving. 
(Sacks 2004: 60) 
 
6DFNV¶VFKDUPLQJDUWLFOHGHVFULEHVKRZWU\LQJWRµFDWFKWKHPPRYLQJ¶ or to slow down the blur 
of insect wings to the point of visibility, led him to consider time-bending possibilities. This first 
involved photography, and later the literary works of authors such as H G Wells, both permitting 
alternative frames through which to perceive speed, time and the natural world. 
&RQQHFWLQJWKHQHDUQHVVLQERWKVSLULWDQGSHULRGRI:HOOV¶VHDUO\VFLHQFHILFWLRQZULWLQJ
and the nascent cinema of the late nineteenth century, this then brings Sacks to another important 
FRQWHPSRUDU\RIWKHWZRZKLFK6DFNVGLVFRYHUHGODWHUDWXQLYHUVLW\:LOOLDP-DPHV¶VVHPLQDO
The Principles of Psychology (1890). The particular chapter in James that interests Sacks is of 
FRXUVHµ7KH3HUFHSWLRQRI7LPH¶ZKHUHLQ-DPHVVSHFXODWHVRQZKDWOLIHZRXOGEHOLNHKRZLW
would be perceived, by one for whom time moved at an altogether different rate than normal. 
James vividly describes some potential consequences: 
 
Mushrooms and the swifter-growing plants will shoot into being so rapidly as to appear 
instantaneous creations; annual shrubs will rise and fall from the earth like restlessly boiling-water 
springs; the motions of animals will be as invisible as are to us the movements of bullets and 
cannon-balls; the sun will scour through the sky like a meteor, leaving a fiery trail behind him, 
etc. 
(Cited in Sacks 2004: 62) 
 
The rhythms of natural phenomena are mirrored in the ability to visually process them; the ebb 
and flow of small- and large-scale physical and biological events depend in this reading upon the 
human capacity to measure and record them, which, as Sacks comments in conclusion to his 
article, is aided, sped up and these days even dictated by the development of ever more elaborate 





So it is interesting that in the passage quoted from James, so full of natural imagery of 
the fast-moving and glacially-slow alike, the only human-made items, sticking out like sore 
trigger fiQJHUVDUHµEXOOHWVDQGFDQQRQ-balls¶ The desire to see what is normally too fast or too 
slow is a desire for mastery over a human inability, and ballistics is the only metaphor (in 
-DPHV¶VFDVHVSHFLILFDOO\DVLPLOHWKDWSRWHQWLDOO\UHSUHVHQWVWKLVPDVWery. This is also, no doubt, 
UHIOHFWHGLQWKHVXSHUVZLIWQHVVRIµSODQWV>WKDW@ZLOOshoot LQWREHLQJVRUDSLGO\¶WKDWWKH\HPXODWH
weapons that shoot (bullets) into beings almost instantaneously ± the danger of guns reflected in 
the potential agricultural endgame of engineering such fast-growing plants, which perhaps masks 
current concerns over the dangers of genetically modified crops, over-farming and possible 
JOREDOIRRGVKRUWDJHVLQWKHIXWXUH7KHµVKRRW¶RIDSODQWDWKLQJDVFRPPRQSODFHDVFDQEH
nevertheless encompasses an expression that belies its own speed, languorously slow under 
normal circumstances but coming neatly into line with immensely increased ballistic speed in 
-DPHV¶VZD\RISXWWLQJLW 
As Sacks remarks, all the examples he uses in the opening part of his article have 
something of a cinematic quality, of time-lapse photography and slow-motion action sequences. 
The unavoidable corollary of his observations lends greater significance to the fact that if neurons 
fire, it is also true that, like plants, film-PDNHUVDOVRµVKRRW¶WKHLUVFHQHVLQWREHLQJ7KHDFWRI
creation occludes an explosive beginning and a ballistic trajectory. Whether this beginning and 
trajectory are cause for concern or celebration is still up in the air; but given that airing this issue 
at all is rare (the rarity itself a further issue for consternation), its consideration is hampered by a 
regulative norm that equally wishes flights of fancy and of bullets to come back down to earth 
and be grounded. This is what drives Deleuze and Guattari, taking their line on speed from 
Virilio, to see the botanical and ballistic interface of shooting as an opportunity, and encourage 
their readers WRµ0DNHUKL]RPHVQRWURRWVQHYHUSODQW'RQ¶WVRZJURZRIIVKRRWV'RQ¶WEHRQH
or multiple, be multiplicities! Run lines, never plot a point! Speed turns the point into a line! Be 
TXLFNHYHQZKHQVWDQGLQJVWLOO/LQHRIFKDQFHOLQHRIKLSVOLQHRIIOLJKW¶'HOHX]HDQG*XDWWDUL
1987: 24±5). This short quotation on their network-like FRQFHSWRIWKHµUKL]RPH¶LVXQGHQLDEO\
and typically convoluted, thick with variable meanings dependent upon context, and it is clear 
that doing justice to it fully (if at all possible) would take much more space than permissible here.  




instruction not to plot the static reference points of a map, but to instead draw a continuous set of 
lines (or just one) making up a labyrinth) ± the linHVRIµFKDQFH¶ µKLSV¶DQGµIOLJKW¶± may well 





speed and chance relying on the swift assumption of the correct body position and the true flight 
of the bulOHW$WILUVWµEHTXLFNHYHQZKHQVWDQGLQJVWLOO¶FDQVHHPSDUDGR[LFDOEXWQRWLIDVLQ
WKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLWFDQEHUHZULWWHQDVµEHTXLFNRUEHGHDG¶± let the brain and arm be quick 
even if the feet are not. Recalling the abovementioned intertwining fates of two such duellists, the 






Even if their stance in the above quotation is endlessly reinterpretable, what Deleuze and 
Guattari do demonstrate is a fundamental undecidability underlying human attitudes to speed. 
Whether regarding the slowness of the rhizome or the quickness of a bullet, whosoever 
influences speed in either direction exerts that influence over matters of life and death, 
nothingness and genesis from the void ± ZKLFKLVZK\LQIOXHQFHRYHUµVSHHGWXUQVWKHSRLQWLQWRD
line¶ Controlling the rate at which plants grow, or at which people are able to adequately 
perceive the world: these are things that are in some sense desirable to humanity, but also 
possibly dangerous if the control goes unchecked by those segments of society themselves not 
quite up to speed. This is because any supposed altruistic, generative or productive intention 
XQGHUO\LQJWKHFRQWURORYHUVSHHGLVEXWDZKLVNHU¶VEUHDGWKDZD\IURPEHLQJMXVWDVPHQDFLQJ
and destructive. Speed instantiates itself here in a number of sometimes contradictory ways. The 
inability to think through such a crucial, risk-laden dilemma quickly enough to make the correct 
decision is the irony within the human conundrum of speed. Acting and thinking need to keep 
pace with each other, because lives may depend upon it, which ironically may sometimes result 
in inactivity ± to keep from acting, to slow down the unfolding of events, is still a reflection of a 
GHVLUHWRFRQWUROVSHHG7RUHFDOORQFHDJDLQKHUHWKHDERYHPHQWLRQHGZRUGVRI/RWPDQµWKH
moment of explosion createVDQXQSUHGLFWDEOHVLWXDWLRQ¶/RWPDQZKHUHDVQRWDFWLQJ
neither pushing the boat out nor pushing the button, so to speak, may prevent the creation of a 
positive situation but may equally prevent a killing. 
On this reading, delaying the moment of explosion, therefore, produces predictability. 
This applies as much to nervous individual duellists as it does to larger units of people and even 
global superpowers as they tensely, hesitatingly contemplate full-scale wars. As Deleuze and 
Guattari write, 
 
the war machine possesses as much weight and gravity as it does speed (the distinction between 
the heavy and the light, the dissymmetry between defence and attack, the opposition between rest 






abstracted as the property of a projectile, a bullet or artillery shell, which condemns the weapon 
itself, and the soldier, to immobility (for example, immobility in the First World War). 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 396±397) 
 
Sometimes the manifestation of speed, when it comes to war, is actually paralysis. Or a total lack 
of speed, such as in the decision not to act, to remain completely immobile, could itself still be 
considered the ultimate form of mastery over speed ± and as shown by each wave of soldiers 
going over the top in the First World War, interrupting that immobility can simply result in 
unadulterated carnage rather than any further domination over speed. 
Whichever way one comes down on it, speed is a complicated notion, far from self-
evident as might at first be assumed. The human impulse to understand speed comes very much 
under the banner of trying to master its complexities. If, then, this pervasive compulsion extends 
to the study of the brain, it is hardly surprising. When nineteenth-century pioneers of physiology 
such as Hermann von Helmholtz and Emil du Bois-Reymond were unable to fully comprehend 
how electrical signals in the nervous system related to the realms of thought and motor action, 
then at least they could seek to measure these things, and take it from there. Indeed, they and 
others set out to measure the very speed of thought. As Carl Zimmer notes in an article itself 
WLWOHGµ7KH6SHHGRI7KRXJKW¶ that the everyday, unquestioned, immediate process of thinking 
even had a speed to speak of, let alone one that could be expressed in numbers and compared 
with other speeds (or other things in general), was XWWHUO\EL]DUUHµ7KHQRWLRQWKDWWKHVSHHGRI
thought was as measurable as the density of a rock was shocking [because it] clashed with 
SHRSOH¶VJXWLQVWLQFWWKDWWKH\H[SHULHQFHGWKHZRUOGDVLWKDSSHQHGZLWKQRODJEHWZHHQ
VHQVDWLRQDQGDZDUHQHVV¶=LPmer 2010: 66). But Zimmer points out that by analogy with the 
then-burgeoning technology of the telegraph, such scientists had a good reason for questioning 
WKHWKHUHWRIRUHLQYLRODEOHSUHVXPSWLRQRIWKRXJKW¶VLQVWDQWDQHLW\7HOHJUDSK\VLPLODUO\GLG
something considered impossible, which induced widespread incredulity despite its genuine 
efficacy, but still did so at an appreciable, measurable rate. 
:KHQLWFRPHVWRWKRXJKWKRZHYHUWKHIDFWWKDWWKLVJDSRUµODJEHWZHHQVHQVDWLRQDQG
DZDUHQHVV¶KDVLQGHHG proved to measurably exist, has neither reduced an instinctive disbelief at 
the state of affairs, nor the scientific ardour to somehow bridge that gap. As mentioned earlier, 
Zimmer notes that despite increased understanding in the present day, not just of neural speeds 
EXWDOVRZK\WKH\DUHVRFRQFHSWXDOO\PHWULFDOO\FKDOOHQJLQJµUHVHDUFKHUVKDYHEHHQWU\LQJWR
get more precise results ever since, [even though] today it is clear why they have had such a hard 
WLPH¶=LPPHU7KHFRQWLQXHGLQFUHGXlity and fascination with the issue of brain speed 






processes and desires eloquently summed up by Douglas Hofstadter:  
 
We are used to the rigidity of our physiology: the fact we cannot, at will, cure ourselves of 
diseases, or grow hair of any colour ± to mention just a couple of simple examples. We can, 
KRZHYHUµUHSURJUDP¶ our minds so that we operate in new conceptual frameworks. The amazing 
flexibility of our minds seems nearly irreconcilable with the notion that our brains must be made 
out of fixed-rule hardware, which cannot be reprogrammed. We cannot make our neurons fire 
faster and slower, we cannot rewire our brains, we cannot redesign the interior of a neuron, we 
cannot make any choices about the hardware ± and yet, we can control how we think. 
(Hofstadter 2000: 302; original emphasis) 
 
How is it possible that people can create larger, faster, more powerful and more sophisticated 
weapons (and create them ever more rapidly and efficiently); or how is it possible that with an 
DPD]LQJHIIRUWOHVVQHVVµZHFDQFRQWUROKRZZHWKLQN¶\HWVWLOOµZHFDQQRWPDNHRXUQHXURQVILUH
IDVWHU¶"7KHWULXPSKDQWURXWLQHO\VXFFHVVIXORQZDUGPDUFKWRFRORQL]HVSDFHDQGWLPHILQds 
here its gallingly banal roadblock. 
For the time being, measuring brain speeds continues to represent an impossible yet 
yearning pursuit to find a chink in the armour of this perennial conundrum. Understanding, 
coming to accept and eventually superseding the telegraph has long since been accomplished; 
how could the same not be true of the relationship between neural chatter and thought? It is the 
indefatigable energy devoted to this cause which sadly obscures the very real problematics of 
ballistic metaphors in brain science. It seems to me that taking a couple of steps back and starting 
DJDLQZLWKRXWWKHDSULRULDVVXPSWLRQRIµILULQJQHXURQV¶ZRXOGEHWKHEHVWZD\WRDWWHPSWWR
disarm this tendency. So to follow suit here, a brief return to Zimmer and telegraphy in the 
nineteenth century. His observation that the development of long distance communication 
technologies was influential upon scientific models for the mind and brain is not unique (for 
example, Cf. Winter 1998; Noakes 1999). However, it is subtly interesting that he posits a kind of 
evolutionary reason why speed is vital to the way organisms work, subtle because it also implies 
a reason why speed dominated the inevitably reflexive way the early physiologists took ballistic 
militarism for grantHGLQWKHLUWKLQNLQJDERXWWKRXJKWLWVHOIµ7KHQHHGIRUVSHHGLQWKHQHUYRXV
system is not hard to understand. Many animals depend on their nerves to sense danger and to 
escape from predators; the predators, in turn, depend on their nerves to mount a fast DWWDFN¶
(Zimmer 2010: 67). The so-FDOOHGµQHHGIRUVSHHG¶ present in predators and prey alike, is perhaps 
ballistically couched because to claim dominion over thought, over how quickly signals travel 
oxymoronically huge yet tiny distances, ultimately translates to true dominion over defence and 
attack ± with the contemporaneous evolutionary argument playing out to back this up. It is at 





material, physical and capable of being used to dominate and lead ± or of being used as a 
weapon.  
A case in point is that of the proto-electrophysiologist du Bois-Reymond. His biographer 
Gabriel Finkelstein relates WKDWKHµGHYLVHGFODVVURRPDLGV>«@HDFKRIZKLFKZDVDQDQVZer to 
the problem of conveying laboratory experience to large audiences. Such talent in teaching 
HQDEOHGKLPWRWUDLQDQHQWLUHJHQHUDWLRQRIVFLHQWLVWV¶)LQNHOVWHLQ:LWKRXW
HODERUDWLRQ)LQNHOVWHLQOLVWVVHYHUDORIWKHVHLQQRFXRXVVHHPLQJµFOassroom aids¶ though some 
are vividly imaginable, sounding either usefully illustrative, or amusing, or both ± WKHµWZLWFK
WHOHJUDSK¶RUWKHµIURJDODUP¶IRUH[DPSOH,ELG+RZHYHUWKHRQHWKDWUHDOO\VWDQGVRXWLVWKH
µIURJSLVWRO¶ This physical insWDQFHRIEDOOLVWLFVFLHQFH¶VMX[WDSRVLWLRQZLWKVFLHQFHRIWKH
nervous system was apparently named by the very students it was designed to teach, according to 
DUHFHQWH[KLELWLRQLQ/RQGRQ¶V6FLHQFH0XVHXP curated by historian Phil Loring, and this shows 
that du Bois-5H\PRQG¶VVWXGHQWV at least had no qualms with this material combination of the 
two fields. This exhibition, which ran from December 2013 to October 2014 and was entitled 
µ0LQG0DSV6WRULHVIURP3V\FKRORJ\¶&I5H\HV-Peschl 2014), describes this amphibian-based 
JXQWKXVµ$QHZO\GLVVHFWHGIURJOHJZDVSODFHGLQVLGHWKHJODVVWXEHZLWKLWVQHUYHVWKUHDGHG
through the metal clips at the end. Pressing one of the ivory keys made the leg kick, 
demonstrating that contact between different types of PHWDOJHQHUDWHGDFXUUHQWLQQHUYHV¶,WLV
on the basis of just such a demonstration that du Bois-5H\PRQG¶VPDMRULPSRUWDQFHUHVWV 
$FFRUGLQJWR)LQNHOVWHLQµGX%RLV-Reymond solved the problem of contact electricity, 
set forth a program of biological reduction, and demonstrated the electrical nature of nerve 
signals. In a little less than two years ± from March, 1841 to January, 1843 ± he created the 
GLVFLSOLQHRIHOHFWURSK\VLRORJ\¶)LQNHOVWHLQ+RZHYHULWLVFOHDUO\QRWMXVWWKHSK\VLFDO
principle, but the manner in which it was explained that marked him out. This is indeed 
something that Finkelstein stresses, namely du Bois-5H\PRQG¶VSDVVLRQIRUUKHWRULFDQG
SHUVXDVLRQDQGLVDWWHVWHGWR\HWIXUWKHUE\VWULNLQJPDWHULDODUWHIDFWVOLNHWKHµIURJSLVWRO¶ZKLFK
he memorably used to back up his stance. Even if his students named it, he still consciously 
GHVLJQHGWKHµIURJSLVWRO¶WRH[SOLFLWO\ORRNOLNHDJXQDVVRFLDWLQJEDOOLVWLFV, nerves and brains 
forever in the minds of the future scientists who studied under him. And as Finkelstein covers in 
his biography, in his day du Bois-Reymond was a hugely important figure on a number of fronts, 
lecturing publicly on a wide range of things, and therefore influential beyond the halls of 
academia. 
This leads Finkelstein to tacitly but tellingly question his own concise summary of du 
Bois-5H\PRQG¶VDFKLHYHPHQWVµ7KDW¶VWKHVKRUWYHUVLRQRIGX%RLV-5H\PRQG¶VLQQRYDWLRQ:H





case of du Bois-5H\PRQGKRZHYHUWKHWUXWKLVFORVHUWRWKLVWKRVHZKRZULWHKLVWRU\ZLQ¶
)LQNHOVWHLQµ:LQQLQJ¶ZKDWH[DFWO\LVQRWH[SODLQHGEXWLWFHUWDLQO\SDLQWVWKH
Prussian scientist as competitive at least, if not downright combative. Between writing history 
and inventing powerful pedagogic tools, du Bois-5H\PRQG¶VXWPRVWHPLQHQFHLVFRORXUIXOO\
painted by Finkelstein: 
 
The significance of du Bois-5H\PRQG¶VLQVWUXPHQWVHVFDSHGKLV)UHQFKDQG(QJOLVKFROOHDJXHVDW
first, but within a generation even du Bois-5H\PRQG¶VVFeptics adopted his methods. In fact, it 
ZRXOGQ¶WEHWKDWPXFKRIDVWUHWFKWRGHVFULEHWKHKLVWRU\RIQHXURVFLHQFHLQWKHLPDJHRIGX%RLV-
Reymond: a march of technological progress from the galvanometer to the optogenetic sensor, all 
originating in table-top experiments that he carried out with apparatus he built himself. 
Du Bois-5H\PRQG¶VLQVWUXPHQWDOPHWKRGVHPERGLHGDSRVLWLYLVWFRPPLWPHQWWR
measurement that permanently changed the practice of science. 
(Finkelstein 2015: 2) 
 
7KHVDOLHQFHRIWKLVPDQ¶VQHXURVFLHQWLILFOHJDF\FDQQRWEHXQGHUHVWLPDWHGLI)LQNHOVWHLQLVWREH
believed ± HVSHFLDOO\WKRVHEHORYHGµWDEOH-WRSH[SHULPHQWV¶DQGµLQVWUXPHQWDOPHWKRGV¶ like the 
µIURJSLVWRO¶ $GGLWLRQDOO\KLVµFRPPLWPHQWWRPHDVXUHPHQW¶FHUWDLQO\WDOOLHVZLWKWKHGRXEOHG
need for speed mentioned earlier, an inherent desire to claim dominion over that aspect of the 
body which developed in order to claim dominion over other creatures (or avoid being 
dominated, killed, rendered immobile and speedless).  
This focus on technological demonstrability, measurement and instrumentation brings its 
own issues, however. As Geoffrey N &DQWRUUHPDUNVLQFHUWDLQFLUFXPVWDQFHVµZHQHHGWR
interpret the [scientific or experimental] apparatus itself as the reification of a metaphor. In so 
doing we encounter a further use of metaphor for the historian of science, since metaphor is not 
confined to discourse or to texts but also takes on a materializeGIRUPLQLQVWUXPHQWV¶&DQWRU
1987: 140). His point is that a vehement eighteenth-century believer in, say, the idea that light 
consists of particles rather than waves, will design an experiment employing mechanical rather 
than optical apparatus, and the outcome is thus more likely to favour the original hypothesis. The 
same could no doubt be said of the nineteenth-century physiological employment of examples 
from ballistics. Experimental design can physically extend the tacit assumption of a guiding 
metaphor which then theoretically underlies the desired result from the start, Cantor claims, and 
afterwards the result is then also explained in the same metaphorical terms, all of this influencing 
the way further theories are composed, experiments designed, research conducted and science 
WDXJKWµ/LNHWKHWKLHILQWKHQLJKWPHWDSKRUZRUNVVLOHQWO\>«@7KHH[SHULPHQWVDQG






Even though nerve impulses move at a variety RIVSHHGV/RULQJ¶Vµ0LQG0DSV¶
H[KLELWLRQDOOXGHVWRDPXFKPRUHVWDEOHDQGXQLIRUPWUXWKµ+HOPKROW]IDPRXVO\DGDSWHGD
technique invented by military engineers to measure bullet velocity and proved nerve impulses 




knowledge, and thus providing a stern test of unscientific assumptions about nerve impulses, it 
was actually the towering superiority of military engineering over everyday thought that 
Helmholtz really proved ± WKXVV\PEROLFDOO\µDUWLFXODWLQJWKHNQRZQ¶UDWKHUWKDQDQ\WKLQJHOVH 
Unchecked and unexplored, the need for speed (neural or otherwise) extends outwards, 
from individuals to communities, to nations and military blocs, and even to a general way of 
talking and thinking and going about cultural life. Defending oneself becomes defending 
ourselves which in turn becomes the utterly reductive idea of Defence with a capital D. In some 
sense, the ballistic metaphor that underpins the widely accepted concept of neurons firing is born 
of a defensive violence, and carries through its violence into the assumptions of neuroscience. 
Militarism and domination go hand in hand with the discipline at the fundamental, conceptual 
level, so that it seems unworthy of report or simply unsurprising and natural that neuroscience 
should be funded in great part by governmental military agencies. Far-fetched as it may seem to 
some, neuroscience convolves in that it takes a metaphor to do with weaponry as its guide for 
practice in the real, everyday world, and then reproduces that metaphor in its disciplinary 
propagation, which more or less brings the circle back round ± but not quite. As Zimmer hints in 
his conclusion to the abovementioned article on measuring impulses in the nervous system, the 
QHHGIRUVSHHGZLOOQHYHUTXLWHEHHQRXJKµ:KHQ+HOPKROW]UHFRJQL]HGWKDWWKRXJKWPRYHVDWD
finite rate, faster than a bird but slower than sound, he missed a fundamental difference between 
the brain and a telegraph. In our heads, speed is not always the most important thing. Sometimes 
ZKDWUHDOO\PDWWHUVLVWLPLQJ¶=LPPHU8OWLPDWHO\DMXGLFLRXVXVHRIVSHHGRURIWKH
ballistic metaphor, comes down to knowing when not to be too swift, when not to increase 
YHORFLW\ZKHQWRWDNHRQH¶VWLPHDQGDOORZWKLQJVWRVLPSO\GHYHORSDQGZKHQQRWWREHWRR
quick to become defensive ± because as I have tried to show, there is a positive aspect to 
explosive metaphors which comes part and parcel of the generally negative, and vice versa. 
This commingled, chaotic DGPL[WXUHLVDWWKHKHDUWRI0DODERX¶VFRPPHQWDU\RQ
SODVWLFLW\DQGDOVRRI'HOHX]HDQG*XDWWDUL¶VWRXWLQJRIWKHUKL]RPHEXWWKHFRQYROYLQJQDWXUHRI







individual fluctuations ± is best expressed by Lotman: 
 
At the present moment, European civilisation (including America and Russia) is experiencing a 
period of general discreditation of the very idea of explosion. Humanity lived through a period 
between the eighteenth and twentieth Centuries which may be described as the realisation of the 
explosive metaphor wherein the image of explosion in popular consciousness came to be 
associated with gunpowder, dynamite and the nucleus of the atom rather than its potential as a 
philosophical construct. To the contemporary man, explosion as a phenomenon of physics, 
transferable to other processes only in the metaphorical sense has come to be associated with ideas 
of devastation and has turned into a symbol of destruction. But if, at the core of our contemporary 
representations, there lay the kind of associations that existed during periods of great openness 
such as the Renaissance or in art in general then our understanding of the concept of explosion 
would evoke in us such phenomena as the birth of a new living creature or any other creative 
transformation of the structure of life. 
(Lotman 2009: 10) 
 
In and of itself, the ballistic metaphor is neutral. It permits potentially enlightening, useful and 
creative knowledge of speed ± but just as easily it can provide for the sedulous over-
determination of a killing machine, the whole idea backfiring, with bullets trying to emulate the 
complexity, precision and speed of neurons. This is down to the steadfastly instrumental 
UDWLRQDOLW\WKDWLQWHUSUHWVH[SORVLRQLQOLWHUDOPDWHULDOWHUPVUDWKHUWKDQµDVDSKLORVRSKLFDO
construct¶ Indeed, in this reading Lotman seems to suggest that science could learn something 
imporWDQWIURPµDUWLQJHQHUDO¶ 
As has been discussed, literature has explored the potential of the ballistic metaphor, 
while neuroscience does not even seem to recognize it ± neuroscience does not even credit its 
entirely unmetaphorical ties with military technologies and defence strategy (these two so often 
VLPSO\WUDQVODWDEOHDVµSUHSDUDWLRQVIRUIXWXUHZDU¶,QDUHYLHZRIMXVWVXFKLVVXHVHQWLWOHG
µ1HXURVFLHQFH(WKLFVDQG1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\7KH6WDWHRIWKH$UW¶ Michael N Tennison and 
Jonathan D Moreno UHYHDOWKDWLQLQWKH86$DORQH'HSDUWPHQWRI'HIHQFHVSHQGLQJµWR
SXUVXHFRJQLWLYHQHXURVFLHQFHUHVHDUFK¶PRUHWKDQGRXEOHGWKDWRIVSHQGLQJRQWKH$UP\1DY\
and Air Force combined (Tennison and Moreno 2012: 1). They say that despite the goals of 
scientific research and the military often clashing, this does not necessarily stop scientists from 
(knowingly or otherwise) participating in DOD projects in order to pursue their own ends, which 
PLJKWEHFRQVWUXHGDVHWKLFDOO\SUREOHPDWLFµ$OWKRXJKWKH\may receive funding from national 






Moreno 2012: 3).70 
Their conclusions are that 
 
VFLHQWLVWVWKHPVHOYHVFRXOGEHFRPHPRUHDZDUHRI>«@ZKHWKHUWKHLUZRUNLVVSHFLILFDOO\IXQGHG
by national security bodies or not, in order to create a more self-conscious scientific enterprise. 
[Furthermore], neuroscientists could consider and promulgate their perspectives on the military 
implications and ethical issues associated with their work. 
(Tennison and Moreno 2012: 3) 
 
One of the co-authors of the quoted review, bioethicist Jonathan D Moreno, has himself served as 
an adviser to the US government in just such a capacity of consideration and promulgation. The 
problem when it comes to neuroscience, he suggests, is that while the potentially monumental 
outcomes are often loquaciously bandied about, by stark contrast, any talk of links with the 
military renders taciturn those same loquacious researchers and funders ± this despite much of the 
work being nonclassified, done in the public eye with no suggestion of foul play (and Moreno 
himself admitting to in no way trying to radicalize the field, nor even vaguely eliminate the idea 
of national security) (Cf. Moreno 2012). In many ways, it is probably the very positivity, or 
positivism of the overall neuroscientific project which obstructs widespread discussions of just 
such ethical conundrums, or thHSRWHQWLDOLQVLJKWVIURPRWKHUILHOGVVXFKDVOLWHUDWXUHRU/RWPDQ¶V
µDUWLQJHQHUDO¶ 
A similar set of concerns is displayed in E /'RFWRURZ¶VQRYHO$QGUHZ¶V%UDLQ (2014), 
which comically yet tragically satirizes the situation of a cognitive neuroscientist. The 
eponymous Andrew is the protagonist but unreliable narrator, a status further complicated by 
LQWHUMHFWLRQVIURPVRPHXQVSHFLILHGWKHUDSLVWEULQJLQJLQWRTXHVWLRQDOORI$QGUHZ¶VVWRU\$Q
unbelievably unlucky man, Andrew moves to a small college town in the USA to get away from 
a number of severe personal problems, and to teach his speciality. The steamrollering positivism 
mentioned above guides his didactic outlook: 
 
I was inspired to give the students only good news: how much neuroscience is advancing almost 
day by day. I was positive, always anticipating a resolved future of essential discoveries, it was 
the guarded optimism of the classroom, the assumption of any science course, that we would get 
to the truth eventually. I harked back to Whitman, who knew better than anybody what we are and 










VDQJRIµthe body electric.¶ How pleasing to those children to learn, body as brain and brain as 
ERG\WKDWLWDOOFDPHWRJHWKHU2IFRXUVH,ZRXOGQ¶WWHOOWKHPKHZDVDSRHW5XLQHYHU\WKLQJ 
(Doctorow 2014: 108) 
 
Never mind Walt :KLWPDQ¶VYDVWIDPH± if at all possible, why even risk arresting the onward 
march of neuroscience with the contribution of a mere poet? The ante is later upped, when 
Andrew for a short period becomes a consultant on matters of neuroscience to the then-President 
of the USA. 
7KLVVHFWLRQZKLFKOHDGVWRWKHERRN¶VPHODQFKROLFSDWKHWLFFRQFOXVLRQLVSDUWLFXODUO\
strange because it turns out, susceptible as he is to the vicissitudes of fate, that Andrew got the 
job because he had been roommates at university with the thinly veiled George W Bush. Andrew 
tells the shadowy but increasingly fractious and disbelieving off-screen therapist of a childish 
governmental boys¶ FOXEUXQE\WKH3UHVLGHQWQLFNQDPLQJKLVFORVHVWDGYLVHUVµ5XPEXP¶IRU 
Rumsfeld), Chaingang (for Cheney) and Android (for Andrew himself). Thrown in amongst this 
QRQVHQVLFDOFUHZZKRWDNHQDWLRQDOPDWWHUVOHVVVHULRXVO\DQGPDWXUHO\WKDQµ*DQJ¶LQ/LWW¶V
deadkidsongs, Andrew describes himself as unwittingly drawn into a constant game of puerile 
one-XSPDQVKLSDPHUHSDZQLQWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VFDELQHWFKDUDGHV7KHUHDVRQ$QGUHZODVWVVXFK
little time in the influential position correlates with the waning novelty to the President of a right-
hand neurological man, leading the bedraggled, star-crossed Andrew to finally snap:  
 
So there came that moment of realization and it was time to let them know who they were dealing 
ZLWK,JDYHWKHP$QGURLG¶VODVWOHFWXUHRQQHXURORJLFDOGHYHORSPHQWVDURXQGWKHZRUOG,WROG
them the great problem confronting neuroscience is how the brain becomes the mind. How that 
three-pound knitting ball makes you feel like a human being. I said we were working on it, and if 
they valued their lives, or life as they knew it, they would do well to divert whatever government 
funding there was for neuroscience and add it to the defence budget. More rockets, landmines, jet 
fighters ± all those things you love, I said. Because if we figure out how the brain gives us 
consciousness, we will have learned how to repliFDWHFRQVFLRXVQHVV>«@ 
6RZKDW\RXPHDQFRPSXWHUVZKRWDONEDFN"&KDLQJDQJVDLG,¶YHVHHQWKDWLQWKH
movies. Computers, of course, I said, and animals genetically developed to have more than the 
primary consciousness of animals. To have feelings, states of mind, memory, longing. He means 
like in Disney, Rumbum said, and they laughed. I laughed as well. Yes, I said, and with all of that 
WKHHQGRIWKHP\WKLFKXPDQZRUOGZH¶YHKDGVLQFHWKH%URQ]H$JH7KHHQGRIRXUGRPLQLRQ
The end of the Bible and alOWKHVWRULHVZH¶YHWROGRXUVHOYHVXQWLOQRZ>«@ 
How insulated these men were. They were imperial in their selfhood, these corporate 
culturists running a government. They lived, heedless, infallible. They understood contention and 
expected nothing else. I told them it depressed me to be in the same room with them. The 





reality ± war, God, money ± that other people invented long ago, I said, and you take these things 
for raw existence. It was quite a speech I gave them.  
(Doctorow 2014: 187±189) 
 
$QGUHZ¶VELWWHUO\LURQLFWRQHKHUHGHOLYHUVDQRWKHUH[SUHVVLRQRI-RKQVRQ¶Vµ0HDQ3RLQWRI
Impact¶ a point where history and the future collide in the present lives of those who can 
effortlessly destroy others, even worlds. But these destroyers are now themselves governed by 
the promise of a science that would effectively prove all human institutions ± including those 
propping up their power ± as essentially moot. 
The historical and cultural processes that effect governmental power, that bear its weight 
and its capability to destroy and subjugate, are challenged precisely by the military neuroscience 
funded by this same governmental power ± and simply because making neuroscience ballistic 
PDNHVLWFDSDEOHRIEUHDNLQJRIIDQGILULQJEDFN'RFWRURZ¶VJORRPLO\EHDXWLIXOWDOHJLYHVDPSOH
warning to heed those historical and cultural processes, to focus on timing over speed, to ensure 
the continued investigation of all this alongside neuroscience. This is because, if the workings of 
the brain become intimately, fully known, but without any other perspective than the mechanical, 
then neuroscience, however advanced, is merely a weapon ± SRWHQWLDOO\KXPDQLW\¶VJUHDWHVW
weapon, against itself. Essentially, attaining mastery of the brain, and total power over 
consciousness, is to render the human obsolete. If this is so, then perhaps $QGUHZ¶V%UDLQ is not 
VRPXFKDERXWRQHLQGLYLGXDO¶VHUUDWLFIDLOLQJFRQVFLRXVQHVVDQGKLVFRQVHTXHQWLnability to avert 
a life-long series of disasters, as first appears. Instead the point is that, whether unwell or 
perfectly healthy, consciousness and the brain always need to be considered alongside, or rather 
within the appropriate historical and cultural context, and only in this way can a tragedy even 
ODUJHUWKDQ$QGUHZ¶VXQHQGLQJPLVIRUWXQHVDVSHFLHVZLGHWUDJHG\EHDYRLGHG,QWKLV
'RFWRURZ¶VOLWHUDU\OHVVRQVHHPVWRHFKRDQGXSGDWHDZHOO-known (perhaps clichéd) saying 














Science! true daughter of Old Time thou art! 
Who alterest all things with thy peering eyes. 
Why preyest thou thus XSRQWKHSRHW¶VKHDUW 
Vulture, whose wings are dull realities? 
How should he love thee? or how deem thee wise, 
:KRZRXOGVWQRWOHDYHKLPLQKLVZDQGHULQJ>«@" 
(Poe 2006: 22) 
 
 
What is the writer going to say? How many convolutions 
will it involve? But leWXVQH[WDGPLWWKDWWKHZULWHUGRHVQ¶W
have to choose a static position from which to speak; that 
the writer can speak as WKH\PRYH>«@ 








And so the loop of historical thread swings back round, doomed to repetition. Or does it? A 
convolution comes back again to its start point and looks as if it were about to land there 
definitively, but at the very last moment, it swerves off again without actually having touched 
that start point. It looks for all the world like a repetition, but is not quite that; it is more of a 
UHLWHUDWLRQRUDVSRHW-RKQ5REHUW&RORPER¶VULYDOFOLFKpWR6DQWD\DQD¶VKDVLWVLPLODUEXW
GLIIHUHQWHQRXJKWREHFRQVLGHUHGDUHLWHUDWLRQLWVHOIµ+LVWRU\QHYHUUHSHDWVLWVHOIEXWLWUK\PHV¶
(Colombo 1970: 46).71 
So here is the reiterative rhyme, as the question comes back around once more in the 
guise of a conclusion: what is a convolution? This question may appear to be the end of this 
thesis, but it is also its opening, in terms of temporality as well as teleology; the question has 
come before, at the beginning of the introduction, and thus it led up (and back) to this repetition 
of itself, as its own causal impetus. When speaking about convolutions it is entirely natural, then, 
to end at the beginning. This may seem illogical or counterproductive, but is not too far off the 
mark if one considers the sometimes overlooked truth as elucidated usefully by cognitive 
VFLHQWLVWDQGDXWKRU'DQ/OR\GWKDWZKHQLWFRPHVWRµQRYHOH[SUHVVLRQVRIRXUHPHUJLQJYLVLon 
RIWKHFRQVFLRXVKXPDQEHLQJ>WKH@PRVWWKRURXJKWKRXJKWH[SHULPHQW>«@LVDQRYHO¶/OR\G
2004: 332). Thus the concluding question was in some way only illusorily conclusive, and will be 
answered now, but only with more questions, its novelty endlessly emergent and its novelistic or 
literary basis having been continuously reemphasized. Becoming a reconvolution, the original 
interrogation resets itself and begs for yet further interrogation. 
  




 This piquant but opaque, semi-anthropomorphic witticism is often attributed incorrectly to Mark Twain ± probably because 
&RORPER¶VSRHPµ$6DLG3RHP¶IURPZKLFKWKHDSKRULVPVWHPVLVSUHVHQWHGDVDOLVWRITXRWDWLRQVDQGVRXUFHVDQGWKXV itself 






Interrogating Silence: Getting Involved, Getting Convolved 
 
 
Interrogation is never innocent, however ± never, that is to say, an uncomplicated, 
straightforward case of subject questioning object, an unproblematic, hierarchical exercise of a 
disinterested interrogator merely demanding transparent answers from an eventually yielding, 
powerless, subservient source of information. There is a silent, unspoken part to interrogation. 
This is because interrogatory activity is not, simply, a case of researcher interpreting text, 
detective questioning suspect, author exploring concept, lawyer examining witness, analyst 
analysing analysand or, indeed, scientist investigating world with unrestricted, unmediated 
access. Interrogation is or can be all these things, but in each circumstance it is always more, 
because it entails involvement. By this, I mean involvement in a situation which is not one-sided, 
but reciprocal: text interprets author, suspect questions detective, concept explores author, and so 
RQ7KLVLVDFRQFHSWWKDW,KDYHGHVFULEHGHOVHZKHUHDVµPXWXDOLQWHUURJDWLRQ¶&I5H\HV-Peschl 
2016).72 If it seems at all counterintuitive, unnecessarily convoluted, it can be more simply 
exemplified: when I read a text, it is not only the text that is affected, but myself as well; I have 
reinterpreted the text, and in doing so, I am also changed. Something real has happened, no 
matter how small. The same goes for the other examples listed above, none of which exist in 
isolation, each connected to every other in a possibly infinite web of connections and 
relationships that make up the phenomenal universe. The reader of these words, whether they like 
it or not,73 is now made to at the very least consider this possibility just by their involvement in 
reading. 
It is true, too, of the silent imposition or assumption or resumption of metaphors 
XELTXLWRXVLQVFLHQFH7KXVDV7KRPDV)*LHU\QZULWHVµCultural cartography is not idle play 
with Venn diagrams: maps of science give definitions of situations real in their consequences, 
ERWKIRUWKRVHZKRUHO\RQWKHPDQGWKRVHZKRGUDZWKHP¶*ieryn 1999: 12). To some degree, 
scientific activity produces truth ± but not just for the artificially exteriorized world that is its 
object, also for the activity itself, and for its participants. This possibility is antithetical to 
VFLHQFH¶VFODLPVWRRbjectivity, or merely taken to be negligible in amount, or unimportant in 




 ,QWKDWVDPHDUWLFOH,GHVFULEHµPXWXDOLQWHUURJDWLRQ¶DVDWZR-way street, and philosopher of science Ian Hacking writes something 
similar of assessing the social construction of madness, also suggeVWLYHO\LQWLPDWLQJLWKDVDODE\ULQWKLQHQDWXUHµ2QHRIWKHGHIHFWVRI
social-construction talk is that it suggests a one-way street: society (or some fragment of it) constructs the disorder (and that is a bad 
thing, because the disorder does not really exist as described, or would not really exist unless so described). By introducing the idea of 










impact. Thus, again, the uncritical, silent uptake of the metaphors ± which in and of themselves 
are not necessarily problematic, but which nevertheless run through and in part govern scientific 
thinking ± is kept silent and uncriticized. I am not saying metaphors should be avoided ± this is 
not possible anyway ± but they should be identified, acknowledged, investigated and mined for 
their possibilities, even (or particularly) when this challenges institutional or personal identities. 
This happens constantly in literature and literary studies, a domain of activity which continuously 
EULQJVLWVHOILQWRTXHVWLRQDQGJUDSSOHVZLWKLWVRZQZRUWK(YHQWKHFRQWURYHUVLHVRIOLWHUDWXUH¶V
major current meta-GLVFRXUVHRUµcapital-T Theory¶ WRERUURZRQFHDJDLQ-RVKXD&ORYHU¶V
expression, are forever debated and defended and debunked by its own practitioners (and for an 
extensive set of perspectives on Theory, including many dissenting voices, Cf. Patai and Corral 
2005). It is a shame that on the whole this is not the case in science, because the type of reflexive 
interrogation I see and advocate in convolution, and which I have attempted to identify 
throughout this thesis via active engagement in the very process, could well have important, even 
emancipatory consequences. This is because the notion of convolutions might have important 
ramifications beyond neuroscience and literature ± for new textual methodologies and 
epistemological categories, for new interdisciplinary endeavours, and above all, for new 
conceptions of the self. 
Therefore, the thesis will conclude by offering: first, a brief reiteration of what has been 
said so far; second, a final case study of the problematic disavowal of convolution, illustrating the 
YHU\VLOHQFHRIµFDVHVWXGLHV¶; third, a suggestion, taken from characters and concepts from the 
previous two parts, for a wandering path out of this problem; and finally, a series of four 
µFRQYRFOXVLRQV¶WKDWZLOOHQFDSVXODWHDOO the issues touched upon, miniaturized demonstrations of 
the implications of the four main Convolutions that make up the core of this thesis. First, then, 
some recapitulation. The introductory chapter of this thesis interrogated the revolutionary rhetoric 
of neuroscience, and proposed how the convolutionary approach, gleaned from literature, could 
replace it. The first chapter proper, or rather the first Convolution, explained that science sees 
itself as a quest with the brain its ultimate goal, but that more often than not, this quest is quixotic 
± and that if acknowledged, quixotism can actually be illuminating. The second Convolution 
argued that neuroscientists paint themselves as literary detectives, and in doing so, are as 
VXVFHSWLEOHWRWKHJHQUH¶VSLWfalls as to its boons. The third Convolution claimed that if the brain 
is a labyrinth, as brain science suggests, then so too is brain science itself ± DQGOLWHUDWXUH¶V
treatment of the figure of the labyrinth (the treatment itself labyrinthine) can provide a productive 
framework for analysing this claim. The fourth Convolution examined the unchallenged but 
XELTXLWRXVPHWDSKRULFDODVVXPSWLRQWKDWOLHVEHKLQGWKHLGHDRIQHXURQVµILULQJ¶DQGDVNHG
whether the overlooked ethical quandary at the nexus of brains and bullets would not benefit 





common that they have remained uncritically silenced, dormant but present, in the assumptions, 
practices and writings of neuroscientists, philosophers, theorists, historians, journalists and other 
writers for some time now.  
This is because identifying convolutions amidst the messy noise of complex systems 
such as science or history is difficult, but it does not mean that they are not there. One merely has 
to be able to strain a little harder against the prevailing dissonance and find amidst the din those 
voices outshouted by the more obvious of soapbox proselytizers. From this ear-straining for the 
unheard, patterns emerge; indeed, there is no speech recognition, or music appreciation, without 
silent pauses or rests to give definition to the sounds around them as they unfold over time. This 
is why the particular example of neurology and aphasia is emblematic, in a sense, and still 
pertinent in the present day.74 As historian of medicine L 6-DF\QDSXWVLWZKLOHµUHVHDUFKLQWR
DSKDVLDZDVFHQWUDOWRWKHJHQHUDWLRQRIDQLQWHOOHFWXDOLGHQWLW\IRUQHXURORJ\¶LWLVDOVRWUXHWKDW
µDSKDVLRORJ\LVYHU\PXFKDQRQJRLQJHQWHUSULVHDVWKHmost casual survey of current medical 
ELEOLRJUDSKLHVZLOOUHYHDO¶-DF\QD%XWDV-DF\QDJRHVRQWRPDNHDFDVHIRUWKH
historiographical rationale behind his writings on aphasia, he also makes important claims for a 
methodological approach with aQDOPRVWH[FOXVLYHO\WH[WXDOIRFXVµFODVVLFDSKDVLRORJLFDOWH[WV
can be read in novel ways to show within them the presence of unexpected contingencies. [This 
is because] a scientific text is not a transparent window upon reality but itself a dense object of 
VWXG\¶-DF\QD$OWKRXJK-DF\QD¶VLGLRPRIµZLQGRZV¶ µVKRZLQJ¶DQGµUHYHDOLQJ¶LV
largely visual in nature, this only serves to further highlight the incongruence between the doctors 
expressing their thoughts, and the relatively inexpressive (or expressively incapable) states of 
their objects of study; pioneering neurological researchers and clinicians spoke for ± made 
audible ± those who could not properly do so themselves, and this megaphonic relationship 
continues today. 
However, Jacyna advocates reading this relationship against the grain, to tease out from 
its archive that which remains unsaid (or is actually occluded) by its amplifications ± a 
convolution which as he rightly points out finds individuals on both sides of the medical 
exchange, and the texts that unite them, mirroring the historical sweep of neurology across time. 
Given that they demarcated and disseminated the vast majority of what is now considered 
orthodoxy in neurology, it is no stretch to compare doctors with the neurological canon itself. By 
the same token, aphasics or other patients can be considered central to, but somehow still quiet 
within, that same orthodoxy. I set up this somewhat elaborate comparison in order to illustrate the 
micro- and macro-movements of a self-constituting, selectively redacting discourse. This can be 












OLWHUDWXUH¶-DF\QDWKLVVR-called appendix encompassing long-term therapeutic 
approaches, as opposed to the predominant (and rather more quickly satisfied) urge for 
FODVVLILFDWLRQDQGGLDJQRVLV2IWKLVµDQRPDORXV¶DWWLWXGHWRWLPH-consuming speech therapies, 
-DF\QDRQFHDJDLQRSLQHVWKDWWKHODWWHU¶VYHU\PDUJLQDOLW\VSHDNVYROXPHV 
 
Texts describing these regimes provide a view of both patient and practitioner that differs in 
important respects from that inscribed in the main body of the aphasia canon. By means of 
ingenious techniques the aphasic is made to utter new truths about his condition; but at the same 
time the doctor reveals previously unknown sides to his nature. 
(Jacyna 2000: 21) 
 
Returning to the earlier comparison, the anomalous, marginal but highly significant stories (or 
µQHZWUXWKV¶YRLFHGE\QHXURORJ\DUHEHWWHUKHDUGLIGXHDWWHQWLRQLVSDLGWRERWKWKHµLQJHQLRXV
WHFKQLTXHV¶DVZHOODVWKHµXQNQRZQVLGHV¶RIQHXURORJLFDORUWKRGR[\DQGLQSDUWLFXODULWVZULWWHQ
manifestations ± its literature. 
Taking a Bakhtinian view of prototypical aphasiological writings, Jacyna deems them 
literary and narrative-like, yet still varied enough  
 
to justify their classification into distinct genres. A literary genre may be considered as both an 
enabling and as an inhibitory device: it facilitates certain discursive possibilities while precluding 
or at least hindering others.75 Genres perform a regulatory role with respect to individual utterance 
>«@7KHXVHRIODQJXDJHZLWKLQDJHQUHLVWKHUHIRUHDVPXFKDSHUIRUPDWLYHDVPHUHO\D
descriptive act; it creates the reality that it describes. An ability to write within a particular genre 
may, moreover, be a qualification for participation in a given way of life. 
(Jacyna 2000: 25; original emphasis) 
 
A precedent, seemingly from thin air, was set in those halcyon days of the study of aphasia, in the 
early nineteenth century7KHQDVFHQWILHOGRIDSKDVLRORJ\LQ-DF\QD¶VWHUPVDOLWHUDU\VXE-genre 
of what was itself the still immature field of neurology, was from the start already divided into 
sub-genres which jockeyed for position, not just for disciplinary currency and prestige, but to be 
constitutive of the very reality being described ± of what would and would not count as 
DGPLVVLEOHLQDQDSKDVLRORJLFDODFFRXQWRIWKHZRUOG,IDSKDVLRORJ\¶VLPSRUWDQFHWRWKH












sustained success of the neurological project is not to be underestimated, then it is not only what 




simultaneously talking about the central, formative role of silence in the unfurling of neurological 






I am a Strange Convolution: Literary Literality 
 
 
That this is an ongoing situation in the modern day is corroborated by Oliver Sacks. He sticks out 
for being willing to comment on himself and his neurological profession in the capacity of 
patient, as well as practitioner, as well as a writer well versed in the act of producing narrative 
GLVFRXUVHMXVWDVPXFKDVSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQLW6DFNV¶VILUVWEHVW-seller was The Man Who Mistook 
His Wife for a Hat, which he sometimes affectionately refers to simply as Hat. A prolific 
raconteur even before the success of the book, Sacks thereafter became exposed to a much larger 
± and more highly appreciative ± pool of readers than previously. He had become a bona fide 
famous person, whose words might then easily be taken as gospel by readers. This was a 
SRWHQWLDOZKLFKH[DFHUEDWHG6DFNV¶VSDLQVWDNLQJVHOI-conscious fastidiousness about avoiding the 
misrepresentation of those patients that had, in effect, made his name ± patients who could not 
hope to speak for themselves to such large numbers of people, if indeed they were able to 
communicate their experiences normally or effectively at all. Willing to listen as much as 
expound, and then again, to additionally question his own conclusions, Sacks provides an 
example of convolution in practice, straining to properly hear what has been missed in the 
cacophony, or what has been simply rendered mute. 
However, not everyone shared thHHQWKXVLDVPRI6DFNV¶VUHDGHUVKLSDQGWRKLVself-
professed lifelong chagrin, the dissent shown in the face of Hat¶VDQGSUHYLRXVO\Awakenings¶s) 
large-scale success chiefly stemmed from his peers and colleagues in the medical establishment: 
 
My fellow neurologists, however, remained somewhat remote and dismissive. Now to this was 
DGGHG,WKLQNDFHUWDLQVXVSLFLRQ,KDGLWVHHPHGGHILQHGP\VHOIDVDµSRSXODU¶ZULWHUDQGLI
one is popular, then, ipso facto, one is not to be taken seriously. This was by no means completely 
so, and there were some colleagues who saw Hat as solid, detailed neurology embedded in a fine, 
classical narrative form. But by and large, the medical silence continued. 
(Sacks 2015: 258) 
 
Trying to break the individual silence experienced by each of his patients, Sacks seemingly came 
up against the barrier of a larger institutional silence, an entrenched mutism permeating the 
closed corridors of specialization. In addition was the galling contradiction of an imposing edifice 
of medico-scientific knowledge influenced only by huge seismic changes rather than the efforts 
of particular people within the structure itself ± even or HVSHFLDOO\ZKHQµSRSXODU¶ Bearing in 
PLQG-DF\QD¶VREVHUYDWLRQDERXWWKHµLQJHQLRXVWHFKQLTXHV¶DQGµXQNQRZQVLGHV¶RIQHXURORJLFDO
SUDFWLWLRQHUVZKLFKDUHUHYHDOHGE\FORVHUUHDGLQJ6DFNV¶VPHWLFXORXVO\FUDIWHGFDVHVWXGLHVVD\





his patients. Despite or perhaps because of its popularity, this is the type of foundation-shaking 
view of selfhood abhorrent to the medical establishment. 
7KXVEDFNWRWKHµSRSXODU¶VFLHQFHZULWHU6WHYHQ-RKQVRQDQGKLVKLVWRULFDOVNHWFKRI
emergence and complexity theory, as mentioned in Re(con)volution, the introduction to this 
thesis. To recap, Johnson selects specific visual images to denote whole technological and 
scientific eras ± µZHE¶ µH[SORVLRQ¶ µJULG¶± each of which is the central metaphoric idea of a 
wholesale seismic shift. TKLVLVHQRXJKWRHVWDEOLVK-RKQVRQ¶VWDFLWEXWFOHDUEHOLHILQWKHSRZHU
of metaphor in science, but as Jacyna claims, spotting and touting these metaphors does not 
exclude one from incorporating yet other mHWDSKRUVLQRQH¶VRZQZULWLQJ 
 
close reading reveals that metaphor pervades even the most overtly literal forms of writing; the 
most powerful metaphors are those no longer recognized as such. [Thus it is important] to draw 
attention to some of the constitutive but effectively invisible metaphors that permeate discourse 
about language and the brain. 
(Jacyna 2000: 8±9) 
 
Putting this aside momentarily, the recap continues: whether consciously or not, Johnson 
incongruously refines his metaphorical set of eras by bringing into question a dichotomy of 
intellectual-KLVWRULRJUDSKLFDOVW\OHVHVVHQWLDOO\WKHµJHQLXV¶YHUVXVWKHµVSRQWDQHRXVSDUDGLJP
shift¶ These styles reflect the same problematic suggested by Sacks in the relationship between 
medico-scientific individuals and institutions, a problematic entirely eliding the role of supposed 
bit-SDUWSOD\HUVVXFKDVSDWLHQWV$OWKRXJK-RKQVRQ¶VPLGGOHZD\VROXWLRQSRVLWVGLVSDUDWH
geniuses working on roughly similar projects in numbers large enough to bring about an 
emergent paradigm sway, the bit-part players in this process are again conspicuous by their 
absence ± and these no doubt include popularizers of science such as Johnson himself. Unlike 
6DFNV-RKQVRQ¶VDWWHPSWDWFRQYROYLQJVWRSVVKRUWRIRYHUWO\DFNQRZOHGJLQJKLVRZQUROHLQWKH
metaphorical system; his involvement submerges rather than emerges. 
Nevertheless, if he chooses not to go upstream to the individual source from this point of 
submersion, Johnson certainly intrigues by looking downstream at the repercussions of the so-
FDOOHGµFRPSOH[LW\WKHRU\¶ which describes µemergence¶. Here, Johnson demonstrates his middle 
way hypothesis precisely by considering the historical genesis of studies into emergent 
behaviour, and finding that indeed, the now accepted, widespread discourse of emergence itself 
suddenly emerged from seemingly unrelated and miscellaneous, yet ultimately crucial units of 
NQRZOHGJHSURGXFWLRQ$VKHVD\VµDILHOGRIUHVHDUFKWKDWKDGEHHQFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\DKDQGIXO
of early-stage investigations blossomed overnight into a densely populated and diverse landscape, 
WUDQVIRUPLQJGR]HQVRIH[LVWLQJGLVFLSOLQHVDQGLQYHQWLQJDKDQGIXORIQHZRQHV¶6-RKQVRQ





thematically linked projects, events and individual participants, culminating as he sees it in this 
µRYHUQLJKW¶µEORVVRPLQJ¶ µWUDQVIRUPLQJ¶DQGµLQYHQWLQJ¶ He concludes by describing a huge 
groundswell in activity throughout the 60s and 70s, mentioning that in 1972 a 
 
professor named Gerald Edelman won the Nobel prize for his work decoding the language of 
antibody molecules, leading the way for an understanding of the immune system as a self-learning 
pattern-recognition device. [Non-HTXLOLEULXPWKHUPRG\QDPLFVSLRQHHU,O\D@3ULJRJLQH¶V1REHO
followed five years later. At the end of the decade, Douglas Hofstadter published Gödel, Escher, 
BachOLQNLQJDUWLILFLDOLQWHOOLJHQFHSDWWHUQUHFRJQLWLRQDQWFRORQLHVDQG>%DFK¶V@µ*ROGEHUJ
9DULDWLRQV¶'HVSLWHLWVDUFDQHVXEMHFWPDWWHUDQGFRQYROXWHGUKHWRULcal structure, the book became 
a best-seller and won the Pulitzer prize for nonfiction. 
(S Johnson 2002: 65) 
 
-RKQVRQEULHIO\JORVVHV+RIVWDGWHU¶VIDPRXVERRNGHVFULELQJLWDVµFRQYROXWHG¶ This description 
is highly appropriate and interesting because unlike Johnson (but like Sacks), Hofstadter is 
ZLOOLQJWRLQFOXGHKLPVHOILQWKHHPHUJHQWHTXDWLRQ1RWRQO\GRHV+RIVWDGWHU¶VSUL]H-winning 
WH[WSRVVHVVWKHµUKHWRULFDOVWUXFWXUH¶RIDFRQYROXWLRQEXWLWGHDOVZLWKWKHYHU\QDWXUHRIZKDWKH
extrapolates from mathematician Kurt Gödel as tKHFRQFHSWRIWKHµVWUDQJHORRS¶; Hofstadter even 
goes so far as to describe himself in the title of a later book as the very same, that is to say, 
Hofstadter claims of himself in 2007 that I am a Strange Loop. 
This self-styling is perhaps not as bizarre as it seems, or as the name itself suggests. 
+RIVWDGWHU¶VPXOWLWXGLQRXVDQGHYHQVRPHWLPHVZDQGHULQJLQWHUHVWVOHGKLPWRZULWHKLVPRVW
famous book Gödel, Escher, Bach during the 1970s. This title, a reference to a pattern he 
identifies running through the works of the respective mathematician, graphic artist and musical 
FRPSRVHULVUHIOHFWHGDQGUHRUJDQL]HGLQWKHVDPHLQLWLDOVRIWKHERRN¶VVXEWLWOHAn Eternal 
Golden Braid. Drawing attention to this pattern is Hofstadter¶VFKLHISXUSRVHHVSHFLDOO\DV
UHJDUGVKLPVHOIRUDQ\µVHOI¶DVKHZRXOGIXUWKHUHOXFLGDWHsome thirty years on in I am a 
Strange Loop7KHFDUGLQDOREVHVVLRQZLWKµEUDLGV¶DQGµORRSV¶ZKLFKFRPHs to dominate the 
imagery of his works can be seen again as a variation on a convolution. This is illustrated not in 
one of Gödel, Escher, Bach¶VSDVVDJHVRQWKHEUDLQRU+RIVWDGWHU¶VYDULRXVH[SRVWXODWLRQVRQWKH
workings of the mind, but in a virtuosic metafictional literary dialogue between classical hero 
Achilles, a Crab, a Tortoise, so-FDOOHGµIDWKHURIWKHFRPSXWHU¶&KDUOHV%DEEDJHDQGWKHDXWKRU
+RIVWDGWHUKLPVHOI$FKLOOHVKDVMRLQHGWKH7RUWRLVHDQGWKH&UDEDWWKHODWWHU¶VKRPHLQRUGHUWR
SOD\PXVLFWRJHWKHUVSHFLILFDOO\FDQRQVIURP%DFK¶VMusical Offering. However, this attempt at 
SHUIRUPDQFHLVUHSHDWHGO\VFXSSHUHGE\WKHFKDUDFWHUV¶FROOHFWLYHGZHOOLQJVRQPXVLFWKHRU\
dreams, literature, free will and determinism, to the point where the Author (transcribed as such) 





that whilst his interlocutors, the other characters in this dialogue, may well be his puppets to 
PRYHDURXQGWKHSDJHKHKLPVHOIDV$XWKRUPLJKWDOVREHWKHPHUHILJPHQWRIVRPHRQHHOVH¶s 





WKHZKROHSDUW\GHFLGHVLQVWHDGWRSOD\ZLWKWKH&UDE¶VPDQ\RGd computer-like contraptions 
µVPDUW-VWXSLGV¶DVWKH\DUHFDOOHGLQWKHERRN%DEEDJHDVFRPSXWHUSLRQHHUVKRZVJUHDWVNLOO
in immediately programming an algorithm which calculates pi to a great number of digits, and 
then another to generate beautiful graphics ± DQGKHUHWKH$XWKRU¶VHDUOLHUH[LVWHQWLDOTXDQGDU\LV
mirrored in the short, adulatory exchange the characters share on the nature of the graphical 
SDWWHUQV%DEEDJHKDVµFUHDWHG¶ 
 
Crab:  How harmonious and pleasing these swirling shapes are, as they 
constantly collide and interfere with each other! 
Author:  And they never repeat exactly, or even resemble ones which have 
come before. It seems an inexhaustible mine of beauty. 
Tortoise: Some are simple patterns which enchant the eye; others are 
indescribably complex convolutions which boggle and yet 
simultaneously delight the mind. 
(Hofstadter 2000: 728) 
 
Despite superficially referring to a series of graphics on a screen, the characters (including their 
ostensive Author) are here alluding to their own pattern of existence within the text, a convolving 
reoccurrence in which they remark their own self-awareness as ontologically textual beings that 
come round again every so often, but never in quite the same way. They are themselves these 
µVZLUOLQJVKDpes¶ WKHVHSDWWHUQVZKLFKµQHYHUUHSHDWH[DFWO\¶DVLVWKHWH[WLQZKLFKWKH\DUH
contained. They are convolutions, as well as components of another larger convolution. 
 This type of playful but deeper-level encoding of conceptual metaphors runs throughout 
Gödel, Escher, Bach, to the point where identification of the pattern is embodied as the very 
same pattern in the book, which is then itself identified and specifically remarked upon. Just prior 
WRWKH$XWKRU¶VHQWUDQFHDERYHWKH&UDEUHPLQGV$FKLOOHVand the Tortoise of a previous strange 
encounter they all had in the park (recorded in an earlier chapter of the book). The three 
unwittingly try to account for the palindromic structure of that previous conversation, dismissing 





dialogue are used without being referenced as such; that is to say, they reappear as if 
spontaneous. But this eventually jogs their memories: 
 
Achilles: Say, something about this conversation strikes me as familiar. 
+DYHQ¶W,KHDUGVRPHRIWKRVHOLQHVVRPHZKHUHEHIRUH" 
 Tortoise: You said it, Achilles. 
 Crab:  Perhaps those lines occurred at random in the park one day,  
Achilles. Do you recall how your conversation with Mr T ran that day? 
 Achilles: 9DJXHO\+HVDLG³*RRGGD\0U$´DWWKHEHJLQQLQJDQGDWWKH 
HQG,VDLG³*RRGGD\0U7´,VWKDWULJKW" 
 Crab:  ,MXVWKDSSHQWRKDYHDWUDQVFULSWULJKWKHUH« 
   
(He fishes around in his music case, whips out a sheet, and hands it to Achilles.  
As Achilles reads it, he begins to squirm and fidget noticeably.) 
  
Achilles:  7KLVLVYHU\VWUDQJH9HU\YHU\VWUDQJH«$OORIDVXGGHQ,IHHOVRUW 
of ± ZHLUG,W¶VDVLIVRPHERG\KDGDFWXDOO\SODQQHGRXWWKDWZKROHVHW 
of statements in advance, worNHGWKHPRXWRQSDSHURUVRPHWKLQJ«$V 
if some Author had had a whole agenda and worked from it in detail in 
planning all those statements I made that day. 
   
(At that moment, the door bursts open. Enter the Author, carrying a giant  
manuscript.) 
  
Author:   I can get along very well without such a program. You see, once 
my characters are formed, they seem to have lives of their own, and I 
need to exert very little effort in planning their lives. 
 Crab:  2KKHUH\RXDUH,WKRXJKW\RX¶GQHYHUDUULYH 
 Author:  Sorry to be so late. I followed the wrong road and wound up very 
far away. But somehow I made it back. 
(Hofstadter 2000: 724) 
 




Seemingly out of the blue, lines that the characters have already said are repeated, but in 
a different context. Not only does this repetition then become their focus, but so does the fact that 





µWUDQVFULSW¶ZKLFKWKH&UDEµMXVWKDSSHQV¶WRKDYH7KLVLVWKHQLQWXUQUH-preserved again in 
+RIVWDGWHU¶VERRNWKHµDFWXDO¶RQHIURPZKLFKWKHTXRWDWLRQLVWDNHQPDNLQJDQDSSHDUDQFH
within itself (albeit in manuscript form). All this is corroborated in tKH$XWKRU¶VILUVWXWWHUDQFH
XSRQLPSRVVLEO\HQWHULQJWKHVFHQHZKLFKWDNHQRQLWVRZQLVDVLPSOHUHWRUWWR$FKLOOHV¶V
suggestion that what is being written (that is to say, what is happening in the scene) has been 
meticulously planned by the Author. HoweYHUKLVVWDWHPHQWµ,FDQJHWDORQJYHU\ZHOOZLWKRXW
VXFKDSURJUDP¶LVDOVRDSKUDVHXWWHUHGE\WKHFKDUDFWHUVVHYHUDOWLPHVHDUOLHULQWKHVDPH
dialogue, only in different contexts (for example, with reference to a radio program, or a schedule 
of musical rehearsal). Thus the Author appears here for the first time in a manner of 
reappearance, or call-EDFNQRZRQGHUKLVFKDUDFWHUV¶OLYHV UHTXLUHKLPµWRH[HUWYHU\OLWWOHHIIRUW¶ 
as he himself is one of them, and even then only as a variation on an already well-worn theme. 
Just as Borges deems it inevitable that the man trying to fashion reality from his dreams in 
FLUFXODUMXQJOHUXLQVHQGVXSLPDJLQLQJµKLVXQUHDOFKLOGZDVSUDFWLVLQJWKHVDPHULWHVLQRWKHU
FLUFXODUUXLQVGRZQVWUHDP¶%RUJHVD Hofstadter (again, unlike Steven Johnson) is 
unafraid to look both up and down the river of selfhood, of time, of convolution. 
,QGHHGEHIRUHWKH$XWKRU¶VDUULYDOWKHRWKHUFKDUDFWHUVKDYHSUH-empted this arrival by 
dwelling on the repercussions if they ZHUHPHUHO\FKDUDFWHUVLQVRPHRQHHOVH¶VVWRU\7KLVOHDGV
them to debate whether or not they are real, given their somewhat fantastical qualities, or just the 
made-XSLQKDELWDQWVRIDQRWKHU¶VEUDLQ 
 
Achilles: What an absurd idea! And yet, I do enjoy trying to find the cleverly concealed 
KROHVLQ\RXUVRSKLVWU\VRJRDKHDG7U\WRFRQYLQFHPH,¶PJDPH 






with talking Tortoises, and talking Crabs? 
Achilles: I must admit, a talking Crab is ±  
Crab:  ± an anomaly, of course. 
Achilles: Exactly; it is a bit of an anomaly ± but it has precedents. It has occurred in 
literature. 
Tortoise: Precisely ± in literature. But where in real life? 
Achilles: Now that you mention it, I caQ¶WTXLWHVD\,¶OOKDYHWRJLYHLWVRPHWKRXJKW%XW
WKDW¶VQRWHQRXJKWRFRQYLQFHPHWKDW,¶PDFKDUDFWHULQD'LDORJXH 






Hofstadter here comments on the literariness of what he is trying to convey throughout his 
strangely looping book, even though the title purports it to cover maths, music and visual art, as 
ZHOODVWKHFRJQLWLYHVFLHQFHLPSOLHGE\WKHDXWKRU¶VPDLQDUHDRIH[SHUWLVHLQµUHDOOLIH¶ Having 
P\VHOIVWDUWHGZLWKWKHXVHRIWKHZRUGµFRQYROXWLRQV¶LQ+RIVWDGWHU¶VWH[W and worked backwards 
from this usage to describe how the text creates the conditions for the usage by convolving, I 
ZRXOGOLNHWRVXJJHVWWKDWOLWHUDWXUHLVDOVRDSDUWRIµUHDOOLIH¶± to enough of a degree in a 
UHDGHU¶VRUDXWKRU¶VEUDLQWKDW+RIVWDGWHU¶VERRNH[LVWVDVPXFKDVWKH7RUWRLVHZKRJUDFHVLWV
SDJHV,PD\QRWEHµDFKDUDFWHULQD'LDORJXH¶EXW,DPFDXVLQJWKHVHZRUGVWRUHDOO\H[LVWLQWKH
brain of my reader. Hofstadter repeatedly mentions (himself mentioning) this type of confusing 
but exhilarating self-referentiality, and relates it to the potentialities of the mind/brain. This is 
what definitively welds the idea of convolution as a literary conceptual metaphor to its 
anatomical cerebral counterpart. 
 This difference between what can legitimately happen in literature and what can happen 
in so-FDOOHGµUHDOOLIH¶LVFUXFLDOEXWQXDQFHG,WLVUHPLQLVFHQWRI'HUULGD¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDW 
 
experience of Being, nothing less, nothing more, on the edge of metaphysics, literature perhaps 
stands on the HGJHRIHYHU\WKLQJDOPRVWEH\RQGHYHU\WKLQJLQFOXGLQJLWVHOI,W¶VWKHPRVW
interesting thing in the world, maybe more interesting than the world, and this is why, if it has no 
definition, what is heralded and refused under the name of literature cannot be identified with any 
other discourse. It will never be scientific, philosophical, conversational. 
(Derrida 1992: 47) 
 
Derrida here makes a complicated claim; he is talking about the specific quality of literariness, its 





anything else, including itself.76 Literature is in this theoretical respect free and unbounded in a 
way that the other discourses Derrida mentions cannot be. However, as he goes on to say, 
 
if it did not open onto any of those discourses, it would not be literature either. There is no 
literature without a suspended relation to meaning and reference. Suspended means suspense, but 




 This is similar to the complicated notion of the brain somehow containing the world which also has that same brain in it, mentioned 






also dependence, condition, conditionality. In its suspended condition, literature can only exceed 
itself. No doubt all language refers to something other than itself or to language as something 
other. 
(Derrida 1992: 48; original emphasis) 
 
In short, literature cannot only be about itself or it ends up becoming self-negated; it has to 
contain the world, or talk about other things, in order to be literary. 
'HUULGD¶VVWDQFHLVXVHIXOO\HOXcidated (or deconvoluted) by Nicholas Royle:  
 
7KHLQWHUHVWRIOLWHUDWXUHJRHVIDUEH\RQGDHVWKHWLFRUIRUPDOLVWFRQFHUQV>'HUULGD¶V@IRFXVLVRQ
the importance of the literary work in having transformed and in continuing to transform the ways 
in which we WKLQNIRUH[DPSOHQRWRQO\DERXWµZULWLQJ¶LQLWVQDUURZVHQVHEXWDERXWKLVWRU\
politics, democracy and law, the world itself. The literary works to which he is most drawn are 
works that participate in a more general transformation, in that trembling and upheaval of western 
thinking that we might, provisionally, call deconstruction. 
(Royle 2003: 86±87) 
 
'HUULGD¶VLGHDRIDµVXVSHQGHGUHODWLRQWRPHDQLQJDQGUHIHUHQFH¶ as in the nebulous quality of 
literariness almost hanging over all signification, reFDOOV6WHYHQ-RKQVRQ¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIVKDSHV
DQGSDWWHUQVµKRYHULQJ¶RYHUPRPHQWVLQWLPHµKDXQWLQJ¶EXWDOVRGHILQLQJWKHPUHLI\LQJRU
DOORZLQJWKHPWREHWKRXJKWRIDVREMHFWVHYHQWVWKLQJVLQWKHµUHDOZRUOG¶ Recalling this 
µDQLPDWHG¶JKRVWOLQHVVLV KHOSIXOEHFDXVHOLWHUDWXUH¶VµWUHPEOLQJDQGXSKHDYDO¶RIµZHVWHUQ
WKLQNLQJ¶DV5R\OHGHVFULEHVLWDOVRUHFDOOV-RKQVRQ¶VµSDUDGLJPVKLIWV¶ Literature and 
metaphors can have seismic effects.77 
So what does this have to do with convolutions, literary or neuroscientific or otherwise? 
/LWHUDWXUH¶VIXQGDPHQWDOµKRYHULQJ¶RUµKDXQWLQJ¶ what Royle suggests is its transformation of 
things in general, is at the heart of the near but not-quite-circular thinking I am trying to capture. 
As Royle continues, 
 
this trDQVIRUPDWLRQLVKLVWRULFDOEXW>«@DOVRDWUDQVIRUPDWLRQof the historical, insofar as 
historiography has always been founded on presence, on the history of the past as what was once 




 +LVWRULDQ+D\GHQ:KLWHZULWHVµ,KDYHORQJWKRXJKWWKDWWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQOLWHUDU\GLVFRXUVHZKHUHZULWLQJLVVXSSRVHGWo be 
free and even abandoned) and historical discourse (where factuality, realism, and rational commonsense are supposed to prevail) 
SURYLGHVDPLFURFRVPRIPRGHUQ:HVWHUQWKRXJKW¶VHIIRUWWRUHODWHLPDJLQDWLRQWKHYLVLRQRIZKDWPLJKWEHDQGFRPPRQVHQVHthe 
thought of what is the case, what goes without saying). In trying to show the literariness of historical writing and the realism of 
literary writing, I have sought to establish [that each] is an example of a distinctively Western practice, not so much of representation 
as of presentation, whLFKLVWRVD\RISURGXFWLRQUDWKHUWKDQRIUHSURGXFWLRQRUPLPHVLV¶:KLWHL[:KLWH¶VDFFRXQWVXJJHVWV







present: [the literary texts Derrida deals with] are also shown to be concerned with notions of the 
present that are strange or ghostly, with kinds of thinking and experience that fracture and disturb 
linear, calendrical conceptions of time and history. 
(Royle 2003: 87; original emphasis) 
 
I am not trying to make a direct equivalence between literature and science, or history, or any 
other discipline, and neither is Derrida, nor Royle. The suggestion is more that literature, at least 
VLQFHQHXURORJ\¶VKH\GD\LQWKHnineteenth century, has contaminated or seeped over into all the 
other discourses it has touched (and vice versa). This is specifically because of its concern with 
its own language and writing, what Derrida says is its own presence, and the knock-on 
problematization of all writing that this entails ± inclusive of retrospective or prospective 
repercussions. In theory, literature can encompass (or inhabit, or engender, or haunt) all other 
writing that has ever existed or ever will ± and this is not so the other way round. 
So, if literature questions literature, its own existence, it then questions any form of 







(Derrida 1992: 48) 
 
7KHVHµVHLVPV¶DUHWKRVHWH[WVWKDWE\DVNLQJWKHPVHOYHVZKDWWKH\DUHDOUHDG\EHJWKHTXHVWLRQ
of their own existence ± it is a crucial operation which serves to undermine any attempt at 




discussion about the amplificatory convolution of aphasiology, note here the parallel historical 
time-frame, and what Royle and Derrida say is the literary seism of all writing, rendering 
µHVSHFLDOO\DXGLEOH¶ZKDWKDGWKHUHWRIRUHEHHQRQWRORJLFDOO\FHQWUDO± but mute. 
This brings up the tricky business of thinking about thinking, and in particular using the 
brain to address the brain. These tasks appear ridiculously easy, but again involve a slight leap, 
essentially the effacing of a presumptive process. This is because the leap relies upon 
exteriorizing and then carefully listening to items which are necessarily quiet in order to function 






My brain, the biggest thing in the head, is silent for most of the time. When it does speak, its 
ORFXWLRQVWHQGWREHUHIHUUHGHOVHZKHUHDFWLYLW\LQWKHEUDLQLVµDERXW¶WKHQRQ-cerebral body or 
the world. In short, the presence of the head to its owner is an intermittent, spatially discontinuous 
EORVVRPLQJRXWRIDEVHQFH>«@,IDOOWKHSODFHVLQWKHKHDGWKDWPLJKWEHFDOOHGXSRQWRGRWKHLU
duty were required to be constantly iterating their presence, there would be such a cacophony of 
cephalic sensation that it would be difficult to see how the necessary attention could be paid to the 
parts that mattered or any attention could be paid to anything that was not a part of the head. 
(Tallis 2008: 8) 
 
As with literature, the brain is somehow in the world just as it contains the world, an unavoidable 
SUHVXPSWLRQRIµSUHVHQFH¶ZKLFKQHYHUWKHOHVVµEORVVRPVRXWRIDEVHQFH¶ For Tallis, completely 
attenuating the potential extremes of auditory existence, that is to say, finding the perfect volume 
beWZHHQVLOHQFHDQGµFDFRSKRQ\¶ is nigh on, if not totally impossible.78 He makes an ultimately 
QHXURSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOTXHU\µ:KDWLVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQZKDW,DPIHHOLQJQRZDQGWKH
scientific account of the world that has had such an impact on what I DPIHHOLQJQRZ"¶7DOOLV
[YEXWILQDOO\LVIRUFHGWRDGPLWWKDWKLVZRUNLVLWVHOIµKDXQWHGRUDWOHDVWERWKHUHGE\
this: our experiences of our head are not fact-shaped. We cannot bridge the gap between what we 
IHHORXUVHOYHVWREH>«@DQGWKHLQQXPHUDEOHIDFWV>«@DERXWXV¶: xvi). It is my contention, 
however, that the bridge between facts and feelings ± that which indelibly connects knowledge of 
wavelengths with the perception of sounds ± is cerebro-literary convolution. 
Thus Hofstadter is often found wilfully using a literary idiom to think through thinking, 
to consider the many convoluted (but ostensibly non-literary) problems he addresses in his works. 
One of the many running jokes in Gödel, Escher, Bach is that every time Achilles, the Tortoise 
and the Crab mention something inherently incongruous, such as their own non-existence, they 
MRNLQJO\FRQFOXGHYLDDQDOPRVWVFRIILQJLQWHUUXSWLRQWKDWWKLVPXVWPHUHO\EHµDQDQRPDO\RI
course¶ The irony is that every such instance makes the entire notion less and less anomalous 
and more the norm. Indeed, the first time this in-joke occurs, the Tortoise and Achilles are 
discussing logic and geometry, but out of the examples they discuss, an outlandish image hits 
them:  
 
  ³$WRUWRLVHSOD\LQJ football would be ±´$FKLOOHVZDVEHJLQQLQJ 





(2015: 1). Otis may not be able to hear thought itself, but she thinks with sound, using this as a vivid and reflexive opening example to 
her fascinating recent book Rethinking Thought&UXFLDOO\2WLV¶VUHSHDWHGVHQWLPHQWLVWKDWZKLOHVFLHQWLILFJHQHUDOL]DWLRQLV
invaluable, what the starkly varying (and indeed, changeable) nature of individual thinking styles demonstrates is that the convolving 






  ³± DQDQRPDO\RIFRXUVH´WKH7RUWRLVHKDVWLO\LQWHUUXSWHG³'RQ¶W 
ZDQGHUIURPWKHSRLQW>«@´ 
(Hofstadter 2000: 44) 
 
7KHSRLQWKHUHLQIDFWLVSUHFLVHO\WRµZDQGHU¶DZD\IURPWKHSRLQWDVLVVKRZQE\WKH return to 
this entire set-up a few more times before culminating in these characters questioning how 
animals can even talk, or whether they are the mere imaginings of some external author. 
Hofstadter covers a lot of disparate and perhaps esoteric ground in his book, but does so in order 
to come back to these anomalies and highlight their non-anomalousness. As he says when his 
RZQWH[WXDODYDWDUHQWHUVLQWRWKHILQDOGLDORJXHµ,IROORZHGWKHZURQJURDGDQGZRXQGXSYHU\
far away. But somehow I made it back¶+RIVWDGWHU7KLVZDQGHULQJDZD\IROORZLQJ
DVXSSRVHGO\µZURQJ¶SDWKDQGZLQGLQJXSIDUDZD\RQO\WRPDNHLWEDFNDJDLQVRPHKRZ± this 
itself again reads very much like a convolution, and it also reads very much like another 
Derridean concept ± that of destinerrance. 
 ,QRUGHUWRGHDOZLWKWKLVFRQFHSWLQDQDSSURSULDWHO\µGHVWLQHUUDQW¶IDVKLRQ,VKRXOGILUVW
remark that this juncture brings me to a series of four short sections by way of tentative 
conclusions ± and though the four correspond roughly to the four large Convolutions at the core 
of this thesis, just as with these central chapters, they all overlap, the overarching link being 






De Te Fabula Destinarratur: Humanistic and Scientific Self-Convolution 
 
 
Convoclusion 1 (Quest)  
 
 
:KLOVW'HUULGD¶Vdestinerrance has served as a guiding principle in my investigation of 
convolutions, it has purposefully not been directly addressed in too much detail, specifically 
because that seems to me the modus operandi that the concept prescribes ± to stray in order to 
stay on track. Wandering as a concrete aim: this is a more orthodox and perhaps also softer (but 
easier to understand) description of destinerrance. Thus, destinerrance as autotelic wandering 
has been used as a figure and a method at the same time. This allows one to think through what 
one is doing whilst one is doing what one is thinking, a synthesis (or better put, a symbiosis) of 
form and content which simultaneously shows in its very fabric the process that one is attempting 
WRGHVFULEH7KLVLVDOVRSHUKDSVZK\,IDYRXU-+LOOLV0LOOHU¶VUHDGLQJRIdestinerrance over 
'HUULGD¶VRZQ,WLVQRWRQO\GXHWR0LOOHU¶VH[FHHGLQJO\OXFLGZULWLQJVW\OHQRUKLVIDVWLGLRXV
exhaustive scholarship on the trope ± it also seems entirely appropriate of the very idea of 
destinerrance not to aim for fidelity to its original conceptualization, but to instead champion a 
reformulated, convolved version which side-steps (or wanders away from) the relationship 
between its origins and goals. 
,QGHHGGHVLJQDWLQJWKHWURSHDVDQµDLP¶LVDOUHDG\DVWHSWRRIDUGRZQWKHZURQJSDWK
EHFDXVHDV0LOOHUVD\VµDQ\XWWHUDQFHRUZULWLQJ,PDNHPD\HVFDSHP\LQWHQWLRQVERWKDVWR
what it should mean (for others) and as to the destination it is supposed to reach. It may be 
destined to err and to wander, even though it may sometimes, by a happy accident, reach the 
destination I intended for it¶ (Miller 2009: 33). As a written word, destinerrance was Derrida¶V
gambit that whilst the term might move from context to context like an erring knight errant 
looking for sanity in random-seeming corners of the landscape ± and often failing ± if it were to 
achieve any success, it would be largely due to the mysterious workings of serendipity. 
Destinerrance is both destiny and error, like the goal of a convolution looping back upon itself is 
to veer off again before reaching its goal. 
However, though the wandering of the term destinerrance from text to text and language 
to language means it may well have no calculable end, it may paradoxically be without any 
discernible beginning either. Miller encapsulates this in two statements. First he writes that 





yarn.79 It could therefore JHQHUDWHDSRWHQWLDOO\HQGOHVVFRPPHQWDU\¶+RZHYHUsoon after, he 
concedes the following: 
 
$SHFXOLDULW\RIPDQ\SODFHVZKHUHWKHZRUGRUWKHFRQFHSW>«@RIdestinerrance appears is that 
they tend tRVD\>«@VRPHWKLQJOLNHµas I have elseZKHUHH[SODLQHGZLWKH[DPSOHV¶ I have not 
\HWIRXQGLQWKHODE\ULQWKRI'HUULGD¶VZULWLQJVZKDWPLJKWEHFDOOHGWKHµmother lode,¶ the place 
ZKHUHWKHZRUGDSSHDUVIRUWKHILUVWWLPHZLWKIXOOH[SODQDWLRQ>«@Perhaps no such origin for 
the word exists. Perhaps the word itself is the consequence of a destinerrance, a wandering from 
locus to locus that to some degree takes for granted its meaning as something always already 
established somewhere else. 
(Miller 2009: 29; 31) 
 
This constantly deferred meaning could begin to indicate the metaphysical presupposition that 
Nicholas Maxwell, as discussed in Convolution 1: Quest, says is inherent to all scientific and, by 
extension, academic endeavour ± but equally, as with Hofstadter, it could simply be the necessity 
WRH[SUHVVO\OLWHUDULO\H[SORUHRWKHUDPELWVHYHQIDUIOXQJRQHVLQRUGHUWRµVRPHKRZPDNHLW
EDFN¶DQ\ZD\1HYHUWKHOHVVIRUWKHWLPHEHLQJLWVHHPVWKDWHYHQWKHTXHVWIRUdestinerrance 
itself goes on, which paradoxically means moving away from it once again here. 
 
 
Convoclusion 2 (Detective) 
 
 
But this movement away does not last very long before coming back into consideration, because 
as part of a convolution, it evidently convolves. This is not as redundant or simplistic a statement 
as it seems. Convolutions acquire definition precisely by defying it ± no magnifying glass or 
imaging technique permits full access to their intrinsic meaning (if there even is any). They are 
thus a complicated idea requiring continuous reformulation, to be seen from constantly adjusted 
angles and viewpoints, with ever finer-grained lenses or more sophisticated software. This is 
because a convolution, as I am trying to elucidate it, is simultaneously a visual representation of a 
concept and the metaphoric use of the resulting image in the verbal description of the idea being 







DQG'HZKXUVW¶VDVVHVVPHQWDIWHU(UDVLVWUDWXVRI$OH[DQGULDWKDWµWKHFRQYROXWLRQVRIWKHEUDLQ>«@ZHUHFRPSDUDEOHWRFRLOV of small 
LQWHVWLQH¶&ODUNHDQG'HZKXUVWµ6SLQQLQJD\DUQ¶FDQRIFRXUVHDOVRPHDQWHOOLQJDORQJ-winded, perhaps convoluted 
VWRU\DQGZLWKWKLV0LOOHU¶VµEDOORI\DUQ¶FDQUHPLQGRQHRI'DQ/OR\G¶VZRUGVZKLFKKHDWWULEXWHVWRDQXQQDPHGFROOHDJXe of his: 






represented ± plus the convolution takes on another layer of complexity by being at once these 
things and the very oscillation between them itself, the very process of convolution. This is why 
it is as valid, though more difficult, to speak of convolving as it is of convolution, the notion flip-
flopping all the time from verb to noun (and from singular to plural) and back. The convolutions 
of the brain (visual, metaphorical, conceptual) are the first instantiation in this regard that I have 
QRWLFHGDQGWKHLQVSLUDWLRQEHKLQGDOOHOVHKHUHEXWWKHWHUPµFRQYROXWLRQV¶PLJKWZHOOEHDGDSWHG
and harnessed for any other conceptual or intellectual field that seems appropriate. 
 This means that any and all possible leads need to be followed, as all are equally likely to 
SURYLGHLQVLJKWRUDWWKHYHU\OHDVWFOXHVDERXWRQH¶VLQLWLDOFRQFHUQ1RQHRIWKHPDUHDZDVWHRI
time; if an intellectual detective (an intellective? a detectual?) is to be properly thorough, then no 
avenue of investigation will ever be a priori rejected out of hand, even though in practice time 
constraints mean one or another avenue will no doubt present itself as the path of least resistance. 
Nevertheless, the necessary implication is repetition, reiteration, having more than one good stab 
at explaining things in detail. And when it comes to destinerrance, this repeated attempting is 
exactly the case for Miller: 
 
What is destinerrance? Discussing it fully would be a virtually endless task. It is a concept, or 
better, motif, or better still, spatiotemporal figure, [because] it is a spatial figure for time. It names 
a fatal possibility of erring, by not reaching a predefined temporal goal, in terms of wandering 
away from a predefined spatial goal. 
(2009: 28±29) 
 
0LOOHUDOVRLPSRUWDQWO\QRWHVWKDWµWKHZRUG>destinerrance] is a concocted present participle used 
DVDQRXQ¶: 7KXVDVIRUFRQYROYLQJVRWRRIRUµGHVWLQHUULQJ¶ZKLFKZRXOGDUJXably 
be the best possible English translation for the original French of 'HUULGD¶VFRQFHSW,WLVQRW
merely that the discussion of either convolving or destinerring is potentially interminable, but that 
WKHYHUEVWKHPVHOYHVDUHµYLUWXDOO\HQGOHVVWDVNV¶ masquerading as they do as nouns. 
Convolution or convolving, terms which a sharp investigator would by now see are almost 
interchangeable, are spatiotemporal figures themselves, mere reiterations in an endless sequence 
on loop in the brain. 
Remarking one particular instance or another entails the manifestation of a pocket of 
cerebral time, an inevitable part of the sequence which is thus also in the process of being 
remarked ± OLNH%RUJHV¶VZRXOG-be dreamer-FUHDWRULQµ7KH&LUFXODU5XLQV¶ trying to espy an 
individual convolution bizarrely invests one in the convolving of something larger and more 
long-WHUPµIRUZKDWZDVKDSSHQLQJKDGKDSSHQHGPDQ\FHQWXULHVDJR¶%RUJHVD,W






As Laura Otis points out, the same is true in reverse: 
 
The relationship between literature and science is one of mutual feedback and suggestibility, each 
FRQWULEXWLQJWRDQGGUDZLQJXSRQWKHµFXOWXUHPHGLXP¶RXWRIZKLFKLWJrows. Culture, however, 
GRHVQRWµGHWHUPLQH¶VFLHQFHRUOLWHUDWXUHDQ\PRUHWKDQVFLHQFHDQGOLWHUDWXUHGHWHUPLQHFXOWXUH 
personal vision persists, despite all indoctrination and all scientific training. 
(Otis 2000: 3) 
 
Maverick detectives, who disregarGWKHLUµLQGRFWULQDWLRQ¶RUWKHLUµVFLHQWLILFWUDLQLQJ¶ still have 
their place: grasping an overall or composite or meta convolution is necessary, but this shape 
does not predetermine what its constituent parts are going to be like, only that they will have an 
LPSDFWXSRQWKHV\VWHPDVDZKROH7KHµSHUVLVWHQFH¶RIHDFKµSHUVRQDOYLVLRQ¶PHDQVWKDWWKH
convolution of each individual brain must also in some sense be accounted for or witnessed.  
 
 
Convoclusion 3 (Labyrinth) 
 
 
And thus, as I also have a brain DQGDµSHUVRQDOYLVLRQ¶ it is possible for me, as I write this here, 
to hear an implicit call of de te fabula narratur coming from my own writing.80 At the risk 
(necessary, calculated) of descending with abandon into narcissism, the largest part of 
convolutions is the recognition of oneself in the search. If my contention is that individual 
scientists belie or mask their own search for intrinsic, individual selfhood in the grander, more 
general project of science, then my own commentary on such matters has to admit its own part in 
such a convolving discourse. One then has to mention the convolution at the heart of pointing out 
convolutions ± that the texts one is highlighting are often chosen because they comment 
somehow upon oneself, even if this choice had been unconscious. I do not contend to be a 
neuroscientist, nor even a scientist of any sort, at least in the ordinarily limited senses in which 
these terms are used. I also do not wish to outright condemn the potential, theoretical unity of an 
overall neuroscientific project. I simply wish to draw attention to the fact that this theoretical 
project does not tend to unity but to a proliferation of concepts (a prominent one being literature), 
and a convoluted, labyrinthine structure from which individual technicians, theorists, writers, 
medical practitioners, sociologists, historians, etc., cannot disentangle themselves if they are to at 
all participate; this, of course, now goes for myself as well. The convolution of the labyrinth, for 










instance, thus seeks to clear up something about my own person and my own place in the literary-
neuroscientific edifice I am trying to describe; at its most distant point it turns back to reflect on 
me just as I do on it. I can, in this regard, highlight two passages of an epiphanic nature, both 
instances of the same uncanny de te fabula narratur IHHOLQJLQ8PEHUWR(FR¶VThe Name of the 
Rose (first published in English in 1983). 
 In the first, Benedictine novice and pseudo-detective Adso of Melk, dwelling on and 
dazzled by the fine line between saintliness and sin, enters the library-labyrinth which is as much 
the centrepiece of the story as it is of the abbey where the story is set. Adso is confused and 
alone, entering the labyrinth much against his better judgement, and, randomly wandering about, 
finally ends up where he had started. Equally randomly, he opens some books and looks through 
them in a daze. Vivid depictions of a lion and an exotically armoured man cause him to 
experience his own fated and emergent literariness, his own destinerrance: 
 
7KH>PDQ¶V@KHDGZKLFKHPHUJHGHQLJPDWLFDOO\IURPDFDVWOHRIUXELHVDQGWRSD]HVVHHPHG>«@
that of the mysterious murderer whose impalpable trail we were following. And then I realized 
why I linked the animal and the armoured man so closely with the labyrinth: both illustrations, 
OLNHDOOLQWKDWERRNHPHUJHGIURPDSDWWHUQRILQWHUORFNLQJODE\ULQWKVZKRVHOLQHV>«@VHHPHG
all to refer to the tangle of rooms and corridors where I was. My eye became lost, on the page, 
along gleaming paths, as my feet were becoming lost in the troublous succession of the rooms of 
the library, and seeing my own wandering depicted on those parchments filled me with uneasiness 
and convinced me that each of those books was telling, through mysterious cachinnations, my 
SUHVHQWVWRU\µ'HWHIDEXODQDUUDWXU¶,VDLGWRP\VHOIDQG,ZRQGHUHGLIWKRVHSDJHVGLGQRW
already contain the story of future events in store for me. 
(Eco 2004: 240±241) 
 
With eyes in his feet, wandering the library-labyrinth has led Adso only to read his own story; the 
confluence of walking, looking and thinking has, however unsettling, crystallized other times and 
spaces for him. 
7KLVOHQGV$GVRVRPHWKLQJRIWKHDLURIZKDW7DOOLVFDOOVDµPHWDSK\VLFDOIOkQHXU¶± µWKH
words on the page he is holding up to his gaze gather up such absences from a multitude of nears 
DQGIDUVDQGPDNHWKHPSUHVHQWLQWKHOLJKWKHUHDQGQRZ¶7DOOLV,QGHHGLI
neuroscientist, physician and staunch defender of humanism Tallis is awed by the metaphysical 
qualities of reading, Adso takes a dimmer view of his own bodily immersion in the process, even 
when it comes to love: 
 
,KDGRQO\WRVHHWKDWERRNDQG,ZDVIRUFHGWRVD\µ'HWHIDEXODQDUUDWXU¶DQG,GLVFRYHUHG,ZDV





DOZD\VFRQYLQFHG\RXIHHOWKHSDLQVRIZKLFKWKH\VSHDN>«@,was frightened to read that the 
VLQFHUHORYHU>«@PXVWIDOOLQWRDZDVWLQJVWDWH>«@DQGVRPHWLPHVWKHPDODG\RYHUSRZHUVWhe  
brain, and the subject loses his mind and raves. 
(Eco 2004: 322±323) 
 
5HDGLQJLVEDGIRUWKHEUDLQLIRQH¶VEUDLQFHDVHVWRFRPSUHKHQGWKDWRQHLVPHUHO\UHDGLQJWRWKH
point where love becomes illness simply by reading about it.81 
 
 




mentioned, and what for him is not at all incongruous with that: a simultaneous defence of 
scientific medicine. Doing these two things together, he contends, sustains human progress whilst 
restoring a diminished sense of wonder at existence. And it is this complicated but compelling 
call to arms that leads Tallis to one of his most oft-UHSHDWHGVWDQFHVµ$UHSHUVRQVOLNH\RXDQG
me brains? The short answer iVQREXW,WKLQN,RZH\RXDORQJHUDQVZHU¶7DOOLV:KR
is Tallis addressing when he writes this? And why does he feel that the long way round is needed 
in order to get from WKHTXHVWLRQWRWKHDQVZHUµQR¶" The basic premise of his claim, the radical 
non-HTXLYDOHQFHRIDSHUVRQZLWKWKDWSHUVRQ¶VEUDLQLVQRWXQGHUFRQWHQWLRQ± I agree 
wholeheartedly and feel that nobody has made the point as clearly, emphatically and consistently 
as Tallis. However, self-styled metaphysical flâneur that he is, yet firm derider of Derrida that he 
has also been, the destinerrance DWZRUNLQ7DOOLV¶VIRUPXODWLRQLVVWULNLQJEXWDSSURSULDWH
because it essentially answers what Miller (after Derrida) refers to as the call of the Other. 
Tallis implies a different equivalence to that of brains and selves, namely that of himself 
DQGSUHVXPDEO\PHUHDGLQJDGGHGWRZKLFKLVWKDWDOOWKHVHVXSSRVHGµSHUVRQV¶DUHWH[WXDOWKH\
are also equivalent to text. The person reading cannot be known at all to Tallis, yet referring to 
KLPVHOILQWKHWKLUGSHUVRQKHUHFRJQL]HVWKHXQNQRZQµ\RX¶DQGKLPVHOIDVµIHOORZPHPEHUVRI
FLYLOVRFLHW\DQGWKH2WKHUZLOOWKHUHIRUHEHDIIRUGHGDJUHHWLQJ¶7DOOLV7DOOLVµRZHV¶
this other something, feels the need to be courteous to the unknown person. This means that he 




 The idea that books and reading could actually DIIHFWRQH¶VERG\DQGHVSHFLDOO\RQH¶VEUDLQPLQGLVUHGROHQWRI'RQ4XL[RWH¶V
reason for sallying forth in the first place, as mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis. Exploring this in greater detail in his book 
FKDSWHUµ7KH3K\VLRORJ\RI5HDGLQJ¶KLVWRULDQ$GULDQ-RKQVDVNVµZKDWHDUO\PRGHUQPHQDQGZRPHQWKRXJKWDFWXDOO\KDSSHQHG
when they read. They saw letters on a page through eyes that resembled the device known as the camera obscura, which conveyed 
LPDJHVWKURXJKWKHERG\¶VDQLPDOVSLULWVRQWRWKHEUDLQ¶Vsensus communis. There imaginative and perceptual images combined, and 
DQLPDOVSLULWVPLQJOHGDQGGHSDUWHGWRGULYHWKHERG\¶VUHVSRQVHVWRERWK¶-RKQV$FFRUGLQJWRWKLVWKHRU\UHDGLng really 






does not simply cut to the chase by saying what he reveals in advance will be the inevitabOHµQR¶, 
EXWLQVWHDGKHWDNHVWKHWLPHµWRFDSLWDOL]HRQdestinerrance by saying yes to whatever call from 
the wholly other comes our way. That call commands us to deflect our course and to begin again 
DQHZIURPDQHZVWDUWLQJSRLQWWRPRYHLQDQHZGLUHFWLRQGHVWLQHUUHGDJDLQ¶0LOOHU±
:KHWKHU7DOOLVNQRZVLWRUDFFHSWVLWRUQRWKLVJXVKLQJµ2YHUWXUH¶ZKLFKFRPSULses the 
µ5HIOHFWLRQVRID0HWDSK\VLFDO)OkQHXU¶&I7DOOLV±28) is less to do with the relationship 
between walking, looking and thinking as he contends. It is more about his conscientious 
attention to such an inaudible call ± the very act of straining to hear the call to wandering and 
ZRQGHULQJZKLFKPLJKWµGHIOHFWKLVFRXUVH¶LQVXFKDXVHIXOPDQQHU 
 It is more than can be said for other supposed humanists who do not deflect their course, 
and despite their best intentions, end up barraging what they are trying to save with so-called 
friendly fire. The problem with many attempts to salvage the humanities from the overbearing 
SUHVHQFHRIQHXURVFLHQFHVXFKDV-RQDK/HKUHU¶VProust was a Neuroscientist (2012), is twofold. 
Firstly, there is an intelleFWXDOLPSRVWXUHDWSOD\ZKHQUHJDUGLQJVRPHRQHWRKDYHµIRUHVHHQ¶WKH
discoveries or advances of neuroscience. It is anachronistic to say the least, and involves 
confusing this supposed foresight with what is likely to be a far more plausible conclusion: that 
WKHQRWDEOHSHUVRQDJHVJUDFLQJ/HKUHU¶VSDJHV± 3URXVW:KLWPDQ/¶(VFRIILHUDQGVRRQ± all 
had useful, elevated and potentially transformative insight into an object of investigation shared 
with neuroscience, call it the human mind or the human condition or whatever. Foresight 
confuses this common object of insight for neuroscience itself. But the second issue, almost more 
grave, is that rather than rehabilitate the cultural standing of the arts and humanities (which in the 
current climate seems only ever to be unhelpfully, pretentiously over-inflated, or under very real 
attack by a wide spread of detractors claiming it a costly and insincere indulgence), the above-
mentioned anachronistic and confused imposture still places neuroscience at the top of a gradient, 
with all human efforts prior to its emergence merely uncannily brilliant and left-field steps on the 
inevitable march towards cultural neuro-dominance. In this reading, no matter the supposed 
intentions of interdisciplinary communion, previous ways of explaining human life occasionally 
yielded moments of unlikely, untimely genius, but were still only semi-lucid precursors to the 
scientific study of the brain and the nervous system. 
 The idea is that guns must be pointed elsewhere, or put down altogether, so as to µGHIOHFW
RXUFRXUVH>«@WREHJLQDJDLQDQHZIURPDQHZVWDUWLQJSRLQWWRPRYHLQDQHZGLUHFWLRQ,¶DV
Miller says. The overwhelmingly reiterated novelty of the way he puts this, a radical and repeated 







story of the story, that is to say, the (my) critique of just such convolutions, inevitably, 
destinerringly, ends with the words of a critic ± but one that has been brought round by rats, 
rather than merely accompanying them in their maze, or their everyday race. They are the words, 
as I have transcribed them, of Anton Ego, the sometime nemesis of Parisian restaurateurs in 
Pixar/'LVQH\¶VDQLPDWHGILOPRatatouille: 
 
In many ways, the work of a critic is easy. We risk very little yet enjoy a position over those who 
offer up their work and their selves to our judgment. We thrive on negative criticism, which is fun 
to write and to read. But the bitter truth we critics must face, is that in the grand scheme of things, 
the average piece of junk is probably more meaningful than our criticism designating it so. But 
there are times when a critic truly risks something, and that is in the discovery and defence of the 
new. The world is often unkind to new talent, new creations. The new needs friends. 
(Ratatouille 2007; original emphasis)  
 















$QWKRQ\$QGUHZµ2OLYHU6DFNV7KHYLVLRQDU\ZKRFDQ¶WUHFRJQLVHIDFHV¶The Observer,  
17 October. http://gu.com/p/2kdye 
 
Armstrong, Paul B. 2013. How Literature Plays with the Brain: The Neuroscience of Reading  
and Art (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
 
Ashmore, Malcolm. 1989. The Reflexive Thesis: Wrighting Sociology of Scientific Knowledge  
(Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press) 
 
 ²² µ5HIOH[LYLW\LQ6FLHQFHDQG7HFKQRORJ\6WXGLHV¶LQInternational Encyclopedia of  
the Social & Behavioural Sciences, 2nd edn, Vol 20, pp. 93±97.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.85018-7 
 
Ashmore, Malcolm, Derek Edwards and Jonathan 3RWWHUµ7KH%RWWRP/LQHThe Rhetoric  
RI5HDOLW\'HPRQVWUDWLRQV¶Configurations, 2, no. 1 (Winter): 1±14 
 
Attali, Jacques. 1999. The Labyrinth in Culture and Society: Pathways to Wisdom, trans. by  
Joseph Rowe (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books) 
 
$XGHQ*$µ%HKDYLRXU&KDQJHV6XSHUYHQLQJ8SRQ(QFHSKDOLWLVLQ&KLOGUHQ¶ The  
Lancet, 200, no. 5174 (28 October): 901±904. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(01)01198-9 
 
²² µ7KH0DGQHVVRI$MD[DVFRQFHLYHGE\6RSKRFOHV&OLQLFDOO\ &RQVLGHUHG¶British  
Journal of Psychiatry, 72, no. 299 (October): 503±512.  
doi:10.1192/bjp.72.299.503 
 
$XGHQ:+µ7KH,URQLF+HUR¶Horizon, 20, no. 116 (August): 86±94 
 
²² 1967. The Orators: An English Study (New York: Random House) 
 
²² 1971. A Certain World: A Commonplace Book (London: Faber and Faber) 
 
²² 2002. The Complete Works of W H Auden: Prose: Volume II, 1939±1948, ed. by Edward  
Mendelson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 
 





Mendelson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 
 
²² 2009. Selected Poems, rev. and ed. by Edward Mendelson (London: Faber and Faber) 
 
²² 2010. The Complete Works of W H Auden: Prose: Volume IV, 1956±1962, ed. by Edward  
Mendelson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 
 
Auster, Paul. 2011. The New York Trilogy (London: Faber and Faber) 
 
Bainbridge, David. 2008. The Zonules of Zinn: A Fantastic Journey Through Your Brain  
(Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press) 
 
Bakker, Scott. 2009. Neuropath (London: Orion) 
 
Beá, Josep, and Victor HerQiQGH]µ'RQ4XL[RWH)UHXGDQG&HUYDQWHV¶LQ International  
Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol 65, no. 2, pp. 141±153 
 
Beer, Gillian. 2009. 'DUZLQ¶V3ORWV(Yolutionary Narrative in Darwin, George Eliot and  
Nineteenth-Century Fiction, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Behne, Adolf. 1927. Neues Wohnen ± Neues Bauen (Leipzig: Hesse & Becker) 
 
Benjamin, Andrew E, Geoffrey N Cantor and John R R Christie (eds). 1987. The Figural and the  
Literal: Problems of Language in the History of Science and Philosophy, 1630±1800  
(Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
 
Benjamin, Walter. 1999. The Arcades Project, trans. by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin  
(Cambridge, MA; London: Belknap Press) 
 
Bensaude Vincent, Bernadette, and Sacha Loeve. 2014. µ0HWDSKRUVLQ1DQRPHGLFLQH The Case  
RI7DUJHWHG'UXJ'HOLYHU\¶Nanoethics, 8, no. 1: 1±17. doi:10.1007/s11569-013-0183-5 
 
%HUODQW/DXUHQµ2QWKH&DVH¶Critical Inquiry, 33, no. 4: 663±672. 
 






Biagoli, Mario, and Peter Galison (eds). 2003. Scientific Authorship: Credit and Intellectual  
Property in Science (New York; London: Routledge) 
 
Bleiberg, Germán, Maureen Ihrie and Janet Pérez (edVµ5DPyQ\&DMDO 6DQWLDJR¶LQ 
Dictionary of the Literature of the Iberian Peninsula: L±Z (Westport, CT: Greenwood  
Press), pp. 1350±51 
 
Bloch, William Goldbloom. 2008. The UnimDJLQDEOH0DWKHPDWLFVRI%RUJHV¶Library of Babel  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Bloom, Harold, and Blake Hobby (eds). 2009. The Labyrinth%ORRP¶V/LWHUDU\Themes series  
 (New York: Infobase Publishing) 
 
Bolaki, Stella. 2016. Illness as Many Narratives: Arts, Medicine and Culture (Edinburgh:  
 Edinburgh University Press) 
 
Borges, Jorge Luis. 1999. Ficciones, ed. by Gordon Brotherston and Peter Hulme (London:  
 Bristol Classical Press) 
 
±±±± 2000a. Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, ed. by Donald A Yates and James  
 E Irby (London: Penguin Classics) 
 
±±±± 2000b. Collected Fictions, trans. by Andrew Hurley (London: Penguin) 
 
±±±±. 2010. The Perpetual Race of Achilles and the Tortoise, trans. by Esther Allen, Suzanne Jill  
 Levine and Eliot Weinberger (London: Penguin Great Ideas) 
 
Borges, Jorge Luis, and Adolfo Bioy Casares. 1982. Chronicles of Bustos Domecq, trans. by  
 Norman Thomas di Giovanni (London: Allen Lane) 
 
Borowski, E J, and J M Borwein. 2002. Collins Dictionary: Mathematics, 2nd edn (Glasgow:  
 Harper Collins) 
 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 2004. Science of Science and Reflexivity, trans. by Richard Nice (Cambridge:  






%ULJJOH$GDPµ1DWXUHRU1HROLEHUDOLVP"7ZR9LHZVRQ6FLHQFHDQGWKH Persistence of  
 (QYLURQPHQWDO&RQWURYHUVLHV¶Interdisciplinary Environmental Review, 15, no. 2/3:  
 94±104 
 
%UR\DUG$QDWROHµ*RRG%RRNV$ERXW%HLQJ6LFN¶The New York Times, 1 April 1990.  
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/01/books/good-books-abut-being-sick.html 
 
Buse, Peter, and Ken Hirschkop, Scott McCracken and Bertrand Taithe. 2005. %HQMDPLQ¶V 
Arcades: An unGuided tour (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
 
Butler, Rex. 2010. %RUJHV¶6KRUW6WRULHV$5HDGHU¶V*XLGH (London; New York: Continuum  
Books) 
 
Cajal, Santiago Ramón y. 1905. µ3VLFRORJtDGHGRQ4XLMRWH\HOTXLMRWLVPR¶,QVWLWXWR Cervantes  
Website (republished from Madrid: Nicolás Moya). 
http://cvc.cervantes.es/ciencia/cajal/cajal_articulos/quijote.htm 
 
²² 2001. Vacation Stories: Five Science Fiction Tales, trans. by Laura Otis (Champaign, IL:  
University of Illinois Press) 
 
²² 2004. µ/D3VLFRORJtDGH'RQ4XLMRWHGHOD0DQFKD\HO4XLMRWLVPR¶Arbor, 179, no.705: 1± 
12. doi:10.3989/arbor.2004.i705.536 
 
Callard, Felicity, and Des Fitzgerald. 2015. Rethinking Interdisciplinarity across the Social  
Sciences and Neurosciences (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
&DQWRU*HRIIUH\1µ:HLJKLQJOLJKWWKHrole of metaphor in eighteenth-century optical  
GLVFRXUVH¶LQ$QGUHZ(%HQMDPLQ*HRIIUH\1&DQWRUDQGJohn R R Christie (eds), The  
Figural and the Literal: Problems of Language in the History of Science and Philosophy,  
1630±1800 (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 124±146 
 
Caraher, Brian G (ed.). 1992. Intimate Conflict: Contradiction in Literary and Philosophical  
Discourse (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press) 
 






Carpenter, Charles A. 1999. American and British Playwrights Confront the Nuclear Age, 1945± 
1964 (Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press) 
 
Carpenter, Humphrey. 1983. W H Auden: A Biography (London: Unwin Paperbacks) 
 
Carroll, Lewis. 1982. The Complete Illustrated Works of Lewis Carroll (London: Chancellor  
Press) 
 
Carroll, Sean. 2013. The Particle at the End of the Universe: The Hunt for the Higgs and the  
Discovery of a New World (London: Oneworld Publications) 
 
Carter, Rita. 1998. Mapping the Mind (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson) 
 
&DVVXWR/HRQDUGµ2OLYHU6DFNV7KH37%DUQXPRIWKH3RVWPRGHUQ:RUOG"¶ American  
Quarterly, 52, no. 2 (June): 326±333. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30041844 
 
&DWDOi5DIDHOµ%RUJHV-RUJH/XLV¶ in Pamela Gossin (ed.), Encyclopedia of Literature  
and Science (Westport, CT; London: Greenwood Press) 
 
Chandler, Raymond. 2000. The Big Sleep and Other Novels (London: Penguin) 
 
²² 2005. The Little Sister (London: Penguin) 
 
Chapple, J A V. 1986. Science and Literature in the Nineteenth Century (Basingstoke; London:  
MacMillan Education) 
 
Choudhury, Suparna, and Jan Slaby (eds). 2012. Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the  
Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell) 
 
Churchland, Patricia Smith. 1986. Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind- 
Brain (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press) 
 
Cervantes, Miguel de. 2005. Don Quixote, trans. by Edith Grossman (London: Vintage) 
 






Clarke, Edwin, and L S Jacyna. 1987. Nineteenth-Century Origins of Neuroscientific Concepts  
(Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press) 
 
Clover, Joshua. 2012. Interview with Joshua Clover, conducted by Ian Beattie, in Maissonneuve,  
May 9 2012. http://maisonneuve.org/article/2012/05/9/interview-joshua-clover 
 
Coe, Jonathan. 2004. Like a Fiery Elephant: The Story of B S Johnson (London: Picador) 
 
²² 2013. µ3UHIDFH¶LQ-RQDWKDQ&RH3KLOLS7HZDQG-XOLD-RUGDQHGVWell Done God!:  
Selected Prose and Drama of B S Johnson (London: Picador), pp. xi±xiv 
 
&RODKDQ&ODUNµ6KHOWRQDQGWKH)DUFLFDO3HUFHSWLRn of Don Quixote in Seventeenth- 
&HQWXU\%ULWDLQ¶LQ-$*$UGLODHGThe Cervantean Heritage: Reception and  
Influence of Cervantes in Britain (London; Leeds: Legenda/MHRA/Maney), pp. 61±65 
 
Colman, Andrew M. 2009. Dictionary of Psychology, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Colombo, John Robert. 1970. Neo Poems (Vancouver: Sono Nis Press) 
 
µ&RQQHFWRPH¶New Scientist, 188, no. 2525 (12 November 2005): 62 
 
Connolly, William E. 2002. Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis; London: 
University of Minnesota Press) 
 
Conrad, Joseph. 2004. The Secret Agent: A Simple Tale 2[IRUG2[IRUG:RUOG¶V&ODVVLFV 
 
Cook, Michael. 2011. Narratives of Enclosure in Detective Fiction: The Locked Room Mystery  
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
Cordle, Daniel. 2008. States of Suspense: The Nuclear Age, Postmodernism and United States  
Fiction and Prose (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
 
Corsi, Pietro (ed.). 1991. The Enchanted Loom: Chapters in the History of Neuroscience  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 







Cox, Virginia. 1992. The Renaissance Dialogue: Literary Dialogue in its Social and Political  
Contexts, Castiglione to Galileo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Craver, Carl F. 2007. Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
 
Crick, Francis. 1995. The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (New York:  
Touchstone) 
 
&XUUDQ3DWULFN-µ7KH6HHPLQJO\4XL[RWLF3XUVXLWRID&XPXODWLYH Psychological  
6FLHQFH,QWURGXFWLRQWRWKH6SHFLDO,VVXH¶Psychological Methods, 14, no. 2 (June): 77± 
80. doi:10.1037/a0015972 
 
Danziger, Kurt. 1990. Constructing the Subject: Historical Origins of Psychological Research  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
²² 1997. Naming the Mind: How Psychology Found its Language (London: Sage Publications) 
 
Davenport-+LQHV5LFKDUGµ$XGHQ¶V/LIHDQG&KDUDFWHU¶LQThe Cambridge Companion to  
W H Auden, ed. by Stan Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 15±24 
 
'DYH\6PLWK*HRUJHµ&RPPHQWDU\W H Auden, G A Auden and Psychosomatic  
$HWLRORJ\¶Int. J. Epidemiol., 31, no. 6: 1137±1138. doi:10.1093/ije/31.6.1137 
 
Davidson, Osha Gray. 2003. Fire in the Turtle House: The Green Sea Turtle and the Fate of the  
Ocean (New York: PublicAffairs) 
 
'H)HOLSH-DYLHUµ6HVTXLFHQWHQDU\RIWKH%LUWKGD\RI6DQWLDJR5DPyQ\&DMDOWKH)DWKHU 
RI0RGHUQ1HXURVFLHQFH¶Trends in Neuroscience, 25, no. 9 (September): 481±484 
 
Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,  
trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press) 
 





(Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
 
Derrida, Jacques. 1976. Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore;  
London: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
 
²² 1982. Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago  
Press) 
 
²² 1984. µ1R$SRFDO\SVH1RW1RZ)XOO6SHHG$KHDG6HYHQ0LVVLOHV6HYHQ0LVVLYHV¶ 
trans. by Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics, 14, no. 2: 20±31 
 
²² 1992. Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge (London; New York: Routledge) 
 
Dexterµ7KH&RPSOHWH6HULHV¶6HDVRQV±8 Boxset, dir. by various (Showtime/Paramount  
Home Entertainment) [on DVD] 
 
'L&KULVWLQD0DULHWWHµ+RZ1HXURVFLHQWLVWVDQG0DJLFLDQV$re Conjuring %UDLQ,QVLJKWV¶ 




Doctorow, E L. 2014. $QGUHZ¶V%UDLQ (London; New York: Random House) 
 
Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan. 2009. The Complete Sherlock Holmes (New York: Barnes and Noble) 
 
Dudchenko, Paul A. 2010. Why People Get Lost: The Psychology and Neuroscience of Spatial  
Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Duffau, Hugues (ed.). 2011. Brain Mapping: From Neural Basis of Cognition to Surgical  
Applications (Vienna: Springer Austria) 
 
Duffy, Enda. 2009. The Speed Handbook: Velocity, Pleasure, Modernism (Durham, NC; London:  
Duke University Press) 
 
Durán, Manuel, and Fay R Rogg. 2006. Fighting Windmills: Encounters with Don Quixote (New  





Easterlin, Nancy. 2012. A Biocultural Approach to Literary Theory and Interpretation  
(Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
 
Eco, Umberto. 2004. The Name of the Rose, trans. by William Weaver (London: Vintage) 
 
Eco, Umberto, and Thomas A Sebeok (eds). 1988. The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce  
(Bloomington, IN; Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press) 
 
Eck, Mary. 20µ5HIOHFWLRQV7KURXJKWKH/DE\ULQWK¶American Journal of Nursing, 100, no. 9  
(September): 25 
 
Edelman, Gerald M, and Jean-Pierre Changeux (eds). 2001. The Brain (New Brunswick, NJ;  
London: Transaction Publishers) 
 
Edelman, Shimon. 2008. Computing the Mind: How the Mind Really Works (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press) 
 
(GZDUGV'HUHN0DOFROP$VKPRUHDQG-RQDWKDQ3RWWHUµ'HDWKDQG)XUQLWXUH The  
Rhetoric, Politics and Theology of Bottom Line Arguments Against 5HODWLYLVP¶History  
of the Human Sciences, 8, no. 2: 25±49 
 
(OLDV&DPHOLDµ6WXPEOLQJXQWR*UDFe: Invention and the Poetics of Imagination¶ in Janus  
Head, 9, no. 1: 63±72. http://www.janushead.org/9-1/Elias.pdf 
 
(QGHUVE\-LPµ'HFHLYHGE\2UFKLGV6H[ Science, Fiction and 'DUZLQ¶British Journal  
for the History of Science, 49, no. 2 (June): 205 ± 229. doi:10.1017/S0007087416000352 
 






)DULQHOOD0DWWHRDQG+DQD5RãNeurocomic (London: Nobrow Press) 
 





Modern Fiction (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
 
Farrell, John. 1996. )UHXG¶V3DUDQRLG4XHVW3V\FKRDQDO\VLVDQG0RGHUQ6XVSLFLRQ (New York;  
London: New York University Press) 
 
Feinstein6DQG\µ$OFKHP\WR&KHPLVWU\,QWHJUDWLQJ6FLHQFHDQG+XPDQLWLHV¶LQ 
Learning Literature in an Era of Change: Innovations in Teaching, ed. by Dona Hickey  
and Donna Reiss (Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing) 
 
Finger, Stanley. 1994. Origins of Neuroscience: A History of Explorations into Brain Function  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
²² 2000. Minds Behind the Brain: A History of the Pioneers and Their Discoveries (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press) 
 
Finger, Stanley, and Marco Piccolino. 2011. The Shocking History of Electric Fishes: From  
Ancient Epochs to the Birth of Modern Neurophysiology (New York: Oxford University  
Press)  
 
Finkelstein, Gabriel. 2013. Emil Du Bois-Reymond: Neuroscience, Self, and Society in  
Nineteenth-Century Germany (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press) 
 
²² µMechanical neuroscience: Emil du Bois-5H\PRQG¶VLQQRYDWLRQVLQtheory and  
practice¶ Front. Syst. Neurosci., 9, no. 133 (30 September). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2015.00133 
 
)RUUHVWHU-RKQµ,Ip, then whDW"7KLQNLQJLQ&DVHV¶History of the Human Sciences, 9, no.  
3: 1±25. doi:10.1177/095269519600900301 
 
Foucault, Michel. 2006. History of Madness, ed. by Jean Khalfa, trans. by Jonathan Murphy and  
Jean Khalfa (Abingdon: Routledge) 
 
Fox, Margalit. 2013. The Riddle of the Labyrinth: The Quest to Crack an Ancient Code and the  
Uncovering of a Lost Civilisation (London: Profile Books) 
 







Frye, Northrop. 2000. 1RUWKURS)U\H¶V/DWH1RWHEooks 1982±1990: Architecture of the Spiritual  
World, ed. by Robert D Denham (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) 
 
Fuller, John. 1970. $5HDGHU¶V*XLGHWRW H Auden (London: Thames and Hudson) 
 
Fuller, David, and Patricia Waugh (eds). 1999. The Arts and Sciences of Criticism (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press) 
 
*DQJ-RVKXDµ%HKDYLRXULVPDQGWKH%HJLQQLQJVRI&ORVH5HDGLQJ¶English Literary  
History, 78, no. 1: 1±25 
 
²² µ0LQGOHVV0RGHUQLVP¶Novel: A Forum on Fiction, 46, no. 1: 116±132.  
doi:10.1215/00295132-2019137 
 
Gery, John. 1996. Nuclear Annihilation and Contemporary American Poetry (Gainesville, FL:  
University Press of Florida) 
 
*LHU\Q7KRPDV)µ%RXQGDU\-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science:  
6WUDLQVDQG,QWHUHVWVLQ3URIHVVLRQDO,GHRORJLHVRI6FLHQWLVWV¶ American Sociological  
Review, 48, no. 6 (December): 781±795 
 
²² 1999. Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago; London:  
University of Chicago Press) 
 
Giordano, James J, and Bert Gordijn (eds). 2010. Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives in  
Neuroethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Goldinger, Stephen D, and Tamiko Azuma. 2003. µ3X]]OH-solving science: the quixotic quest for  
units in speeFKSHUFHSWLRQ¶ Journal of Phonetics, 31: 305±320.  
doi:10.1016/S0095-4470(03)00030-5 
 







Grant, Michael (ed.). 2000. The Raymond Tallis Reader (Basingstoke: Palgrave) 
 
Greenberg, Herbert. 1968. Quest for the Necessary: W H Auden and the Dilemma of Divided  
Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 
 
Greene, Graham. 2006. Monsignor Quixote (London: Vintage) 
 
Greenfield, Susan. 1998. The Human Brain: A Guided Tour (London: Phoenix) 
 
²² 2016. Personal Website. http://www.susangreenfield.com 
 
Greenwood, John D. 2009. A Conceptual History of Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill) 
 
Grinberg, León, and Juan Francisco Rodríguez. µ7KH,QIOXHQFHRI Cervantes on the Future  
&UHDWRURI3V\FKRDQDO\VLV¶International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 65, no. 2: 153±169 
 
*URVVPDQ(GLWKµ7UDQVODWRU¶V1RWHWRWKH5HDGHU¶LQ0LJXHOGH&HUYDQWHV Saavedra, Don  
Quixote, trans. by Edith Grossman (London: Vintage), pp. xvii±xx 
 
Guenther, Katja. 2015. Localization and its Discontents: A Genealogy of Psychoanalysis and the  
Neuro Disciplines (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press) 
 
Hacking, Ian. 1999. The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard  
University Press) 
 
Harrington, Anne. 1987. Medicine, Mind, and the Double Brain: A Study in Nineteenth-Century  
Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 
 
Havemann, Miriam. 2011. The Subject Rising Against its Author: A Poetics of Rebellion in Bryan  
6WDQOH\-RKQVRQ¶V2HXYUH (Hildesheim; Zurich; New York: Georg Olms Verlag) 
 
+D\HV-XOLH&DQGOHUµ(LJKWHHQWK-Century English Translations of Don Quixote¶LQ-$* 
Ardila (ed.), The Cervantean Heritage: Reception and Influence of Cervantes in Britain  
(London; Leeds: Legenda/MHRA/Maney), pp. 66±75 
 





/LWHUDWXUHDQG6FLHQFH¶New Literary History, 20, no. 2 (Winter): 305±322.  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/469103 
 
²² 1999. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and  
Informatics (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press)  
 
Hebb, Donald O. 2000. The Organization of Behaviour: A Neuropsychological Theory (Mahwah,  
NJ: Erlbaum) 
 
Hernández Martín, Jorge. 1995. Readers and Labyrinths: Detective Fiction in Borges, Bustos  
Domecq, and Eco (New York; London: Garland Publishing) 
 
Heringman, Noah (ed.). 2003. Romantic Science: The Literary Forms of Natural History  
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press) 
 
Hickey, Dona, and Donna Reiss (eds). 2000. Learning Literature in an Era of Change:  
Innovations in Teaching (Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing) 
 
Hirsch, Martin C. 2000. Dictionary of Human Neuroanatomy (Berlin: Springer) 
 
Hofstadter, Douglas R. 2000. Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid: Twentieth- 
Anniversary Edition: With a New Preface by the Author (London: Penguin) 
 
²² 2007. I am a Strange Loop (New York: Basic Books) 
 
Hohmuth, Jürgen. 2003. Labyrinths & Mazes (Munich: Prestel) 
 
Holland, Norman N. 1988. The Brain of Robert Frost: A Cognitive Approach to Literature (New  
York; London: Routledge)  
 
²² µDon Quixote and the Neuroscience of MHWDILFWLRQ¶LQ,-DpQDQG--Simon (eds),  
Cognitive Literary Studies: Current Themes and New Directions (Austin, TX: University  
of Texas Press) 
 
Hollings, Ken. 2014. The Bright Labyrinth: Sex, Death and Design in the Digital Regime  





Horne Craigie, E, and William C Gibson. 1968. The World of Ramón y Cajal: With Selections  
From His Nonscientific Writings (Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Books) 
 
+XVWDN&DUODDQG1DWDVKD0\HUVµ,QYROXWLRQDU\0RPHQWXP$IIHFWLYH Ecologies and the  
6FLHQFHVRI3ODQW,QVHFW(QFRXQWHUV¶differences, 23, no. 3: 74±118.  
doi:10.1215/10407391-1892907 
 
Irwin, John T. 1994. The Mystery to a Solution: Poe, Borges, and the Analytic Detective Story  
(Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
 
Jacobson, Marcus. 1993. Foundations of Neuroscience (New York; London: Plenum Press) 
 
Jacyna, LS. 2000. Lost Words: Narratives of Language and the Brain, 1825±1926 (Princeton, NJ;  
Oxford: Princeton University Press) 
 
Jeannerod, Marc. 1985. The Brain Machine: The Development of Neurophysiological Thought,  
trans. by David Urion (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press) 
 
Johns, Adrian. 1998. The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago;  
London: Chicago University Press) 
 
-RKQVRQ%6Dµ&OHDQ/LYLQJLVWKH5HDO 6DIHJXDUG¶LQ%S Johnson and Zulfikar Ghose,  
Statement Against Corpses (London: Constable), pp. 13±29 
 
²² Eµ2Q6XSSO\¶LQ%6-RKQVRQDQG=XOILNDU*KRVHStatement Against Corpses  
(London: Constable), pp. 76±78 
 
²² (ed.) 1968. The Evacuees (London: Gollancz) 
 
²² Dµ0HDQ3RLQWRI,PSDFW¶LQ$UHQ¶W<RX5DWKHU<RXQJWREHWriting Your Memoirs?  
(London: Hutchinson and Co.), pp. 43±50 
 
²² Eµ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQ$UHQ¶W<RXRather Young to be Writing Your Memoirs? (London:  
Hutchinson and Co.), pp. 9±31 
 





²² 2013. Albert Angelo (London: Picador) 
 
Johnson, B S, and Zulfikar Ghose. 1964. Statement Against Corpses (London: Constable) 
 
Johnson, Christopher. 1993. System and Writing in the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
²² 1998. µ'HUULGDDQG6FLHQFH¶Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 52, no. 205 (October):  
477±494 
 
Johnson, Steven. 2002. Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities and Software  
(London: Penguin) 
 
²² 2005. Mind Wide Open: Why You Are What You Think (London: Penguin) 
 
-RUGDQ-XOLDµ)RUHZRUG¶LQ-RQDWKDQ&RH3KLOLS7HZDQG-XOLD-RUGDQHGV Well Done  
God!: Selected Prose and Drama of B S Johnson (London: Picador), pp. xv±xx 
 
Jordan, Julia, and Martin Ryle. 2014. B S Johnson and Post-War Literature: Possibilities of the  
Avant Garde (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1995. Refiguring Life: Metaphors of Twentieth-Century Biology (New York;  
Chichester: Columbia University Press) 
 
.HPSVWHU3HWHU$DQG$QGUHZ-/HHVµ1HXURORJ\DQG'HWHFWLYH:ULWLQJ¶ Practical  
Neurology, 13, no. 6: 372±376. doi:10.1136/practneurol-2013-000597 
 
Kern, Stephen. 2003. The Culture of Time and Space: 1800±1918 (London: Weidenfeld &  
Nicolson) 
 
Koch, Christof. 2004. The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach (Englewood,  
CO: Roberts and Co) 
 
Knight, David M. 1998. Science in the Romantic Era (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum) 
 





(Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press) 
 
Kuhn, Thomas S. 2012. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Fiftieth-Anniversary edn  
(Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press) 
 
Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. 2003. Metaphors We Live By, updated with a new Afterword  
(Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press) 
 
Laplante, Phillip A (ed.). 2001. Dictionary of Computer Science, Engineering, and Technology  
(Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press) 
 
Leavey Jr, JoKQ3µ'HVWLQHUUDQFH7KH$SRWURSRFDO\SWLFVRI7UDQVODWLRQ¶LQ 
Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida, ed. by John Sallis  
(Chicago, IL; London: University of Chicago Press), pp. 33±43 
 
Lehrer, Jonah. 2012. Proust was a Neuroscientist (Edinburgh: Canongate) 
 
Lemov, Rebecca. 2005. World as Laboratory: Experiments with Mice, Mazes, and Men (New  
York: Hill and Wang) 
 
Lepenies, Wolf. 1988. Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology, trans. by R J  
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 39±40 
 
Litt, Toby. 2000. Corpsing (London: Penguin) 
 
²² 2001. deadkidsongs (London: Penguin) 
 
²² 2008. Interview with Toby Litt, conducted by Fiona Tolan (2006), in Philip Tew, Fiona  
Tolan and Leigh Wilson (eds), Writers Talk: Conversations with Contemporary British  
Novelists (London; New York: Continuum), pp. 72±87 
 
²² Dµ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQ%6-RKQVRQAlbert Angelo (London: Picador), pp. v±ix 
 
²² 2013b. µ7KH*ORRS¶LQ*UHJRU\1RUPLQWRQHGBeacons: Stories for Our Not So Distant  






²² 2016. Mutants: Selected Essays (London; New York; Calcutta: Seagull Books) 
 
Lloyd, Dan. 1989. Simple Minds (Cambridge, MA; London: Bradford/MIT Press) 
 
²² 2004. Radiant Cool: A Novel Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge, MA; London:  
Bradford/MIT Press) 
 
²² 2016a. Institutional Website, Trinity College (Hartford, CT). 
http://internet2.trincoll.edu/facprofiles/default.aspx?fid=1000493 
 
²² 2016b. Personal Website. https://commons.trincoll.edu/dlloyd/research  
 
Lodge, David. 2001. 7KLQNV« (London: Penguin)  
 
²² 2002. Consciousness and the Novel: Connected Essays (London: Secker & Warburg) 
 
²² 2011. The Art of Fiction: Illustrated from Classic and Modern Texts (London: Vintage) 
 
López-Muñoz, Francisco, Jesús Boya and Cecilio Alamo. µ1HXURQ7KHRU\WKH&RUQHUVWRQH 
of Neuroscience, on the Centenary of the Nobel Prize Award to Santiago Ramón y  
&DMDO¶Brain Research Bulletin, 70 (October): 391±405 
 
Lotman, Juri. 2009. Culture and Explosion, ed. by Marina Grishakova, trans. by Wilma Clark  
(Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter) 
 
Luria, A R. 2010. The Autobiography of Alexander Luria: A Dialogue with the Making of Mind,  
ed. and trans. by Michael Cole and Karl Levitin (New York; London: Psychology Press) 
 
/XW]$QWRLQHDQG(YDQ7KRPSVRQµ1HXURSKHQRPHQRORJ\,QWHJUDWLQJSubjective  
([SHULHQFHDQG%UDLQ'\QDPLFVLQWKH1HXURVFLHQFHRI&RQVFLRXVQHVV¶Journal of  
Consciousness Studies, 10, no. 9±10: 31±52 
 
Lynch, Zack, with Byron Laursen. 2009. The Neuro Revolution: How Brain Science is Changing  
the World 1HZ<RUN6W0DUWLQ¶V3UHVV 
 





New York: Routledge) 
 
Maasen, Sabine, Everett Mendelsohn, and Peter Weingart (eds). 1995. Biology as Society, Society  
as Biology: Metaphors (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers) 
 
0DFKDGR,UHQHµ,PSDFWRUH[SORVLRQ"7HFKQRORJLFDOFXOWXUHDQGWKHEDOOLVWLF PHWDSKRU¶ 
Sign Systems Studies, 34, no. 1: 245±261 
 
Macknik, Stephen L, Susana Martinez-Conde and Sandra Blakeslee. 2011. Sleights of Mind:  
What The Neuroscience of Magic Reveals About Our Brains (London: Profile Books) 
 
Macmillan, Malcolm. 2000. An Odd Kind of Fame: Stories of Phineas Gage (Cambridge, MA;  
London: MIT Press) 
 
Malabou, Catherine. 2008. What Should We Do with Our Brain?, trans. by Sebastian Rand (New  
York: Fordham University Press) 
 
Mannix, Patrick. 1992. The Rhetoric of Antinuclear Fiction: Persuasive Strategies in Novels and  
Films (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press) 
 
Marshall, Louise H, and Horace W Magoun. 1998. Discoveries in the Human Brain: 
Neuroscience Prehistory, Brain Structure, and Function (Totowa, NJ: Humana Press) 
 
Matthews, W H. 2003. Mazes and Labyrinths: Their History and Development (Whitefish, MT:  
Kessinger Publishing) 
 
Maxwell, Nicholas. 2004. Is Science Neurotic? (London: Imperial College Press) 
 
McCabe, Cameron. 1986. The Face on the Cutting-Room Floor (London: Penguin) 
 
McCullough, David Willis. 2005. The Unending Mystery: A Journey Through Labyrinths and  
Mazes (New York: Anchor Books) 
 
McMurran, Mary Helen, and Alison Conway (eds). 2016. Mind, Body, Motion, Matter:  






Mendelson, Edward. 1999. Later Auden (London: Faber and Faber) 
 
0HQJKDP5RGµ$XGHQ3V\FKRORJ\DQG6RFLHW\¶LQThe Cambridge Companion to W H  
Auden, ed. by Stan Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 165±174 
 
Meyer, Michel. 1995. Of Problematology: Philosophy, Science, and Language, trans. by David  
Jamison with Alan Hart (Chicago, IL; London: University of Chicago Press) 
 
Miller, J Hillis. 1992. $ULDGQH¶V7KUHDG6WRU\/LQHV (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University  
Press) 
 
²² 2002. On Literature (London; New York: Routledge) 
 
²² 2009. For Derrida (New York: Fordham University Press) 
 
Mol, Annemarie. 2002. The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham, NC;  
London: Duke University Press) 
 
Moreno, Jonathan D. 2012. Mind Wars: Brain Science and the Military in the 21st Century, rev.  
edn (New York: Bellevue Literary Press) 
 
Mulkay, Michael. 1985. The Word and the World: Explorations in the Form of Sociological  
Analysis (London: George Allen & Unwin) 
 
Nelson, James Lindemann. 2003. +LSSRFUDWHV¶0D]e: Ethical Explorations of the Medical  
Labyrinth (Lanham, MD; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield) 
 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1968. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ, trans. by R J Hollingdale  
(London: Penguin) 
 
Noakes, Richard J. µ7HOHJUDSK\,VDQ2FFXOW$UW&URPZHOO)OHHWZRRG9DUOH\DQGWKH 
'LIIXVLRQRI(OHFWULFLW\WRWKH2WKHU:RUOG¶British Journal for the History of Science,  
32, no. 4 (December): 421±459 
 
Norris, Christopher. 1997. Against Relativism: Philosophy of Science, Deconstruction and  





²² µ'HFRQVWUXFWLRQRQWRORJ\DQGSKLlosophy of science: Derrida on $ULVWRWOH¶, Revue  
Internationale de Philosophie, 52, no. 205 (October): 411±450 
 
Novillo-Corvalán, Patricia. 2011a. Borges and Joyce: An Infinite Conversation (London:  
Legenda/MHRA/Maney Publishing) 
 
²² Eµ/LWHUDWXUHDQG'LVDELOLW\7KH0edical Interface in Borges and %HFNHWW¶Medical  
Humanities, 37, no. 1 (June): 38±43. doi:10.1136/jmh.2011.007476 
 
²² (ed.) 2015a. Latin American and Iberian Perspectives on Literature and Medicine (New  
York; London: Routledge) 
 
²² Eµ([SORUHUVRIWKH+XPDQ%UDLQ7KH1eurological Insights of Borges and Ramón y  
&DMDO¶LQLatin American and Iberian Perspectives on Literature and Medicine (New  
York; London: Routledge), pp. 23±44 
 
2¶.HHIH-RKQDQG/\QQ1DGHOThe Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press) 
 
2¶5HLOO\5DQGDOODQG<XQR0XQDNDWDComputational Explorations in Cognitive  
Neuroscience (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press) 
 
Ortega, Francisco, and Fernando Vidal. µ%UDLQVLQ/LWHUDWXUH/LWHUDWXUHLQWKH %UDLQ¶ 
Poetics Today, 34, no. 3 (Autumn): 327±360. doi:10.1215/03335372-2325241 
 
Ortega y Gasset, José. 2000. Meditations on Quixote (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois  
Press) 
 
Osborne, Charles. 1995. W H Auden: The Life of a Poet /RQGRQ0LFKDHO2¶0DUD Books) 
 
Otis, Laura. 2000. Membranes: Metaphors of Invasion in Nineteenth-Century Literature, Science,  
and Politics (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
 
²² 2001. Networking: Communicating with Bodies and Machines in the Nineteenth Century,  






²² 2007. 0OOHU¶V/DE (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
²² 2015. Rethinking Thought: Inside the Minds of Creative Scientists and Artists (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press) 
 
Palma, Jose-Alberto, and Fermin Palma. µ1HXURORJ\DQG'RQ4XL[RWH¶European  
Neurology, 68: 247±257. doi:10.1159/000341338 
 
Parker, Allene M. 2001µ'UDZLQJ%RUJHV$7ZR-Part Invention on the Labyrinths of Jorge Luis  
Borges and M C Escher¶ Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature, 55, no. 2:  
11±23. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1348254 
 
3DUU-DPHV$µ&HUYDQWHV)RUHVKDGRZV)UHXd: On 'RQ4XL[RWH¶V)OLJKWIURPthe  
)HPLQLQHDQGWKH3K\VLFDO¶Cervantes: Bulletin of the Cervantes Society of America, 15,  
no. 2: 16±25. http://www.h-net.org/~cervant/csa/articf95/parr 
 
Patai, Daphne, and Will H Corral (eds). 2005. 7KHRU\¶V(PSLUH$Q$QWKRlogy of Dissent (New  
York: Columbia University Press) 
 
Pels, Dick. 2003. Unhastening Science: Autonomy and Reflexivity in the Social Theory of  
Knowledge (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press) 
 
Penfield, Wilder, and Theodore Rasmussen. 1957. The Cerebral Cortex of Man: A Clinical Study  
of Localization of Function (New York: The Macmillan Company) 
 
Penfield, Wilder. 1960. The Torch (Boston, MA; Toronto: Little, Brown and Company) 
 





Pesic, Peter. 2000. Labyrinth: A Search for the Hidden Meaning of Science (Cambridge, MA;  
London: MIT Press) 
 





Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (Stanford, CA: Stanford  
University Press) 
 
Piccolino, Marco, and Marco Bresadola. 2013. Shocking Frogs: Galvani, Volta, and the Electric  
Origins of Neuroscience, trans. by Nicholas Wade (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Pilz, Kerstin. 2005. Mapping Complexity: Literature and Science in the Work of Italo Calvino  
(Leicester: Troubador Publishing) 
 




The Enchanted Loom: Chapters in the History of Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press), pp. 144±203 
 
Popper, Karl R, and John C Eccles. 1977. The Self and Its Brain (Berlin: Springer International) 
 
Poundstone, William. 1991. Labyrinths of Reason: Paradox, Puzzles and the Frailty of  
Knowledge (London: Penguin) 
 
Pynchon, Thomas. 1995. *UDYLW\¶V5DLQERZ (London: Vintage) 
 
Quian Quiroga, Rodrigo. 2012. Borges and Memory: Encounters with the Human Brain, trans. by  
Juan Pablo Fernández (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press) 
 
Rabinbach, Anson. 1992. The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity  
(Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press) 
 
Ratatouille. 2007. Dir. by Brad Bird (Pixar/Disney/Buena Vista Pictures Distribution) 
 
Reid, Ann H, S McCall, J M Henry and J K Taubenberger. 2001. µ([SHULPHQWLQJRQWKH3DVW 
7KH(QLJPDRIYRQ(FRQRPR¶V(QFHSKDOLWLV/HWKDUJLFD¶Journal of Neuropathology and  







Restak, Richard. 2001. The Secret Life of the Brain (New York?; Washington, DC?: Dana  
Press/Joseph Henry Press) 
 
Reyes-Peschl, Romén. 5HYLHZRIµ0LQG0DSV6WRULHVIURP3V\FKRORJ\¶ (exhibition at the  
6FLHQFH0XVHXP/RQGRQµScience Comma¶ blog, 12 June.  
http://blogs.kent.ac.uk/sciencecomma/2014/06/12/mind-maps-review-reyes-peschl 
 
²² µ7KH'HWHFWLYHDV³=RPELHRIWKH,QWHUURJDWLYH0RRG´LQ&DPHURQ 0F&DEH¶VThe  
Face on the Cutting-Room Floor¶Mosaic, 49, no. 1 (March): 93±109.  
doi:10.1353/mos.2016.0005 
 
5LFK0RWRNRµ2OLYHU6DFNV-RLQV&ROXPELD)DFXOW\DV³$UWLVW´¶The New York Times, 1  
September 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/01/books/01sack.html 
 
Richards, Robert J. 2002. The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of  
Goethe (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press) 
 
Richardson, Alan. 2001. British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press) 
 
Richerand, Anthelme. 1801. Nouveaux Éléments de Physiologie (Paris: Béchet Jeune) 
 
Richet, Charles. 1879. Physiology and Histology of the Cerebral Convolutions. Also, Poisons of  
the Intellect, trans. by Edward P Fowler (New York: W Wood & Co.)  
 
Rogers, Janine. 2014. Unified Fields: Science and Literary Form (Montreal; Kingston, ON;  
London; Ithaca, NY: McGill-4XHHQ¶V8niversity Press) 
 




Rose, Nikolas, and Joelle Abi-Rached. 2013. Neuro: The New Brain Sciences and the 
Management of the Mind (Princeton, NJ: Oxford: Princeton University Press) 
 





Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Ross, EllioWW'µ&HUHEUDO/RFDOL]DWLRQRI)XQFWLRQVDQGWKH1HXURORJ\RI Language: Fact  
YHUVXV)LFWLRQRU,V,W6RPHWKLQJ(OVH"¶The Neuroscientist, 16, no. 3 (June): 222±243.  
doi:10.1177/1073858409349899 
 
5RWK0DUFRµ7KH5LVHRIWKH1HXURQRYHO¶N+1, no. 8, 14 September.  
https://nplusonemag.com/issue-8/essays/the-rise-of-the-neuronovel 
 
Royle, Nicholas. 2003. Jacques Derrida (London; New York: Routledge) 
 
5XVVHOO$OLVRQµ'HFRQVWUXFWLQJThe New York Trilogy3DXO$XVWHU¶V$QWL-Detective  
FicWLRQ¶Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction, 31, no. 2 (Winter): 71±84.  
doi:10.1080/00111619.1990.9934685 
 
Ruston, Sharon (ed.). 2008. Literature and Science, Essays and Studies Series (Cambridge: D S  
Brewer) 
 
6DFNV2OLYHUµ'HDU0U$«¶LQStephen Spender (ed.), W H Auden: a tribute (London:  
Weidenfeld & Nicolson), pp. 187±195 
 
²² 1981. Migraine: The Natural History of a Common Disorder (London: Pan Books) 
 
²² µ7KHRULJLQRI³$ZDNHQLQJV´¶British Medical Journal, 287, no. 6409 (December):  
1968±1969 
 
²² µClinical TaleV¶Literature and Medicine, 5 (January): 16±23.  
doi:10.1353/lm.2011.0299 
 
²² 1995. An Anthropologist on Mars: Seven Paradoxical Tales (London: Picador) 
 
²² 2004. µ6SHHG$EHUUDWLRQVRI7LPHDQG0RYHPHQW¶The New Yorker, August 23, pp. 60± 
69. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/08/23/speed-5 
 






²² 2010b. 7KH0LQG¶V(\H (London: Picador) 
 
²² 2011a. Awakenings (London: Picador) 
 
²² 2011b. The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat (London: Picador) 
 
²² 2012. A Leg to Stand On (London: Picador) 
 
²² 2015. On the Move: A Life (London: Picador) 
 
²² 2016a. Institutional Website, University of Warwick. 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/events/distinguishedlecture/oliversacks 
 
²² 2016b. Personal Website. www.oliversacks.com 
 
Salisbury, Laura, and Andrew Shail (eds). 2010. Neurology and Modernity: A Cultural History of  
Nervous Systems, 1800±1950 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) 
 
Sallis, John (ed.). 1988. Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida (Chicago;  
London: University of Chicago Press) 
 
Santayana, George. 2011. Introduction and Reason of Common Sense, Book One of The Life of  
Reason: or the Phases of Human Progress, ed. by Marianne S Wokeck and Martin A  
Coleman (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press) 
 
Sassón-Henry, Perla. 2007. Borges 2.0: From Text to Virtual Worlds (New York: Peter Lang  
Publishing) 
 
Saward, Jeff. 2002. Magical Paths: Labyrinths and Mazes in the 21st Century (London: Mitchell  
Beazley) 
 
6FKPLWW)UDQFLV2µ3URPLVLQJ7UHQGVLQ1HXURVFLHQFH¶Nature, 227, no. 5262  
(September): 1006±1009. doi:10.1038/2271006a0 
 
Schwarz, D W F, K Satoh, I E Schwarz, K HXDQG+&)LELJHUµ&KROLQHUJLF,QQHUYDWLRQ 







6HFRUG-DPHV$µ.QRZOHGJHLQ7UDQVLW¶Isis, 95, no. 4 (December): 654±672 
 
²² 2014. Visions of Science: Books and Readers at the Dawn of the Victorian Age (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press) 
 
Sharratt, Bernard. 1982. Reading Relations: Structures of Literary Production; A Dialectical  
Text/Book (Brighton: Harvester Press) 
 
²² 1984. The Literary Labyrinth: Contemporary Critical Discourses (Brighton: Harvester  
Press) 
 
Shaviro, Steven. 2015. No Speed Limit: Three Essays on Accelerationism (Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press) 
 
Shuttleworth, Sally. 2010. The Mind of the Child: Child Development in Literature, Science, and  
Medicine, 1840±1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
6OHLJK&KDUORWWHµ%UDYH1HZ:RUOGV7URSKDOlaxis and the Origin of Society in the Early  
7ZHQWLHWK&HQWXU\¶Journal of History of the Behavioural Sciences, 38, no. 2 (Spring):  
133±156. doi:10.1002/jhbs.10033 
 
²² 2011. Literature and Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan) 
 
²² 2015. µ:ULWLQJWKH6FLHQWLILF6HOI6DPXHO %XWOHUDQG&KDUOHV+R\)RUW¶Journal of  
Literature and Science, 8, no. 2: 17±35 
 
Smith, Anthony. 1984. The Mind (London: Hodder and Stoughton) 
 
²² µ%UDLQ6L]H¶LQ-RKQ&DUH\HGThe Faber Book of Science (London: Faber and  
Faber), pp. 440±444 
 
6PLWK-RQDWKDQµDe Te Fabula Narratur: Narrativity, Ethics and Psychoanalysis in the  






Smith, Roger. 1992. Inhibition: History and Meaning in the Sciences of Mind and Brain  
(Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press) 
 
Solomon, J Fischer. 1988. Discourse and Reference in the Nuclear Age (Norman, OK: University  
of Oklahoma Press) 
 
Sontag, Susan. 2002. Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its Metaphors (London: Penguin) 
 
Sosa-Velasco, Alfredo J. 2010. Médicos Escritores en España, 1885-1955: Santiago Ramón y  
Cajal, Pío Baroja, Gregorio Marañón y Antonio Vallejo Nágera (Woodbridge, Suffolk:  
Tamesis) 
 
Sova, Dawn B. 2001. Edgar Allan Poe: A to Z (New York: Checkmark Books) 
 
Sprod, Liam. 2012. Nuclear Futurism: The Work of Art in the Age of Remainderless Destruction  
(Alresford, Hants: Zero Books) 
 
6WDGOHU0D[µ7KH1HXURPDQFHRI&HUHEUDO+LVWRU\¶LQSuparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby  
(eds), Critical Neuroscience: A Handbook of the Social and Cultural Contexts of  
Neuroscience (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell), pp. 135±158 
 
Stamenov, Maxim I, and Vittorio Gallese. 2002. Mirror Neurons and the Evolution of Brain and  
Language (Amsterdam: John Benjamins) 
 
Steier, Frederick (ed.). 1991. Research and Reflexivity (London: Sage Publications) 
 
Stiles, Anne (ed.). 2007. Neurology and Literature, 1860±1920 (Basingstoke: Palgrave  
Macmillan) 
 
²² 2012. Popular Fiction and Brain Science in the Late Nineteenth Century (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press) 
 
Sutherland, John. 2000. The Literary Detective: 100 Puzzles in Classic Fiction (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press) 
 





Prôle (London: Allen Lane) 
 
Tallis, Raymond. 1988. Not Saussure: A Critique of Post-Saussurean Literary Theory (London:  
Macmillan) 
 
²² 1999. Theorrhoea and After (London: Macmillan) 
 
²² 2004. Why the Mind is Not a Computer: A Pocket Lexicon of Neuromythology (Exeter:  
Imprint Academic) 
 
²² 2008. The Kingdom of Infinite Space: A Fantastical Journey Around Your Head (London:  
Atlantic Books) 
 
²² 2011. Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity  
(Durham: Acumen Publishing) 
 
²² 2013. Reflections of a Metaphysical Flâneur and Other Essays (Durham: Acumen  
Publishing) 
 
7D\ORU(XJHQHµ:LOOLDP-DPHVDQGWKH+XPDQLVWLF,PSOLFDWLRQVRIWKH Neuroscience  
5HYROXWLRQ$Q2XWUDJHRXV+\SRWKHVLV¶Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 50, no. 4  
(October): 410±429. doi:10.1177/0022167810376305 
 
Taylor, Gordon Rattray. 1979. The Natural History of the Mind: An Exploration (London: Secker  
& Warburg) 
 
7HQQLVRQ0LFKDHO1DQG-RQDWKDQ'0RUHQRµ1HXURVFLHQFH(WKLFVDQG National  
6HFXULW\7KH6WDWHRIWKH$UW¶PLoS Biol, 10, no. 3, article e1001289 (March).  
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001289 
 
Tew, Philip. 2001. B S Johnson: A Critical Reading (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
 
²² 2007. The Contemporary British Novel, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Continuum) 
 







Tew, Philip, and Glyn White (eds). 2007. Re-reading B S Johnson (Basingstoke: Palgrave  
Macmillan) 
 
Thomas, Ronald R. 1999. Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press) 
 
Tiedemann, Friedrich. 1826. The Anatomy of the Foetal Brain, trans. by William Bennett  
(Edinburgh: J Carfrae) 
 
7ROPDQ(GZDUG&µ&RJQLWLYH0DSVLQ5DWVDQG0HQ¶Psychological Review, 55, no. 4  
(July): 189±208 
 
Triarhou, Lazaros C (ed. and trans.). 2015. Cajal Beyond the Brain: Don Santiago Contemplates  
the Mind and its Education (Thessalonica; Indianapolis, IN: Corpus Callosum) 
 
Trotter, David. 2001. Paranoid Modernism: Literary Experiment, Psychosis, and the 
Professionalization of English Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Turner, Mark. 1996. The Literary Mind (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press) 
 
9DQGHERVFK'DJPDUµ4XL[RWLVPDVD3RHWLFDQG1DWLRQDO3URMHFWLQWKH(DUO\ Twentieth- 
&HQWXU\6SDQLVK(VVD\¶LQ7KHR'¶KDHQDQG5HLQGHUW'KRQGWHGV International Don  
Quixote (Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi), pp. 15±31 
 
Vidal, Fernando, and Francisco Ortega. µ$SSURDFKLQJWKH1HXURFXOWXUDO Spectrum: An  
,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQ)UDQFLVFR2UWHJDDQG)HUQDQGR9LGDOHGV, Neurocultures: Glimpses  
into and Expanding Universe (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang), pp. 7±27 
 
9LQFHQW1LFKRODVµ'HUHKDP(OLDVRId. ¶LQOxford Dictionary of National  
Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37391 
 
Virilio, Paul. 2006. Speed and Politics, trans. by Mark Polizzotti (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e)) 
 





Crusoe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 
 
Waugh, Patricia. 1984. Metafiction: The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction (New  
York; London: Routledge) 
 
Weingart, Peter, S D Mitchell, P J Richerson and S Maasen (eds). 1997. Human by Nature:  
Between Biology and the Social Sciences (Mahwah, NJ; London: Lawrence Erlbaum  
Associates) 
 
:HLVVPDQQ(PPDµ$PD]LQJ0D]H:KDW6FLHQFH6D\V$ERXW6ROYLQJ Labyrinths¶  




Wertheimer, Michael. 2000. A Brief History of Psychology, 4th edn (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt  
College Publishers) 
 
White, Alan. 1990. :LWKLQ1LHW]VFKH¶V/DE\ULQWK (New York; London: Routledge) 
 
White, Hayden. 1999. Figural Realism: Studies in the Mimesis Effect (Baltimore; London: Johns  
Hopkins University Press) 
 
²² 2010. The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, Literature, and Theory: 1957±2007, ed.  
by Robert Doran (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press) 
 
²² 2014. Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe: Fortieth- 
Anniversary Edition: With a New Preface by the Author (Baltimore; London: Johns  
Hopkins University Press) 
 
Williams, Harley. 1954. Don Quixote of the Microscope: An Interpretation of the Spanish Savant  
Santiago Ramón y Cajal (1852±1934) (London: Jonathan Cape)  
 
Wilson, Jason. 2006. Jorge Luis Borges (London: Reaktion Books) 
 
:LOVRQ/HLJKµ3RVVHVVLQJ7RE\/LWW¶VGhost Story¶LQ3KLOLS7HZDQG5RG0HQJKDP 






Winter, Alison. 1998. Mesmerized: Powers of Mind in Victorian Britain (Chicago; London:  
University of Chicago Press) 
 
:ROII8ZHµ2QWKH:D\WRWKH&HQWUH± TKH/DE\ULQWKLVQRWD0D]H¶LQJürgen  
Hohmuth, Labyrinths & Mazes (Munich: Prestel), pp. 8±13 
 
Woolgar, Steve (ed.). 1988. Knowledge and Reflexivity: New Frontiers in the Sociology of  
Knowledge (London: Sage Publications) 
 
Wright, Alex. 2014. Cataloging the World: Paul Otlet and the Birth of the Information Age  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
Young, Robert M. 1990. Mind, Brain and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century: Cerebral  
Localization and its Biological Context from Gall to Ferrier (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press)  
 
Zeki, Semir. 2009. Splendours and Miseries of the Brain: Love, Creativity, and the Quest for  
Human Happiness (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell) 
 
 
Zimmer, Carl. 2005. Soul Made Flesh: The Discovery of the Brain ± and How It Changed the  
World (London: Arrow Books) 
 
²² 2009. The Tangled Bank: An Introduction to Evolution (Greenwood Village, CO: Roberts  
and Company) 
 
²² 2010. Brain Cuttings: Fifteen Journeys Through the Mind (New York: Scott & Nix) 
 
²² 2013. µ0RXVHXQFXOXV+RZ7KH%UDLQ'UDZV$/LWWOH<RX¶National Geographic [online],  
µ7KHLoom¶ blog, July 24. http://phenomena.nationalgeographic.com/2013/07/24/ 
mouseunculus-how-the-brain-draws-a-little-you 
 
Zwierlein, Anne-Julia (ed.). 2005. Unmapped Countries: Biological Visions in Nineteenth  
Century Literature and Culture (London: Anthem Press) 
